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Abstract 
Since the start of the 21r" century the terms identity theft and identity fraud have been 
used to describe a variety of crimes which appear both new and unique to the 21"t 
century. So much so, that the government is in the process of re-introducing a National 
Identity Card Scheme to tackle the problem. But are identity theft and identity fraud 
uniquely 21 r" century problems, and is a new Identity Card Scheme going to prevent 
these crimes? 
The study seeks to examine identity theft and identity fraud and determine what these 
crimes are, and to distinguish between the two. In order to do this, the study will 
examine the different definitions used in America, Australia and the U. K. as well as the 
history of identity related crime. The use of identity theft and identity fraud by organised 
crime, illegal immigration and terrorism will also be discussed. This examination of 
identity theft and identity fraud includes an explanation of the differences between 
modem and traditional identity related crimes and the various methods used to gather 
infort-nation on people's identities. 
The study also looks at ways of researching identity related crime. As part of the 
research process, simulated identity theft was developed as a research approach. The use 
of this research method and the ethical and legal consideration associated with it are 
discussed at length as is the use of the internet as a source of information. 
The study concludes with an analysis of the role of the National Identity Card Scheme in 
preventing identity related crime, and the potential benefits and drawbacks of 
reintroducing a National Identity Card Scheme. 
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CHAPTER I 
Age of surveillance 
In 2004 Barry Steinhardt the director of the Technology and Liberty Program at the 
American Civil Liberties Union went before the U. S Congress Commerce, Trade and 
Consumer Protection subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
He presented his organisations views on the use of Radio Frequency Identifiers 
(R. F. lDs) - small tags which can be used to track people or objects. Steinhardt went 
before the committee to highlight the risks R. F. ID tags and advances in surveillance 
technology posed to people's privacy. 
"The explosion of computers, cameras, sensors, wireless communication, GPS, 
biomctrics, and other technologies in just the last 10 years is feeding what can be 
described as a surveillance monster that is growing silently in our midst. 
Scarcely a month goes by in which we don't read about some new high-tech 
method for invading privacy, from face recognition to implantable microchips, 
data-mining to DNA chips, and now RFID identity tags. The fact is, there are no 
longer any technical barriers to the creation of a surveillance society. " 
(Steinhardt B, 2004: 1) 
In the remainder of Steinhardt's statement, he discusses how important it is that in an 
age where a surveillance society is technically possible, it is important that there are 
social constraints to protect privacy, Since Steinhardt's statement in 2004, surveillance 
technology has developed even further. R. F. ID chips can now be implanted in a person's 
body and biometric security is becoming a common method of confirming identity. 
Wifle it is debateable whether or not we now live in a surveillance society, it is fair to 
say we live in an age where the potential to use surveillance is great. The2l"century 
can be seen as an age of surveillance it is technically possible to track people and 
monitor them 24/7. In the UX surveillance technology is a popular tool for crime 
detection and prevention. A world map produced by Privacy International in 2007 to 
illustrates how much surveillance people are under around the world in 2006. 
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In Privacy International's survey it was determined that the U. K. had one fifth of the 
worlds CCTV cameras and that surveillance was endemic in the U. K. Steinhardt argued 
in 2004 that society needed social barriers to the protect people from the excessive 
amounts of state surveillance. But in looking at the way the U. K. has embraced 
surveillance technology over the past twenty years it can be argued that we as a society 
are open to the idea of creating a surveillance society. 
Curiously, howeverjust as our acceptance of and reliance on surveillance technology in 
the U. K. has increased, so too have the opportunities to commit identity fraud, Despite 
the increased use of surveillance technology there is also evidence to suggest that the 
U. K. is coming under increased threat from identity theft. According to the Association 
of Payment Clearing Services (APACS), the Fraud Advisory Panel, the Credit Industry 
Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) and the credit reference company Experian, identity 
fraud is an emerging threat to people in the 21" century. Statistics from various 
government agencies and private associations were compiled by the Identity Fraud 
Steering Committee to produce an estimate of the cost of identity fraud to the U. K. 
economy. The committee determined that identity fraud cost the U. K. economy E1 .2 
billion between April 2006 and March 2007 (see appendix I for full estimate of cost of 
identity fraud to the U. K. economy). Earlier estimates from the Credit Industry Fraud 
Avoidance System had placed the cost of identity fraud between E1.3 billion in 2002 
and L1.7 billion in 2006. 
'Age of perception' 
While it can be argued that the U. K. is immersed in a culture of surveillance recent 
developments in popular culture and communication technology have also provided new 
and different ways for people to use their identities. With the use of technologies like the 
internet it is now possible for people to communicate and project their identities on a 
global scale. 
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Through the internet, it is now possible for people to form new, virtual identities or to 
present their identities on a global scale. On the internet there is freedom for individuals 
to be anyone they want to be, to communicate with anyone who has access to the 
internet, and enter identification processes without face-to-face interactions. It can be 
argued that through this technology, society has developed to create an 'age of 
perception', where people are whoever they want to be. 
Social networking websites such as MySpace, Facebook and Bebo have become popular 
venues for people to express themselves self to any others on the internet. In the online 
world of Second Life, people can build new virtual identities and homes. 
Not only does the internet allow for the use of a person's identity on a global scale it 
also allows for commercial transactions resulting in private and public organisations 
forming websites which allow access without face-to-face transactions. While face-to- 
face interactions are still used in many identification processes, the developments in 
communication technology have allowed for an alternative. However, the disadvantages 
of the freedom for people to be whoever they want to be, on the internet, is the rise in 
identity fraud witnessed in America, Australia and the U. K. in the 21" century. While 
deception and impersonation have been used by criminals for centuries, it is in the 21 
century that the crime of identity fraud has come to prominence. 
In the 21" century the U. K. has become in many respects a contradictory nation. On the 
one hand, the U. K. is a surveillance society; but it is also a society which allows for a 
great deal of freedom with regard to people's identities. This contradiction is, however 
reaching a tipping point; the use of surveillance technology to prevent impersonation is 
now being planned in the form of a National Identity Card Scheme. With the identity 
card, the U. K. government plans to prevent identity fraud, in effect limiting the degree 
to which people can use their identities or the identities of other people. 
4 
Aims of this study 
This study seeks to research what will happen when the U. K. 's use of surveillance 
technology begins to affect people's ability to deceive with regard to their identities. The 
initial aim of this study was in many respects a simple one - to explore whether identity 
cards will stop identity fraud. However, this question raised, within it several even 
bigger questions: What is identity fraud? What effect can identity cards have on societY9 
Will identity cards prevent crime? What will the identity card actually do? Thus in the 
attempt to answer one simple question, several more complex questions must be 
answered first. 
Additionally, there are numerous questions surrounding the National Identity Card 
Scheme. This is the first time that a National Identity Card system has been proposed as 
a means of stopping crime. It is the first time that biometric security and a biometric 
database have been suggested on a national scale and this represents a significant step 
forward in creating a surveillance society. Furthermore given that identity fraud is such 
a complex, and in some respects 'new' crime, it is difficult to see how there can be 
anything but questions over what the identity card will and will not do. 
Much of the discussion about and opposition to the identity card scheme has been rooted 
in its implications with respect to civil liberty. Concerns over the creation of a 
surveillance society as described in George Orwell's book '1984'have, it can be argued, 
distracted people from the real question of whether or not an identity card scheme will 
actually work. This focus on the implications of the identity cards for civil liberty, rather 
than on their practical use, can be explained to a certain degree by identifying the origins 
of the most recent call for identity cards. 
Identity cards are arguably a reaction to concern over crimes such as terrorism, illegal 
immigration, and identity fraud. The beginning of the 21" century has been marked by 
several dramatic incidents involving these areas of criminal activity. On I 11h of 
September 2001, terrorist attacks using commercial jets on the World Trade Centre and 
the Pentagon sparked an increased concern with regard to terrorism. In 2004,21 illegal 
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immigrants were killed while picking cockles in Morecambe Bay, U. K, bringing to the 
public's attention the issue of illegal immigrants and the conditions they live and work 
in. Coupled to these events was the false arrest of Derek Bond in 2003 for the crimes of 
his impersonator Derek Lloyd Sykes. 
These events and others like them have created a 'perfect storm' of fear and concern 
over defrauding and lying during identification processes and the dangers posed by 
those who abuse it. This fear of what people who conceal their identity can do has 
motivated the government to enact several new approaches to terrorism, illegal 
immigration and the use of fraud. Legislation to protect against terrorist attacks has been 
enacted the 2001 Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 2005, and the 2006 Terrorism Act. Also, concern for border security 
has lead to the creation of the U. K. Border Agency, and in 2007 Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown outlined plans to create a border police force. The new Fraud Act 2006 has been 
brought into improve law enforcement efforts to combat the innovations in committing 
fraud that have emerged in the 21" century, such as the use of internet. 
The one phenomenon which will be central to this study is the proposed introduction of 
a National Identity Card Scheme. While it can be argued that other approaches to 
dealing with terrorism, illegal immigration and identity fraud have been tested, the use 
of a National Identity Card Scheme as a method of preventing crime is an untested 
approach. The question must be asked - will it work? As with anything which seeks to 
predict the future, this study cannot provide concrete answers to the question. It is 
hoped, however, that by discussing the relevant issues and hypothesising about how 
identity cards will affect identity fraud significant insight can be gained into the changes 
that may occur in society with the introduction of the National Identity Card Scheme. 
While it may appear that identity fraud is a new phenomenon for the 2 I't century, 
history records many impostors and identity thieves. Royal families have had to deal 
with usurpers, people who have claimed to be missing royals or the true regents. 
Similarly, looking at famous incidents of fraud and deception, it is possible to see 
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examples of people who have committed crimes which can be described as identity 
fraud, before the term not existed. For example, the activities of Frank Abagnale, 
F. W. Demara and Arthur Orton (see chapter 6) can all be seen as incidents of both 
identity theft and identity fraud despite their activities not being described as such. 
By looking back through history, therefore, it is possible to find several accounts of 
people who stole the identity of others or who used deception to hide their own 
identities. Lying about who you are is not a new phenomenon; identity fraud is not a 
new crime. Nevertheless, it was not until the beginning of the 21" century that people in 
the U. K. began to perceive identity fraud as a crime. The emergence of the terms 
identity fraud and identity theft can in part be traced to difficulties faced with this type 
of crime in America during the 1990s. 
This study is split into two parts. In the first part of this study literature on the 
importance of identification and trust, definitions of identity fraud and background of 
the National Identity Card Scheme will be discussed. The second part of this study 
focuses on the methods used in this study, explaining the difference between identity 
theft and identity fraud and the potential impact of a National Identity Card Scheme on 
the crimes of identity theft and identity fraud. Due to their importance to the study of 
identity related crime three high profile cases of identity theft are also included. These 
sections document the experiences of Michelle Brown and Derek Bond as victims of 
identity theft and the activities of Charles Stopford and his impersonation of Christopher 
Buckingham. These cases are of particular importance as they have been influential in 
raising the profile of identity theft and mention is made of them throughout the study. 
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Chapter 2 
The Importance of Identification and Trust 
Central to the argument for the introduction of a National Identity Card Scheme is the 
idea that the identification processes used in the U. K. today are under threat from 
criminal activity. Whether this threat should be worried about to the point of introducing 
new laws and an identity card scheme will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4. However, 
before discussing the threat posed by identity related crime it is important to look at the 
identification process and the importance of identification. 
In this thesis it is argued that in the 21" century there has been an increase in concern 
over identification in the U. K. How people identify themselves, and the accuracy of that 
identification has come under increased scrutiny due to high profile identity related 
crimes by terrorists, illegal immigrants and professional criminals. The terrorist attacks 
by Islamic extremists on New York in 200 1, and subsequent attacks, have raised 
concern over accurately identifying people who are a threat to society. Concern over 
illegal immigration has increased attention given to the question of who is a legitimate 
citizen and issues of access to goverm-nent services, and the activities of organised and 
professional identity thieves have raised concern over the formation of bonds of trust 
and transactions between individuals. Arguably, the government is seeking to use the 
National Identity Card Scheme to reinforce and secure the processes of identification 
used in the UX, to counter these types of attack. Equally the backlash against the 
identity card scheme is a further example of anxiety with regard to control of the 
identification process. 
Even without the recent rise in concern with regard to identity and identification the 
concept of identity and the process of identification is still an important phenomenon. 
Jenkins (2004) argues that identity and identification are vital: 
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"Levels of concern about identity may wax and wane, but, whether individually 
or collectively, we can't live routine lives as humans without identification, 
without knowing - and sometimes puzzling about - who we are and who others 
are. This is true no matter where we are, or what the local way of life or 
language. Without repertoires of identification we would not be able to relate to 
each other meaningfully or consistently. We would not have the vital sense of 
who's who and what's what. Without identity there could be no human world. " 
(Jenkins A, 2004: 7) 
When discussing identification and the process by which people identify themselves, 
social identity, social trust and the use of social symbolism are important factors to 
consider. The influence of globalisation in the form of new technology such as the 
World Wide Web is also important to discuss. The use of non-face-to-face interactions 
such as those experienced via the internet makes it easier to commit identity related 
crime, as establishing an identity is easier and confirming the validity of the identity is 
harder. 
Social identity theory 
One theoretical view of identity and the formation of identity which is important to the 
study of identity related crime and the identity card scheme is social identity theory. 
Social identity theory was developed by social psychologists Tajfel and Turner (1979) in 
their study of the psychological basis of inter-group discrimination (Turner, 1999: 6). 
According to social identity theory, individuals do not have a single identity; rather they 
have several identities that correspond to widening circles of group membership. 
Fulcher and Scott (1999) distinguish between a social identity and self. They argue that 
individuals are placed into categories of people, and these form social identities (e. g. 
child, mother, Christian, plumber, thief, homosexual, etc. ). Connected to the concept of 
self is the existence of a personal identity which is used to identify an individual from a 
particular social group. A clear example of this is a person's name, which indicates that 
while people may be members of a social group, they are also unique individuals with 
traits that cannot be covered by social identity: 
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"A social identity marks people out as, in certain respects, the same as others. A 
personal identity marks someone out as a unique and quite distinct individual. " 
(Fulcher. J, Scott. J, 1999: 125) 
Discussion of social identity is important in understanding the identification process as it 
emphasises the role of individuals in choosing how society sees them. Social 
psychologists highlight the role of the individual in the determining how their identity is 
formed. Social identity refers to the practice ofjoining and claiming membership of 
certain social groups by individuals, and it is important to discuss social identity when 
looking at identity related crime. In modem cases of identity related crime, the activities 
of criminals are usually focused on exploiting an individual's membership of a social 
group. The goal is not to adopt a victim's sense of self or take their personal identity; 
rather, it is to use their identity to give the false impression that the identity thief is a 
member of a particular social group. 
Consider the case of Derek Lloyd Sykes and his use of Derek Bond's identity (see page 
113 for details). Sykes obtained a passport in Bond's name and from this one aspect of 
Bond's identity, Sykes was able to engage in a lucrative criminal enterprise. Sykes did 
not need to steal Bond's personal identity, as his goal was simply to give the impression 
that he was a trustworthy businessman, So limited was the contact that Sykes had with 
Bond's personal identity, Bond was kept unaware of the theft of his identity for over 20 
years. Sykes had used Bond's social identity to protect himself from detection whilst 
committing criminal activity. 
This practice of hijacking people's access to social groups can also be seen in other 
cases of identity theft such as illegal immigrants using stolen passports or internet based 
thieves sending phishing emails. The goal is not to take over the victim's sense of self, 
rather it is to appear as a legitimate member of a social group, or to avoid inclusion in a 
social group. It is the identification which most identity thieves seek and not the 
personal identity of the victim. A theory associated with social identity theory is self 
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categorisation theory-, this theory is also important to discuss as it further highlights the 
role of individuals in choosing their own identity. 
Self eategorisation theory 
While an individual cannot have a valid identity without the confirmation of society, it 
can also be argued that to some extent it is up to individuals to determine what their 
identity is. It is argued by Turner (1987) that identity is created by individuals deciding 
which social group they belong to. Self categorisation theory argues that individuals are 
responsible for forming their identity- 
"Turner and his colleagues' theory claims that identity is shaped by self- 
categorization; by people looking at social categories, and deciding whether or 
not they are in a category. If they consider themselves a member of a category, 
that category becomes part of their identity. The explanation given by Turner's 
self categorisation theory works like this: 
1. We see people as members of social categories. 
2. We also see ourselves as members of social categories. 
3. We take on identities appropriate to the social categories with which we 
identify. " (Gove, Watt, in Woodward X, 2000: 47) 
It can be argued that self categorisation theory is an important aspect of the study of 
identity related crime as many examples of identity related crime involve people who 
consider, or pretend to consider, themselves to be members of social groups or 
categories that they have no legitimate claim to. In chapter 6, the history of identity theft 
and identity fraud is discussed with reference to several historical examples of identity 
related crime. In these examples (of identity related crime) there are several instances of 
people who have made false claims to membership of social groups such as military 
groups or the medical profession. For example, there is F. W. Demara who claimed 
(among other things) to be a doctor and professor of psychology. While Demara had no 
legitimate claim to being a doctor or a psychology professor, he was treated, and 
expected to be treated, as such because of his assertions that he was a member of these 
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social groups (and his ability to persuade others to believe him). In some cases, the 
claims made by criminals to be a member of a social group are sincere. They truly 
believe they are entitled to be a member of a particular social group despite not being 
eligible to join. An example is Treva Throneberry, a 31 year old woman who spent her 
twenties claiming to be a teenager, attending high school and using the foster care 
system (see chapter 6 for more). 
As with social identity theory, scif categorisation theory is important when considering 
identity related crime. Just as identity thieves will steal identities in order to gain access 
to social groups and exclusion from other social groups, they can - and do - go a step 
further and misrepresent the victim by asserting membership to social groups. 
Confirmation of social group membership and identity 
Social identity theory and self categorisation theory both emphasise the role of 
individuals in forming and choosing their own identity, but individuals need their claim 
to an identity confirmed by others within society and the social group they claim 
membership of. Without the confirmation and acceptance of the group any individual's 
claim to an identity will not be successful, regardless of the individual's opinion or 
belief in their identity. Identity is a construct which aids the social group, community 
and/or society in structuring and organising individuals' determining role and status 
within the group. Social role and status is discussed later in this chapter. 
It is rare that society in its entirety comes together to identify an individual. More 
commonly, society is represented by representative groups who surround the individual 
as they seek identification. For example, a student who seeks to assert their identity in a 
class full of other students is dependent on the other students and the teacher 
acknowledging their claim to a particular identity. In this context, society is tile other 
people in the classroom. There is interplay between an individual seeking to assert an 
identity and a group of individuals who represent society acknowledging or rejecting 
that individual's claim to identity, 
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It can be argued that in normal circumstance, society or an aspect of it is in control of 
the process of identification, but in cases of identity theft and fraud this relationship is 
undermined. It can also be argued that society's power to validate identity is dependent 
not only on the truthfulness of individuals but also trust that people will not subvert 
society's judgement. The threat that identity related crime poses to society is that it 
negates the power society has to conf inn identity. 
Forming bonds of trust, familiarity and solidarity 
The use of trust in general is an important element in society, according to Newton 
(2007: 342): 
"The idea that trust is essential for social, economic, and political life is very old 
one going back at least to Confucius who suggested that trust, weapons, and food 
are essentials of governments: food, because well - fed citizens are less likely to 
make trouble, trust because in the absence of food, citizens are likely to believe 
that their leaders are working on the problem, and weapons in case neither of the 
other two work. " (Newton X, 2007: 342) 
It is important to discuss trust in a study of identity related crime, as the abuse 
experienced in an instance of identity fraud is an abuse of a bond of trust. Bonds of trust 
can be found in many, if not all, identification processes and are not dependent on a 
prolonged or close relationship between the individuals involved. While people often 
form personal bonds of trust and relationships with family and friends, it can also be 
argued that they fon-n bonds of trust with people they do not know in society, and that 
this capacity to extend trust to strangers is crucial for the maintenance of social order. 
We trust people to conforni to social contracts which dictate acceptable behaviour; we 
also trust people to acknowledge our rights and entitlements. Several studies have been 
conducted on how bonds of trust are formed. Deutsch (1958; 1960 cited in Ziller 1973) 
conducted studies into trust and bonds of trust. According to Ziller (1973), Deutsch 
defined trust as: 
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" .... occurring 
in a situation where the individual is dependent upon the behaviour 
of another person in order to realize an outcome. lie trusts the other person if he 
behaves in a way which renders him vulnerable to exploitation by the other, yet 
permits the other to act in such a way that both parties will benefit equally" 
(Ziller. R. C, 1973: 41) 
Hardin (1998) also argues that trust is a phenomenon based upon incentive, with people 
forming bonds of trust based upon self-interest and knowledge of other people's self- 
interest. Take the example of an interaction between a cashier at a bank and a customer 
depositing money. The customer will trust the cashier with their bank account details 
and their money because they have determined that it is in the cashier's interest to carry 
out the transaction. Hardin also argues that we do not trust people generally, and that 
trust occurs only in specific exchanges. Returning to the example of cashier and 
customer - according to Hardin the customer will trust the cashier in the specific 
situation of depositing money into the bank, but not in every situation in which they 
interact. This is because the depositor has some understanding of the institution of 
banking and the clerk has a specific role within that structure. 
Hardin's view of trust has been criticised in Rothstein's study Trust, Social Dilemmas 
and Collective Meniories (2000). Rothstein notes'that Hardin's view of trust places a 
great deal of emphasis on the assumption that the person who is trusting is fully aware 
that it is in the interest of the person they trust to fulf it their request. Rothstein argues 
that according to Hardin's view of trust, as soon as it is not in the interest of the person 
being trusted to fulfil the request of the person doing the trusting, they will betray them. 
For instance, if we take the example of the cashier and the customer: Hardin's view of 
trust requires that the customer be fully aware that it is in the cashier's interest to fulfil 
the customer's requests. Furthermore, once it is not in the cashier's interest to fulfil the 
customer's requests, Hardin's theory argues that the cashier will betray the customer. 
Rothstein argues that in reality people could not and would not conduct complex 
calculations with regard to the self-interest of others. Rothstein further argues against 
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the idea that once it is no longer in the self-interest of someone to be trusted, they would 
exploit or abuse someone who trusts them. If, as Hardin argues, people would exploit 
each other once it was in their self-interest to do so, Rothstein claims this would make 
the practice of trusting a rarer phenomenon than it is in reality. People would not risk 
putting themselves at risk from shifts in others self-interests if, as Hardin argues, people 
will exploit or abuse them. The element of deception on the part of people who are 
being trusted further complicates Hardin's view of trust. Hardin argues that people who 
trust others must calculate the self-interest of the people they want to trust, but this does 
not take into account people who deceive people as to their genuine self-interest. 
Rothstein concludes that Hardin's view of trust as being about investment in others is 
problematic, as it will lessen the likelihood of people using trust. Rothstein refers to 
Granovetter's comment on trust: 
"a perception of others that one's interest in them is mainly a matter of 
'investment' will make this investment less likely to pay off, we are all on the 
lookout for those who only want to use us" (Granovetter 1988 cited in Rothstein 
. 13,2000: 7) 
The idea that trust is about self-interest and people's ability to discern the self-interest of 
others gives some insight into why certain bonds of trust are made within society. Bank 
loan agreements are an instance where both parties - the loan applicant and the bank - 
have determined that it is in their best interest to help each other, based on their 
understanding of what their self-interests are. The problem here is that the bond of trust 
is based on an accurate view of both parties self-interest. As Rothstein argues, it is open 
to debate as to whether or not people actually engage in an in-depth analysis of others' 
self-interests. Certainly, looking at bonds of trust formed between organisations and 
individuals, these can involve very little need for in-depth analysis of self-interest, there 
being only a general presumption of what individuals' self-interests are. 
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Luhmann (1988) also discusses the use of trust in society, in: 'Familiarity, Confidence, 
Trust: Problems and A Iternatives'(1 988). Luhmann distinguishes between trust, 
familiarity and confidence, arguing that the concept of trust is roughly the equivalent to 
the idea of social solidarity. Lubmann argues that in the study of trust there is the 
potential to confuse trust with the concept of familiarity. According to Luhmann the 
concept of familiarity is useful as it explains the close bonds of trust which can exist 
between family members: 
"Familiarity is an unavoidable fact of life; trust is a solution for specific 
problems of risk. But trust has to be achieved within a familiar world, and 
changes may occur in the familiar features of the world which will have an 
impact on the possibility of developing trust in human relations. Hence we 
cannot neglect the conditions of familiarity and its limits when we set out to 
explore the conditions of trust. " (Luhmann, N, 1988: 95) 
As well as discussing the links between familiarity and trust, Luhmann also argues that 
trust and confidence are connected phenomena, Confidence and trust are used in 
situations where there is risk of disappointment and people will have expectations of a 
particular outcome. By trusting others, or having confidence in people, we place 
ourselves at risk of exploitation, but by not trusting others we place limits on what we as 
individuals can achieve or gain access to. The nature and level of trust we place in 
people can vary; who we trust and why can be a difficult thing to establish. It can be 
argued that in cases of identity related crime, familiarity, trust and confidence are all 
capable of being exploited and manipulated as in instances of identity theft and fraud. 
There are cases of identity theft that have exploited personal and close relationships 
where familiarity has played an important role. Certain cases of identity theft have 
occurred between family members where the familiarity between victim and identity 
thief has enabled the abuse of the victim's identity. Identity theft and fraud between 
family members is discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
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In modem cases of identity theft there is often exploitation between people where there 
is no personal relationship, simply a transaction between an individual and a social 
institution. This requires a bond of trust between strangers. Trust in strangers is 
sometimes referred to as social trust. The concept of social trust is important to the study 
of identity fraud as often instances of identity fraud involve abuse of social trust. Social 
trust is defined as: 
44 ... a belief in the 
honesty, integrity and reliability of others -a 'faith in people. ' 
It's a simple enough concept to describe. But it's never been easy to figure out 
who trusts, or why. " (Taylor. P et al 2006: 1) 
Social trust forms the basis for many interactions between individuals. One view of 
social trust is that it is trust in people with whom there is no personal relationship or 
familiarity to rely on. In other words social trust, 'trust in strangers, is a reliance on 
people (whom we do not know personally) to follow society's laws and social norms, 
and to be truthful. According to O'Neil (2002): 
"Each of us and every profession and every institution needs trust. We need it 
because we have to be able to rely on others acting as they say that they will, and 
because we need others to accept that we will act as we say we will. The 
sociologist Niklas Luhmann was right that 'A complete absence of trust would 
prevent (one) even getting up in the morning. "' (O'Neil . 0,2002: 3-4) 
Social trust is an important concept in the study of identity theft and fraud as it is this 
bond of trust which is most often broken by criminals who assume false identities or the 
identities of others. It can be argued that without a system of trust between individuals, 
identity thieves could not operate; they exploit and rely on people's need to trust each 
other. In a study of social trust, Pew Research conducted a telephone survey of 2,000 
adults who were asked questions to determine who were the most trusting people in 
America (Taylor et al, 2006). The study found that in America, white people were more 
trusting than black people or Hispanic people; people with higher family incomes were 
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more trusting than people from low-income families; married people were more trusting 
than single people; the middle aged and elderly were more trusting than the young; and 
those who live in rural areas were more trusting than those in urban areas. Pew's 
research also found in their research that issues of politics and religion played no 
significant role in influencing people's sense of social trust. On the issue whether or not 
other people could be trusted Pew's survey found that when asked the question, 
'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be 
too careful in dealing with people? ', (Taylor et al, 2006) 45% of respondents thought 
that most people are trustworthy, while 50% thought that you cannot be too careful in 
dealing with people. 
While these statistics may imply that the people researched are almost evenly split 
between trusting and not trusting, it is worth noting that the people who participated in 
this study had enough social trust in the researchers to share their views with them. The 
extent to which people in the study really trust others, and whom they choose to trust is 
hard to determine; how would the research subjects react outside the context of the study 
when confronted with situations which require trust between individuals? In several 
cases of identity related crime, the talent of identity thieves in gaining the trust of their 
victims has been the key to convincing the victims that they can safely share information 
with them (see chapter 6). One area of society where social trust is of particular 
importance relates to commercial transactions. According to Arrow (cited in Huang 
2003) in Social Thist, Cooperation, and Human Capital: 
"Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, 
certainly any transactions conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly 
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained 
by the lack of mutual confidence" (Arrow, 1972 cited in Huang X, 2003,1 - 2) 
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It can be argued that the U. K. and western society in general is dependent on a system of 
social trust in order to ensure that society can function. Arguably, a society without 
social trust would instead rely on lengthy process of confirmation, or be dependent on 
the formation of more personal bonds of trust. Given the complexity of modem society 
(in the U. K. and globally) it is unlikely that this could work effectively. 
The concepts of trust, and specifically that of social trust, are important in the study of 
fraud as it can be argued that the only way fraudsters can succeed is if they are able to 
abuse some bond of trust. Sociological concepts such as role, status and self 
categorisation all come into play in an instance of identity fraud. An identity fraudster's 
ability and need to abuse social trust can be seen in the famous deception of Wilhelm 
Voigt 1906 who was able to steal 4,000 marks from the Mayor of Kopenick in Germany 
simply by pretending to be a captain in the Prussian Guards. Voigt was a petty thief who 
bought a second-hand Prussian officer uniform; he would put on the uniform and walk 
around Berlin, where he discovered that soldiers who saw him in uniform would snap to 
attention and treat him as a superior. According to Burton (2000) after realising that 
soldiers and people would react to him in his uniform as though he were a genuine 
captain in the Prussian Guard, Voigt decided to take his impersonation to the next step. 
On October 17th 1906 Voigt entered a barracks and ordered a squad of soldiers to follow 
him to Kopenick so that they could arrest the mayor, who Voigt claimed had defrauded 
the state of 4,000 marks. Upon reaching Kopenick, Voigt had the mayor and treasurer 
arrested, and confiscated the sum of 4,000 marks and documents from Kopenick. Voigt 
sent the mayor and treasurer on the train to Berlin with an armed guard while he made 
off with the 4,000 marks. Voigt's actions sparked much controversy, with some 
objecting to his actions and others, including the Kaiser, seeing Voigt's deception as 
amusing. Voigt was captured several weeks after his deception and sentenced to four 
years in prison; however in 1908 the Kaiser decided to pardon Voigt. The case of the 
'captain of Kopenick' was later turned into a play by Carl Zucktnayer which became 
very popular in German during the early 1930s as a story of resistance, humour and wit 
in the time of Kaiser Wilhelm (Ulbricht, 2006). 
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Voigt's deception is an important example of how identity fraudsters abuse social trust. 
Voigt needed very little to convince people he was a soldier, apart from his uniform and 
demeanour. If at any point anyone had questioned the role, status or self categorising of 
Voigt, they would have found out that he was not who he claimed to be. But in reality 
no one questioned Voigt; the soldiers he commanded never asked if he was a captain 
neither did the Mayor of Kopenick. The reason they did not ask can be attributed to their 
assumption of social trust between them selves and Voigt. They assumed that only 
someone entitled to take on the role of a captain would wear the uniform. Their trust 
was placed not in the man, but in the role he assumed and in the belief that only 
someone entitled to wear the uniform would do so. Howard (2008) also notes that* 
"Voigt exposed the fact that the soldiers had been so indoctrinated into 
following orders, and civilians had been taught such a reverence for a uniform, 
that anything could happen. " (Howard J, 2008: 2) 
The exploits of Voigt and other identity thieves provide an insight into the abuse not 
only of social trust and solidarity but also the pursuit of self-interest and happiness. 
These concepts are discussed by both Emile Durkheim in The Division ofLabour (1964) 
in the theory that modem society relies on social solidarity; and Utilitarian thinkers such 
as John Stuart Mill in his book Utilitarianism (1863), and his theorising on the 
individuals and societies pursuit of happiness. These theoretical perspectives place the 
discussion of trust between individuals, happiness and self-interest in wider theoretical 
discourses on the formation of social order. 
Durkheim argued that a distinction can be made between traditional societies and 
modem societies. He argued that in modem societies an organic social solidarity forms 
between individuals, with people relying on each other to perform specialized roles in 
order to achieve social order. This interdependency means that people need to trust each 
other; hence the basis of social order in modem society is social trust. Without social 
trust how could society gain any kind of cohesion or social order? 
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In the context of a study of identity theft and fraud Durkheim's theories on social 
solidarity in modem societies goes some way to explain how identity thieves can 
succeed at their crimes. Victims of identity related crime can be seen as those who 
presume the existence of social solidarity between themselves and the identity thieves 
who victimise them. Rather than evaluating self-interest in others as Hardin (1998) 
describes trust, it can be argued that society and victims of identity related crime in 
particular adhere more to Durkheim's practice of social solidarity. An example would be 
people who are the victims of advance fee frauds such as phishing emails or Nigerian 
419 scams (see chapters 6 and 7 for details). In these scams victims are lead to believe 
that they are entering into a legitimate interaction with the fraudster, assuming that the 
fraudster will adhere to the laws and social norms of society. Assuming this perspective 
is accurate, it can be argued that identity thieves exploit not only individual's trust in 
them but also by abusing social solidarity they undermine social order within society. 
When looking at the motivation of identity thieves it is also worth considering the 
Utilitarian perspective on self-interest and the pursuit of happiness. The idea that people 
are rational individuals who place the pursuit of happiness and self-interest first explains 
in pail why someone might engage in identity related crime. Identity thieves in this 
context are people who do not limit themselves and their desires to society's 
conventions and rules. The exploits of Voigt the 'captain of Kopenick' in the context of 
Durkheim's view of society and trust, can be seen as disruptive and an abuse of others. 
However from a Utilitarian perspective Voigt can be seen as someone who sought to 
achieve happiness by placing his own self-interest before any social solidarity he might 
have felt with his victims. His calculation, which proved to be mistaken, was that he 
would be able to carry out his act without any negative consequence. In accordance with 
Hardin's view of the formation of trust, identity thieves can be portrayed as people who 
not only pursue happiness and self-interest above and beyond any obligation to social 
solidarity, they are also people who assess the self-interests of others and use it to 
exploit them. Looking at the formulation of phishing emails and Nigerian 419 letters, 
the wording of these documents often seeks to attract people based on a calculating 
understanding of what victims find attractive (e. g. money, rise in social status). 
22 
As stated earlier these broader theoretical perspectives highlight the possible role social 
solidarity might have in people's susceptibility to identity related crime and the 
underlying motivations of identity thieves in pursuing self-interest above and beyond 
any social conventions others might follow. Voigt's exploits also highlight the 
importance of social symbols and the presumption of a person's role in society. 
Arguably, in the case of 'the Captain of Kopenick' the soldiers who followed Voigt 
substituted social trust and reliance on social symbols and the role Voigt took on for 
their own evaluation of Voigt's identity. 
Roles and symbols 
The concept of roles is discussed by George H. Mead in his 1934 book 'Mind, Setfand 
Society'. Mead argued that roles are a collection of social attributes and expectations 
associated with a social position. Roles are separated from an individual's character or 
personality and enable people to generalise over the behaviour of people in certain roles. 
According to Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1984) roles are an important sociological 
concept: 
"Role is sociologically important because it demonstrates how individual activity 
is socially influenced and thus follows regular patterns. Sociologists use roles as 
the units from which social institutions are constructed. For example, the school 
as a social institution may be analysed as a collection of teacher and pupils 
which are common across all schools. "' (Abercrombie. N, Hill S, Turner. B. S, 
1988: 209) 
In the context of identification, social symbols refer to any kind of badge or marker 
which identifies someone as being a member of a particular social group. Symbols can 
be a person's manner of dress, adoption of mannerisms or even their language or use of 
slang. Woodward argues that it is important for people to show their membership of 
certain groups and to distinguish themselves from members of another group. According 
to Woodward: 
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11 ... although as individuals we 
have to take up identities actively, those identities 
are necessarily the product of the society in which we live and our relationship 
with others. Identity provides a link between individuals and the world in which 
we live. Identity combines how I see myself and how others see me. Identity 
involves the internal and the subjective, and the external. It is a socially 
recognised position, recognised by others, not just by me. " (Woodward. K. 2000: 
7) 
Social symbols are a way for individuals to assert their sense of self as well as their 
membership of social groups. By using social symbols, individuals can make it easier 
and quicker for others to identify them. For example, the use of uniforms and badges by 
the police enables people to identify police officers quickly and helps to assert that 
police officer's role in society. 
The goal in displaying social symbols in an interaction between individuals is to 
establish who is responsible for what and what treatment individuals should expect. 
With the introduction of the National Identity Card Scheme, tile government is seeking 
to introduce a specific highly individualiscd social symbol. The identity card is intended 
as a means of enabling people to display their status as U. K. citizens and their eligibility 
to various services and rights. The value of the identity card scheme is in part based on 
its ability to serve as a universal proof of identity, which would make it a powerful 
social symbol. If the identity card proves to be a popular social symbol of identity and 
citizenship this could have the knock on effect of making counterfeiting of identity cards 
more popular. If people rely heavily on the identity card as a social symbol, then its 
value to criminals increases. This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter 9. 
It is also through social symbols and the adoption of certain roles in society that social 
status is determined. Looking at the history of identity fraud, it is possible to highlight 
several famous cases of identity fraud where the individual in question sought to attain 
social status through the use of social symbols and the adoption of certain roles. An 
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example of someone who misused social symbols in order to attain role and status is 
Gene Morrison. Morrison was jailed for five years in 2008, after being found guilty of 
obtaining a money transfer by deception, obtaining property by deception, perverting the 
course ofjustice, and perjury. Morrison was found guilty of these crimes after it was 
discovered that he had spent over 26 years pretending to be a forensic psychologist and 
had provided forensic evidence in approximately 700 cases (BBC News, 2007). 
According to Smyth (2007) Morrison did not lie about his name but he obtained a BSc 
degree Forensic Science, a Masters in Forensic investigation, and a Doctorate in 
Criminology from a fictitious American University. It was through the use of these 
documents - as social symbols - that Morrison was able to take on the role of a forensic 
psychologist. In this role Morrison was afforded the status of an expert in legal cases; 
his opinions and evidence were seen as being credible and reliable and influenced the 
outcome of criminal cases. In reality, Morrison had no skills in forensic science, and 
managed to keep up the pretence by subcontracting the work he was given to other 
forensic scientists and then passing it off as his own. 
In terms of social role and symbolism, Morrison often used symbols such as his 
academic qualifications to claim ownership of the role of an expert in forensic 
psychology. For 26 years, Morrison effectively collected and used social symbols 
associated with what people would expect from a forensic psychologist. As well as the 
qualifications Morrison obtained, he also established his own business (Criminal and 
Forensic Investigations Bureau) and publicised his expertise in professional journals. 
Morrison's deceptions were not based on the use of another person's identity or on 
abandoning his own identity; he kept his name, but through a manipulation of social 
symbols was able to adopt a role in society that he was not entitled to. Morrison's case 
illustrates the trust people place in strangers, and their reliance on social trust. 
Changes to society and their effect on Identities 
As discussed above there are many ways to view a person's personal or social identity 
and how it is constructed. Another important issue with regard to the discussion of 
identity is the effect changes in society have on the development of an identity. Issues 
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such as globalisation and the increased importance given to individuality have affected 
the construction and scope of people's identities. According to Ulrich Beck (2002), 
Western societies have developed so that people now strive to lead 'a life of your own': 
"We live in an age in which the social order of the national state, class, ethnicity 
and the traditional family is in decline. The ethic of individual self fulfilment and 
achievement is the most current in modem society. The choosing, deciding, 
shaping human being who aspires to be the author of his or her own life, the 
creator of an individual identity, is the central character of our time. It is the 
fundamental cause behind changes in the family and the global gender revolution 
in relation to work and politics. " (Beck U, Beck-Gemsheim X, 2001: 23) 
Beck's argument that western society has developed to be more individualistic in part is 
due to the breakdown of traditional bonds based on kinship, gender, social class and 
religion. The influence of modem of society on individuals' efforts to identify 
themselves is also discussed by Giddens (199 1) in his book Modernity and Self1dentity. 
In this book Giddens discusses what he terms the reflexive project of self. According to 
Giddens, individuals are actively involved in forming their own identity over the span of 
their life. Giddens' view of how an individuals formulate and revise their own identity is 
that this is effected through the use of biographical narratives. As Giddens notes, a 
biographical narrative is the story of who someone is and how they have developed. The 
process of forming a biographical narrative, according to Giddens, is something people 
do reflexively and a person's biographical narrative is consistently developed. Giddens 
also notes that it is possible for a person to have several different biographical 
narratives. In this way, a person can have or be developing several different aspects of 
their identity. Giddens argues that this is a result of post modernity, 
"What to do? ' How to act? Who to be? These are focal questions for everyone 
living in circumstances of late modernity - and ones which, on some level or 
another, all of us answer, either discursively or through day-to-day social 
behaviour. " (Giddens. A. 1991: 70) 
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Giddens discusses this issue in the context of the importance of self analysis in therapy. 
With reference to Rainwater's (1989) book Setf Therapy Giddens, suggests that the only 
way therapy can be effective is when patients become reflexive on the process and begin 
self therapy. Self-identity and the formation of a person's sense of self is dependent on 
individuals being reflexive and responsible for the creation of their own identity: 
"... what the individual becomes is dependent on the reconstructive endeavours 
in which she or he engages. These are far more than just 'getting to know 
oneself' better: self-understanding is subordinated to the more inclusive and 
fundamental aim of building/rebuilding a coherent and rewarding sense of 
identity. " (Giddens A, 1991: 75) 
The process of developing and generating an identity is also linked to the adoption of a 
lifestyle. Giddens argues that one aspect of post modernity is that social roles are no 
longer assigned by society. In modem societies, people must choose to adopt a 
'lifestyle', rather than being assigned social roles. The term lifestyle refers to a form of 
template that individuals can adopt to help form their personal identity and sense of self- 
"... in conditions of high modernity, we all not only follow lifestyles, but in an 
important sense are forced to do so - we have no choice but to choose. A 
lifestyle can be defined as a more or less integrated set of practices which an 
individual embraces, not only because such practices fulfil utilitarian needs, but 
because they give material form, to a particular narrative of self-identity. " 
(Giddens A, 1991: 81) 
A *% 
pplying Giddens' views on reflexive project of self and lifestyles to the study of 
identity related crime is important. The activities of identity thieves are in a sense an 
effort to rebuild their self-identity by adopting aspects of other people's identities; 
taking control of who they are and how they will be perceived by others. This practice is 
a rejection of any control or influence society might have on the individual's self- 
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identity. The activities of identity thieves such as Arthur Orton, F. W. Demara and 
Charles Stopfard (see chapter 6 and page 115 for details) can thus be seen as efforts to 
rebuild their identities and adopt lifestyles they were not entitled to. It can be argued that 
identity thieves, and these particular identity thieves display a great deal of reflexivity in 
the use of the identities they stole. Arguably, identity thieves are people who have a 
great understanding of how identities are formed and how to manipulate relationships of 
trust. The response of society to the discovery of Orton's, Demara's and Stopford's 
deceptions was to be scandalised as the three appeared to have rejected the power of 
society to dictate an individual's identity. According to Giddens, this is the reality of 
modem society; society has lost its role in determining self-identity. 
It can be argued that this shift described by Beck and Giddens is due in part to the 
development of technology that allows for easier movement and communication. 
Changes in the means and amount of travel and communicating we do as individuals 
have allowed for more self expression. A by-product of this is the increased use of 
individuals' identities and a decrease in the importance of society or the community in 
establishing identity. This has caused an increase in the potential for identity theft and 
fraud. In the last ten years the development of the internet has created a new and unique 
venue for self expression. Online communities have formed, allowing people to express 
themselves and develop online versions of their identities: 
"Within a decade, the majority of North Americans will be living a Web 
Lifestyle. " (Gates . 13 cited in Feather F, 2007: 1) 
It could be argued that Gates' predictions have come true, with websites such as 
MySpace, Facebook and Bebo providing people with a medium for self expression. The 
internet also provides commerce and a source of infon-nation about the world we live in. 
Commentators on the development of technology in the 21" century have argued that 
through the development of the internet and mobile phone technology society has gone 
through what Frank Feather (2008) calls a 'weboloution' (internet revolution). Dr 
William Webb an expert in mobile communication speculates that in the future mobile 
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phones will be in effect a 'remote control' for our lives. Mobile phones will inform, 
entertain and plan out our daily lives providing constant access to a various pieces of 
information provided on the internet. 
Globalisation 
The development and increased use of the internet can be seen as an element of the 
movement towards globalisation. Globalisation is defined by the World Bank Group 
(2007) as the integration of different nations' cconomies and societies. A briefing paper 
for the World Bank Group by PREM Economic Policy Group and Development 
Economics Group (2007) discusses some of the difficulties in explaining the term 
globalisation: 
"Amazingly for such an extensively-used term as globalisation, there does not 
appear to be any precise, widely-agreed definition. Indeed the breadth of 
meaning attached to it seems to be increasing rather than narrowing over time, 
taking on cultural, political and other connotations in addition to the economic. 
However, the most common or core sense of economic globalisation - the aspect 
this paper concentrates on refers to the observation that in recent years a quickly 
rising share of economic activity in the world seems to be taking place between 
people who live in different countries. " (PREM Economic Policy Group and 
Development Economics Group, 2007: 1) 
Work by sociologists, such as Ulrich Beck's (2000) Hat is Globalisation?, Hazel 
Henderson's (1999) Beyond Globalisation, and Robert J. Holton's (1998) Globalisation 
and the Nation-State, illustrates how in the later part of the 201h century the phenomenon 
of globalisation has arisen. This has lead to the formation of companies and 
organisations which transcend nation states, increased sharing of cultural ideas and 
concepts, and increased communication between people in different countries. With 
regard to the study of identity and identity fraud the increase in communication between 
people in different countries is of particular importance as identity related crime can be 
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committed over the internet and involve criminals in one country victimising people in 
another. It also minimises the amount of time taken to set up and commit identity fraud. 
The role of the internet not only as a means of communication but also as an extension 
of the system of social trust may or may not be a good thing. O'Neil (2002) notes in her 
book A Question of Trust that perhaps the internet is both a good and bad thing in terms 
of the formation of bonds of trust: 
"Perhaps we are in luck. We live in an age of communication technologies. It 
should be easier than it used to be to check out strangers and institutions, to test 
credentials, to authenticate sources and to place trust well. But unfortunately 
many of the new ways of communicating don't offer adequate, let alone easy, 
ways of doing so. The new information technologies are ideal for spreading 
reliable information, but they dislocate our ordinary ways ofjudging one 
another's claims and deciding where to place our trust. " (O'Neil . 0,2002: 84) 
It can be argued that the development of lines of communication with people on a global 
scale means that there is often an element of risk and uncertainty to the relationships 
formed. O'Neil's (2002) argument, that we cannot rely on ordinary or traditional 
methods ofjudging trustworthiness, means that when we do form bonds of trust over the 
internet we are taking a risk. Issues of risk and uncertainty are discussed by Beck (200 1) 
in his book Individualisation; according to Beck: 
"The narrative of risk is a narrative of irony. This narrative deals with the 
involuntary satire, the optimistic futility, with which the highly developed 
institutions of modem society - science, state, business and military - attempt to 
anticipate what cannot be anticipated. Socrates has left us to make sense of the 
puzzling sentence: I know, that I know nothing. The fatal irony, into which 
scientific-technical society plunges us is, as a consequence of its perfection, 
much more radical: We don't know, what it is we don't know - but from this 
dangers arise, which threaten mankind 1" (Beck U, Beck-Gemsheim E, 200 1: 1) 
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On the issues of identity theft and fraud and the identity card scheme, there is often 
discussion of risk and preventing dangers. Advice given by organisations such as the 
Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) often emphasises minimising risks 
posed by identity thieves through data security measures such as shredding documents 
before discarding them. The arguments posed by opposition groups against the identity 
card scheme often refer to the risks posed by giving the government too much power. 
Phrases such as 'surveillance society' and 'database society' refer to the danger of too 
much monitoring of citizens' movement and control of the identification processes. In 
both contexts, the emphasis is on addressing known risks and perceived dangers. This 
situation, as Beck argues, still leaves us unable to protect ourselves from threats we do 
not know about or are unable to anticipate. In terms of the threat posed by identity 
related crime, part of the perceived problem is that the general public are unaware of the 
risks posed by identity related crime and are unable to protect themselves against it. 
Take for example the experience of Derek Bond and the media attention his arrest 
received. What made his experiences in South Africa so shocking was that he had no 
idea his identity had been stolen and could not anticipate or prevent his arrest. Despite 
the media reporting of Bond's experience, it appears that people still face difficulty in 
anticipating or protecting themselves against identity related crime. According to the 
Identity Theft Resource Centre's 2008 survey of the effects of identity theft, victims of 
identity theft in America take on average 58 hours to clear up cases of account takeover. 
Conclusion - broader Issue of identity 
The study of identity is a vast area of research in sociology, and presented here in this 
chapter is an overview of some key concepts that directly relate to the study of identity 
related crime. As mentioned earlier, concern over identification in the 2l't century has 
increased. Attacks on the identification processes through terrorist activity, illegal 
immigration and identity theft have spurred movement on the re-introduction of the 
National Identity Card Scheme. Inherent in the discussion of both identity theft and 
identity cards are the themes of accurate identification and trust which are discussed in 
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social identity and social trust theory. The use and abuse of social symbols and roles are 
also an important aspect of the discussion of identity theft. 
The concern over identification and security is furthermore a part of a larger concern 
over identity and an interest in studying the nature of identity. The study of identity has 
become an important issue in the U. K. in the last decade. Starting in 2004, the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) Identities Programme (2003) has funded the 
Identities and Social Action research programme, consisting of 25 studies into various 
aspects of identity over five years. The programme was established in order to 
investigate recent developments in the formation of identities. In the proposals for the 
programme it is argued that: 
"These are interesting times for the study of identity. Identity is central to many 
of the most significant developments in contemporary society. It has been 
suggested, for instance, that social and technological changes have led to the 
replacement of stable identities based on familiar social class hierarchies with 
multiple, fragmented and more uncertain identity projects based on 'life-style' 
and consumer choices. It has been argued that family and work-place loyalties 
and traditional political and community commitments are breaking down and 
have been replaced by a more volatile and dynamic 'identity politics'. Many 
have stressed the upsurge of intense solidarities based on religious, ethnic and 
national identities. The negative side of this is expressed through exclusion and 
through hostility towards those with different identities. " (ESRC Identities 
Programme, 2003: 1) 
Part of the justification for the Identities and Social Action Programme is that there are 
several theories on identity and identification which have received insufficient research 
and testing. Luhmann also argues that the study of trust has not been a central concern in 
the study of sociology, with both traditional theorists and modem thinkers failing to 
address the issue of trust. So while this study focuses on identity related crime, it is 
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important to note that it is part of a broader discussion of the nature of identity and the 
role of trust in society-, aspects of which this study will touch upon. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Fraud 
Introduction 
Fraud as a subject of criminological study has often been associated with the activities 
of certain social groups. Often the emphasis of criminology with regard to fraud has 
been on the individuals who use this type of criminal behaviour, rather than the crime 
itself. One of the developments with regard to fraud that this study will look at is the 
shift from focusing on the social groups who use fraud, to the specific study of fraud and 
its variations. It will be argued in this study that identity fraud as a concept is not a new 
type of crime but rather a change in the way criminology discusses and views fraudulent 
activity. 
In order to review the literature on identity fraud, this chapter will look at four areas of 
criminological theory and discourse which deal with the crime of identity fraud and the 
people who are associated with its use. Firstly this chapter will look at academic studies 
of identity fraud from America, Australia and Britain and discuss the various different 
definitions of identity fraud that have developed. Secondly, this chapter will look at 
organised crime and its use of identity fraud as part of various criminal enterprises. The 
third part of this chapter will focus on the issue of the use of identity fraud in organised 
crime (people trafficking and illegal immigration), and will also cover Lord Grabner's 
report on the 'Hidden Economy'. In the final section of this chapter, the use of identity 
fraud by terrorists will be assessed. 
Literature on identity fraud 
The literature on identity fraud can be broken down into three main areas of research 
based on the work of criminologists in the three countries America, Australia and the 
U. K. From each of these countries there have developed different definitions of identity 
fraud and perspectives on the scope of the terms identity fraud and identity theft. 
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Identity theft - the Ainerican definition 
Identity fraud is a crime that came to the public's attention in America during the mid to 
late 1990s due to high profile instances of identity theft (see the story of Michelle 
Brown on page 109). The term identity theft became popular for describing crimes 
which in the U. K are often referred to as identity fraud. While both the terms identity 
fraud and identity theft are used in the U. S. A., it is argued by some that identity theft is a 
sub group/definition of identity fraud. The term identity theft is popular in U. S. 
legislation, media discussion and governmental reporting. In a report by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) for the subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland 
Security, and the subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Richard M. Stana discusses 
identity fraud and its connection to identity theft: 
'Identity Fraud' -a term that encompasses a broad range of illegal activities 
based on fraudulent use of identifying information of a real person or of a 
fictitious person. A pervasive type of identity fraud is identity theft, which 
involves 'stealing' another person's personal identifying information - such as 
Social Security number (SSN), date of birth, and mother's maiden name - and 
then using the information to fraudulently establish credit, run up debt, take over 
existing financial accounts, or to undertake other activities in another's name. 
Also, another pervasive category is the use of fraudulent identity documents by 
aliens to enter the United States illegally to obtain employment and other 
benefits. The events of September 11,2001, have 11eightcned concerns about the 
contributory role that identity fraud plays in facilitating terrorism and other 
serious crimes. " (Stana. R. M, 2002: 2) 
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Academic study of the subject of identity theft and identity fraud in America has 
provided several definitions of the two terms. According to Newman and McNally 
(2005): 
"Identity theft is rarely one crime, but is composed of the commission of a wide 
variety of other crimes, many if not all of which are crimes well known to us all. 
The crimes with which identity theft is commonly associated are: check and card 
fraud, financial crimes of various sorts, various telemarketing and Internet scams 
{Newman and Clarks 20031, theft of autos and auto parts aided by fraudulent 
documentation {Maxfield and Clake 2004), thefts or robberies of various kinds 
where identification information is stolen either by coincidence or intentionally, 
counterfeiting and forgery, trafficking in human beings JUNICRI 2003) and 
terrorism. " (Newman. G, McNally -M. M, 2005: 2) 
In their report for the Department of Justice, Newman and McNally outline the several 
different types of identity theft that exist in the U. S. A.: 
US definitions of identity theft by Newman and McNally (2005) 
1. Exploiting Weakness in Specific Technologies and Information Systems. 
2. Financial Scams. 
3'. As a motive for other crimes. 
4. Facilitating Other Crimes. 
5. Avoiding Arrest. 
6. Repeat Victimization: "Classic" Identity Theft. 
7. Organized Identity Theft. 
The definitions developed by Newman and McNally highlighted the ways in which 
identity can be abused in order to facilitate criminal activity. They acknowledge that 
while identity theft is not a new crime, the increased media profile of victims of identity 
theft and the development of technology has compelled the state to give this type of 
crime more attention. While the U. K. 's response to the problem of identity theft and 
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identity fraud was to propose the introduction of identity cards, the U. S. approach was to 
criminalise identity theft by introducing the Identity Theft Act of 1998 (discussed in 
chapter 8). The U. S. system of identification relies on the use of social security numbers 
and the use of drivers' licences with picture ID to establish identity which in effect is 
similar to the use of National Insurance numbers and drivers' licences in the U. K. When 
the idea of introducing an identity card was suggested after the September II th 2001 
terrorist attacks, the idea was dismissed as a solution to preventing future terrorist 
attacks in America. 
Identity fraud in the U. K. 
The crime of identity fraud has become a more acute problem for the U. K. since the 
millennium and several criminologists have researched and discussed the nature of 
identity fraud. In a report for the Department for Trade and Industry by Gareth Jones 
and Michael Levi (2000) the subject of identity fraud is comprehensively discussed and 
defined. In this report Jones and Levi argue that identity is an important aspect of social 
life in that it represents the need for trust between individuals. : 
"Society and commerce depend on trust, and assurance of identity is one 
important facet of that trust, though it simultaneously indicates distrust that 
people might not be who they claim to be. So that is, we believe, an important 
topic that goes beyond the creation or inhibition of economic crime opportunities 
- significant though that is in itself - and touches issues such as the sense of 
integrity of self, which is disturbed profoundly by impersonation. " (Jones G, 
Levi. M, 2000: 1) 
Jones and Levi also note that with the emergence of the internet the need for face-to- 
face meeting is decreasing and this brings with it an increase in the need to identify 
ourselves to strangers. The work of Jones and Levi was carried out in 2000, and since 
then it can be argued that the use of the internet by individuals and organisations has 
increased. According to statistics on world usage of the internet formulated by Internet 
World Stats (2007), between the years 2000 and 2007 there has been a 265.6% increase 
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in the use of the internet. The reliance placed on the internet by private companies and 
state agencies has significantly increased, with many organisations providing online 
access for customers. The benefits of using the internet is that services can be provided 
quickly and in many instances through the use of an automated identification process 
which the customer can complete without the need for assistance from a member of 
staff. While, arguably, services provided over the internet are not the norm, the 
increased use of internet identification processes has had a significant impact on the way 
people interact and the way people commit identity fraud. Techniques such as phishing 
and pharming capitalise on the lack of face-to-facc interactions. In some instances, the 
risk of fraud is such a concern that face-to-face identification is made mandatory to 
ensure accurate identification. Examples of this include adult applications for National 
Insurance numbers and applications for state benefits. 
Also in Jones and Levi's study, the process of identification is discussed in detail as are 
the methods used to commit identity fraud. Jones and Levi outline the creation of a 
person's identity from birth to death and highlight the significant forms of identification 
that are obtained or adopted as a person grows up. They also outline the different ways a 
person can change their identity in the U. K. 
Jones and Levi refer to two sociological classifications of a person's identity. The first is 
a person's attributed identity which refers to the identity given to someone at birth; this 
includes details such as name, date of birth and names of parents. The second is a 
person's biographical identity. A person's biographical identity refers to tile identity 
that is formed by a person's interactions with other members of society. This form of 
identity is formed through interactions with others in both the public and private sectors 
of society. Jones and Levi go on to argue that while every individual in a society is 
given their own individual attributed identity, a person's biographical identity depends 
on their interactions with others. 
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They highlight the examples of children and inunigrants who, while having 'attributed 
identities'may have minimal 'biographical identities'in the commercial sectors of U. K. 
society. For example, a child, while having a name and date of birth (attributed identity), 
may not be old enough to gain access to a bank account or develop a credit record and 
therefore will not have a significant biographical identity in the private sector. As a 
consequence of this, banks and credit companies will be unaware of the child's 
existence. 
From this distinction in the classifications of identity Jones and Levi argue that the 
formation of an identity is not reliant on the attributed identity that is provided at birth; 
an identity can be formed on the events that take place in a person's life which go to 
form a person's biographical identity. 
"Traditionally, identities are compiled from the starting point - the birth 
certificate - but this is increasingly redundant. In a new age of greater 
interactions that are not face to face, with higher expectations of instantaneous 
responses for customer service, and new thinking on matters of establishing 
trust, the fact-on-computer usually characterised as 'data' is king and provides 
for significant personal and commercial advantages for those able to leverage 
them. " (Jones G, Levi M, 2000: 4) 
The process of identification in the UX is, according Jones and Levi, a cumulative 
process. 
"Individuals accumulate evidence of identity - proof documents, and if the 
number and type of these proofs meets the required threshold, the individual is 
deemed identified. " (Jones G, Levi M, 2000: 5) 
The process described by Jones and Levi reflects some of the key themes discussed in 
sociological theories of identity. These concern the use of social symbols and labels in 
the form of proof documents, and the role of society in confirming the claims of 
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individuals. Jones and Levi also highlight the use of numerous forms of identification in 
ensuring accuracy in identification processes. They go on to argue that this is a risky 
way of establishing an identity as it leaves society open to identity fraud. With regard to 
fraud, Jones and Levi argue that there are five basic types of personal identity fraud and 
four types of commercial identity fraud. The typology discussed here by Jones and Levi 
is an important development in the study of identity fraud as it represents an early 
attempt to codify and distinguish different types of identity fraud. Fraud, in the context 
of the work by Jones and Levi, refers to instances of manipulating the identification 
process. 
The first form of personal identity fraud discussed by Jones and Levi is termed Current 
Address Impersonation; here the Post Office's redirection service is used to divert a 
household's mail to another address in order to gain access to identifying documents and 
details from bills and bank forms delivered through the post. Jones and Levi distinguish 
between a variety of different types of current address impersonation. Their distinctions 
are based on the status of the householders. Jones and Levi distinguish between people 
who are residents at an address, people who have just left a residence or people who are 
on holiday or living abroad. Different types of householders will have different levels of 
awareness with regard to the activities of identity fraudsters using this approach. While a 
resident of a household may notice the sudden lack of mail, people who have just left a 
property may not be aware of fraudsters using this approach for some time, nor might 
people who have been absent from their residence because they are on holiday or living 
abroad. 
The second form of personal identity fraud is Previous Address Impersonation. 
According to Jones and Levi there are two forms of previous address impersonation. 
The first form is where a fraudster will use the address history of another person with 
the same name as the fraudster. The fraudster will use the address history of the victim 
on application forms. The second type is where the fraudster will adopt a person's 
identity and make it appear that they have moved residence; the fraudstcrs will use 
stolen and forged documents to back up the claim that the victim has moved house. 
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The third type of personal identity fraud is where a fraudster adopts the identity of a 
dead person. Of this type of identity fraud impersonation of dead elderly people and 
dead children can be the most lucrative, Theft of the identities of people in other age 
groups does happen (see identity fraud during natural disasters in chapter 7); however, it 
can be argued that the theft of dead children and elderly people's identities can provide 
identity thieves with a greater chance of success and better chance of avoiding detection. 
With the impersonation of dead elderly people, the fraudster establishes, through 
publicly available sources such as obituaries that an elderly person has died. According 
to Jones and Levi the identity of the dead elderly person is then used in conjunction with 
current or previous address impersonations to create a biography. In this type of 
personal identity fraud, it may be difficult to obtain official documentation as there may 
be an age gap between the fraudster and the victim, 
The use of dead children's identities is another form of identity fraud. The appeal of this 
form of identity fraud for fraudsters is that these identities are not well established and 
therefore the identity can be established by fraudsters without the threat of discovery. In 
this form of identity fraud the birth certificate is very important: 
"The birth certificate is the turnkey or precursor to obtaining a passport, the 
passport can be used to support an application for a driving licence, and so on. 
The fraudster will invariably establish the identity in the commercial sector by 
opening up utility accounts, opening accounts for certain types of financial 
services and even take a driving test to obtain a 'full licence' in a false name. " 
(Jones G, Levi M, 2000: 8) 
This form of identity fraud is often very traumatic for the family members of the dead 
child if they are called on by the authorities. As with the current and previous address 
based identity fraud the potential for detection by the legitimate identity holder is a 
factor in this type of identity fraud. (see story of Charles Stopford page 115) 
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Another form of identity fraud discussed by Jones and Levi involves creating fictional 
identities that do not require the copying of a genuine identity. This type of identity 
fraud is achieved through abuse of official sources of identification such as the Driving 
Vehicle Licensing Agency. Other methods of developing an identity are through the use 
of documents that have no official or practical value as identification documents, such as 
utility bills. These documents do not identify the person presenting them as the genuine 
holder of the identity they only provide proof that the identity exists. According to Jones 
and Levi, this form of identity fraud is on the decline as the use of fraud prevention 
tactics and photo identification are increased. 
The final type of identity fraud discussed by Jones and Levi is transactional 
impersonation. Transactional impersonations refer to fraudsters who use stolen identity 
documents and attempt to pass themselves off as the rightful bearer of the document. 
Examples of this are crimes such as credit card fraud and using stolen cheques. This 
type of identity fraud often involves the forging of signatures or the altering of 
documents such as cheques. Transactional impersonations also refer to the creation of 
counterfeit credit cards. According to Jones and Levi, there has been a growth in this 
type of identity fraud, often used by criminal organisations because of the ease with 
which cards with magnetic strips could be copied. They highlight the use of magnetic 
card readers by gangs of counterfeiters to 'clone' the credit details from victim's credit 
cards (This report was published before the introduction of chip and pin systems on 
various credit and debit cards). 
As well as referring to financial transactions, transactional impersonations also refers to 
the use of counterfeit or forged identity documents in other contexts. The use of 
transactional impersonation can be seen in the impersonation of police officers through 
the use of fake warrant cards or the impersonation of utility workers by counterfeit work 
IDs. 
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As well as personal identity fraud there is also commercial identity fraud. Jones and 
Levi identify several types of commercial identity fraud: 
"There are several ways in which companies can be attacked, such as by 
surreptitiously registering new bogus Directors and by transferring the 
company's registered address, or copying its identity by loading fake web sites 
to the internet that look very similar to the genuine company's site, with the aim 
of collecting information about an individual and their payment card, with which 
to subsequently commit card not present fraud. " (Jones G, Levi M, 2000: 9) 
As well as defrauding companies, identity fraud can also be used in the purchasing of 
companies. Fraudsters can purchase companies under assumed names. While the 
company is genuine the directors or owners and their intentions for the company are not. 
As well as classifying the different categories of identity fraud, Jones and Levi also look 
at the consequences of identity fraud. They highlight the problems faced by victims of 
identity fraud: 
"The true owner of the identity - who is invariably unaware of the iniquitous 
activity being committed in their name - has an administrative mess ahead of 
them to resolve. They have to disassociate themselves from the offence, clean 
their data records to reflect their non-involvement in the frauds and potentially 
erroneous default notices, and organise for the re-issue of documents and cards. 
They may have to provide witness statements to police, attend court proceedings, 
and this can go on for many months and even years. " (Jones G, Levi A, 2000: 
10) 
Jones and Levi argue that people's identities are under threat as a person's privileges, 
rights and rewards are connected to their identity and the identification process. The 
various forms of identification are also discussed by Jones and Levi who argue that there 
are a variety of defences against fraud around these processes. Within the different 
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processes of identification there is a need to test for validity and verification. The first 
step is to ensure the person exists and the second is to ensure that person presenting the 
identity is the true identity holder. 
"The modem thinking on identity is that two separate equations should be 
satisfied. The first is to show that the individual actually exists. The second is to 
show that the applicant is or is not the individual they say they are. " (Jones G, 
Levi M, 2000: 11) 
However, it is argued by Jones and Levi that there is no identification process that is 
completely safe from fraud. In the commercial sector, the reason for this is that there is 
more of an emphasis on speed than safety. This is due in part to the perception that a 
quick service is a good service. Advertisements for loan and credit companies 
emphasise their ability to provide 'quick and simple' application processes. Some 
companies even encourage people who may have problems obtaining a loan due to debt 
or county court judgements to apply for loans. This may be a cultural phenomenon that 
has developed due to the availability of technology which allows for quick 
communication over large distances. As stated earlier, statistics formulated by Internet 
World Stats (2007) on world usage of the internet have shown a significant increase. As 
well as seeing a rise in the number of people who use the internet, it is also important to 
note that, with regard to e-commerce, there is a perceived need to increase the usability 
of the internet. Usability is a term which refers to a trend towards making websites easy 
to use and accessible to as many people as possible. According to Nielsen (2003): 
"Usability is a quality attribute that assesses how easy user interfaces are to use. 
The word 'usability' also refers to methods for improving case-of-use during the 
design process" (Nielsen J, 2003: 1) 
Usability is something that Nielsen argues everyone involved in the running of a web 
based business should seek to improve. Nielsen identifies five different aspects of 
usability: learnability, efficiency, memorability, errors, and satisfaction. Learnability 
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refers to how easy it is for people to learn how to use a website the first time they 
encounter it. Efficiency is how quickly visitors to the website can perform tasks. 
Memorability is how easy it is to remember how to use the website after a period of not 
using it. Errors refer to how many and how severe the mistakes people make when using 
the website are. The final aspect of usability is how satisfying the website is to use. 
Nielsen argues that maximising these elements of usability is important in any website 
design as it ensures customers will return to the website. 
In terms of identity fraud, the perceived need to improve usability of websites can be 
seen as a detriment. It can be argued that by making it easier for people to use websites, 
they are also making it easier for identity thieves to operate. It can also be argued that 
the easier and the quicker it is for someone to conduct transactions on the internet, the 
easier it is to use a stolen identity. 
This tendency to make the use of websites and companies on the internet easier and 
quicker can be seen as a continuing problem in society in general. Organisations are 
encouraged to make their services quicker and easier for their customers to use. The 
identification process in the U. K. is, according to Jones and Levi, ill-equipped to deter 
fraudsters. They argue that identity is established by the accumulation of paper proofs 
which have limited or inadequate security surrounding them. The security surrounding 
birth certificates, for instance, is non existent, as anyone can obtain a copy. With a birth 
certificate all manner of identifying documents can be obtained and an identity can be 
established. The lack of regularised notification of fraud risks to individuals surrounding 
certain documents is also determined to be a serious problem according to Jones and 
Levi, as there is an apparent rise in the levels of fraud in the U. K. 
Since this study by Jones and Levi in 2000, the practice of warning people of threats to 
their identities has been taken up by some aspects of society. Often warnings for specific 
threats are issued, such as in the case of the el3ay phishing attack of July 2003 - July 
2004 where 160 customers of the online auction site had their dctails stolen. Aside from 
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this form of notification, there are also several websites which provide details on various 
threats people might face from identity fraudsters both on the internet and in general. 
Alternatives to the current system of identification are also discussed by Jones and Levi, 
such as the efforts made by the information solutions company Experian to create a new 
identification process: 
"... Experian measures identity in a new way that harnesses credit scoring 
expertise to measure data evidence of life events, scores these for Provenance 
and reliability - validity, and then tests all the data for consistency and fraud 
risks to provide for verification to reach a final identity score. " (Jones G, Levi 
M, 2000: 14) 
It is argued by Jones and Levi that the system proposed by Experian provides the ability 
to detect cases of identity fraud. Experian also provides a process that will quickly deal 
with legitimate and easily validated identities and provide an alternative process for 
identification where there is a degree of doubt surrounding the validity of the identity. 
An alternative approach to the identification process reviewed by Jones and Levi is the 
use of 'challenge and response questioning'. This approach involves checks on 
information provided by the person entering the identification process with third party 
sources in the public and private sector. Once these initial checks are completed the 
individual is questioned on specific details that only the genuine identity holder should 
know. If the applicant is able to answer the questions then it is suggested by this 
approach that the individual is the valid holder of the identity. According to Jones and 
Levi, this approach runs into difficulty if the individual in question has had very little 
contact with the public or private sector. 
Jones and Levi favour these new approaches as the process of identification is based on 
qualitative issues of validity and verification. This is in contrast to the current approach 
which favours a quantitative approach by relying on the reaching of a cumulative 
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threshold of paper proofs. Jones and Levi note that the only area that could not be 
covered by these new models of identification is where there is collusion between the 
individual committing identity fraud and the victim of the fraud. 
As well as discussing identity fraud and the identification process, Jones and Levi also 
discuss the right to anonymity and the formation of trust without identity. Jones and 
Levi argue that the majority of commercial transactions are anonymous and there is no 
expectation on the part of individuals to have to identify themselves. However, it is 
through the identification process that trust is created between the individual and the 
service provider. 
The future of the development of trust between individuals is an important area of 
discussion in this study. It is argued by Jones and Levi that future efforts to formulate 
trust may be formed on accumulated transaction patterns and performance. Rather than 
relying on identity formed from evidence of life events, trust and identity would be 
formed from a person's performance as a consumer. Jones and Levi do note that a 
possible downside to this approach is the devaluing of a person's identity if the 
performance in the context of financial transactions decreases. 
This shift from a process of identification based on life events to performance as a 
consumer is in part used by the credit industry. Credit ratings are issued to individuals 
by credit providers and are used to determine a person's reliability when lending them 
money. A bad credit rating can result in someone being denied a mortgage, credit card 
or a loan. In some cases of identity fraud, the damage done by the identity thief has 
resulted in the victim receiving a bad credit rating. While the victim can be reimbursed 
for the money they lost in the instance of identity fraud, repairing a person's credit 
rating can be more difficult. In several cases of identity fraud, the real damage done to 
victims has been the decrease in their credit rating which they have had difficulty 
reinstating. Since 2003, concern over the abuse of a person's credit rating has been 
combated in 40 states in America in the form of fraud alerts and credit freezes, If a 
person in the U. S. believes they have been the victim of identity fraud, they can contact 
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a credit reference company such as Experian and issue a fraud alert notifying them of 
any attempt to open a new credit account. Aside from issuing a fraud alert, it is also 
possible to issue a credit freeze on a person's identity. A credit freeze prohibits any form 
of credit account from being opened, effectively shutting down that identity's ability to 
obtain credit. Since 2007 the credit industry in the U. K. has considered introducing 
credit freezes as a method of fraud prevention. By using credit ratings, it can be argued 
the credit industry has effectively reduced a person's identity to that of an account 
whose value is based entirely on their economic viability. 
The process by which we confirm identity is an important factor in the study of identity 
fraud. While the use of alternative approaches such as credit ratings to determine 
identity may be gaining in popularity, the more conventional process of assessing 
identity by looking at life events is still common. This may be due to the continued 
efforts of individuals to formulate identity through the use of biographical narratives (as 
discussed by Giddens 1991 in chapter 2). 
Jones and Levi also look at the role of technological innovations in confirming identity 
and influencing how identity fraud is committed. They discuss the impact of smart cards 
and biometrics, and the decrease in face-to-face interaction. Jones and Levi highlight the 
use of new technology and its impact on the formation of identity and outline the impact 
on crime control: 
"... if the criminal becomes aware that they can be identified more easily than 
ever before, how might this change their behaviour? If they recognise the risk, 
there could be two effects. They will either be displaced through target 
hardening into committing other crimes where the risk of being identified is less, 
or exercise leverage upon others to commit crimes for them, for example by 
kidnapping or blackmail. Identification might not cause them concern, if the 
short term gain is worth more to them than the ultimate sanction, The uplift to 
law enforcement would be more focussed investigations, and less opportunity for 
judicial error. " (Jones G, Levi M, 2000: 19) 
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In conclusion, it is noted by Jones and Levi that by introducing the identity card scheme, 
the government is attempting to introduce a new database which will define who 
actually exists, and then to ensure through biometric security measures that people 
cannot use another person's identity or create a fictitious identity. It is thought that by 
establishing and registering who exists and then preventing any alterations, identity 
fraud can be prevented. This approach, however, assumes that the true number of people 
living in the U. K. can be determined and that measures to ensure that people cannot alter 
or use other peoples' identities will be successful. These issues and others are the focus 
of this study. 
This paper outlines the current state of identity fraud and the methods of committing this 
type of crime, as well as the possible future uses or changes to the identification process. 
Later, some of the changes discussed by Jones and Levi, such as biometries and smart 
cards, will be discussed, as they have been introduced since this report was published. 
While the report by Jones and Levi outlines a very specific view of identity fraud, there 
is still room for looking at identity fraud in a wider context. 
Since the work by Jones and Levi others have updatcd and re-conceptualised definitions 
of what constitutes identity theft and identity fraud. Work by Semmens (2006) and 
Finch (2003) providcs newer definitions of identity fraud and identity theft and 
comment on the differing uses of the two tenns. According to Semmens: 
"There are essentially two defining features of identity theft. First, there must be 
an tappropriation' of another individual's personal data and, second, an act of 
'impersonation' in which the perpetrator masquerades as that individual in order 
to commit another crime. " (Semmens N, 2006: 3) 
Another definition of identity theft is provided by Finch (2003) who, rather than using 
the tenn identity fraud, focuses on the term identity theft and provides two methods or 
types of identity theft - total and partial identity theft. Total identity theft refers to the 
49 
assumption of another person's identity and the abandonment of the identity thief's 
identity. Other definitions of identity fraud and identity theft refer to this type of identity 
theft as wholesale assumption. The term partial identity theft refers to all types of 
identity theft that involve the short term abuse of a person's identity as a means of 
committing or enabling a criminal offence. 
Aside from the definitions of identity fraud provided by criminologists there is also the 
definition provided by the Fraud Advisory Panel to consider. In their report on identity 
fraud 'Identity Theft: Do you know the signs? '(2003), identity fraud is separated into 
four different types: 
" "Application Fraud - where a fraudster applies for payment cards and 
financial products in the name of his victim; 
" Account take over - where the fraudster collates sufficient information 
about the victim to dupe the victim's bank that they are the victim; 
" Wholesale assumption of the victim's identity - obtaining false passports 
and identification documents or using the identity of a dead person which 
may result in fraudulent claims for social security benefits; 
" The fraudulent use of a business identity. " (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2003: 
1) 
Burton (2000) provides an alternative view on the issue of identity fraud focusing on 
impersonation, and distinguishing between the different intentions behind people's 
impersonation and the length of their impersonations. 
"... In attempting to categorize different kinds of impostors, however, there is 
one simple and useful division into two broad but distinct types. The first 
category consists of those people who use imposture to gain what could never 
rightfully be theirs. They may pose, for example, as an heir to an estate, or as 
some remarkable person in order to gain fame and fortune. Whereas this group 
use imposture in order to pretend to some great achievement or status, the second 
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group use imposture to enable them to achieve. This group comprises genuinely 
and prodigiously talented people who, in their 'real' lives, would never have the 
opportunity to exploit their abilities and intelligence. The first group pretend they 
have achieved (or inherited); the second group pretend in order to achieve. They 
could be called, respectively, opportunists and pragmatists. " (Burton S, 2000: 4) 
While the issues presented in the U. K. definitions mirror many of the concerns 
presented in the U. S. definition, it can be argued that the timing of the rise in concern 
over identity fraud has played a greater role in the levels of concern over identity fraud 
in the U. K. than in America. While identity fraud has been an issue in America since the 
1990s, the rise in concern over identity fraud in the U. K. came during the rise in concern 
over illegal immigration and terrorism at the beginning of the 21 "' century. In the last 
eight years of the 21"' century, stories about terrorism, illegal immigration and large 
scale cases of identity fraud have received a great deal of media attention. 
While the threat of identity fraud faced by America and Australia has, in many respects 
been the same as that faced in the U. K., what makes the U. K. experience of identity 
fraud unique is the time frame in which public awareness was increased. The idea that 
identity fraud is a new 21 " century crime is due in part to the way identity fraud has 
been introduced to the U. K. 
The work by Jones and Levi (2000), Finch (2003), the Fraud Advisory Panel (2003) and 
Semmens (2006), represents some of the most recent commentary on identity fraud. It is 
apparent that changes in the way people interact, in particular the use of the internet 
have raised issues concerning the formation of trust between individuals. Identity fraud 
as a subject deals as much with criminal opportunity surrounding the identification 
process as it does with individual types of crime, such as credit card fraud or illegal 
immigration. 
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Another aspect of the study of fraud is the manner in which it is investigated and the 
emphasis placed on stopping this type of crime. In an article by Michael Levi on the 
Roskill Fraud Commission (2003), Levi discusses the commission and the allocation of 
resources and attention to fraud and associated crimes. Levi criticises the current 
approach for undermining the importance of investigating fraud. According to Levi 
there is little political pressure to tackle fraud; this is due in part to the difficulty in 
distinguishing many types of fraud from legitimate financial practices. However the lack 
of interest is not limited to people in charge of policy, and Levi notes that: 
"Only in the City of London is policing fraud a key local police objective. " (Levi 
. M, 2003: 38) 
Levi later mentions that: 
"In the study for the National Fraud Working Group, half the UK forces stated 
that fraud investigation was not specifically mentioned at all in force written 
policy, though it was sometimes covered in the course of more general policy 
statements on crime prevention and detection. " (Levi M, 2003: 41) 
Levi goes on to describe how there is no uniformity in style, function and approach 
between the different police forces around the country. According to Levi, fraud squads 
suffer from being seconded to murder and major crime enquiries and the perception of 
fraud as being lengthy and complex. 
This paper by Levi helps to put the relative importance of fraud investigations in the 
context of other efforts by the police. It can also be argued that the problems of 
detecting, preventing and prosecuting identity fraudsters are exacerbated by the apparent 
low priority fraud cases are given by the police. It was also estimated by the Credit 
Industry Fraud Avoidance System (2008) that the police investigate less than 1% of 
identity fraud cases. CIFAS notes that this due in part to the complexity of identity fraud 
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investigations and because that the investigations can often cross Police Authority 
boundaries and take up a great deal of time and resources. 
Identity Crime - the Australian deflnition 
The confusion over the contradictory nature of the terms identity fraud and identity theft 
is not only limited to America and Britain; in Australia concern over the issue of identity 
related crime has lead to a reorganising of the terms for official use. In Australia the 
concern over the differing uses of the terms identity theft and identity fraud lead to the 
adoption of another term identity crime. This term was adopted in policing circles and 
used to cover both identity theft and identity fraud. According to the Australasian Centre 
for Policing Research (A. C. P. R): 
"There does appear to be value in this approach. The classification helps 
distinguish identity takeover or assumption of a specific identity (i. e. identity 
theft) from a more remote and isolated use of an identity for part thereof) for 
fraudulent purposes, usually involving financial gain or another form of benefit 
(i. e. identity fraud). The above classification also helps to distinguish between 
the use of a fictitious identity and an existing or real identity. Such an approach 
should assist in the community's understanding of this phenomenon, as well as 
in marketing and community education initiatives. " (Australian Centre for 
Policing Research 2004: 2) 
The importance of establishing a clear definition of what constitutes identity crime is 
discussed in the SIRCA study by Cuganesan and Lacey (2003): 
6'... prior research seldom discusses what is to be included as identity fraud and 
what is to be excluded. This lack of operational isation results in significant 
ambiguity in interpretation. " (Cuganesan, Lacey 2003: 23, cited in ACPR 2004: 
3) 
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The ACPR report on standardising ID crime established definitions of the terms identity 
crime, identity fraud and identity theft in an effort to thoroughly cover the criminal 
activity made possible through the use of false identities. Proposed definitions used in 
Australia provided by Blindell (2006) 
"The term 'identity' encompass the identity of natural persons (living or deceased) 
and the identity of bodies corporate; 
'Identity Fabrication'be used to describe the creation a fictitious identity; 
'Identity Manipulation'be used to describe the alteration of one's own identity; 
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'Identity Theft'be used to describe the theft or assumption of a pre-existing 
identity (or significant part thereof), with or without consent, and, whether, in the 
case of an individual, the person is living or deceased; 
'Identity Fraud'be used to describe the gaining of money, goods, services other 
benefits or the avoidance of obligations through the use of a fabricated identity; a 
manipulated identity; or a stolen/assumed identity; II and 
'Identity crime'be used as a generic term to describe activities/offences in which 
a perpetrator uses a fabricated identity', a manipulated identity; or a 
stolen/assumed identity to facilitate the commission of a crime(s). 12" (Blindell 
J, 2006: 1 of I see appendix 2 for original email) 
Common themes In definitions of Identity fraud and Identity theft 
By looking at the definitions used in these three countries, it can be argued that there are 
several key themes that are common to each. While each country has a different 
perspective on identity fraud and identity theft, it is clear that each country has 
encountered problems with distinguishing identity theft from identity fraud. The 
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Australian approach has been to invent a new term of identity crime in order to clarify 
the problem. But still in each country's definitions of the terms, the tendency has been to 
separate the two terms in order to apply them to different but similar identity related 
activities. Equally, each country's definition of identity fraud and identity then 
highlights the trend to target individual identities and the form of dual victimisation this 
causes. It can be argued that it is as much the sense that an individual is losing control of 
their identity, as the actual crime committed that has caused the recent concern in 
identity fraud. Identity fraud and identity theft are new terms that refer to established 
forms of fraudulent criminal activity. The reason these terms have come into common 
use in the 21" century is due in part to statistical analysis which has shown an increase 
in the instances of identity related crime in the U. K. 
An important organisation with regard to the statistical analysis of identity fraud is the 
Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS), This system is responsible for 
compiling statistics on the levels of identity fraud in the U. K. WAS is a fraud 
prevention service with over 200 member organisations. These member organisations 
include representatives from banking, the credit card industry, telecommunications, 
asset finance, insurance companies and mail order companies. The system works 
through communication between these different groups and others on identified types of 
fraud in an effort to improve fraud prevention. According to CIFAS this system is the 
first of its kind in the world. 
CIFAS argue that identity fraud is the fastest growing fraud type in the U. K. WAS 
records show that identity fraud has grown rapidly. In 1999, WAS recorded 9,000 
cases of identity fraud; this number increased to 34,000 in 2002 and 80,000 in 2006. 
WAS also highlights the point that, while identity fraud may be a relatively rare crime, 
it is not a victimless crime: 
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"Identity theft is definitely not a victimless crime. In 2007, CIFAS identified and 
protected 65,000 victims of identity theft. As the scale and type of identity fraud 
varies, so does the impact on those whose identity has been stolen. In one-off 
cases, perhaps involving one fraudulent application or transaction, the damage to 
the victim may be minimal. 
At the other extreme, persistent and skilled fraudsters who comprehensively steal 
an identity can cause a great deal of distress to victims. It can take between 3 and 
48 hours of work for a typical victim to sort out their life and clear their name. In 
cases where a 'total hij ack' has occurred, perhaps involving 20-3 0 different 
organisations, it may take the victim over 200 hours and cost up to E8000 before 
things are back to normal. They may suffer considerable (albcit temporary) 
damage to their credit status, which may then affect their ability to obtain finance 
or insurance - even a mortgage may be temporarily compromised. " (CIFAS, 
2007: 1) 
Work done by CIFAS also looks at the fraudulent use of dead people's identities and 
notes that in 2003 there were 16,000 instances of this type of fraud. CIFAS note that in 
this type of fraud it is often very distressing for the family members to have the identity 
of their dead relative being abused. With respect to the cost of identity fraud CIFAS note 
that reported cases of fraud cost the U. K. economy C 13.8 billion in 2002 and of this, 
identity fraud cost the U. K. economy E1.3 billion. CIFAS argue that this amount is 
conservative, as it does not include the costs incurred by local government and health 
services. 
The statistics compiled by CIFAS on the rise in the instances of identity fraud, and the 
use of identity fraud by terrorists, illegal immigrants and organised criminals in recent 
years, have led to heightened media attention and the perception that identity fraud is the 
crime of the 21" century. This perception that identity fraud is a modem phenomenon is 
in part contradictory to the actual nature of identity fraud (see chapter 6 for history of 
identity fraud). When looking at the criminal activity covered by the terms identity theft 
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and identity fraud it is evident that it is the use of historically well established forms of 
fraud; that have evolved due to the use of new and developing technologies and cultural 
trends. The British Crime Survey for 2006/07 reported that an estimated 2% of the U. K. 
population had experienced the use of their personal details by someone else without 
their permission in the previous year. The identity fraud steering committee estimated 
the cost of identity fraud to the U. K. at E1.2 billion in 2006 -07(see appendix I for 
figures). 
The overall cost of fraud to the U. K. was researched by Levi et at (2007) in 77? e Naiui-e, 
Extent and Economic Impact ofFratul in the UK they noted that fraud in general cost 
the U. K. approximately f 13.9 billion in 2005. In reaching this number Levi et at note 
that there are difficulties in establishing an accurate number as to the cost of fraud given 
variations in definitions and the reporting of fraud. 
is reliably known about the extent and cost of fraud in an aggregate 
sense. This considerably complicates policyrnaking. Much of what policy has 
had to be based upon is drawn from studies carried out by National Economic 
Research Associates (NERA) and Norwich Union to estimate the economic cost 
of fraud (NERA, 2000; Norwich Union, 2005). These place the cost of fraud in 
the UK at some 6.75 billion GBP as a lower bound and 13.82 billion GBP as an 
upper bound (NERA, 2000) and a (presumed mid-range) 15.78 billion GBP 
(Norwich Union, 2005). Neither study, however, represents the last word on the 
subject. Indeed, each makes clear that limitations in data quality and coverage 
make their figures tentative at best. " (Levi M, Burrows J, Fleming M. H, 
Hopkins. M, Matthews X 2007: 5) 
This problem over the accuracy of fraud figures is of particular importance in 
discussing identity related crime. In Levi et al's study it is noted that the term identity 
fraud is a problematic one as the scope of what constitutes identity fraud varies in the 
formulation of statistics by the organisations reviewed in Levi et al's study. In some 
respects it is argued that the use of the word 'identity' is redundant in discussion of 
57 
fraud as such a wide array of fraudulent activity is covered by the term. This point is 
elaborated on in Levi and Burrows (2008) paper Measuring the impact offraud in the 
UK which discusses the findings of The Nature, Extent and Economic Impact qf Fraild 
in the UK. In this paper they note that identity fraud is not a term which helps to assess 
the number of cases of fraud that occur. 
"... this study did not regard it as appropriate to treat ' identity fraud ' as a 
separate category of fraud, as some studies have done (Cabinet Office 2002; 
Home Office 2006 ) in response to popular concerns and a barrage of media 
interest. Like terrorism, it is a method of crime rather than a clear victim 
category, since it spans commercial businesses, financial institutions, 
governments and individuals. " (Levi -M, Burrows J, 2008: 304) 
How fraud and fraud that involves some form of deception with regard to a person's 
identity is recorded is an important issue. It raises questions as to how accurate the 
perception that identity fraud is an emerging problem or indeed the extent of identity 
fraud in the U. K. The implication of separating and publicising identity theft and fraud 
over other forms of fraud is that it compels policy makers to address identity related 
crime as a new phenomenon. This further implies that new methods for combating 
identity related crime are needed such as the identity card scheme. However in practical 
terms determining as Levi et al's study implies the true level of identity related crime in 
society is not a simply task. The value of using terms such as identity theft and identity 
fraud in the formulation of statistics is also debatable. 
Use of identity fraud by terrorists and organised crime groups 
As well as looking at the theories surrounding the concept of identity fraud, it is also 
important to look at the different types of criminal who are associated with the use of 
identity fraud. The idea that identity theft and fraud is a major problem in the U. K. is in 
part based on the use of identity related crime by terrorists, illegal immigrants and 
organised crime groups. Arguably, what the identity card scheme seeks to prevent is not 
just the potential for someone to lie about who they are but also the systematic and 
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continued use of identity theft by organised groups. The September I 1"' 2001 terrorist 
attack in New York raised concern over terrorists' use of identity theft. The deaths of 
Chinese immigrants in 2004 at Morecambe Bay also raised concern over the levels of 
illegal immigrants in the U. K. This concern over the number of illegal immigrants 
entering the UX has been linked to the use of false identification and organised crime in 
the form of people smugglers and human traffickers. Organised crime groups have also 
found identity theft to be a valuable source of income with some groups focusing and 
specialising in this activity. 
Identity theft and fraud are activities that are hard to detect; they can enable clandestine 
travel and be a lucrative source of income. For these reasons, identity theft and fraud are 
an attractive option for terrorists, those involved in illegal immigration and organised 
financial fraud. The use of identity fraud by professional criminals such as conmen will 
be discussed in chapter 6. However, it is important to note that the argument for the 
introduction of a national identity card scheme has focused more on the threat posed by 
terrorists, organised crime groups and illegal immigrants than the activities of conmen. 
The following section will look at the use of identity theft and fraud by terrorists, those 
involved in illegal immigration and organised crime groups. 
Terrorism and Identity fraud 
Since the terrorist attacks in New York September 114' 2001 there has been discussion 
with regard to identity fraud and its use by terrorists. The activities of terrorists are 
distinguished from those of a conventional armed force among other things by the fact 
that they conceal their presence within the general public. So the link between terrorism 
and the crime of identity fraud is in one respect is quite strong. In recent terrorist attacks 
by Islamic extremists there have been several incidents where terrorists have been 
discovered to be using stolen and false identities. Smith (2002) discusses the role and 
use of identity fraud by terrorist groups such as al Qacda, and notes how the ability to 
travel undetected around the world is vital to their agenda: 
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"Identity fraud and illegal migration have emerged as the lifcblood of global 
terrorism, as critical as any bomb, machine gun, or grenade. Terrorist 
organizations place a premium on clandestine international mobility, relying on 
an array of identity fraud techniques. " (Smith P, 2002: 7). 
Gartenstien-Ross and Dabruzzi (2007) also note that the ability to avoid detection is of 
great value to those involved in terrorist attacks, and may involve fraud and deception: 
"The 9/11 Commission Report established that terrorists have committed identity 
fraud. 'For terrorists, ' the Report noted, 'travel documents are as important as 
weapons. Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets 
and gain access to attack. " (Gartenstien-Ross D, Dabruzzi X, 2007: 8) 
According to Eldridge et al (2004) the first attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 
was enabled through the use of false identities and travel documents. Ramzi Yousef and 
Ahmad Ajaj who directed the attack, were caught in possession of numerous stolen 
identities, passports and drivers' licenses. After the 1993 World Trade Centre attack, but 
before Yousef was caught, he also used a false identity to board a Philippines Airline to 
plant a bomb which exploded but failed to crash the plane. Eldridge et al (2004) provide 
a case study of Yousef and Ajaj's activities to illustrate how the two used multiple false 
identities. (see appendix 3 for case study) 
After the second attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11200 1, it was 
discovered that the same tactic of using false identities had been used. Every terrorist 
involved in the 2001 attack had used stolen social security numbers, and several used 
entirely false identities to succeed in their attacks. In a 2003 report by Tendler on the 
use of false identities by terrorists in the U. K. it is noted that: 
"The first two al-Qaeda terrorists convicted in Britain earlier this year were 
discovered with hundreds of false travel documents that had been used to open 
bank accounts, get ajob and claim benefits. " (Tendler. S, 2003: 1) 
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Aside from these accounts associated with the 9/11 attack, other members of al Qaeda 
have been discovered in, possession of false identities. According to Raphaeli (2003), Dr 
Ayman al-Zawahiri believed to be Osama Bin Laden's second in command is one such 
member of al Qaeda known to have used false documentation. In December 1996 al- 
Zawahiri attempted to enter Chechnya in order to establish a base in the region but was 
caught by Russian security personnel. While ultimately the Russian authorities had to 
release al-Zawahiri due to a lack of evidence, during the trial and investigation it was 
found that al-Zawahiri had a variety of false documents in his possession. Raphaeli 
notes that among the documents found were visa applications, details for a Malaysian 
company which listed al-Zawahiri under an alias as the director, and various bank 
account details for both American and Chinese banks. 
Identity theft and terrorist funding 
Aside from helping in efforts to plan and commit terrorist attacks, identity theft is also 
noted by Gartenstien-Ross and Dabruzzi (2007) to be of value to terrorist groups in 
terms of funding their efforts. Since the end of the cold war, they argue, the need to rely 
on crime as a means of funding has increased as state sponsorship for terrorism has 
declined. They note that, in a broad sense, there are five areas of criminal enterprise 
where terrorist groups are known to have been involved: drug trafficking, financial 
fraud, illegal money transfers, illegal immigration and cyber crime. According to 
Gartenstien-Ross and Dabruzzi, of these areas financial fraud and identity theft in 
particular has been the most useful tool for raising funds. This point is echoed by 
Campana, (2006), discussing identity theft in America. According to Campana: 
"... it should not be forgotten that most of all identity theft has a financial 
element. It is the sale and trading of stolen identities that links identity theft to 
drug trafficking, money laundering, organized crime, and terrorism. " 
(Campana. J, 2006: 8). 
Campana also highlights how the lack of awareness of identity theft in America is a 
problem for both individuals and organisations. 
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Border security and false documentation 
Border security and the use of false documentation is another area in which identity 
fraud and terrorism can be connected. This subject has been discussed in some detail 
with regard to immigration control in America. Gartenstien-Ross and Dabruzzi (2007) 
note that violation of immigration control is often one of the first offences committed by 
terrorists. Kephart (2005) reviews the immigration history of 94 foreign terrorists. Of 
the 94 foreign-born terrorists who operated in the US between 1990 and 2004 Kephart 
notes that 59 committed immigration fraud prior to or conjunction with taking part in 
terrorist activity. Of these 59, many conducted multiple immigration violations - 79 in 
total according to Kephart. The main concern in the report is the apparent ease with 
which terrorists were able to enter the US and stay in the country and maintain the 
appearance of legitimacy: 
"What requires emphasis is the ease with which terrorists have moved through 
U. S. border security and obtained significant immigration benefits such as 
naturalisation. The security gaps that existed then still, in many instances, exist 
today. My work on the 9/11 Commission made it clear that terrorists need travel 
documents for movement at some point during tbeirjoumey here as much as 
they need weapons for operations. Once within U. S. Borders, terrorists seek to 
stay. Doing so with the appearance of legality helps ensure long-terin operational 
stability. At the 9/11 Commission we called this practice embedding, a term also 
used in this reporf' (Kephart J, 2005: 7) 
The issue of border control and the use of false documentation is also of importance 
with regard to the issue of illegal immigration and people smuggli ng and is discussed in 
that context later in this chapter. 
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Organised crime and the use of identity fraud 
In many of the modem cases of identity fraud discussed in this thesis, understandably, 
the main motivation to commit fraud has been financial. Aside from being a difficult 
crime to detect, identity fraud can also be a lucrative criminal enterprise, especially if it 
involves multiple victims. A noteworthy example of organised crime using identity 
fraud is the use of advanced fee fraud by Nigeria based organised crime syndicates, 
known as the Nigerian 419 scam. The Nigerian 419 scam involves convincing victims to 
provide a sum of money on the promise that eventually it will lead to them being given a 
greater sum. The process underlying Nigerian 419 scams and advanced fee fraud are 
presented in chapter 6. In this section, the focus will be on the groups who use Nigerian 
419 scams. An important source of information on the people who engage in this 
activity is a Watchdog group known as the 419 Coalition. On the Coalitions main 
webpage it is noted that: 
"The Nigerian Scam is, according to published reports, the third to fifth largest 
industry in Nigeria. It is the 419 Coalition view that the elites from which the 
governing classes of Nigeria are drawn contain 419 Scammers which can make it 
difficult for victims seeking recourse in these matters. Monies stolen by 419 
operations are very rarely recovered from Nigeria, although the Nigerian 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) led by Nuhu Ribadu and 
Ibrahim Lamorde made some welcome progress in that regard over the last few 
years. " (419 Coalition, 2009: 1-2) 
According to the 419 Coalition the 419 scam is operated predominantly from Nigeria 
but also from other West African nations such as Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and the Ivory Coast. The coalition estimate that the scam began in the 1980s and by 
1996 had made the gangs who run the scam $5 billion; they also believe that this sum 
has gone up since 1996. 
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The emergence and success of 419 scams is discussed in Wright (2006). Wright refers 
to the work of Ebbe (1999) who argues that a symbiotic relationship has developed 
between the government and criminals. Wright (2006) describes how: 
"Organised crime and the legitimate economy of the country are closely 
integrated. Nigerian criminal gangs operate from a territory that is notorious for 
its corruption. " (Wright. A, 2006: 157) 
The combination of corruption in Nigeria and the increase in globalisation is the key to 
the success of the 419 scam. Initial the scam in the 1980s involved the use of fax 
machines to convey the scam message to victims. Eventually criminals involved in the 
scam transferred to the use of the internet and emails. According to Finckenauer and 
Albanese (2005) aside from Nigerian and West African organised crime groups, Russian 
organised crime groups based in America have also used and relied on fraud as a 
criminal enterprise. 
Efforts to police identity related crime 
According to the National Criminal Intelligence Service and its successor the Serious 
and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), crimes such as organised immigration crime, 
money laundering and fraud against individuals and the state are enabled through the 
use of false and/or stolen identities. An assessment by the National Criminal Intelligence 
Service concluded that while it was difficult to make firm judgements on the extent to 
which identity fraud is used by organised crime it could be determined to a reasonable 
degree that: 
"a. Identity fraud underpins much serious and organised crime, A significant 
proportion of criminals at all levels use false personal identities; 
b, Identity fraud cuts across most criminal sectors: illegal immigration, drugs 
trafficking, money laundering, vehicle theft, and fraud against the public sector; 
c. The primary purpose of false identities is to enable serious and organised 
criminals to conceal themsclves, their activities and their assets. They may also 
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facilitate specific criminal's acts, such as people smuggling or benefit fraud. In 
addition, false identities are sold for money; 
d. A false identity document can be obtained by counterfeiting or forgery, 
fraudulent application or misuse of someone else's document. Theft and 
corruption can play a supporting role. Some serious and organised criminals 
undertake these activities themselves; others turn to their contacts or to specialist 
providers to meet their needs; " (National Criminal Intelligence Service, 2003: 2) 
The assessment also determined that counterfeiting and forgery were the most common 
methods used by organised and serious criminals as a means of obtaining false 
identities. In April 2006, the Serious and Organised Crime Agency was formed as part 
of the Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. This agency took over from 
the National Crime Squad and National Criminal Intelligence Service; the agency also 
took over the investigative and intelligence gathering work of Her Majesty's Customs 
and Excise with regard to drug trafficking and the Immigration Services work on 
organised immigration crime. This agency also highlights the role of identity fraud in 
the activities of organised crime, noting its use in private and public sector fraud. 
According to the 2007/08 Annual Report by SOCA, the agency has conducted 
operations which focus on efforts to combat illegal immigration and identity fraud. 
Operations which are noteworthy are operation Coptine which investigated people 
smuggling and the use of false documentation, and Operation Ajowan which targeted 
the trade in credit information. 
Operation Coptine was a five year operation which looked into an organised crime 
group who were smuggling Indian illegal immigrants from South Africa to the U. K. The 
group, based in Leicester, would smuggle Indian nationals to South Africa and then 
through the use of fake or stolen passports would enable these illegal immigrants to 
come to the U. K. The gang also engaged in credit card fraud and visa scams. The report 
estimated that the criminals involved had made Z5 millions and Operation Coptine 
resulted in the arrest of 200 people worldwide with 40 members of the group being 
prosecuted in the U. K. According to O'Neil (2008) the gang smuggled an estimated 
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6,000 illegal immigrants into the U. K. and charged between E5,000 and E8,000 per 
migrant. The gang was lead by Yusef Mewaswala who was convicted and sentenced to 
ten years in prison. 
Another operation conducted by SOCA which involved identity fraud was Operation 
Ajowan which investigated the trade in stolen bank and credit information via the 
internet. According to the 2007/08 report by SOCA: 
"The potential loss to the UK from the actions of just one of the conspirators was 
assessed at over f6m. " (SOCA, 2007/08: 28). 
Aside from SOCA, identity fraud is also investigated by the Economic and Specialist 
Crime Unit which is responsible for investigating a variety of different forms of 
fraudulent activity. Within the Economic and Specialist Crime Unit there are several 
operations focused on preventing and detecting criminal activity which involves the use 
of false or stolen identities. Operations Maxim and Sterling are directly involved in 
combating identity fraud and the use of false identities. Operation Sterling is the name 
given to the Metropolitan Police Services strategy to commit economic crime in 
London. This operation has involved forming partnerships between the Metropolitan 
police and several public and private industries. Through Operation Sterling, the 
Metropolitan Police are trying to identify where organised criminals are using identity 
fraud and how to prevent it. Operation Maxim is dedicated to investigating cases of 
people smuggling and human trafficking. Within this operation is Project Genesis a joint 
operation between the police and the printing industry to prevent the abuse of printing 
equipment. On 21't March 2007 an investigation lead by Operation Maxim resulted in 
13 raids across London on illegal passport factories and suppliers. These raids resulted 
in 22 people being arrested, with E40,000 being confiscated along with a variety of fakc 
passports, drivers' licences and foreign identity documents. 
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While the Economic and Specialist Crime Unit is involved in combating identity fraud, 
the overall involvement of the police in investigating identity fraud has been criticised 
by some. According to the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) less than 
one per cent of identity fraud cases are investigated by the police, CIFAS notes that 
many cases of identity fraud are time consuming and cross several police authority 
boundaries, making the policing of this type of crime problematic. 
Organised crime and illegal immigration 
One area of criminal activity where the use of identity fraud by organised crime groups 
can be seen most clearly is in the use of identity fraud to facilitate illegal immigration. 
As with concern over identity fraud and its use by terrorists, the use of identity fraud by 
illegal immigrants and organised crime groups gained increased public awareness at the 
beginning of the 2 I't century. 
In 2000 concern over illegal immigration was raised with the discovery of 58 dead 
illegal immigrants in a cargo container in Dover (Kyle, Liang, 2001: 18). All were from 
the Fujian province of China and had died from suffocation. This incident was followed 
in 2004 with the reported deaths of 23 Chinese illegal immigrants working as cockle 
pickers at Morecombe Bay. 
When discussing illegal immigration, important issues to consider are the role and 
activities of people smugglers, the use of false documents such as passports and the 
degree of involvement of illegal immigrants are with criminal activity after entering the 
U. K. The use of false documentation and the role of people smugglers are discussed in 
the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Second Report on Asylum 
Applications (2003-2004). According to the report, a large proportion of asylum seekers 
who enter the U. K. do so through people smuggling operations. It is noted in the report 
that asylum seekers use illegal methods of entry into the U. K. because of visa 
restrictions and the difficulty of gaining entry. In the report, Beverley Hughes MP, 
Minister of State at the Home Office, states : 
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"I would say the vast majority, either through actually being transported in 
lorries and so on through people operating as people smugglers, or through 
facilitation at the other end or with false documents that allow people to get on 
an airline. " (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2003-04: 30) 
Input into the report is provided by Harriet Sergeant, author of the Centre for Policy 
Study's pamphlet Welcome to the Asylum(2001). In the report, Sergeant discusses the 
role in illegal immigration of people smugglers and false documentation: 
"This new migration industry provides all kind of services to would-be 
immigrants from obtaining entry visas and other supporting documents for travel, 
to transport arrangements and legal instructions on how to apply for asylum and 
employment. A journey from Asia, India and Pakistan, costs about E15,000 to 
Z20,000. A Franco-Dutch gang active since 1994 charges Chinese immigrants 
$50,000 for theirjourney to the US which includes new identities and false 
passports. A large market has grown up for forged documents. " (Sergeant. H 
cited in House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2003-04: 30) 
The trade in false passports and documents was investigated in a 2006 Panorama 
documentary 'Myjake passport and me'; j ournalist Shahida Talaganova illustrated how 
people are able to obtain false or stolen passports all over the European Union and 
former Soviet countries. Talaganova then showed how these documents are used to 
enter the U. K. illegally. The goal Talaganova set herself in this documentary was to 
obtain a fake passport from each of the 24 member states of the E. U. Then Talaganova 
planned to enter the U. K. illegally by using these passports. Throughout the 
documentary Talaganova travelled to various countries in the E. U. and former Soviet 
Union countries such as the Ukraine. In each country Talaganova sought out brokers 
who deal in stolen and fake passports. In many instances, the brokers stated that rather 
than providing a stolen passport they would find someone from an E. U. country to apply 
for a passport and then substitute the picture for a picture of Talaganova. 
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When Talaganova successfully obtained a number of passports this way she took them 
to an expert in forgery who checked each one under a ultraviolet light to detect the 
I hidden security layers in the laminate used in passports. After choosing the best fake 
passport Talaganova then attempted to enter the UX Talaganova took a ferry from 
Spain to the U. K., and despite being checked by immigration officials, was able to enter 
the country on a Latvian passport. 
Aside from obtaining falsely applied for passports, Talaganova also attempted to obtain 
a stolen passport and then have it altered. The documentary shows how the influx of 
holiday makers in Barcelona, Spain, during the summer is a good time for illegal 
immigrants to obtain a stolen passport. In Spain, Talaganova was able to obtain stolen 
passports from Holland, Portugal, Belgium and the U. K. By the end of her 
investigation, Talaganova had been able to obtain passports from 20 of the 24 member 
states of the E. U. Her investigation only stopped after a dangerous encounter with one 
broker in false passports who threatened her with a knife. The documentary ends with 
Talaganova gaining entry to the U. K. using the stolen Dutch passport obtained in Spain. 
Talaganova entered the U. K. on the Eurostar train and successfully passed two security 
checks in Belgium and the U. K. 
What this documentary highlights is the well developed market in fake or stolen 
passports that exists in both the E. U. and those countries which border the E. U. It also 
highlights the differing attitudes held towards illegal immigration. In one instance in 
Greece, Talaganova was told how the police will accept the presence of illegal 
immigrants as they are aware that they do not want to stay in Greece but rather they are 
travelling to the U. K. and if they arrest them they will only be ensuring that they stay 
longer in Greece. Furthermore people smuggling provides organised crime with a source 
of income comparable to drug and arms smuggling. 
the issues raised with regard to false documentation in Talaganova's documentary are 
also discussed in a Europol (2008) report on illegal immigration: Facilitated Illegal 
Immigration into the European Union. In this report, Europol also note that false 
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documents are used to enter the European Union and that these documents are often 
produced by organised crime groups. Moreover: 
"Although travel documents, such as passports, national ID cards, visas and 
residence and work permits, are the most commonly falsified travel documents, a 
number of other types of documents are targeted by OC groups. Documents 
needed to support bogus application for a business or student visa are frequently 
falsified. These kinds of documents may include registrations for a school or a 
study, supporting letters from an employer or an invitation from a company 
within the EU. The use of other documentation, such as seaman books and 
joining letters from shipping companies and the merchant navy are also used to 
allow illegal immigrants to enter or transit the EU without visa. " (Europol, 2008: 
4) 
Living asan illegal immigrant 
Aside from enabling illegal immigrants to enter the U. K., people smugglers and false 
documents also have a part to play in enabling illegal immigrants to stay in the 
country. Housing, work and health care are all aspects of living in the U. K. that illegal 
immigrants are able to access. Through people smugglers and false documentation, 
access to these things can be made easier. The level of interaction between smugglers 
and illegal immigrants varies, as does the care and attention the smugglers give to 
illegal immigrants. 
A distinction can be made between those organised crime groups which smuggle 
people and those who traffic in human beings. According to Nicola (2004) the 
activities of people traffickers can be broken down into three stages: recruitment, 
transfer and entrance into the destination country. Human traffickers by contrast 
engage in another stage after transportation to the destination country and this further 
stage is exploitation. In both people smuggling and human trafficking, false 
documentation can play a vital role in transporting of migrants and maintaining 
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control over them. The relationship between people smugglers and illegal immigrants 
is discussed by Enzensberger (1992) who says 
"Illegal migration and illegal employment presupposes illegally operating 
entrepreneurs. Organised crime provides a service to such entrepreneurs, as they 
smuggle human beings on request. 'In the textile industry the unskilled sector 
and, above all, the building trade, practices dominate which are reminiscent of 
the slave markets of the past. " (Enzensberger, 1992 cited in Ruggiero N, 1996: 
140) 
This viewpoint suggests that, in the relationship between illegal immigrants and people 
smugglers, the power resides with the people smugglers who are in control of both the 
illegal immigrants' travel into the country, and their residence and employment. 
However according to Margaret Beare in Phil Williams (1999) book Illegal Immigration 
and Commercial Sex: The New Slave Trade: 
"As one smuggler said: 'First of all, I never go out to look for clients, Invariably 
it is the client who comes to me for help.... Second, I do not traffic in drugs or 
ammunition. My work hurts nobody. In fact, it helps people'. " (Beare M. E, in 
Williams. P, 1999: 23-24) 
The discussion of illegal immigration can at times focus on the oppression and 
subjugation of illegal immigrants by organiscd crime groups. Equally it is important to 
remember that for those who become illegal immigrants the perceived benefits outweigh 
the risks. Chawla and Pictschmann (2005) in their chapter on Trafficking in Human 
Beings and Smuggling ofMigrants in the Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice 
discuss how globally there is still a gross disparity in terms of income between the rich 
and poor. They refer to findings from the UN. Development Programme 2002 which 
note the following: 
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" In 1999,2.8 billion people lived on less than $2 a day, with 1.2 billion of them 
barely surviving at the margins of subsistence on less than $1 a day. 
" The richest 5% of the world's people have incomes 114 times those of the 
poorest 5%. 
" During the 1990s the number of people in extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan 
Africa rose from 242 million to 300 million (U. N Development Programme, 
2002: 10) 
These issues and others are raised by the U. N. Development Programme to illustrate the 
current state of human development. It is also noted that there has been a drop in the 
proportion of people around the world living in extreme poverty from 29% in 1990 to 
23% in 1999, However in Chawla and Pietschmann's (2005) chapter the negative 
aspects of human development are focused on and discussed in terms of their influence 
on the decision of people to become illegal immigrants. They argue that people 
smugglers and traffickers in human beings exploit the needs of the impoverished who 
are seeking a better life: 
"The difference of well being among the countries of the world, and perceptions 
of those differences, are the main factors not only for emigration but also for the 
criminal activities of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. " 
(Chawla. S, Pietschmann. T, 2005: 184) 
Chwala and Pietschmann also refer to push and pull factors which influence people's 
decision to become a migrant. Push factors motivate people to leave the country they 
live in, and pull factors attract migrants to a particular country or region. Europol in a 
report on the Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union: A EUROPOL 
Perspective (2008) outline the different push and pull factors: 
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Push Factors 
" high unemployment 
" labour market not open to women and gender discrimination 
" lack of opportunity to improve quality of life 
" sexual or ethnic discrimination 
poverty 
escaping persecution, violence or abuse 
escaping human rights violations 
collapse of social infrastructure 
other environmental conditions including conflict and war 
Pull Factors 
improved standard and quality of life 
better access to higher education 
less discrimination or abuse 
enforcement of minimum standards and individual rights 
better employment opportunities 
demand for cheap labour 
demand for commercial sexual services 
higher salaries and better working conditions 
demand for workers within the sex industry and higher earnings 
established migrant communities (Europol, 2008: 3) 
According to Europol, all EU countries are affected by illegal immigration but, there 
are certain countries which are the main destinations for illegal immigrants and 
victims of human trafficking. These countries are Austria, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. These countries are the most desired destinations for migrants and 
organised crime groups exploit this desire by promising employment opportunities. 
Europol note that there is no typical victim of human trafficking. According to the 
Office for Victims of Crime: 
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"Each year, an estimated 600,000 to 800,000 men, women, and children are 
trafficked across international borders (some international and non-goverrimental 
organizations place the number far higher), and the trade is growing. (U. S. 
Department of State. 2004. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, D. C.: 
U. S. Department of State. ) 
Of the 600,000-800,000 people trafficked across international borders each year, 
70 percent are female and 50 percent are children. The majority of these victims 
are forced into the commercial sex trade. "' (Office for Victims of Crime, 2005: 1) 
The key to human trafficking is the exploitation of the desire of migrants to gain a 
better life and this is done this through false promises of work and control over their 
movement, documentation and contact with others, 
Human trafficking and false documentation 
False documentation and the control of migrants' documentation can be an important 
factor in the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation. There are different types of 
human trafficking operations; some operations traffic in people in order to exploit 
them for labour in the hidden economies of countries (see below for discussion of 
hidden economy). Others are sex trafficker operations which seek to exploit women 
and children. According to Hughes (2000) in her paper - The "Natasha " Trade: The 
Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in Women, one method of recruiting and 
controlling women used by sex traffickers is to utilise false documentation: 
"Some traffickers use the woman's legal documents and tourist visas to 
legally enter the destination countries. The woman may be put on a circuit by 
pimps in which they are moved from country to country on legal tourist visas 
or entertainers visas. Other times, the woman is given false documents. In this 
case, the woman is even more vulnerable after she arrives in the destination 
country because she is there illegally, If police discover her she is arrested and 
depoiled. " (Hughes . 13,2000: 6) 
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According to Caldwell et al. (1999), false passports are also used to conceal the age of 
young girls being smuggled by gangs: 
"... 'Natasha', a Moscow-based Russian citizen who traffics woman and girls 
to Japan to work as prostitutes, informed GSN that she could obtain foreign 
passports for underage girls. 'According to our rules' she said, 'you must 
obtain an international passport. But, to go abroad, if she is only 16, she must 
get approval from her parents. If you want to avoid it, we can make her a 
passport where it will be indicated that she is 18, so she doesn't need to have 
any approvals. " (Caldwell G, et al, 1999: 48) 
This discussion of illegal immigration focuses on the activities of people traffickers 
who exploit the illegal immigrants they smuggle. However, not all operations end 
with the exploitation of migrants; there are some migrants who try to integrate with 
legal citizens. 
Illegal immigrants and 'looking legitimate' 
A study conducted by Engbersen and Van Der Leun (2001), - The Social 
Construction oflilegality and Criminality, conducted research into the relationship 
between migration and criminality, looking at the degree to which illegal immigrants 
engaged in further criminal activity. This study involved interviews with 170 illegal 
immigrants living in Rotterdam in Holland between 1993 and 1998. Engbersen and 
Van Der Leun found that: 
"Apart from the use of false or forged documents which the respondents 
considered unavoidable, the majority of the interviewed illegal immigrants 
refrain from criminal activities, They do everything they can to keep on the 
tight side of the law and commonly find other ways of making a living. " 
(Engbersen. G, Van Der Leun. J, 2001: 56) 
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Engbersen and Van Der Leun also note that figures on the arrest of illegal immigrants 
showed that 47% of illegal immigrants were arrested for illegal residence which was 
the most common reason for arrest. The study by Engbersen and Van Der Leun is 
useful when looking at illegal immigration in the U. K. It suggests that while illegal 
immigrants might rely on false documentation and people smugglers to enter a 
country, there is no guarantee they will continue to engage in criminal behaviour. It 
can be argued that continued involvement with illegal activity would jeopardize 
migrants' efforts to remain in the country by increasing the chances they will come 
into contact with the police. 
However involved the illegal immigrants are with the people who smuggled them into 
the country, they will have to gain some form of employment. In a report by Lord 
Grabner on the Informal Economy (2000), the issue of employing illegal immigrants 
is discussed. 
Hidden/informal economy 
According to Lord Grabner the informal economy (sometimes referred to as the hidden 
economy) refers to undeclared economic activity where no income tax, National 
Insurance contributions or Value Added Tax (VAT) are collected or claimed. The 
informal economy covers a number of different activities, such as tax evasion, working 
while claiming some form of unemployment benefit and running an unregistered 
business. With regard to illegal immigrants working in the United Kingdom Lord 
Grabner states: 
"Broadly speaking, illegal immigrants are prohibited by law from working. It is 
also illegal for employers to hire them. Employers have a duty to check that new 
employees have a right to work. So, by definition, if illegal immigrants do work, 
they are part of the informal economy. " (Lord Grabner, 2000: 16) 
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Lord Grabner goes on to explain that assessing the number of illegal immigrants in the 
U. K. is difficult, but that the majority of illegal immigrants have been found to work in 
sectors where the work is casual and paid with cash in hand. Lord Grabner also notes 
that some employers deliberately hire illegal immigrants as they are a source of cheap 
labour. The use of illegal immigrants also means that employers can avoid 
implementing health and safety regulations, and can avoid paying the national minimum 
wage as their employees are unlikely to complain for fear of exposing themselves to the 
authorities. 
With regard to identity fraud, Lord Grabner discusses the subject in the context of 
defrauding the benefit system and the illegal use of National Insurance numbers. 
National Insurance numbers are unique numbers that are issued to people in the United 
Kingdom when they reach 16, and are used when applying for benefits or starting work 
as an employee. National Insurance numbers are sometimes issued to adults from abroad 
who come to live in the U. K. and it is here that instances of fraud have been found. 
National Insurance numbers can be used fraudulently if someone who is not entitled to 
work in the U. K. can obtain one. Lord Grabner also discusses the use of birth 
certificates of dead people by fraudsters to make multiple claims for state benefits. The 
importance of investigating the informal economy is that it is one of the reasons people 
enter this country illegally and why people are able and ready to create and use false 
identities. 
It has been difficult to find statistics on the number of illegal immigrants in the U. K. and 
in 2006 the National Statistics review by the Home Office acknowledged this by calling 
for a more in-depth study of the number of illegal immigrants in the U. K. Current 
estimates from the Home Office estimate that there are between 3 10,000 and 570,000 
illegal immigrants in the U. K. Of this population, it can be speculated, a percentage are 
involved in the use of identity fraud. 
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Identity cards as a means of preventing organised crime, illegal immigration and 
terrorism 
Identity related offences are vital parts of many criminal enterprises; terrorists, illegal 
immigrants and organised crime groups all benefit in some way from using identity 
theft, In the debate over the introduction of the identity card scheme much has been 
made of the idea that identity cards can prevent the use of identity related crime by these 
groups of offenders. According to Lyon (2004): 
"At least three kinds of arguments are used to promote ID systems; eliminating 
terrorism, preventing fraud and controlling immigration. The first works on the 
logic of security and fear, the second on that of management and audits and the 
third on legal residence-who may be in the country and what they may do 
while there. ID cards, it seems, can provide simultaneous solutions to several 
perceived problems. " (Lyon D, 2004: 4) 
The U. K. identity card scheme has been promoted by the government on the basis of 
these three arguments. The emphasis has for the most part been on preventing the 
activities of terrorists, illegal immigrants and/or organised criminals rather than using 
the identity card to specifically target these types of criminals. It has been argued by the 
government that, by denying access to identity related crime, the scheme can deter 
and/or detect any and all individuals involved in criminal activity. When the Entitlement 
Card Scheme was first unveiled in 2002, a great deal was made of the crime prevention 
benefits: 
"Biometric ID cards will provide a simple and secure means of verifying 
identity. Together with electronic border controls they will help us tackle illegal 
migration and working, organised crime, terrorist activity, identity theft, and 
fraudulent access to public services, as well as helping our citizens travel freely 
and complete everyday transactions securely and easily, (Blunkett. D cited in 
Privacy International, 2004: 1) 
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This argument that the identity card scheme can help in preventing crime has remained 
central, despite criticism from opposition parties and protest groups. In a 2008 speech by 
then Home Secretary Jacqui Smith, the idea that the identity card scheme could prevent 
crime was still a vital part of the argument for introducing the scheme: 
"... the duty of public protection and the impetus for greater citizen convenience 
are the two drivers for our plans for the National Identity Scheme. 
The benefits are clear: 
" to counter illegal immigration and illegal employment; 
" to tackle crime and terrorism; 
" to lessen the burden for employers and employees involved in proving identity; 
" to improve access to the public services to which we are entitled; and 
" to, quite simply, make life easier for all of us in the modern world. " (Smith J, 
2008: 9) 
The identity card is presented as a multi purpose solution to the problem of identity 
related crime by preventing people from using multiple identities. With a secure means 
of identification in operation terrorists cannot embed themselves in the civilian 
population. Illegal immigrants cannot pass themselves off as legitimate residents and 
organised criminals cannot capitalise through financial fraud, people smuggling or 
human trafficking. It is envisaged that individuals contemplating identity related crime 
in the U. K. will be deterred from even trying. 
According to former Home Secretary Jacqui Smith, the identity card scheme will 
prevent the creation of multiple identities by terrorists and organised criminals. Smith 
argues that the identity card will combat terrorism and organised crime by preventing 
money laundering which can involve the use of false identities to establish bank 
accounts. Smith further argues that the introduction of the National Identity Card 
Scheme has helped prevent identity related crime by introducing legislation that 
criminalises the use of false identities. 
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On the issue of terrorism there has been a significant amount of criticism over the idea 
that identity card can prevent terrorist attacks. An important part of the argument for the 
introduction of the identity card scheme has been the preventing terrorist from using 
multiple identities in the U. K. As discussed earlier, the success of the September 110, 
attacks was in part due to the terrorist's ability to embed themselves within the civilian 
population. However, both the July 7"' 2005 attacks on London and the 2007 attack on 
Glasgow were conducted without the need for any identity related crime. The terrorists 
involved were U. K. citizens who would have been eligible for an identity card had the 
scheme been in effect. Critics such as Mendham (2004) argue that the government is 
playing on the general public's fear of terrorism in order to introduce the identity card 
scheme: 
"Following the II th September atrocity, the UK Government immediately began 
talking about introducing ID Cards. We were told they would help fight crime 
and specifically terrorism. In fact this was simply a case of Blunkett shamelessly 
taking advantage of the post-91 I panic. There is no evidence to support the claim 
that ID Cards will significantly cut down on crime and terror. Many other 
countries have ID Cards and still suffer from crime and terrorism. " (Mendham T, 
2004: 1) 
The role of the identity card scheme in preventing terrorist use of identity theft and fraud 
is discussed in more detail in chapter 9. The arguments raised with regard to the effect 
identity cards might have on terrorist activities are also important when discussing the 
actions of organised crime and illegal immigrants. As stated earlier, identity related 
crime is important to both terrorists and organised crime because it enables clandestine 
travel and a means of criminal enterprise. According to the U. K. Border Agency, the 
identity card will help with the detection of illegal immigrants by confinning tile status 
of immigrants to the UX.: 
"It is a very secure way to provide evidence of the holder's nationality, identity 
and status in the United Kingdom. It helps public agencies, employers and 
educational establishments to more easily understand the migrant's entitlements. 
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It also enables holders to confirm their identity, immigration status, and right to 
work or study and access public services. " (UK Border Agency, 2009: 1) 
The ability to confirm people's migration status and their eligibility is, according to the 
government, key to preventing illegal immigration. By obtaining biometric records of 
foreign nationals in the U. K., the scheme will be able to separate legal residents from 
illegal immigrants. With regard to immigration, the identity card scheme would also 
allow the government to keep track of failed asylum applications in order to catch 
anyone trying to stay in the country. However, Mendharn argues that with regard to 
illegal immigration the identity card scheme could conceivably cause a rise in crime: 
"ID cards will not deter illegal immigrants, they will still come. Nor will ID 
Cards allow illegal immigrants to be deported more easily. By definition people 
in the country illegally will not apply for the cards and will avoid places where 
these cards need to be shown, Most illegal immigrants currently work at the 
fringes of legality, where pay is in cash, no questions asked. Such employers are 
unlikely to start demanding to see Identity Cards. If they do then many illegal 
immigrants will have no choice but to turn to crime to survive. Thus compulsory 
National Identity Cards could actually raise the crime rate. " (Mendham T, 2004: 
1) 
By introducing the National Identity Card scheme, the government seeks to provide a 
multi purpose solution to the activities of several groups of offenders. How will 
criminals react to the identity card scheme? The desired effect is that the scheme scares 
anyone considering identity theft by presenting a system which guarantees detection of 
any identity related crime. However it can be argued that rather than being scared by the 
identity card scheme, criminals will adapt their behaviour to compensate for its presence. 
It is foreseeable that terrorists and organised criminals may attempt to compromise the 
scheme through the use of corrupt employees or advances in forgery. It may be that 
terrorists and organised criminals simply adapt their activities to avoid interaction with 
the identity card scheme. 
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Law regarding fraud 
Identity theft and identity fraud have yet to be codified as crimes but there are numerous 
criminal offences under current legislation which can be considered forms of identity 
theft and identity fraud. Just as determining the extent and nature of the term identity 
can be a complicated matter, examining how the law responds to identity fraud is also a 
difficult issue. 
Identity fraud is an abuse of the identification process but this does not always mean it is 
an abuse of the law. This could be because the actual abuse of the identification process 
does not contravene any legal statues or there is no expectation of ownership over the 
information or identification. 
For instance obtaining another person's birth certificate is not a crime, they can be 
purchased by anyone (e. g. people interested in genealogy). Equally, obtaining 
someone's birth certificate is not a crime against that person as they have no right to sole 
ownership of that form of identification. The issue of privacy is also a key factor in the 
determination of the legality of identity fraud and changing identity. 
The criminality of modem identity theft and identity fraud is a dual criminality, firstly 
against the individual whose identity is stolen, and secondly against the third party who 
has entered into some form of interaction with the person using another person's 
identity. The development of the concept of a crime of deception as outlined in the 1968 
and 1978 Theft Act form the basis for crimes that can be defined as identity fraud. More 
recently the 2006 Fraud Act also helps to outline what crimes can be considered identity 
fraud. 
1968 and 1978 Theft Acts - crimes of deception 
When detennining the criminality of identity fraud in the U. K. the first area to look at is 
the crime of deception as it is described in the 1968 and 1978 Theft Acts. Under section 
15 (4) of the 1968 Theft Act, the concept of deception is defined as - 
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"For the purpose of this section 'deception' means any deception (whether 
deliberate or reckless) by words or conduct as to fact or as to law, including a 
deception as to the present intentions of the person using the deception or any 
other person" (Section 15 (411968 Theft Act cited in Herring J, 2006: 570) 
Under the 1968 act, the key elements to deception were that by word and action an 
individual had deceived on the grounds of fact or law. When establishing if a criminal 
deception has taken place under the 1968 act, a person's statements must be determined 
as untrue and someone must be victimised by the deception. The requirement that a 
person is victimised in order for there to be a crime of deception means that crimes 
which involve counterfeit objects and machines (e. g. fake debit cards in ATM machines) 
are crimes not of deception but rather of theft. 
When discussing crimes of deception the following terms are important: obtain, procure, 
secure and induce. In order for a theft to be considered a crime of deception the criminal 
must obtain, procure, secure or induce some result through deception. The 1968 act 
outlines several different types of criminal deception. Arguably there are many forms of 
identity fraud which would be prosecuted under sections of the 1968 Act. Below are 
several examples of sections from the 1968 and 1978 Act. 
1. Obtaining property: 1968, s. IS. 
2. Obtaining a pecuniary advantage: 1968, s. 16. 
3. Procuring the execution of a valuable security: 1968, s. 20 (2). 
4. Obtaining services: 1978, s. 1. 
S. Securing the remission of a liability: 1978, s. 2 (1) (a), 
6. Inducing a creditor to wait for or to forgo payment: 1978, s. 2 (1) (b). 
7. Obtaining an exemption from or abatement of liability: 1978, s. 2 (1) (c) 
(Smith J. C, 1989: 84) 
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2006 Fraud Act 
The most recent improvement to U. K. law with regard to fraud is the 2006 Fraud Act. 
This act focuses on three areas of fraud and more directly deals with the types of 
criminal behaviour referred to as identity fraud. The 2006 Fraud Act addresses the 
crimes of fraud by false representation, fraud by failing to disclose infonnation and 
fraud by abuse of position. All three types of fraud discussed in the 2006 act can be 
considered forms of identity fraud. 
Under section 2 of the act a person has committed fraud by false representation if they 
have dishonestly made a false representation and if by making this false representation, 
the individual intends to gain from this deception for themselves or another. Also, under 
this section, if an individual intends to use false representation to harm another by 
causing them to lose something or put them at risk of loss then they have committed a 
crime. 
This section covers activities such as applying for credit in someone clse's name or 
using another person's credit details to draw money from their account. Section 2 goes 
on to explain what exactly is meant by a false representation. According to the act: 
" (2) A representation is false if- 
{a) it is untrue or misleading, and 
1b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading 
(3) 'Representation' means any representation as to fact or law, including a 
representation as to state of mind of. 
a) the person making the representation, or 
{bj any other person. 
(4) A representation may be express or implied 
(5) For the purposes of this section a representation may be regarded as made if 
it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system or device 
designed to receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without 
human intervention). " (Fraud Act 2006, c 35: 2) 
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The 2006 act abolishes several sections of the 1968 and 1978 theft act with regard to 
crimes of deception. Through the 2006 act the criminal activity of those involved in 
identity fraud has been addressed. The criminalising of false representations does 
however raise some questions as to the extent of this law and whether or not it allows 
for any personal freedom with regard to presentation of self. As the act focuses on the 
issue of representation it is necessary to ask what false representations are not criminal? 
If a person alters their first name or uses their middle name are they liable under the new 
law? 
American law on identity theft 
America's response to the crime of identity theft has been to introduce new laws 
specifically designed to prosecute people involved in identity theft. This law is the 
Identity Thcft and Assumption Deterrence Act 1998 which outlines the crime of identity 
theft and provides some parameters for prosecutors to determine what identity theft is 
and if someone has committed it. 
"(7) knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any 
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a 
felony under any applicable State or local law;. " (Identity Theft and Assumption 
Deterrence Act, 1998: Section 1028(a) of title 18) 
Other laws on identity theft in America include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999 
which outlaws the use of pretexting (also known as social engineering, see chapter 7). 
The act requires that financial institutions take all precautions necessary to protect and 
defend the consumer and associated non-public information from identity thieves who 
use pretexting to obtain information. However, according to Sullivan (2004) there are 
rules in place to outlaw this method of appropriating information and thereby 
committing identity theft. Private companies and financial institutions have been slow to 
adhere to the requirements laid out in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley. 
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The fact that America has laws against identity theft does not mean that identity theft is 
a high priority for prosecutors or the police in America. Sullivan goes on to argue that 
for police and prosecutors there is very little motivation to prosecute identity theft as the 
crime often requires a great deal of investigation and prosecution is at times difficult. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, identity fraud is form of criminal activity which has recently received 
attention both in the U. K. and abroad. In all definitions, however there are common 
themes, such as the emphasis on distinguishing and using both the terms identity fraud 
and identity theft. Also criminological study of identity fraud has looked primarily at the 
abuse of an individual's personal identity and acts of deception with regard to an 
individual's personal identity. This emphasis on the abuse of personal identities is due in 
part to a perceived rise in the abuse of personal identities as noted by recent surveys of 
identity fraud. Also accounts of the experiences of victims of identity theft help to 
emphasise the personal and financial harm caused by this non-violent, white collar 
crime. The apparent rise in popularity of identity fraud by organised crime groups, 
illegal immigrants and terrorists has also helped to make identity fraud an important 
issue in the 2 Vt century. The idea that there are people in society being deceptive about 
their 'true' or 'legitimate' identity has raised the general level of concern over the safety 
of identification processes. Arguably, the idea of reintroducing a National Identity Card 
Scheme is a response to this rise in concern over the safety of individual identities. 
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Chapter 4 
The fuss about identity cards 
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the political and social implications of introducing a National 
Identity Card Scheme. The history of previous identity card schemes both in the U. K. 
and in other countries is the first subject for discussion. The next area dealt with in this 
chapter is the political discourse over the subject of identity cards. Due to political 
disagreement over the implications for civil liberty implications of introducing an 
identity card scheme many modem commentaries can often be high polarised either for 
or against the identity card scheme. The issues raised in the debate over identity cards 
will be discussed. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the development of the concept 
of identity cards and to highlight the current discourse on this subject; this will be 
achieved through the use of literature from news reports and arguments for and against 
the introduction of identity cards. 
History of ID cards 
In 1995, plans were in place to introduce an identity card scheme, and a Green Paper on 
Identity Cards (1995) was published to invite opinions. Ajoint response titled 'Identity 
Cards Revisited'to this Green Paper came from the Institute for Public Policy Research 
and JUSTICE, which highlighted previous attempts to introduce identity cards in the 
United Kingdom and questioned the need for such a scheme and its overall usefulness. 
This report describes how earlier attempts have been made to use identity cards in the 
United Kingdom as far back 1939, when the outbreak of war brought about the creation 
of the 'National Registration Act'. This act was meant as a mean of efficiently operating 
the rationing schemes for food and clothing during the war. This act also allowed the 
police the power to demand to see a person's identity card without any connection to a 
crime being required. The 'National Registration Act' was eventually repealed in 195 3 
because of this practice by the police. According to this report, it was a test case in the 
High Court (in which a motorist refused to show his identity card and was subsequently 
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arrested) that brought about the end to this fonn of identity card. In this case, the Lord 
Chief Justice is quoted as saying: 
44.... although the police may have powers, it does not follow that they ought to 
exercise them on all occasions... it is obvious that the police now, as a matter of 
routine, demand the production of national registration cards whenever they stop 
or interrogate a motorist for whatever cause... This Act was passed for security 
purposes, and not for the purposes for which, apparently, it is now sought to be 
used... in this country we have always prided ourselves on the good feeling that 
exists between the police and the public and such action tends to make the public 
resentful of the acts of the police and inclines them to obstruct them rather than 
to assist them. " (Willcock v Muckle, 1952,1 K13367, at p. 369 cited in Identity 
Cards Revisited Report, 1995: 3) 
Since 1953, several Conservative and Labour governments have suggested reintroducing 
an identity card scheme. The arguments have usually focused on the advantages to 
administrative processes that an identity card would provide. It has been argued that 
with an ID card the welfare state would run more smoothly. According to Identity Cards 
Revisited (1995) each time the ID card was suggested, the opposition party, be it Labour 
or Conservative, have argued that the system would be too expensive. 
The issue of crime prevention and crime control began to emerge in discourse on 
identity cards during the mid 1990s. In the 1995 Green Paper on Identity Cards, their 
role as a means of improving law enforcement and crime prevention was introduced. 
However according to Davies (1996) the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
were less enthusiastic about the use of identity cards as a tool of crime prevention; they 
believed that demanding ID cards from the public would erode public relations. Davies 
notes: 
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"... the major problem in combating crime is not lack of identification 
procedures, but difficulties in the gathering of evidence and the pursuit of a 
prosecution. Indeed, few police or criminologists have been able to advance any 
evidence whatever that the existence of a card would actually reduce the 
incidence of crime, or the success of prosecution. " (Davies S, 1996- 5) 
However Davies does acknowledge the usefulness of the National DNA database as a 
means of improving the detection of offenders. Looking at fraud and the usefulness of 
ID cards in combating fraud, Davies notes that the more an identity card is valued by 
society the more likely it is that fraudsters will attempt to copy or counterfeit it. 
In 1997 when Tony Blair was shadow Home Secretary he argued against the identity 
card scheme proposed by the then Conservative government. While the 1996 proposal 
of an identity card was turned down, the latest identity card scheme proposed by the 
Labour government has gone forward despite a great deal of opposition. Why has this 
current identity card proposal succeeded where others have not? 
The answer is related to the changes that have taken place in society over the last 15 
years in particular with regard to identity and national security. To elaborate, in western 
societies such as the U. K. the culture has changed with regard to identity. Through 
technology like the internet and the opportunities to express an individual's sense of self 
on the internet, and medical advances such as gender reassignment procedures, there is 
more ambiguity available to individuals when it comes to their identity. Even in terms of 
dress and language it is becoming harder to distinguish things such as a person's class. It 
can be argued that we have developed into a society that allows for anonymity and 
greater self determination as to how others perceive us. This trend does have its negative 
side; on September I Vh 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States of America sparked 
world wide concern over Islamic extremist attacks. This concern over identifying 
terrorist was joined by concern over illegal immigration and asylum seekers and several 
high profile instances of identity theft and identity fraud. From 2001 until today we have 
in a sense been in a perfect storm of moral panic over the identification process. We 
need to know who the terrorists are, we need to know who is here legally and who is 
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here illegally and on an individual basis we need reassurance that no one is 
impersonating us and stealing our bank account details. 
The response to this concern came in 2002 with a new call for an identity card scheme. 
The scheme was originally called the Entitlement Card Scheme and the stated goal was 
to aid in preventing and detecting crime. This is why the scheme has not been shut 
down; the idea that the identity card can stop crime has given it the appearances of being 
more cost effective and justifying what is seen by some as an invasion of privacy. 
The entitlement card scheme proposed a new and secure form of ID which would be 
protected by biometric security. In principle the card would stop illegal immigration by 
making it impossible to work in the U. K. without one; it would stop benefit cheats by 
making the identity card a requirement of welfare applications. Ultimately, in principle, 
the hope was that it would stop terrorists from concealing themselves in the U. K. 
Passport security 
As the passport office has recently introduced a biometric element to passports there is 
information here on the ways a biometric system will be used and its usefulness. 
According to the United Kingdom Passport Service they are introducing the new facial 
recognition system for passports as a means to improve security around travel 
documents. One of the reasons for this effort is to support the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation's efforts to develop international standards for biometrics 
deployment within travel documents. 
ID cards in other countries 
In a report for Privacy International by Simon Davies (1996), on the use of identity 
cards around the world Davies notes that a number of countries have rejected tile idea of 
an identity card, amongst them America, Canada and Sweden. However, European 
countries such as France, Portugal, and Spain have adoptcd an identity card scheme, 
Looking at the use of identity cards around the world, Davies notes that there are a 
variety of reasons for establishing an identity card system: 
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"Race, politics and religion were often at the heart of older ID systems. The 
threat of insurgents or political extremists, and the exercise of religious 
discrimination have been all too common as motivation for the establishment of 
ID systems which would force enemies of the State into registration, or make 
them vulnerable in the open without proper documents. In Pakistan, the cards are 
used to enforce a quota system, in China, they are used as a tool of social 
engineering. " (Davies S, 1996: 1) 
When discussing the previous plans to introduce an identity card scheme in the UK in 
the 1990s Davies notes that this scheme like others introduced in Holland and Australia 
was intended as a means of improving administrative efficiency and combating fraud in 
the welfare system. Davies notes that as well as providing improved services and a 
method of combating identity fraud, the introduction of an identity card also involves an 
increase in police powers with regard to detaining people and demanding they present 
their identity card when it is requested by the police. 
When considering the issue of identity cards it is important to understand the policy 
based criticism levelled at previously proposed identity card schemes, namely the issues 
of cost and the invasion of privacy. As the idea of using an identity card as a means of 
preventing crime began to emerge it can be argued that people who were pro identity 
cards finally had a counter argument. The political upside of suggesting identity cards in 
the 21" century is that they appear to be a means of stopping identity fraud, illegal 
immigration and terrorism and answer our concerns over deception in the identification 
process. 
Political discourse on ID cards and views of opposition groups 
The history of identity cards has often involved heated debate, and the current plans for 
a National Identity Card Scheme have motivated several different protest groups to 
speak out against it. The debate surrounding the introduction of the National Identity 
Card Scheme is an important area to discuss as the debate amongst protest groups and 
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political parties has raised several important issues about the effect an identity card will 
have on society in the U. K. The criticisms laid against previously proposed identity card 
schemes, such as issues of cost and implications for people's civil liberties, have been 
raised again by politicians and protest groups. 
In a study by the London School of Economics the issues of cost were attacked; also, 
groups such as Liberty, Privacy International and N021D have attacked the identity card 
on the grounds of invasion of privacy. These are important areas of contention that the 
govenu-nent has attempted to address with varying degrees of success. Ultimately, 
however, very few have tried to challenge the identity card on the grounds of whether or 
not it will work. 
The political discourse on whether or not to introduce the identity card has focused on 
issues of privacy and cost. This discourse has lead to several changes to the National 
Identity Card Scheme since it was originally proposed. Cost and effects to people's 
sense of privacy have lead to several changes to the identity card even before it has been 
introduced. Cost has driven as much of the political discourse as the issue of privacy. 
There are several elements to the issue of cost; setting up the system, running it, and the 
cost to the individual. On all three elements there have been differing opinions as to how 
much the identity card will cost. The cost of setting up the system has been judged to be 
in the billions and no number is available to determine what the system will cost to run 
as there is no pre-existing identity card system to compare the U. K. identity card scheme 
to, By far the most controversial issue of cost is that of the cost to the individual. Some 
estimates have the cost of the individual identity card at E200 pounds per person and 
others at E30. The issue of cost to the individual may not have been such a big issue if 
people had a choice in whether or not to have the card, but one element of the identity 
card which the government have remained firm on is that it is compulsory to everyone 
in the U. K. 11 
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Another significant effect is the limiting of full access to cards to public sector services 
only. Originally, the 2002 proposal envisaged the identity card being used throughout 
society for both public and private sector institutions. The government went so far as to 
offer access to the National Identity Register to private companies for a fee. The 
thinking behind this move was that it would help keep the cost of the identity card 
down. In principle, the more the identity card was used, the better it would be at 
preventing and detecting crime. However, when these plans were revealed through the 
media, opponents of the identity card argued that the card's function had crept too far 
and that its use in all aspects of society would be too invasive. So access to the register 
was limited to public services only with private companies allowed to verify but not 
alter the identity card, at a cost, and with the permission of the card holder, 
Opposition to the identity card scheme has been voiced not only through media 
reporting but also on the websites of various civil liberty advocates such as N0211), 
Liberty, Privacy International and Justice Not Vengeance. On these websites, attacks on 
the identity card scheme often focus on the potential curtailment of civil liberties, the 
cost of the identity card scheme and issues of personal privacy. The concerns of civil 
rights campaigners with regard to cost are that by forcing people to pay; E35 for an 
identity card, the government is in effect creating a tax on identity. The director of 
Liberty Shami Chakrabarti, also indicated that there were implications with regard to the 
issue of personal privacy and civil liberty. Published on the Liberty website Chakrabarti 
outlines her opposition to the identity card: 
"My problem as Director of Liberty is that at the height of the so-called War on 
Terror, when absolute rules like prohibition on torture are compromised by our 
political rulers, how much harder to defend more subtle and qualified rights like 
the presumption of privacy from the chilling slogan politics of 'nothing to hide, 
nothing to fear'. " (Chakrabarti S 2007: 1) 
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Privacy has been a major issue for opponents of the identity card scheme. They believe 
that identity cards will undermine societal trust and create a rift between the individual 
and the state. This issue of creating a rift between the individual and the state is one that 
brought the old identity card scheme of the 1940s and 50s to an end in the U. K. 
However, it is worth noting that other countries have identity card schemes for example 
France Belgium and Spain all have identity cards and there does not appear to be major 
concerns over infringement of civil liberties or privacy rights being impeded. 
It may be that the concerns over the identity card in the U. K are not specifically 
concerned with the idea of an identity card, rather with the reasoning behind for the 
identity card, and the justification for the information it requests, and the political 
motivation for the scheme. Chakrabarti from the human rights advocacy group 'Liberty' 
argues that: 
"Perhaps when policy is built upon opinion polling rather than principle, these 
are the inevitable authoritarian results? But I wonder. Support for the intrusive, 
discriminatory and expensive folly of identity cards in steady decline. The latest 
bright idea of an information free-for-all within Government with the massive 
corresponding risks of error and fraud will only exacerbate widening popular 
concern as to the competence of public administration and who really serves 
whom. " (Chakrabarti S 2007: 2) 
Other organisations who oppose the introduction of the identity card are Justice Not 
Vengeance (JNV), Stand, N021D and Defy ID. According to Justice Not Vengeance 
(JNV) the aim of the National Identity Card Scheme is not to protect against terrorism or 
to stop crime, it is rather an instrument to expand state control. In order to promote this 
view of the identity card, Justice Not Vengeance in 2004 noted the shortcomings of the 
National Identity Card in its April 2004 Anti War Briefing - NO ID. In this briefing, 
JNV note that identity cards will not stop terrorism or detect terrorists before they 
attack. This approach is used by many of the anti ID card groups, highlighting the ways 
that an identity will not work in the way that is intended. 
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Another approach to opposing the National Identity Card Scheme is to question the 
further implications of introducing an identity card. Like many groups opposed to the 
introduction of the identity card, Defy ID highlight the role of the National Identity 
Register and how this may be as much a risk to civil liberties as the actual identity card. 
'7he ability to check your identity against your entry in the National Identity 
Register will not just be available to the Immigration Service and the Police but 
also to 'providers of public services and private sector organisations (e. g. 
employers, banks, credit reference agencies, libraries, dentists, utilities 
companies, student loans company etc). The ID card bill includes a power which 
in theory could force 'any person' to provide information about you for 
background checks. " (Defy-ID 2004-05: 1-2) 
Defy-ID also note that the government's claim that the identity card will prevent 
terrorists from obtaining access to services in the U. K. without the ID card will mean 
that ordinary citizens will also be under the same constraints. 
Another group opposed to the identity card scheme is N0211); this organisation 
campaigns against the Identity Card Act. Like Defy-ID, N021D have highlighted the 
downside of introducing ID cards with regard to preventing crimes such as illegal 
immigration, benefit fraud and identity fraud. On the subject of identity fraud N021D 
note that: 
"Both Australia and the USA have far worse problems of identity theft than 
Britain, precisely because of a general reliance on a single reference source. 
Costs usually cited for of identity-related crime here include much fraud not 
susceptible to an ID system. Nominally 'secure', trusted, ID is more useful to the 
fraudster. The Home Office has not explained how it will stop registration by 
identity thieves in the personae of innocent others. Coherent collection of all 
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sensitive personal data by government, and its easy transmission between 
departments, will create vast new opportunities for data-theft. " (N021D, 2007: 2) 
Trevor Mendharn is a writer on the subject of civil liberties who is opposed to identity 
cards and is a coordinator in Scotland for N021D. Several questions on the subject of 
civil liberties and the National Identity Card Scheme and the National Identity Register 
were posed to Mendham: 
"I)What is it that the national register does that other government 
and private 
databases dont do that makes it such a threat to civil liberties? 
1) It's the arbitrary invasion of privacy. One big, central database 
containing all sorts of information about us. In particular the 
"audit trail" means that the government will have a record of cvcry 
time our card is checked against the central database. This is 
defined in para 9 of Schedule 1: 
http: //www. opsi. gov. uk/ACTS/acts2006/6001 5--b. htm#sch I 
And we can't "opt out". 
21 Given the way our society works what is the problem with having 
a national register? We already freely give out masses of information 
about ourselves to private organisations and government agencies. To play a bit 
of devils advocate 
where is the issue of liberty? To be a part of society you have to be rccognised 
by society won't a national register merely formalise what we do every day? If 
being unknown to the state is a liberty then we all give it up quite early on in life 
don't we? 
2) You used one vital word: "freely". For example I have chosen NOT to 
use supermarket loyalty cards. I with have no choice about the NIR 
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and ID Card. In addition the existing databases are all "information silos". 
Government departments -and private companies - know what they need 
to know and no more. The NIR turns this Principle on ifs head and 
says "We'll record everything we can just in case it's useful". 
Yes, there are times when we must give up information for society to 
function, I accept that. But currently they are considered necessary 
exceptions rather than the general rule. 
3) Why is privacy more important than security? Is it better to have privacy 
and crimes like illegal immigration or is it better to have no privacy but the 
reassurance that the state knows who every member of society is and can verify 
that information? 
There is no evidence that ID Cards will actually stop these crimes 
and give us any significant extra security. Many countries have 
compulsory ID cards and still suffer from illegal immigration, crime 
and terrorism. 
Privacy is essential for a free society. Without privacy it's very 
difficult to be different, to be an individual. Or, in political 
terms, a dissident. 
That's why privacy is included in article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/udhr/lang/eng. htm 
We're supposedly fighting the terrorists in order to preserve our way 
of life. If we give up that way of life then they've won. " (Mendham. T, 2006: 1 
of I see appendix 4 for original email) 
Opposition groups, when discussing identity cards, often promote public protest by 
petitions against the introduction of the identity card and by public demonstrations, and 
their attack on the cards often focuses both on the identity card's ability to succeed and 
the possible negative implications of what might happen if the scheme were to be 
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introduced. Discussion of the impact of identity cards can be found in many of the major 
newspapers where members of protest groups orjournalists often speculate about the 
potential impact of the cards. 
An example is an article in the Sunday Mail by Simon Davies (2004), entitled Do you 
want MI5 to know your medical details? They soon will and it will cost you S35'. 
Simon Davies is the head of Privacy International, an organisation that is very vocal in 
its resistance to identity cards, citing the human rights and civil liberties that will be 
infringed or denied by the introduction of a National Identity Card Scheme. In his article 
Davies discusses how the identity card is a means of creating a surveillance society that 
will deny people the right to privacy rather than protect them or make their lives easier: 
"This is not a plan to help citizens beat the problem of wallets over stuffed with 
cards. It is a surveillance system that will prove a disgrace to democracy" 
(Davies S, 2004: 13) 
Davies highlights the creation of a variety of offences that accompany the present 
identity card scheme. According to Davies, there are a number of fines that accompany 
the new identity card scheme. These fincs cover things such as failure to report changes 
in personal circumstances, or providing false information which can be dealt with by a 
fine of aE 1000 or up to two years in prison. 
Along with the new identity card, there will be the introduction of a National Identity 
Register where information on every person enrolled in the system will be stored. In the 
bill for the identity card scheme, the Home Secretary has the power to divulge 
identification information to a range of government agencies. According to Davies tllcre 
is also legislation giving the Home Secretary the power to compel people to rcgister and 
to register people without their consent. 
"So we shall all be compelled constantly to provide personal information to 
government, which will then pass the data on to any organisation it chooses, 
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Tough luck if you don't feel comfortable with the police knowing your every 
detail. Or if you don't like the idea of the Inland Revenue knowing your medical 
records. " (Davies S, 2004: 13) 
Aside from the impact of an identity card scheme on society, Davies also discusses the 
crime of identity fraud and how an identity card would influence this type of crime. 
Davies (1996) argues that the causes of fraud are situated in human and organisational 
issues rather than a lack of technology. Looking at benefit agencies from around the 
world and their work on the causes of fraud, Davies argues that the three most common 
forms of fraud are- 
"False declaration, or non declaration, of income and assets (problems which 
are also components of non declaration of income for tax) 
Criminal acquisition of multiple benefits using false identification 
More conventional fraud and theft of benefit payments" (Davics. S, 1996: 6) 
Therefore the introduction of an identity card scheme would have minimal effect on the 
levels of fraud. With regard to illegal immigration Davies argues that identity cards will 
help in combating illegal immigration if the police and other services involved in 
investigating illegal immigration are given broad powers to stop and demand identity 
cards from people, According to Davies, these powers could either be uscd on everyone, 
resulting in a culture of constant identity checking; or by targeting minority groups or 
communities. With either alternatives, questions of civil liberties are raised, 
On the subject of police powers, Davies highlights that in many countries there have 
been claims of abuse made against the police with regard to demanding identity cards. 
In these cases of abuse, the failure to produce an identity card when demanded has also 
lead to people being detained: 
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"While it is true that cards containing non sensitive data are less likely to be used 
against the individual, cards are often alleged to be the vehicle for discriminatory 
practices. " (Davies S, 1996: 8) 
Davies goes on to argue that by their very nature identity cards are discriminatory as 
they will often be used against minority groups to combat illegal immigration. 
According to Davies if there were no discrimination in the use of identity cards, this 
would result in random checks of the entire population which would prove to be 
politically unacceptable. 
News reports on identity cards also include discussion of the financial implications of 
introducing a National Identity Card Scheme. In an article for BBC News (2004), the 
use of civil financial fines for people who do not register for the new identity card 
scheme is reported. These fines maybe as much as E2500. The decision on making 
identity cards compulsory will go on until 2013 according to this article. The reason put 
forward by the government for making identity cards compulsory is to avoid terrorist 
attacks and to improve standards of detection with regard to climes such as Identity 
fraud, people smuggling and illegal employment. The use of Britain for health tourism 
and abuse of the welfare system is also a concern. Concerns have been raised by 
opposition parties and civil rights campaign groups. For the opposition parties the 
concern is about the implementation of this scheme and its cost: 
"Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman Mark Oaten said: 'I would much 
rather see the; E3bn that's going to be incurred in looking at better intelligence'. 
Shadow Home Secretary David Davis said Tories were sceptical about the home 
office's ability to successfully introduce ID cards - but added the idea must be 
looked at 'carefully". 'The practical problems in the way of ID cards are 
immense. ' "If a scheme can overcome these problems without sacri ficing civil 
liberties, ID cards should be introduced soon- not in ten years time. The terrorist 
threat is real, and is here today, " Mr Davis said. " (BBC News, 2004: 2-3) 
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News reports also cover the issue of the social implications of introducing an identity 
card and the political nature of the decision to introduce such a scheme. The reporting of 
the Queens speech by the Independent in 2004 highlights the criticisms levelled at 
Labour for introducing the identity card scheme. Morris (2004) notes that: 
"Mr Blunkett has faced accusations he is using the threat of terrorism to give 
impetus to his pet project. Many Labour MPs, - including cabinet members- are 
worried about giving the state too much power; the Commission for Racial 
Equality has warned that ID Cards could inflame racial tensions, Critics point 
out that an identity system was in operation at the scene of the Madrid 
bombings. " (Morris N 2004: 1) 
In this report, Morris highlights the claims that then Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
David Blunkett were at the time scaremongering in order to gain during elections. The 
report also looks at the introduction of new laws regarding drugs, organised crime, anti 
social behaviour and terrorism. Since the Queen's speech there has been a great deal of 
activity with regard to identity card legislation. In a report by Michael White, David 
Hencke and Alan Travis (2005) for the Guardian, it is noted that bills such as the 
identity card bill would be sacrificed because of the approach of an election in May 
2005 and difficulty in gaining support from the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats. 
... The Tories don't know where they are on the bill so the easiest thing to do 
would be to stop it,, the minister said, in reference to Conservative nip flops on 
the issue. They abstained on the third reading. " (White. M, Ilencke. D, Travis 
. A, 2005: 2) 
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In a report by Andrew Grice for the Independent the political strategies used by both the 
Labour government and the Conservatives are discussed. According to Gricc- 
"Labour is preparing to blame the Tories for the delay, accusing them of 
weakening the fight against terrorism. This is increasing the pressure on the 
Opposition not to scupper the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, which would allow 
the Home Secretary to put suspects under house arrest. Senior Tories fear that if 
they halt both measures, it would make it easier for Labour to portray them as 
4soft' on crime. 'We can block one of the Bills but not both, "' (Grice. A, 2005: 
6) 
The political battles over the introduction of the identity card have continued as the date 
for the introduction of the identity card scheme approaches. These reports on the 
progress of the bill to introduce an identity card to Britain show that this decision is not 
being made in a vacuum, it is in part linked to new anti-terrorism legislation and the 
public appearance of the political parties with regard to crime. But as the advocates for 
the identity card bill begin to highlight its usefulness, so too have its critics challenged 
the wisdom of even introducing an identity card scheme. 
The Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties have outlined, on their websites and in 
statements to the general public, their objections to the introduction of an identity card 
scheme. The Conservatives, while previously suggesting the introduction of identity 
cards have denounced the current identity card scheme. According to the Conservative 
party website, if the Conservatives were to win the next election they would 
immediately scrap the Identity Card Scheme. Also on the Conservative Party website is 
an outline of the reasons why the identity card is not a good idea and what the 
Conservatives would do instead. The website states that identity cards would not 
succeed in preventing terrorism, illegal immigration, identity fraud or human trafficking. 
The website also notes the cost of the system at E20 billion and the cost to the individual 
for an identity card at E93 as reasons not to introduce the system. It states, 
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"ID cards will cost each person E93: According to government estimates, You 
will pay at least E93 for a combined ID card and passport package but, given this 
government's appalling record of implementing IT projects, this figure is likely 
to go up. Also, if your ID card is stolen, or you lose it, you'll have to pay E30 for 
a replacement. If you change your name when you get married, you'll have to 
pay for a new ID card. If one of your relatives dies and you forget to return their 
ID card, you could be fined L1,00O. " (Conservative Party, 2007 see appendix 5 
for original email) 
Aside from the shortcomings of the system and its costs, the Conservatives also criticise 
the identity cards on the grounds of the government's success rate with regard to 
implementing large scale information technology projects and the invasion of privacy 
the identity card will constitute. The alternative to identity cards, according to the 
Conservatives, is to create more prison places, more drug rehabilitation facilities in 
prisons, and a boarder police force as a means of detecting and preventing illegal 
immigration and the movement of terrorists into the U. K. 
Of all the political parties represented in parliament, the one party to have opposed the 
identity card scheme most consistently is the Liberal Democrat party. Not only does this 
party oppose the identity card, it has also suggested an alternative to the identity card 
scheme. Mathew Hanney policy researcher to Nick Clegg MP and Liberal Democrat 
Shadow Home Secretary has written: 
"Below I have outlined the Liberal Democrat position on the points you raised: 
I. How do you think the proposed ID card system will fare as a means of 
preventing crime? 
1. The government has yet to offer any conclusive proof that ID cards prove 
beneficial in the prevention of crime. Indeed, it is possible that they would lead 
to an increase in some crimes, such as fraud. Though the government have 
insisted that these cards would be impossible to forge, this claim is somewhat 
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implausible. ID cards will become the "holy grail" to fraudsters and terrorists, 
and with ever developing technology it seems unlikely that we can be definite 
about their security. 
2. How do you think the proposed Id card system will fare as a means of 
detecting - 
criminals 
terrorists 
illegal immigrants 
2. There has been no positive link established between the introduction of ID 
cards and a reduction in crime or terrorism. We are sceptical about the idea that 
ID cards would reduce illegal immigration. Employers in industries with a high 
level of illegal immigrant labour arc already required to check identity 
documents before employing someone. It is the blatant disregard to this 
procedure which needs to be tackled (via inspections), rather than the question of 
ID cards. 
3. What alternative to id cards - with regard to preventing crimes such as id fraud, 
illegal immigration and terrorism does the Liberal Democrats propose? 
3. Obviously our alternative policies in these wide ranging areas are complex, 
and I recommend our website (www. libdems. org. uk-) for more in-depth 
information. But our top policies are: with the money saved from not 
implementing the ID card scheme, we would put 10,000 more police on tile 
street along with investment in extra equipment and new technology. 
We do support biometrics passports, bclicving these would be more effective at 
tackling cross border fraud, terrorism and illegal immigration. We also propose 
to establish a National Border Agency, bringing together officcrs from customs, 
police and immigration who currently have overlapping responsibilities. We 
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back the use of phone tapping and other 'intercept communications' evidence in 
court against terrorist suspects. 
4. What do you think the social implications of having an id card in the U. K. will 
be? How will it change our lives? 
4. Introducing ID cards in Britain would have a huge social impact. Britain is a 
country with a strong tradition of civil liberties. Also, unlike every other country 
with ID cards, the UK does not have a written constitution to protect its citizens. 
With the relationship between state and citizen not properly defined by law, the 
risks of an abuse of state power are greater. ID cards will unquestionably tilt the 
balance of power in the UK away from individuals and towards the government. 
The cards could also lead to a culture of mistrust, for example ID cards may be 
required to keep an appointment with a GP. It may also lead to a growth in 
discrimination, An increase in racial and ethnic tensions as a result of the 
introduction of ID card is regrettably an all too likely occurrence. 
5. What difficulties do you think the government will face in trying to implement 
this system? 
5. The possible difficulties involved in implementing a scheme on such a large 
scale are numerous. Yet such errors will have serious implications such as the 
withholding of benefits and the denial of services. 
The government has a woeful history of organising large scale IT projects, with 
large scale overspending practically the norm. ID cards will be the largest scale 
public sector IT project undertaken, and considering the failure of smaller 
government projects such as in the Police Service, Courts Service, CSA and 
NHS it is not surprisingly that we feel a lack of confidence in the prospects for 
this scheme. 
105 
6. From my research so far I have determined that a lot of people want the id 
card and think that it is a good idea (Recent Yougov poll) - what is it they are not 
considering or are unaware of? 
6. We are sceptical of how reliable any poll finding can be, since the 
Govemment still has not come clean about the real cost of this scheme or its 
draw backs. " (Hanney. M, 2006: 1-2 see appendix 6 for original email) 
Most opposition to the identity card scheme presented by political parties has addressed 
the practical shortcomings of the identity card, but some parties have also addressed the 
implications for civil liberties of the scheme. One of the main alternatives discussed has 
been the introduction of a border police force. This idea has been suggested by both the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats as a means of improving security against illegal 
immigration and terrorism. Curiously, however, neither the Conservatives nor the 
Liberal Democrats have suggested a policy to directly confront the rise in identity fraud. 
While the Liberal Democrats have suggested recruiting 10,000 more police officers, 
these are not directly intended for investigation of fraud. Equally, while the 
Conservatives have suggested a solution to illegal immigration and terrorism, they have 
not presented a solution to identity fraud. Both parties, rather than addressing the 
'unholy trinity' of 21' crime (terrorism, illegal immigration and identity fraud) have 
opted to focus on the crimes of terrorism and illegal immigration. While this may 
decrease the overall numbers of cases of identity fraud in the U. K. it will not address 
identity fraud committed for profit or over the internet. 
It can be argued that while the debate over the introduction of an identity card scheme 
has raised several important issues for the study of identity cards, there may also be a 
degree of bias in the discourse provided by politicians and protest groups. The debate 
over the introduction of identity cards can be seen as one facet of a larger debate over 
the expansion of state powers. With increased concern over terrorism the debate about 
how much power the state should have to monitor and detain people has increased since 
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the attacks in New York in 2001. The protest groups discussed above not only oppose 
the introduction of identity cards but are also vocal opponents of the expansion of police 
powers. As such, their views on identity cards may be seen as keeping to a more general 
perspective of the role of the state. Equally, the views expressed by politicians against 
identity cards may also be seen as keeping to some general political stance on the role of 
the state. Historically both the Conservative and Labour parties while in power have 
suggested an identity card scheme; equally both parties when not in power have 
criticised the government for suggesting the introduction of an identity card scheme. As 
such, the views of political parties and protest groups are useful but also open to a 
degree of bias. 
Conclusion 
The history of identity card schemes in the U. K. shows us that while the U. K has 
previously accepted and used an identity card there has still been controversy and 
criticism attached to any attempt to re-introduce an identity card scheme to the U. K. The 
current reintroduction of the identity card to the U. K., however, faces an even more 
heated debate. While older identity card schemes emphasised their usefulness as a tool 
for improving administrative processes, the current identity card scheme is intended as a 
tool for crime prevention and detection. 
It can be argued that this shift in purpose for an identity card is due to increased concern 
over terrorism, illegal immigration and identity fraud. However, in the process of trying 
to make society safer by stopping identity thieves through identity cards, critics claim 
that Britain is in danger of becoming a surveillance society. It is argued that by 
introducing an identity card scheme the government will focus more on monitoring 
everyone than stopping those involved in criminal activity. 
While most of the discourse between supporters of the identity card scheme and its 
critics focuses on this question of a surveillance society, less is said about the potential 
of identity cards to prevent identity fraud. The goal of this study is to discuss how 
identity cards might impact the activities of the minority of people who use identity 
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fraud, rather than the majority of people who do not. To achieve this goal, this study has 
explored the use of simulated identity theft as a method of researching identity fraud. 
This study has also used analysis and discussion over the internet to research the crime 
of identity fraud and the use of identity cards. In the next chapter the methodological 
approach of this study will be discussed. 
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WE MICUELLE BROWN CASE 
This case from America is an important example of identity fraud as it highlighted the 
dangers people faced and the lack of legislation to protect victims. 
Below is the verbal testimony of Michelle Brown, given to the Senate Committee 
Hearing on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government 
Information "Identity Theft: How to Protect and Restore Your Good Name" (July 12, 
2000) 
Verbal Testimony by Michelle Brown 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 
I am pleased to be in your presence today and I genuinely thank you for the 
opportunity to elevate the invasive crime known as identity theft. This is a topic 
that I am unfortunately, intimately familiar with. 
My name is Michelle Brown. I am 29 years old and have been working in the 
disciplined field of international banking for the last 7 years. I am an ambitious 
and hard-working individual; I'm certain that I am much like any of your 
cousins, your nieces, your daughters. I believe that I strongly represent any 
average, respectable citizen of the United States. However, there is one clear-cut 
issue that separates me from nearly the rest of the population, I have lived and 
breathed the nightmare of identity theft. I will tell you first-hand, this is a 
devastation beyond any outsiders' comprehension, a nearly unbearable burden 
that no one should ever have to suffer. 
Imagine establishing credit at age 17, and building a perfect credit profile over 
the next II years. Imagine working consistently since age 15, helping to finance 
your education at an accredited University to advance your future success in life. 
Imagine never having been in trouble with the law. Imagine the violation you 
would internalize as you realize some vile individual you have never met nor 
wronged, has taken everything you have built-up from scratch to grossly use and 
abuse your good name and unblemished credit profile. 
That's precisely what happened to me. I discovered this new blackened reality on 
January 12,1999, when a Bank of America representative called me inquiring 
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about the first payment on a brand new truck, which had been purchased just the 
previous month. I immediately placed fraud alerts on my credit reports, 
cancelled all credit cards, and even placed a fraud alert on my Driver's License 
number. From that day forward, I unearthed the trail of this menace's 
impersonation and attempted to work with the current faulty system to protect 
myself from any further abuse. The system clearly failed me. 
To summarize, over a year and a half from January 1998 through July 1999, one 
individual impersonated me to procure over $50,000 in goods and services. Not 
only did she damage my credit, but she escalated her crimes to a level that I 
never truly expected: she engaged in drug trafficking. The crime resulted in my 
erroneous arrest record, a warrant out for my arrest, and eventually, a prison 
record when she was booked under my name as an inmate in the Chicago 
Federal Prison. 
The impersonation began with the perpetratoes theft of my rental application 
from my landlord's property management office in January 1998. Immediately, 
the perpetrator set up cellular service, followed by residential telephone and 
other utility services, attempted to obtain timeshare financing and department 
store credit cards, purchased a $32,000 truck, had nearly $5,000 worth of 
liposuction performed to her body, and even rented properties in my name 
including signing a year lease. Not only did this person defraud the Department 
of Motor Vehicles in obtaining a duplicate drivcrs'license (with my name and 
number) in October 1998, but she even presented herself as me with this 
identification to the DEA and before a federal judge when she was caught 
trafficking 3,000 pounds of marijuana in May 1999. 
She remained a fugitive for almost 6 months while still assuming my name-- and 
was finally turned in by an acquaintance in July 1999, 
Months later - in September 1999 -I was stopped at LAXs Customs after 
returning from a vacation in Mexico (after she was already in prison). While I 
explained my innocence to several agents in a stream of tears, and as I attempted 
to clearly distinguish this Michelle Brown from the "other Michelle Brown" with 
a criminal record, I was blatantly treated with strong suspicion. I was, as is 
110 
typical for an identity fraud victim, guilty until proven innocent. I was finally let 
go after an hour, after the police were called to vouch for me. This situation 
reinforced my fear that I may be wrongly identified as the criminal, which could 
end up with my arrest, or worse yet, being taken into custody to serve time in 
jail. After having seen so many inefficiencies and blatant errors in the system, I 
feel no assurance nor can I receive any concrete evidence from authorities that 
this type of insane mix-up would never happen again. 
It was tormenting to know someone was in essence living the good life at my 
expense, and I was left in the dust with the taxing chore of proving my 
innocence. The restoration of my credit and my good name was a seemingly 
never-ending process. I was forced to make literally thousands of phone calls, fill 
out various forms, submit all sorts of documents, and have many documents 
notarized. Without a doubt, I was entirely consumed with the whole painstaking 
process. I gained nothing from putting over 500 hours into the chore of 
restoration; all in all, it was an exhausting waste of a good person's time and a 
massive drain on my life and energy. At one point, I even feared my safety after 
I learned that the perpetrator had previously been linked with a convicted 
murderer. The whole identity fraud experience was, by far, the darkest, most 
challenging and terrifying chapter of my life. 
I faced many difficulties in clearing my name, and I still face the fear that I will 
forever be linked with the perpetrator's criminal record. I have encountered 
widespread inefficiency and general insensitivity at nearly every turn, and know 
that there are most definitely not enough dedicated resources and governmental 
authorities to assist victims and to simplify the burden on the innocent's life. 
Clearly changes need to be made. The Government not only needs to promote 
initiatives to shorten and simplify restoration of one's name and credit, but also 
to facilitate early detection and termination of an abused name, and most 
importantly, to deter criminals from the lure of such an easy crime by enforcing 
swift and severe punishment. 
I think that Senator Feinstein's Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2000 is 
definitely a positive initiative and will put the legislation in the right direction to 
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fight this crime. I support the two corresponding bills and recommend the 
enforcement of such initiatives. 
I came here today because I feel responsible to limit the abuse of other innocent's 
names and their lives. I know bow terribly ton-nenting it is to be a victim. I am 
living proof that identity theft is a very real crime, with very real victims, and 
true life-altering consequences. It's astounding that my life-long discipline to be 
a law abiding citizen, and to have the diligence to establish perfect credit, was 
reversed so easily, so quickly, simply because I represent the perfect victim in a 
criminal's eyes. This crime is clearly on the rise, and no one at this time is 
completely protected from becoming the next victim. 
I realize the scenario of becoming an identity fraud victim seems entirely far- 
fetched and implausible to many of you. I know the feeling. I was once in your 
shoes. 
I thank you for your time and for the opportunity to present my story and views 
today. I hope it is clear now that many changes need to effected to the current 
system to combat this crime and protect victims. This fact is crystal clear in my 
mind. 
(Brown 2000: 1-5) 
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THE DEREK BOND CASE 
erek Lloyd Sykes (BBC News 2003: 1) 
Fhe Real Derek Bond (BBC News, 2005: 1) 
One of the most famous cases of identity fraud in recent years was the case of 72 year 
old Derek Bond. What makes Mr Bond's case so noteworthy is that it was the first high 
profile case of identity fraud involving a U. K. citizen. This case prompted the rise in 
concern with regard to identity fraud in the U. K. and showed in dramatic fashion the 
dangers of identity fraud to the general public. 
Derek Bond was arrested in South Africa in January 2003, after a warrant for his arrest 
was issued by the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (F. B. I. ). Bond was placed 
in a South African jail for three weeks, before it was revealed that he was not the man 
the F. B. I. was looking for. The man the F. B. I. was really looking for was a 72 year old 
Briton called Derek Lloyd Sykes who was living in America and using Bond's identity. 
Using Mr Bond's identity, Sykes had participated in a telemarketing scheme with two 
other men in Houston Texas which had stolen the equivalent of three million pounds 
during the 1990s. According to Allison (2003) it is estimated that Sykes had been using 
Bond's identity since 1989. Using Bond's identity Sykes was indicted in 1999 of 22 
charges of money laundering, wire fraud and transporting stolen property. Based on this 
indictment, the F. B. I. issued a warrant for the arrest of Derek Bond, unaware that the 
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man the F. B. I. was seeking was not Derek Bond. This lead to South African Police in 
Durban arresting Derek Bond on 6 February 2003; based on this mistake, Derek Bond 
was imprisoned for 20 days. When the F. B. I. finally caught Sykes, they found he was 
using another false identity: Robert James Grant, and that he had used this identity for 
three years. After Sykes was caught, Derek Bond was released, 
The case of Derek Bond is important in terms of publicising identity fraud in the U. K. 
While subsequent media reporting, up until the case of Charles Stopford (otherwise 
known as Christopher Buckingham), focused on internet based financially motivated 
fraud, the case of Derek Bond was the first high profile case of identity fraud in the U. K. 
and illustrates in many respects the worst case scenario for victims of this type of crime. 
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THE CHRISTOPHER BUCKINGHAM CASE 
low Ot Am low v 
0 
Nme, eoý" 11 ' ýu "ý' , A 
-. dMCharles 
Albert Stopford (BBC News, 2006: 1) 
Aside from the 2003 case of Derek Bond, the most well known and arguably shocking 
case of identity fraud in the U. K. is the 2005 case of Charles Albert Stopford and his 
impersonation of Christopher Buckingham. While the case of Derek Bond was 
instrumental in displaying what many would consider the worst case scenario in terms 
of identity fraud, the discovery of Stopford's impersonation showed how prolonged and 
invasive an impersonation could be. Stopford had been impersonating Buckingham for 
23 years, and in that time he had married as Buckingham had two children and worked 
as a computer consultant. In 2006, in a report for ABC news, Martin Bashir and Rob 
Wallace referred to Stopford as 'The Great American Impostor'. What makes Stopford's 
impersonation so noteworthy was the length and depth of his impersonation. Stopford 
had for 23 years abandoned his real identity in favour of being known as Christopher 
Buckingham. This form of identity fraud is known as wholesale assumption (see chapter 
8 for more on wholesale assumption). 
Charles Albert Stopford was born in Orlando Florida in 1963, the eldest of nine 
children. It is reported by Bashir and Wallace that as a child Stopford was fond orplay 
acting, and in his youth there were two events which may have been influential in his 
subsequent decision to take up a new identity. Firstly, when he was in his teens, 
Stopford's parent's divorced, leaving Stopford feeling deeply humiliated and prompting 
him to leave home. Secondly, it is reported by Bashir and Wallace that in his youth 
Stopford had blown up a man's car with a pipe bomb. The man was a manager at a 
Burger King who had fired one of Stopford's friends. After this incident, Stopford was 
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arrested and prosecuted for the bombing. Soon after this, Stopford left America for 
Europe and the U. K. 
In the U. K., Stopford began implementing his plan to become someone else. The first 
step was to obtain a new identity, and Stopford chose to use the identity of a dead child 
called Christopher Buckingham who was born towards the end of 1962 and died several 
months later in 1963. Stopford found Buckingham's identity by visiting the archive of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages. According to Stopford, he chose Buckingham's identity 
for the following reasons: 
... There was a very, very short time between birth and death. ' Buckingham said. 
'There would be very little registration, if any registration, with doctors. There 
would be no state documents &A clean state. "' (Stopford cited in Bashir. M, 
Wallace J, 2006: 3) 
Along with Buckingham's birth certificate, Stopford accumulated other forms of 
identification including a National Insurance number and a British passport. In terms of 
identification, both of these forms of identification are crucial: the National Insurance 
number allowed Stopford to work in the U. K., and the passport gave him the appearance 
of a genuine U. K. citizen. According to Stopford: 
"It's like the food chain. You have to use smaller documents to create bigger 
documents, and those bigger documents then create even larger documents... " 
(Stopford cited in Bashir. M, Wallace. R, 2006: 3) 
In the 23 years that Stopford impersonated Christopher Buckingham, he was able to 
obtain all the documentation Buckingham would have had if he had lived. In terms of 
paper proof, Stopford was Buckingham. 
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While in more short term, financially motivated identity fraud there is often no attempt 
to embellish the nature of the identity, in the case of Stopford's identity fraud he had to 
develop a history for the Buckingham identity. According to Stopford, Christopher 
Buckingham was the only son of Lord Edward Buckingham. His father had been a 
diplomat in Egypt who, along with Buckingham's mother, had died in a plane crash in 
1982. Aside from his family, Stopford also fabricated an education at Harrow and 
Cambridge University. He furthermore claimed that he was a Lord. In 1984, 
Buckingham visited West Germany and while staying there met Jody Doe, a 19 year old 
student from Canada. Several months after their meeting, they married and had two 
children; both his wife and his children believed Stopford was Buckingham. It was not 
until 2005 that the deception came to an end. 
In 2005 Stopford was travelling from France to the U. K. using the Calais-Dover ferry 
crossing. While in Calais, Stopford's Buckingham passport was checked by U. K. 
immigration officials who were stationed there and Stopford's impersonation was 
discovered. After a 10 month long investigation, Stopford appeared in court still 
claiming to be Buckingham and refusing to reveal his true identity. lie pleaded guilty to 
falsifying his passport records and was given a 22 month jail sentence. 
During his imprisonment, Stopford refused to reveal his true identity even to his 
children. It was not until his daughter Lindsey began using MySpace to find her fathers 
family that Stopford's identity was revealed. In the time between the revelation of 
Stopford's impersonation and discovery of his true identity, several theories were put 
forward about who Stopford was. Some believed he was a cold war era spy who had 
continued to live on in the U. K. 
Currently, Stopford is living in Zurich and he still uses the name of Christopher 
Buckingham. When interviewed during the documentary 'Identity Fraud - 
Outnumbered' (April 3 2008), Stopford explained how he now had a prison ID card 
with the name Christopher Buckingham and how that further helped to prove his claim 
to be Christopher Buckingham. 
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As stated earlier Bashir and Wallace (2006) refer to Stopford as the 'Great American 
Impostor', and go on to describe him as the most successful hoaxer on record. Arguably, 
his 23 year impersonation was a thorough and elaborate deception, but it can also be 
argued that Stopford benefitted from a system which was unable to stop or detect his 
activities. 
Looking at the history of impersonation it is possible to see several men and women 
who have at least equalled Stopford's exploits and in some cases exceeded even his 23 
year impersonation (see chapter 6). The importance of the Stopford case is that it shows 
how concern over false identity has developed in recent years. It could be argued that 
Stopford's impersonation might have continued undetected, if it had not been for 
changes in the way identities are monitored and recorded identities and concern over 
terrorism and illegal immigration. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Research Methodology 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to establish what identity theft and identity fraud are and 
how they might be affected by the introduction of an identity card. This chapter will 
examine various methods of gathering information and researching the subjects of 
identity fraud and identity cards. The approach taken (in this study) has been to research 
noteworthy cases of identity theft and identity fraud from the U. K. and elsewhere. 
These cases have been used to develop an understanding not only of what identity theft 
and identity fraud are, but also how they are carried out. In considering what is involved 
in identity theft and identity fraud, it was also considered worthwhile to carry out a 
thought (Gedanken) experiment regarding simulated identity then, which will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
The second part of the study involved researching the National Identity Card Scheme 
through government reports and literature from opposition groups. This proved to be a 
challenging task, as discourse on the nature and use of the identity card scheme is still 
open to debate and alteration. This means that when trying to answcr the question about 
what impact an identity card scheme would have on identity theft, it is necessary to take 
into account factors which have modified and influenced the debate on identity cards. 
In studying identity theft, identity fraud and the National Identity Card Scheme, 
researching through the internet became a valuable approach. Using the internet it was 
possible to contact people and organisations with experience of each of the subjects, in 
particular experience of identity theft and fraud. Accessing these people through the 
internet it was possible to download literature on the subjects which may have bccn 
harder to obtain by other means. In this study the internet proved to be a valuable 
resource and its use is also discussed further in this chapter. 
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Simulated identity theft as a means of research 
The goal of this study is to understand how the process of committing identity fraud 
might be influenced by the presence of a National Identity Card Scheme. In order to 
explore this, an explanation is necessary as to how identity theft and fraud is committed 
now, in the absence of an identity card. Therefore some thought was given as to how a 
person could steal an identity - what techniques can be used to gather information on 
people and how such information can be used. This developed into a mental experiment 
on how identity theft occurs. The experiment was never intended to go past the 
theoretical stage, since doing this would raise a range of ethical and legal questions, but 
was performed in order to analyse potential issues. Initially this thought experiment was 
seen as a means of outlining the different sources of information on a person's identity. 
But, over time, thought was also given to the ethical, legal and practical issues 
associated with committing identity theft. After developing an understanding of how an 
identity can be stolen these thoughts were organised into a 'model' of how to steal an 
identity, referred to in this study as simulated identity theft. 
In discussing simulated identity theft, the goal is twofold: firstly, to examine how a 
person's identity might be stolen in a genuine instance of identity theft; secondly the 
simulation also raises issues of how an identity might be treated in an attempt to 
simulate identity theft by academic researchers. When first constructing tile simulation, 
no thought had been given as to who might be administering the simulation, In effect, 
the simulator was in no way different from a genuine identity thief. This would provide 
a sense of the different techniques of stealing an identity. But upon further thought, it 
was decided that not distinguishing between an academic simulation of identity theft and 
a genuine attempt to steal an identity would deny the opportunity to consider ethical 
issues associated with academic research which would be useful to the further 
discussion of identity, issues of privacy and control in the identification process. 
Arguably inherent in both the discussion of identity theft and identity cards is the issue 
of who is in control of a person's identity and the process of identification. The 
experiences of victims of identity theft are discussed in chapter 8 of this tlicsis; and in all 
of these cases, the root problem is a loss of control over the individual's identity due to a 
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loss of control over personal information. Equally, concern over loss of privacy 
associated with the discussion of the identity card is in a sense a discussion of who 
should have control over the identification process. 
In order to examine these issues of control of an identity the simulation presented here 
represents thoughts on how an academic researcher might adopt a new identity rather 
than how an identity thieftnight steal an identity. This allows for consideration of ethical 
and legal issues associated with taking over a research subject's identity. The following 
section examines how an identity might be stolen as part of a study of an academic study 
of identity theft in relation to 
" previous attempts to use simulated identity theft 
" what ethical and legal considerations must be taken into account - How do we 
determine if and when an identity is stolen 
" how an identity might be stolen 
Thought was also given as to whether or not an identity could be stolen without 
victimising the genuine identity holder. In developing simulated identity theft, thought 
was also given as to whether or not it is possible to avoid defrauding any organisations 
in society, while at the same time testing their ability to detect identity fraud. The 
practices of 'ethical hackers' were considered as an example of simulating a crime in 
order to test security. In order to counter the threat of online attacks, some organisations 
such as banks and online companies have begun employing 'ethical hackers' to test the 
security of their IT systems and new web based applications. According to Vyaharc 
(2007) ethical hackers (also known as White Hat hackers) are described thus: 
"An ethical backer is permitted to hack computer systems or networks and he 
tries his best to hack it. Now the question arises - why? An obvious answer to 
this is that unless there is an understanding of what's insecure in our system or 
network, we won't be able to protect it. An ethical backer provides with 
vulnerabilities or loop holes in the system or network through extensive use of 
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various hacking techniques. These vulnerabilities and flaws are then gcnerally 
corrected through corrective and preventive measures. " (Vyavhare A, 2007: 1) 
Ethical hackers use the same techniques as criminal hackers (sometimes referred to as 
crackers) to attack networks, but the intention in conducting the attack is the exact 
opposite. The issue of the illegality and harm associated with identity theft can at times 
be debatable. As discussed in chapter 8 some cases of identity theft and fraud can be 
prolonged affairs with the victims remaining unaware of the activities of the identity 
thieves. Equally, in cases of wholesale assumption (such as the case of Charles 
Stopford) where the identity thief fully adopts the identity of the victim, the issue of 
harm can also be hard to establish as the identity thief in this instance seeks in most 
respects to appear to be a law abiding citizen, upholding obligations to organisations 
within society. 
Previous attempts to use simulated identity theft 
In this study simulated identity theft is used only as a thought experiment. However, 
there have been occasions when people have attempted to research identity theft and 
fraud through practical examples or exercises. Exercises which could be described as 
examples of simulated identity theft have been conducted by j ournalists during 
investigations of identity fraud, and in governmental investigations into identity theft in 
America. 
In 2003 in an investigation for the programme BBC Kenyon Confronts, the presenter of 
the programme obtained a driver's licence in the name of the then Home Secretary- 
David Blunkett. During this investigation Kenyon was also able to obtain the identifying 
documents of Frederick Forsyth the author of 'The Day of the Jackal' a book 
noteworthy when discussing identity fraud as it explains how an assassin could adopt 
the identity of a dead child to conceal his presence. When confronted with this 
information Mr Forsyth was surprised that no improvement in the security surrounding 
identity had been implemented. The aim of this investigation and the then of these 
identities were to highlight the dangers of identity fraud. 
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In a report for the Independent newspaper by Judd (2005), figures on identity fraud 
which showed that one in four people have been a victim of this type of crime or know 
someone who has been are discussed. Included in this report is discussion of another 
example of simulated identity theft conducted by the magazine 'Which? ': 
"The data published by the consumer magazine 'WhichT indicates that 10 per 
cent of people have been first hand victims and a further 15 pcr cent know 
someone who has had their identity stolen. " (Judd T, 2005: 16) 
According to Judd's report, staff from 'WhichT magazine discussed how easily they 
were able to easily steal the identity of their editor Malcolm Coles: 
-I couldn't believe how easy it was for someone else to assume my identity, ' 
Mr Coles said. 'Sitting at my desk was a folder with my birth certificatc, a print 
out of how often I went to the gym and my mortgage details. ' 'If this is what an 
amateur can do, just imagine how easy it is for an experienced criminal. "' (Judd 
. T, 2005: 16) 
Forjourrialists, simulated identity thcft is a means of highlighting the risks to the general 
public. Simulated identity theft also allows journalists to comment on the efforts of 
organisations to prevent and detect identity fraud. Aside from these attempts by 
journalists, simulated identity theft has also been used in America by investigators 
working for the Special Investigations office of the General Accounting Office (GAO). 
For three years, starting in 2002, a team of investigators from the GAO tested how 
counterfeit documents could be used to undermine various aspects of security in 
America. The areas of security the GAO tested by using fictitious and stolen identities 
were: 
0 Entering the United States 
* Purchasing firearms 
9 Gaining access to government buildings and other facilities 
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" Obtaining genuine identification for both fictitious and stolen identities 
" Obtaining social security numbers for fictitious identities 
(Malfi AD, 2003: 1) 
The GAO's investigation used simulated identity theft to test security and came to the 
following conclusions: 
"(II government officials and others generally did not rccognise that the 
documents we presented were counterfeit; (2) many government offi]cials were 
not alert to the possibility of identity fraud and some failed to follow security 
procedures and (3) identity verification procedures are inadequate. " (Malfi AD, 
2003: 2-3) 
Through the GAO's investigation, it was possible to highlight weaknesses both in terms 
of security procedures and in processes of identification. Both in journalistic 
investigations and the work of the GAO simulated identity theft has been used to gain 
insight into security surrounding identification processes. While simulated identity theft 
had proved useful in bothjoumalistic investigations and the work of the GAO, it 
appeared that simulated identity theft has not been attempted in any academic studies of 
identity fraud. 
Ethical, legal and practical considerations with an acadernic simulated Identity 
theft 
When it came to devising how simulated identity theft might be conducted, several 
ethical drawbacks were discovered. In previous examples of simulated identity then 
conducted byjournalists, the ethics of adopting someone else identity is rarely 
discussed. It became apparent, however, that in academic studies ethical guidelines 
would be central in any simulation of identity theft. Adhering to ethical guidelines 
established by the British Society of Criminology, and ensuring that no laws were 
broken during a simulation, raised questions about how to dccriminalise any simulation 
attempt. In devising the simulated identity theft, it was determined that there would 
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always be a conflict between an ethical simulation and providing a realistic insight into 
identity theft. The more realistic the simulated identity thcft is the more useful it could 
be as a means of estimating how actual instances of identity theft are committed. 
However the more realistic the simulation might be, the less ethical it would become. 
Issues of gaining consent, invasion of privacy and the legality of impersonation which 
had not been discussed during other simulations of identity theft are central to any plan 
to use simulated identity theft in an academic study. This aspect of the thought 
experiment also encouraged additional practical questions about how to establish a point 
of success in simulating identity theft and what methods of impersonation and 
surveillance would be appropriate. 
At what point success? 
One of the issues that had not been considered during the initial thoughts on simulated 
identity theft was how to determine when an adoption of another identity was 
successful. There are a variety of different methods of gathering and appropriating 
information about someone else's identity, but which ones are most significant in terms 
of proving identity? Also how many proofs of identity are needed to justifiably claim the 
theft of an identity? Is it enough to verbally claim you are someone else? Does duration 
of use influence the authenticity of someone's claim to an identity? One of the major 
changes the identity card scheme will introduce is the creation of a single universal form 
of identification. By doing this the scheme could bring an end to the current practice of 
confirming identity through requiring multiple paper proofs of identity. 
How far could the simulation go? 
The first goal of this study was to determine how identity fraud is committed now, prior 
to any introduction of an identity card. In previous attempts at simulated identity theft 
by journalists, the success of the simulation had been defined by the obtaining of 
documentation in someone else's name. By obtaining a driver's licence or birth 
certificate, it has been possible to illustrate the potential for abuse. Rarely were the 
simulations taken to the point of stealing other's people's money; oflen it was enough to 
establish the possibility of going forward to steal. In trying to examine the whole 
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process of how identity fraud is committed, in this study, it became apparent that 
obtaining only a paper proof of identity would not be enough. The simulation would 
have to go all the way from gathering information about the individual whose identity 
was being targeted, through to obtaining proof of identity and then obtaining resources 
(money, credit, items of value etc) under that name. By doing this, it was reasoned that 
not only would the process of detecting identity fraud by individuals and organisations 
be tested, but also this would enable a view of how effective current identity fraud 
prevention measures are. In terms of realism, the simulation had to include discussion 
and thought on the entire process of stealing someone's identity. This would mean that 
ethical and legal issues would be unavoidable. The next issue to address was 
determining how much of person's identity must be stolen. 
At what point is an Identity stolen? 
In previous attempts at simulated identity theft, the goal had been to obtain paper proofs 
of identity such as drivers' licences; but is having a licence in someone else's name 
sufficient to declare that an identity has been stolen? Often in processes of identification 
a number of different documents are required as proof. In simulating identity theft it was 
reasoned that several forms of identification would be required, not only a driver's 
licence. In determining what proofs of identity would be required to show ownership of 
an identity, another issue was raised, namely that of who needed to be convinced by the 
impersonation. 
Additionally, it was necessary to consider the issue of what forms of identification 
would produce the most accurate impersonation. Research into the identification process 
(see chapter 7) revealed that there were six key pieces of identification which were often 
relied on as proof of identity. These were: 
" Birth certificate 
" Drivers Licence 
" Passport 
Bank or Credit Card account 
National Insurance Number 
Proof of residence (e. g. utility bill) 
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By obtaining these documents, it was thought that the researcher involved in the 
simulation would be able to obtain access to most of the things that a genuine identity 
holder would be entitled to. It was reasoned that by obtaining these forms of 
identification, additional forms of identification would become available to legitimate 
identity holders or identity thieves. 
Discussing this issue, it was determined that while these documents are often used as 
proof of identity, it can be argued that they do not involve the theft of more personalised 
aspects of a person's identity. In addressing this issue, it became apparent that simulated 
identity theft might provide insight into how to steal a person's proof of identity but not 
a person's actual sense of self or personality. 
Time taken to commit identity theft and the need for face-to-face Interaction 
Research into identity theft and fraud revealed that in some instances the actual time 
taken to impersonate someone could be very brief For example, in an instance of online 
fraud such as phishing, a number of people can be targeted and have their details stolen 
and used in a short space of time (see chapter 7). At the other extreme in cases of 
wholesale assumption (see chapter 8) people can spend years trying to convince others 
of their impersonations (as in the case of Charles Stopford). This raised questions about 
how long a simulation of identity theft would take if it progressed to practical 
application. If the internet was utilised it could reasonably be assumed that very little 
time would be needed to instigate any impersonation of the research subject. This raised 
further questions over the need to use face-to-face interactions. An argument can be 
made that an identity thief will try to avoid detection wherever possible, and would 
therefore avoid unnecessary face-to-face meetings. An identity thief might also utilise 
technology which helps speed up the identity theft such as the internet (provided they 
have access). However, by avoiding the use of face-to-face interactions, the simulation 
would be limited in the forms of identification which could be sought, since several 
forms of identification provided by the state require a face-to-face meeting to confirm 
the applicant's identity. If face-to-face meetings were a required as part of the 
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simulation then this would have a knock on effect in terms of the potential research 
subjects whose identities could be used. The 'donor identities' would have to be ones 
that the researcher performing the simulation could reasonably be expected to 
impersonate. 
Ethical considerations 
As stated previously, the development of simulated identity theft was intended as a 
theoretical experiment into how a researcher might steal a person's identity, It was never 
intended as a practical experiment as the ethical implications for any research subjects 
were too great to ignore. However considering how a research subject might be treated 
and the effect the simulation might have on the research environment helped to clarify 
several issues. 
In previous uses of simulated identity theft by others such as the GAO (2003) and 
Kenyon (2003), the issue of ethical treatment of research subjects bad not been raised. 
However in this study the guidelines established by the British Society of Criminology 
(BSC) required that the issue of hann to research subjects be considered. In a simulation 
of identity theft, there are in effect two groups who could potentially be victimiscd. The 
first are individuals whose identity is being used (referred to as research subjects), and 
secondly there are the organisations who might be approached by the researcher. 
The guidelines established by the BSC note that research subjects should not be harmed 
by the research. In effect, none of the research subjects in a simulation of identity theft 
should be harmed after the simulation was completed. In terms of realism and ethics, the 
choice of research subject would prove pivotal, as would the issue of how the research 
subject should be treated. 
How are victims chosen In genuine cases of Identity fraud? 
The choice of a victim for simulated identity thcft was difficult, In a genuine instance of 
identity theft, there is reason to believe that often identity thieves will use a piece of 
information they have happened upon, such as in cases where family members abuse 
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information on relatives. Or, in instances of identity theft by organised individuals, there 
is a process of trawling for information going out and searching for whatever is 
available. In either case, it is reasonable to assume that it is a law of averages as to 
whether or not the identity theft succeeds. Research by Bob Sullivan (2004) suggests 
that in instances of Thishing' there is a success rate of only 5%; however these types of 
gathering operations can be applied to millions of online users so if one person is 
chosen as a victim for the simulated identity theft there is no guarantee that it will 
succeed. In order for the simulated identity theft to work there would have to be several 
potential victims so that the success rate could be assessed. 
Choosing a research subject or choosing a vktins? 
In simulated identity theft, the first element of the simulation would be the gathering and 
appropriation of information on the research subject. In the potential practical 
application of a simulation of identity theft, it would be necessary to investigate and 
gather information on the research subject. This would require, on the part of the 
research subject, a high degree of trust in the researcher in terms of how the information 
would be used. This proved a difficult issue to reconcile in the thinking on how the 
simulation might work, as access to the research subject's identity would also involve an 
invasion of their privacy. 
One early idea for the simulation was to look at approaching family and friends as 
research subjects. It was thought that perhaps the pre-existing bond of trust would make 
the simulating of identity theft easier. The trustworthiness of the researcher would 
already be established and maintaining contact and a good relationship with the research 
subject would be easier. However upon further consideration the idea of enquiring into 
the personal lives of friends and family did raise questions over invading the privacy of 
people with whom there is a strong bond of trust and the potential strain this might have 
caused. 
The alternative to using the identity of someone with whom there was a personal 
relationship was to the use the identity of a stranger or a volunteer. By using the identity 
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of someone with whom there was no or limited social interaction, it was reasoned, there 
would be less chance of jeopardizing or abusing a bond of trust. Thus the use of a 
randomly obtained identity was considered for a time. In this form of simulated identity 
theft, a research subject would not be chosen; rather several methods of gathering 
information would be used to 'trawl' for a vulnerable identity. One approach might be to 
conduct bin-raiding in residential areas and begin the simulation with any information 
which was discovered. In this simulation the victim would be chosen at random, 
depending entirely upon how vulnerable they were to impersonation. Once the research 
subject had been chosen, then their consent to proceed would have to be sought to 
proceed with the simulation. 
Another approach considered was the use of a dead person's identity. This method has 
several distinct advantages. The use of a dead person's identity means, in terms of 
simulated identity theft, that the victim identity can be used in several ways without any 
need for negotiation with the victim as to what is permissible. Research on 'deceased' 
fraud by the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (2008) revealed that there are two 
types of victim of deceased identity theft relating to either those who have recently died 
or to the identities of dead children. The use of a recently deceased person's identity 
involves obtaining and maintaining the identification the deceased had during life. The 
alternative is the use of birth certificates of dead children who were born at around the 
same time as the person committing the simulated identity theft, so as to ensure a match 
with regard to age of the victim. Using the birth certificate of a dead person means that 
there will be very little additional identification past the birth certificate and the 
possibility of detection is minimal. The use of a deceased person's identity is discussed 
further in chapter 8. 
Ethically, the use of the identities of the recently deceased or a dead child raises a 
number of moral issues. Obtaining consent would involve speaking to relatives of the 
deceased; in either instance it was assumed that consent would be, difficult to obtain. 
While the actions taken during the simulated identity theft would focus on obtaining 
paper proofs of identity, the concern would be that relatives of the deceased would see 
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these actions as commandeering the identity or as an abuse. While identity in the 
simulation was viewed as more of an issue of proof used in the identification process, 
for many an identity is a representation of self, and using the identity of a dead person, it 
can be argued, would involve adopting their sense of self. The effect this could have on 
people's perception of the deceased could be damaging. In the case of Charles Stopford 
it was reported that his impersonation of Christopher Buckingham caused Buckingham's 
mother Audrey Wing a great deal of distress. In the documentary The Real Jackal 
(2006) Wing was interviewed about the discovery that someone had been impersonating 
her dead son. Her initial response upon hearing that someone called Christopher 
Buckingham was alive was an assumption that her son was still alive, despite his death 
as a baby. The discovery of Stopford's use of the identity also raised old memories of 
the death of her son for Audrey Wing. In the documentary, it is clear that remembering 
the death of Christopher Buckingham causes Audrey Wing a great deal of distress. 
While it is not technically illegal to use another person's birth certificate (unless it is as a 
part of a wider criminal conspiracy) ethically is it right or fair to use a dead person's 
name? Should consent be gained from their family and how much use should be made 
of this document and in what respects should it be used? These issues raised questions 
about the wider influence of a person's identity. It can be argued that any impersonation 
will not only affect not only the genuine owner of the identity but also those associated 
with that person. In cases of identity fraud where criminals seek to avoid prosecution, 
the effect has often been to victimise not only the individual whose identity was stolen, 
but also people who interact with that identity. Examples of this can be seen in chapter 
8. 
The final approach considered was requesting volunteers to take part in the simulation. 
This approach would involve simulating identity thcft on people with whom there was 
no personal relationship. This approach would seem most appropriate as it would allow 
people to choose whether or not to participate. But this approach also raises questions 
about how informed the research subjects should be of what would happen to them. The 
B. S. C. guidelines state that research subjects should not be harmed by taking part in the 
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research; this meant that anyone taking part in the simulation would have to be protected 
in some way from the actions of the researcher simulating the identity theft. In order for 
any practical application of the simulation to be an accurate analysis of how identity 
theft is committed, there would have to be some form of resource taken from the 
research subject. Also, the research subject would have to be unaware of what was 
happening so the ability of the research subject to detect the identity thcft could be 
assessed. 
However to keep the research subject safe from the financial and possible emotional 
damage of being a victim of identity theft, they would have to be informed of what was 
happening and their consent would be needed. If the research subject were aware of 
what was going on then there would be the potential for them to interfere in the process 
of gathering information on themselves. The research subject's efforts to secure their 
identity might change because of the simulation. This could provide an inaccurate view 
of the research subject's ability to detect and prevent identity fraud. It was also 
determined during this stage of the simulation that research subjects might request that 
certain areas of their personal life were not investigated. It was determined that there 
would be a potential for the research subject to censor or limit the scope of the 
information gathering elements of the simulation in order to maintain a degree of 
personal privacy. This resulted in a conflict between keeping the simulation realistic and 
keeping it ethical if it ever progressed to practical application and this conflict could not 
be resolved. 
Similar considerations obtain with regard to the organisations it would have been 
necessary to approach in the later stages of practically application of the simulation. If 
organisations such as the DVLA or any financial institutions had been informed and 
involved, it is reasonable to assume that they would either oppose their inclusion in the 
simulated identity theft or would have tried to ensure the failure of the experiment. In 
order for the simulated identity thcft to be a representation of what might happen in a 
genuine incident of identity theft, the victims (both the individual whose identity has 
been stolen and the organisations targeted) must be unaware. 
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Previous attempts at simulated identity theft by Kenyon (2003) and Aaron (2007) had, in 
a way avoided this issue of research subject awareness by choosing people they would 
not feel uncomfortable about victimising. In the case of Kenyon, he targeted David 
Blunkett, the then Home Secretary, and a major advocate of the identity card scheme. 
Arguably, by targeting a high profile person, the actions of Kenyon rather than 
appearing as a crime or unethical, were seen as a demonstration or a stunt to illustrate a 
point. Also, the simulated identity theft used by journalists from 'Which' magazine was 
used to further the success of the magazine as a whole. No evidence could be found to 
suggest that either Kenyon or thejoumalists at 'Which' faced any legal action over their 
actions. This may be because, as journalists their actions were not perceived as 
malicious or an attempt to defraud anyone; it might also be that given the way they 
adopted the identities of others, there was no perception of hann on the part of their 
victims. In both accounts, people's personal information had been used without their 
consent, but both Kenyon and the journalists at 'Which' had not abused the identities 
they had access to. An important distinction can be made here between impersonating 
someone and misrepresenting their identity (this distinction is discussed in more detail 
in chapter 8). This does not excuse the unethical accessing of another person's identity, 
but it does show how there can be a certain ambiguity around efforts to impersonate 
someone for reasons other than financial gain. 
Should research subjects be Informed? 
The issue of whether or not the research subject should be aware of the simulation is the 
major obstacle to the practical application of this thought experiment. In many respects, 
at this stage, it became apparent that identity fraud could not be simulated accurately 
without the research subject being victimised to some degree. It became apparent that 
the standards of practice in an academic study were different to the standards applied to 
journalistic investigations and the work of the GAO. The abuse of a person's identity 
cannot be justified on the grounds of research alone. By planning but how to treat 
research subjects, the value of personal privacy became apparent. 
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invasion of privacy 
During the development of the simulation, it became apparent that the line is very thin 
between information intended to gain access to social institutions and information of a 
personal and private nature. This is intentional, as the idea behind various security 
measures using identification is that the information used such as mother's maiden name 
is not something people will openly share although this is not to say this information is 
not obtainable from other sources. So any attempt to instigate a practical simulation of 
identity theft would entail learning a variety of personal facts about the research subject. 
In the debate over identity cards, the argument is often used that 'if you have nothing to 
hide you have nothing to worry about'. This phrase is used as justification for identity 
cards, but for individuals there is the power (some would argue the right) to include and 
exclude other people from knowing certain things about themselves. In the process of 
stealing an identity, a person's ability to place boundaries on what the identity thief 
learns is gone. 
When developing the simulation of identity theft it was deten-nined that it should be a 
thought experiment which tests different methods of gathering information about 
people. This could involve methods of gathering information from both documentation 
going to and leaving the research subject, and also from direct observation of the 
research subject. All of the forms of gathering information considered involved some 
degree an invasion of privacy. For example, by reading a person's private mail or email, 
it is possible to obtain pieces of information about their identity which can be used in the 
simulation of identity theft but at the same time personal correspondence includes 
information that research subjects may want to keep private. Often the information 
which is used to enable the impersonation of someone is the same as the infon-nation 
people may want to keep private for personal reasons. While the issue of privacy is 
something which may result in research subjects refusing to participate, it is also worth 
noting that people can be quite open with their personal details. 
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Willingness to share information 
Ironically, while this study is based on a perceived increase in concern over the 
identification process, often the details that we hold so personal to our sense of self are 
the ones we give freely when asked. One of the methods of committing identity theft is 
by simply asking your victim for these personal details. In the terminology of identity 
theft, this is known as pre-texting or social engineering (see chapter 7). Individuals 
divulge private information about themselves, because, arguably, divulging these details 
is a daily occurrence and part of a normal social life. As a matter of course, we identify 
ourselves and use various identification processes. Awareness of the risks of identity 
theft has still to be fully developed so while there is awareness of the danger of leaving 
identifying documents out for people to take, the risks posed by simply asking are still 
underdeveloped. In a discussion of this issue with a fraud investigator at a conference 
for the Department for Works and Pensions (2005) it was explained how during a 
discussion with a taxi driver the investigator had been able to elicit enough information 
from the driver to put his identity at risk. It was not until the end of the journey that the 
investigator revealed just how much had been gathered from the driver without his being 
aware of it. 
Legal considerations and protecting the researcher 
As well as concerns about how to treat the research subject during the simulation of 
identity theft, there are also concerns with regard to the potential risk faced by the 
researcher simulating identity theft. Legally it is not a criminal act to claim you are 
someone else; it is only when someone tries to validate their claims, through a social 
institution that is required to validate or conf imi an identity for legal reasons, that it 
becomes criminal and / or fraudulent. Simply declaring oneself to be someone else is not 
enough to commit identity fraud; there must also be an attempt to validate that claim. 
In addition to the introduction of an identity card the National Identity Card Act 2006 
also introduces laws against false representation. False representation means that 
pretending you are someone you are not, or collecting information to assume another 
identity, becomes a criminal act as soon as it is used with another person who is 
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unaware of your true identity. False representation requires that the person who is being 
presented with the false identity is in some way deceived or unaware of the deception. 
In a practical simulation of identity theft, the use of deception is something which would 
place the researcher at risk. In order to avoid false representation it would be necessary 
to inform people that the identity being used is not the researcher's true identity. 
However, this would undermine one of the goals of simulating identity theft, namely 
determining how easy it is to deceive people and for that deception to be detected. It can 
be argued that this situation places the researcher in a 'catch 22' situation: if they want 
to simulate identity theft they must use false representations; but if false representation 
is used then the researcher is at risk of criminal prosecution. 
The research environment 
The final ethical issue which was considered was the research environment and how 
simulating identity theft could affect future efforts to research identity fraud and identity 
cards. Future involvement with organisations such as the banking and credit industry, 
the DVLA and other providers of identification might be difficult to maintain if the 
simulation had gone forward. In previous attempts at simulating identity theft the goal 
has been to highlight deficiencies and failures in protecting the identification process. 
When in 2003 Paul Kenyon simulated the theft of David Blunkett's identity, his aim was 
to show how current levels of security were inadequate. Equally, the efforts of the GAO 
investigators in 2003 were designed to highlight any problems in security. If this 
simulation had gone forward it is reasonable to assume that some organisations might 
have taken issue with being deceived. While the ability to detect and prevent identity 
fraud is something the simulation could analyze, it is also important to maintain good 
relations with organisations involved in the identification process in order to enable 
future research, 
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Criteria for the simulation 
In order to determine the limits and scope of the simulation a series of goals were 
developed to inform the later stage of constructing a guide to simulating the theft of an 
identity. These goals were: 
" To establish the whole process of how to steal someone's identity from 
beginning to end 
" To assess the ability of social institutions to detect identity fraud 
" To assess the ability of individuals to prevent identity fraud 
" To assess the ability of social institutions to prevent identity fraud 
How to simulate identity theft 
When developing simulated identity theft it was necessary to do significant research into 
various cases of identity theft and fraud. Cases from the U. K. and U. S. A. were studied 
to determine what techniques are used to gather information on people, and how that 
information can be used to impersonate another person. 
When thinking about how to simulate identity theft, it was important to deterniine what 
the end goal of the simulation could be. Also, could a fictitious identity be used instead 
of another person's identity? Most of the thinking on simulated identity theft had been 
done in the context of stealing another person's identity. But an equally viable approach 
might be the use of a fabricated identity where no 'donor identity' would be needed. 
Fictitious Identities In simulated Identity theft 
While the use of a fictitious identity had not been considered, upon further consideration 
it became clear that the process of generating one would not be difficult. With the 
advent of personal computers, scanners and printers it would be possible to fabricate 
copies of official documents. By taking an official document, for example an official 
document from Bangor University, it is possible to scan the document into a computer, 
cut and paste out the text so that the document appears as a blank apart from the header 
and then fill in new information, print the new document and use it. With computers and 
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printers so prevalent in society, it is not uncommon for documents to be printed copies. 
In many instances, documents or forms are available online and are intended to be 
downloaded and printed. The drawback of fictitious documents is that they do not exist 
in departmental databases or official records. Also in some instances, such as passports, 
a great deal of effort has gone into making them unrepeatable by plivate citizens, 
through the use of UV ink, special papers and document checks at point of use. 
A fictitious identity would require a great deal of pretexting and social engineering to 
establish and conceivably there would be areas of society that would be closed off to it 
such as passport control. The drawbacks of using a fictitious identity were also 
considered. These drawbacks were predominantly associated with not being able to 
consider the impact that identity theft has on its victims. 
Simulated identity theft 
Presented below is a discussion of how the simulation could have been conducted; while 
none of these actions were actually carried out the planning of them proved useful in 
conceptualising how identity theft might be committed. 
This simulation represents a form of identity theft which seeks to break as few laws as 
possible; so for example the initial information on a 'donor identity' would be obtained 
legally from social institutions rather than the individual. By doing this it was thought 
that the simulation could show how vulnerable people are to others appropriating their 
information and impersonating them. This simulation also represents a concerted effort 
to steal one specific person's identity. 
The process of targeting one person's identity specifically would be used by someone 
who planned a prolonged period of use with that identity. An example of this would be 
wholesale or partial assumer's efforts to swap identities and take up their victim's name 
(see chapter 8 for details on wholesale and partial assumers). Here the first step is to 
choose a victim and then locate their information; an alternative approach would be to 
begin with a location or piece of information and then build on that. This alternative 
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happens when bin raiding is successful in finding a valuable piece of information or if 
someone's mail (both real and virtual) is stolen. 
One way this simulation of identity theft differs from identity theft used for financial 
gain is that it would require the spending of money to establish the researcher simulating 
identity theft as the legitimate identity holder. In many instances of identity theft it is left 
to the victim to notice that identity theft has occurred. This is because it is not until the 
victim sees that their identity is being abused that the crime is detected, Only in specific 
instances is identity theft noticed by social institutions such as in the case of Charles 
Stopford's impersonation of Christopher Buckingham where a cross reference of death 
certificates and passports detected his impersonation. As a general rule however if the 
victim does not notice the impersonation no one will detect the impersonation as long as 
there is sufficient information on the part of the impersonator. 
Step I Birth Certificate 
The practical stage of simulating identity theft would have to begin with legally 
obtaining the research subject's Birth Certificate. A copy of this can be obtained from 
the registry of Birth, Deaths and Marriages. With the copy of the research subject's birth 
certificate, other information can be gathered: parents' names and the victim's date of 
birth and location of birth. With the names of the parents, a search of the registry of 
marriages can be done to find the marriage certif icate of the research subject's parents, 
and this can lead to the research subject's mother's maiden name (sometimes used as a 
question in security checks). Also, by estimating the age of the research subject and their 
parents, it is possible to go to the Friends Reunited website and attempt to find out what 
schools the research subject and their parents attended (which is sometimes used as a 
security question). With the birth certificate, the research subject's date of birth is 
revealed so that the research subject's age today can be known. Ideally, the research 
subject should be close to the age of the person assuming their identity, in case there is a 
need to impersonate them in a face-to-face interaction. 
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Step 2 Geographic location 
With the name of the research subject, the next step would be to attempt to locate their 
home. The home is a vital component as it acts as store house for information intended 
for and leaving the research subject. As an identity thief, the goal is either to take 
information from people through direct theft (a method not used in this study), or to 
intercept information intended for the victim. Information discarded by victims can also 
be used to steal an identity. 
In order to find the research subject's home by legal means, it would be necessary to 
first check the phone book to see if they are listed and/or check the electoral register at 
the local library for the victim's location. Recently concern over access to the publicly 
available electoral register for this purpose has lead to the option of having your details 
kept off it. If the home address of the research subject can be found, a process of 
intercepting information intended for the research subjects, or information discarded by 
the research subject, can begin. Mail can be taken from the research subject's post boxes 
(if they have one) outside the house, or a request for mail redirection can be made to the 
Royal Mail. As well as taking real mail, there are various methods of obtaining emails. 
Key loggers are devices that can be attached to computers to monitor what keys are 
typed on the key board (providing access to Personal Identification Numbers and 
answers to security questions); this would require access to the interior of the house. 
One way to gain access to the interior of the house would be to break into the house or 
to use deception to elicit entry; both methods were deemed unacceptable for legal and 
ethical reasons. Alternatively, spyware computer programs can be downloaded in emails 
on to a person's computer, providing access to the information stored there. 
As well as intercepting information before it reaches the research subject, or from the 
research subject's computer; bin-raiding will provide access to information discarded by 
the research subject. Among the various types of information available from bin raiding 
are bank statements, credit card information, old or out dated forms of identification (cut 
up debit or credit cards), and also there is general evidence of the type of lifestyle the 
research subject is living. Bills and receipts from shops might show how much money 
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they are likely to spend and where. Trying to intercept information before and after it 
has reached the research subject is in some ways like gold prospecting: there is no 
guarantee that anything useful will be found but there is a chance that something highly 
valuable will be discovered. 
If information was gained from bin-raiding or redirecting mail, then it would enable the 
takeover of accounts that the research subject has opened (see chapter 6 for account 
takeover). If however information on presently open accounts is not forthcoming then it 
may still be possible to use the information gained to open new accounts that the 
research subject is not aware of, in the research subject's name. In order to do this, the 
research subject must be separated from their identity so that any further activity 
planned in this study would not be noticed by the research subject. 
Step 3 Setting up an alternative repository for documentation 
With a degree of information derived from the birth certificate and from monitoring 
information going to and coming from the research subject, the next step is to purchase a 
post office box for any correspondence obtained while using the research subject's 
identity. When setting up bank accounts, or accessing forms of identification there must 
be a geographical point for this information to be sent to. 
An alternative to a post office box is to secure a flat or house in the research subject's 
name, so that bills for electricity and other amenities can be obtained. Additionally, as 
well as creating a geographical location for all the correspondence attracted while using 
the research subject's identity, it will also be necessary to obtain a mobile phone in the 
research subject's name. 
By obtaining a different residence and phone line the identity thief can apply for 
different forms of identification and set up bank accounts without having to use tile 
genuine identity holder's address or phone number. In effect, the identity thief 
establishes a parallel existence for the identity. There is the genuine identity holder and 
their contact details and residence, and then parallel to this there is the identity thief with 
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a separate set of contact details and residence. This reduces the likelihood of an 
organisation involved with the identity thief contacting or interacting with the genuine 
identity holder and thereby exposing the activities of the identity thief 
Step 4 Additional evidence 
Aside from having the appearance of a residence and a means for people to contact the 
individual simulating identity theft instead of the genuine identity holder it is also 
necessary to create the impression that the researcher simulating identity theft has lived 
as this research subject. This will require obtaining additional forms of identification 
such as a driver's licence or evidence that other social institutions have trusted the 
identity thief in their use of the research subject's identity. 
The obtaining of this evidence may be in some instances quite easy as there are several 
forms of identification which have minimal security checks. This is because there is no 
direct financial benefit to their theft. Memberships in social groups for instance or 
gaining qualifications either professional or academic are examples of this. There are 
several academic qualifications which can be bought from the internet from fake or 
counterfeit universities. Aside from forged qualifications, there is also qualification from 
distance learning courses where their identification checks can be manipulated. It is 
even possible to buy a peerage from websites such as nobility. co. uk, allowing the 
identity thief to raise the social status of the stolen identity. In obtaining additional 
forms of identification, people begin to trust that the identity thief is the genuine holder 
of the identity even though they are not. 
This process will involve spending money; however, this merely reinforces the idea that 
the researcher conducting the simulation is the genuine identity holder. The goal here is 
to establish several bonds of trust within society under the research subject's natne; the 
more bonds created the more proof exists that the identity thief is Ole genuine identity 
holder. This is important, as providing background information that the identity thief can 
control will allow for interaction with organisations which require some form of 
background checks. 
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Step 5 Approaching financial institutions 
By taking these steps, it is possible to give the impression to social institutions such as 
banks and credit companies that they are dealing with the genuine identity bolder. 
According to Sullivan (2004) one of the problems facing the credit industry is that it is 
too eager to set up accounts and then deal with any problems it faces with identity thert 
when genuine identity holders discover there is a problem. With the advent of the 
internet it has become possible to set up bank accounts over the internet thercby limiting 
the amount of face-to-face interaction and allowing for multiple applications to 
numerous banks or credit agencies in a short period of time. 
Step 6 Achieving an all-round impersonation 
If steps 1-5 are successful, then it is conceivable that the researcher conducting the 
simulation could live under the identity assumed. There would be an address, phone 
number, bank account, and state documentation all under the researcher's control. The 
only area where the simulated identity thief would face difficulty in maintaining the 
identity is when trying to obtain the National Insurance number of the research subject. 
Without this number, the only places the researcher could work would be in jobs that are 
'cash in hand'. These types ofjobs form the 'black economy' (discussed in chapter 3) 
which attracts people who wish to avoid paying tax or involvement with government 
work, for instance illegal immigrants. This may be beneficial for it would mean the 
researcher would not have to pay taxes. However this would limit the researcher to 
relatively low income work which would have none of the security found in legitimate 
work. If the researcher wanted a job that involved a pay check it would involve the 
obtaining of the research subject's National Insurance number. This would also improve 
the chances of obtaining a passport by making an application in the name of the research 
subject. 
There are ways of obtaining someone's National Insurance Number such as thefl from 
the home or theft of employment records. But in simulating identity theft these avenues 
would be closed off for ethical reasons. The method this study imagined using would be 
pretexting with. tbe research subject. The researcher simulating identity theft would use 
143 
the information already gathered on the research subject and contact them or someone 
they are involved with. This would involve pretending to be an organisation such as the 
Department for Works and Pensions that the research subject would expect to know 
their National Insurance number. The key to the pretexting is to imply that rather than 
trying to find out something the identity thief does not know we are in fact re checking 
information already known. While people will be cautious about revealing information it 
can be argued that if instead they believe they are confirming something already known 
they will not feel as though they have anything to protect. This pretexting would be done 
via phone or over the internet. Neither of these approaches are guaranteed to be 
successful as scams involving pre-texting over phone lines and the internet have been 
publicised in the media for instance Phishing emails (see chapter 7 for examples of 
pbishing emails). 
If successful in obtaining the National Insurance number then it would be possible for 
the researcher to attempt to obtain a passport. Obtaining a passport would be important 
when it came to reinforcing the researcher's claim to the identity. After obtaining a 
passport the next step would be to try and obtain a National Identity Card (if the scheme 
were operational at that time). 
Another approach that could be used with the passport is to move to another country and 
use the stolen identity there. The use of travel to other countries is a useful approach as 
it can obscure the initial identity theft. It can be argued that this is something Charles 
Stopford did when he stole the identity of Christopher Buckingham. By moving to 
another country, the identity thief would be using the identirication documents with a 
new administrative system that would have to work a lot harder to detect the identity 
theft. 
This process would take time and require a great deal of research into the life of the 
research subject; it would also require a great deal of effort and f ifiancing to establish 
the separate address and forms of identification. In a genuine case of identity theft, it can 
be argued that the criminals would not focus on the victim, rather they would be more 
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focused on the information, credit card numbers, National Insurance numbers ctc., and 
any paper proofs of identity the criminals found would be exploited to see what could be 
gained from them rather than to focus on the identity. In a way, the goal of identity theft 
for profit is not to obtain the identity but what the identity provides. The model of 
identity theft represented in this simulation of identity theft is a partial assumption of 
identity. Here the goal is not simply to dispose of the identity once financial gain has 
been made. 
Why this approach cannot be used In researching Identity theft 
As stated earlier the simulation presented above was always intended as a thought 
experiment. This was due mainly to the ethical and legal drawbacks of attempting to 
enact it and as such none of the actions discussed were attempted. However, in 2007, a 
television documentary for Channel 4 by Bennett Aaron on identity thcft did use actions 
which could be considered as a practical example of simulated identity theft. During this 
documentary, Aaron tried to illustrate the dangers of identity theft; however in his 
efforts to show how dangerous and damaging identity theft is, he openly abused the 
identities of others. 
Aaron was himself a victim of identity theft and was hoping that by using identity theft 
in his documentary he could highlight the dangers of this crime. During the making of 
the documentary, Aaron raided a man's bins, and used information gained there to 
purchase items in his name. After achieving this instance of identity theft Aaron went to 
the house of the man whose identity he had stolen and showed him how lie had stolen 
the identity and the items he had purchased. 
While this was a powerful illustration of the danger of identity theft, it failed to 
acknowledge the abuse Aaron himself had done to the victim's identity. The man whose 
detail had been taken showed no sign of consenting to the theft of his information. 
While he agreed to take part in the documentary, it was evident that lie was unaware of 
what had been done to him until presented with the findings of Aaron's bin-raiding. 
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In another example from the documentary, Aaron also obtained a driver's licence in the 
name of Charles Clarke (the then Home Secretary) to show how anyone is at risk. After 
trying and failing to arrange to meet Charles Clarke, Aaron went to London with a 
poster size copy of the drivers licence and displayed it in front of the Houses of 
Parliament. At the end of the documentary, it was revealed that Aaron had been arrested 
and cautioned for his activities, 
This documentary helped to illustrate the dangers of identity theft to the general public, 
but for this study it has also helped to show the dangers of simulating identity theft. 
Aaron began the documentary by noting how he felt when his identity was stolen, but in 
the rest of the documentary he happily stole the identities of others without considering 
what he was doing to them, Stealing an identity to show the danger and abuse that can 
happen when an identity is stolen seems an unethical approach that undermines the 
message that identity theft is a personal abuse. While there is no practical example of 
simulated identity theft as described, in this study, we can look to the actions of Aaron 
as an example of the kinds of ethical and legal implications that prevent academic 
studies of identity theft from using simulated identity theft. 
Inaccuracy simulating modern identity theft 
According to Frank Abagnale (2007) there has been a shift in the nature of identity theft. 
Where conmen in the 1960s had to focus more on the victims and what could be gained 
from them, the modem day identity thief focuses on the information be/she can obtain. 
Abagnale compares the activities of modem identity thieves to workers on a production 
line processing the identities they have stolen in an industrial sense en masse. 
In this respect, simulated identity theft is not in keeping with the perceived nornial 
processes of modem day identity thieves. In considering how to simulate identity theft, 
there had to be a focus on the research subject (the victim) in order to avoid unethical 
treatment by the researcher. The simulation also had to demonstrate how susceptible 
difCcrent types of identification are to identity theft and identity fraud. 
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This is not the motivation for organised crime groups seeking to makc money from 
credit scams, or people-smuggling operations in the U. K. Simulated identity theft, while 
showing the process of stealing certain parts of a person's identity, does not represent 
the true manner in which criminals adopt or impersonate the victim. In the simulation, 
the identity of the victim is developed and constructed, whereas in a more conventional 
case of identity theft the identity is abused. 
Researching the national identity card scheme 
Aside from researching the various methods of committing identity theft, it was also 
necessary to monitor developments with regard to the proposals for the National Identity 
Card Scheme. This can at times be difficult as the proposal for the ID card scheme have 
been subject to various changes since 2002. 
This has made the task of assessing what effect the identity card might have on identity 
theft and identity fraud harder, as the exact nature of the proposed scheme is still in flux. 
It can be argued that the use of identity cards will always be open to alteration by public 
protest and political disagreement, with regard to the aims and objectives of the scheme. 
In order to adapt and include these variations it also important to keep track of political 
debate concerning the identity card, the popularity of the scheme and the discovery of 
security issues. 
Researching a new area of study 
Researching the national identity card scheme at this stage of its development has its 
difficulties because the scheme is still being amended and changed. Looking at the 
operation of identity card schemes in other countries and the political discourse for and 
against identity cards can provide some insight into how identity cards might work in 
the U. K. However given that the scheme is still under development this study can only 
provide an informed snapshot of what is happening with the scheme up to 2009. 
One way to gain an insight into what impact an identity card scheme might have is to 
look at identity card schemes operating in other countries. According to Privacy 
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International (1996) there are numerous countries worldwide that use an identity card 
scheme: 
"Around a hundred countries have official, compulsory, national IDs that are 
used for a variety of purposes. Many developed countries, however, do not have 
such a card. Amongst these are the United States, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia, Ireland, the Nordic countries and Sweden. Those that do have such a 
card include Germany, France, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Spain. 
The use of sectoral (specific purpose) cards for health or social security is 
widespread, and most countries that do not have a national universal card, have a 
health or social security card (in Australia, the Medicare Card, in the United 
States, the Social Security number), or traditional paper documents of identity. 
The reverse is also true. In Sweden, while there exists a ubiquitous national 
number, there is no single official identity card. 
Generally speaking, particularly in advanced societies, the key element of the 
card is its number. The number is used as an administrative mechanism for a 
variety of purposes. In many countries the number is used as a general reference 
to link the card holders activities in many areas. " (Privacy International, 1996: 2) 
By looking at European identity card schemes it maybe possible to learn about how the 
identity card scheme in the UX might be administered and run. The process of applying 
for an identity card and how the identity card is used on a day to day basis by citizens in 
countries such as Belgium, France and Portugal could provide some insight into how 
citizens in the U. K. will engage with the scheme. It might also provide some insight into 
the benefits the scheme might provide with regard to the administration of health care 
provisions, state benefit and the general process of identification people are involved in 
on a daily basis. As discussed in chapter 4 identity cards are not a new idea. Although 
there are things we can learn from looking at other identity card schemes; thcre are 
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aspects of the new UX identity card scheme which distinguish it from other schemes 
established identity card schemes. 
Firstly the new UX identity card scheme will not be a paper based identity card it is a 
smart electronic identity card. Established European identity card schemes often employ 
a paper based identity card which is a simply a paper or plastic card linked to a central 
register. Smart electronic identity cards according to Lyon (2004) include an embedded 
computer chip which holds information such as biometric data. In effect the identity 
card holds its own information and is not just a document that links to a centralised 
register of information. This new approach to identity cards is being developed in 
several countries most notably in South East Asia. Lyon (2004) notes that China, Hong 
Kong, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are all investing in smart electronic identity 
cards with Austria, Belgium, Germany, Russia and Spain considering the introduction of 
new identity card schemes. The technology that these particular schemes rely on varies 
and could influence the effectiveness of the various schemes. How each smart electronic 
identity card scheme operates and the manner in which the schemes operate and counter 
identity related crime will vary. So while there is some benerit to looking at pre- 
established identity card schemes it is important to recognise that the UX scheme 
is part of a new wave of identity card schemes which are being established. 
Also the UX scheme is a new form of identification, not since the 1950s has the UX 
operated an identity card scheme. How the new identity card scheme will be received 
and adopted by people in the U. K to a degree cannot be determined by looking at 
countries which have a pre-existing identity card schemes. The UX scheme is being 
introduced at a time when a concern over identity security is a major concern for both 
the government and the general public. In many respects the nature of the scheme 
reflects these concerns with an emphasis on biometric security, and the role the identity 
card can play in preventing identity fraud, terrorism and illegal immigration. Identity 
card schemes in Europe emphasize improvements in health and welfare provisions, and 
are ultimately a tool of administration and not security, This is not to say they do not 
play some part in crime prevention or detection. But in comparison with the U. K. 
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scheme which has placed biometric security at the forefront of the scheme, European 
identity cards do not involve the same (proposed) levels of scrutiny holders of a U. K. 
identity card will be under. 
The issue of security and crime prevention associated with the UX scheme bring into 
play issues of civil liberty and the limits of state surveillance. These developments are 
important to consider in their own right as they show how concerns over data security, 
trust in the government, biometrics, cost and civil liberties have dictated the 
development of the scheme. The recent credit crunch in the U. K. is also a factor which 
may influence the future of the identity card scheme. Critics of the identity card scheme 
such as Privacy International, N021D and Defy ID have often pointed to the rising cost 
of the scheme as a reason to discontinue plans to introduce identity cards. flow the 
scheme will survive through these times of economic difficulty is debateable. It may be 
that in order to counteract concerns over cost the identity card scheme is curtailed or 
amended to make it cheaper. This may in turn result in the scheme being less effective 
as a means of preventing crime or detecting it. 
Despite concerns over the credit crunch in May 2009 die Identity and Passport Service 
began a pilot of the voluntary identity card scheme in Manchester indicating an intention 
to go ahead with the scheme. It has also been noted by Woodhouse (2009) that the 
government has introduced a 'poison pill' strategy which wil I result in a E40 million fee 
to companies involved in introducing the Identity Card scheme if the scheme is 
discontinued. This fee would make the plans of the Conservative and Liberal 
Democratic parties to discontinue the identity card scheme costly. 
Researching political developments around the Identity card 
The politics surrounding the identity card scheme have raised several questions about 
the future of the identity card. As discussed in chapter 4 both the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat Parties have made discontinuing the identity card scheme a part of 
their policy commitments. According to Conservative shadow Home Secretary Chris 
Grayling: 
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"I see little reason why the rules to a national identity register such as that 
proposed by the government at a time when the nation's finances are straitened 
and when genuine questions arise about civil liberties seem to suggest that it is a 
project that we do not need to pursue. " (Grayling C, 2009: 1) 
The Conservative party aside from denouncing the identity card scheme have also sent 
letters to companies taking part in the identity card scheme outlining their intention to 
discontinue the scheme. Leader of the Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg has vowed to face 
court proceedings rather than register for an ID card if the government presses ahead 
with plans to make them compulsory. The Liberal Democrat shadow Home Secretary 
Chris Huhne has also criticised the identity card scheme stating: 
"These expensive and intrusive plans should be ditched now. The vast amount of 
money would be far better spent on something that will actually fight crime and 
terrorism - ten thousand more police on the street. " (11uhne C, cited 
in Tall . S, 
2009: 1) 
Perhaps one of the most damaging criticisms of the identity card scheme came from 
David Blunkett in 2009. At the InfoScc security conference 2009 Blunkett argued that 
the identity card scheme should be scrapped in favour of the mandatory biometric 
passport system. The former Home Secretary argued that the biometric passport would 
not only be a cheaper alternative, but would also alleviate the general public's fears over 
National Identity Register. 
"People don't worry about the Passport Agency but they do worry about some 
mythical identity database, " (Guard ian. co. uk, 2009: 2) 
The criticisms posed by David Blunkett have been highlighted by both the Conservative 
party and the Liberal Democrats as a sign that the scheme should be discontinued. 
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Liberal Democrat shadow Home Secretary Chris Huhne responded to Blunketts 
comments by saying: 
"When even the father of ID cards spurns them, the idea is truly an abandoned 
orphan. " (Huhne. C, cited in Liberal Democrats website, 2009: 1) 
These objections have placed a definite question mark over the long term survival of the 
identity card scheme. Aside from the issue of whether or not the identity card would 
survive a change in government the politics surrounding the identity card scheme has 
also been influenced by the public perception of the government and its scheme. 
Concern over both civil liberty implications of the identity card and the trustworthiness 
of the government to operate the scheme has influenced the debate. 
The view that identity cards are part of an effort to create (or perpetuate) a 'surveillance 
society' has led to a great deal of opposition from protest groups and civil libcrty 
advocates such as Privacy International, Defy ID and N021D. The effect opposition to 
the identity card scheme from the general public might have on the continued popularity 
of the scheme is debateable. 
Often arguments over the identity card scheme involve referral to public opinion polls, 
with both supporters of the identity card scheme and opposition groups reinforcing their 
view of the identity card with referral to polling data. Surveys commissioned by the 
anti-ID card group N021D between 2005 and 2007 have routinely posed the same 
question: 
"Q. I The Government has proposed the introduction of identity cards that, in 
combination with your passport, will cost around L93. From what you have seen 
or heard do you think that this proposal is a ... ?" (NONDACM, 2007: 2) 
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The 2005 survey found that 50% of people thought it was a good idea (14% very good, 
36% good) and 48% thought it was a bad idea (23% very bad, 24% bad) with 2% 
refusing to answer or not knowing. In 2006 the survey found that 52% of people thought 
it was a good idea (16% very good, 36% good) and 45% thought it was a bad idea (20% 
very bad, 26% bad) with 2% refusing to answer or not knowing. The 2007 survey found 
that 54% of People thought it was a good idea (14% very good, 40% good) and 42% 
thought it was a bad idea (17% very bad, 25% bad) with 4% refusing to answer or not 
knowing. This implies that feelings on the identity card are still mixed as to the whether 
or not the scheme is a good idea. What effect combining discussion of how people feet 
about the identity card with the issue of cost has on people's view of the scheme is 
debateable it may influence their response to the question. Equally it can be argued that 
discussing the identity card with regard to terrorism, civil liberties and privacy might 
also influence people responses. Despite these possible biases, these surveys suggest 
that there is some shift towards finding the scheme more acceptable; but how these 
numbers will be affected if and when the identity card scheme becomes compulsory is 
debateable. (see appendix 7 for N021D. ICM Polls) 
An assessment of awareness and demand for the Identity Cards Scheme in 2005 by the 
Home Office also looked at the popularity of the identity card scheme. In this survey 
983 people aged 16-75 were sampled with an additional sample of 126 parents of 
children aged 15 years old. This was done as part of quota sampling to ensure 
representation of subgroups. The survey sought to provide a representative view of the 
U. K. population with regard to gender, presence of children, working status and no 
passport ownership. This survey found that 73% of citizens support the proposed 
identity card scheme. 
According to the UK Polling Report (2009) surveys on the popularity of ID cards 
commissioned for the Home Office, N021D and various newspapers, also report mixed 
response to the popularity of the identity card scheme between 2004 and 2009. With 
finding like this, it can be argued that the acceptance of the identity card scheme by the 
general public is still debateable. How people's feelings over the scheme will change 
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when they are required to have an identity card and must pay for it is debateable. The 
degree to which people must use their identity card and the convenience/inconvenience 
of having the identity card will affect the popularity of the scheme. How much the 
identity card will cost the individual citizen may also influence the appeal of the 
scheme. 
The prominence of the identity card in preventing or detecting terrorists, illegal 
immigrants and identity thieves will also play a role in the popularity of the scheme (see 
chapter 9 for details). As the scheme has not won the overwhelming support of the 
general public it is more important that the government appear competent and 
trustworthy, so as to ensure that when the scheme does come into effect support does not 
fall away completely, 
However since the ID card scheme was first proposed in 2002 by then home secretary 
David Blunkett, there have been four changes in home secretaries Charles Clarke, John 
Reid and Jacqui Smith and as of May 2009 Alan Johnson. Clarke and Reid were both 
been forced to resign due to failure to maintain accurate records of criminals. Aside 
from these controversies there have also been several incidents of confildcritial and 
private data being lost by the government (see chapter 9 for more). A major part of the 
new identity card scheme is the creation of a National Identity Register a database of 
personal information. Criticism of the government's ability to ensure the safety of 
information in pre-existing databases raises doubts over their ability to secure and 
protect data in the National Identity Register. The government's ability to effectively 
introduce new information technology projects has been criticised both in terms of 
human rights implications and the cffectiveness of schemes. The Joseph Rowntrce 
Reform Trust (2009) conducted a review of 46 government databases and assessed them 
in tcnns of their adherence to human rights and data protection legislation. The report - 
Database State (2009) uses a traffic light system with databases where there were no 
problems being referred to as green, databases with moderate problems referred to as 
amber and highly problematic systems were red. According to the report: 
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"Of the 46 databases assessed in this report only six are given the green light. 
That is, only six are found to have a proper legal basis for any privacy intrusions 
and are proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. Nearly twice as 
many are almost certainly illegal under human rights or data protection law and 
should be scrapped or substantially redesigned, while the remaining 29 databases 
have significant problems and should be subject to an independent review. " 
(Anderson R et al, 2009: 2) 
In the review one of the databases looked at was the National Identity Register which 
was placed in the red category as a database which had significant problems and should 
be revised. Examples of other databases which were included in the red category were 
the National DNA database, the MIS Detailed Care Record, the Home Office ONSET 
system, and the Department for Works and Pensions cross-departmental data sharing 
programme. 
Aside from concerns over human rights and protection of privacy, government IT 
projects have also encountered problems over the introduction of new technology. 
According to the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology report on 
Government IT Projects (2003) IT projects in both the public and private sector 
encounter serious difficulties: 
"Difficulties with IT delivery occur in both the public and private sectors. A 
survey across sectors found that only 13% of all IT projects, and less than 1% IT 
development projects, were successful (on time, to specification and to cost). " 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2003: 2) 
The report also highlights two surveys on the success of IT projects from 2003, one 
from the Standish Group and a survey conducted by Oxford University and Computer 
Weekly which both noted that the success rates for both private and public sector 
projects were low. The Standish group noted that only a third of the 13,522 IT projects 
reviewed in America succeeded with nearly 70% being challenged or failing completely. 
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The Oxford University and Computer Weekly survey found similar problems, noting 
that one in ten of the IT projects surveyed were abandoned, three quarters of projects 
were challenged or encountered difficulties, and only 15% of the IT projects succeed. In 
the context of the National Identity Card Scheme this raise the possibility that even if 
the scheme is accepted in principle it maybe that in practice the technology fails. The 
report argues that the reason so many public sector projects fail is that unlike private 
sector projects they are open to change by policy makers and influence by media 
reporting of the project. It is farther argued that issues of accountability can cause 
problems with government IT projects: 
"In the private sector, companies are accountable mainly to their shareholders, 
who may not even be aware of a projecVs existence. In contrast, the public sector 
has more open methods of accountability, such as reporting to the National Audit 
Office and the Public Accounts Committee. It has been suggested that this need 
for public accountability can lead to a risk averse culture in government, and 
EURIM, the Parliamentary IT lobby group, has recommended replacing, "the 
culture of blame avoidance and cover-up followed by witch-hunt by one of risk 
management with recognition and rewardfor delivery of outcomes. " 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2003: 9) 
When we consider these issues with regard to the identity card scheme it is clear that the 
influence of both media reporting of the scheme and changes by policy makers have 
affected the scheme. With concerns over adherence to human rights and privacy 
legislation it can be argued that these are indicators that the identity card scheme may 
fail as much in terms of its deployment as in principle. The focus of this study is 
predominantly on how successful the concept of using an identity card to prevent 
identity theft and fraud might be. But issues relating to the success of government IT 
projects in general also raise questions of how successful the identity card scheme might 
be in practice. 
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Specific security concerns 
The National Identity Card Scheme has also been revised because of specific security 
concerns, such as the decision to establish several National Identity Registers rather than 
one centralised register. This change was introduced in order to limit the risk of a single 
attack by computer hackers providing access to all records stored on the National 
Identity Register. 
Practical security concerns are an area of study with regard to the identity card which 
will continue to need further study with regard to the identity card as it is conceivable 
that criminals will develop new ways to adapt to the identity card. The manner and 
method of how criminals might corrupt or circumvent the ID card is discussed in chapter 
9. The insights provided in chapter 9 must be seen as merely the initial concerns as it is 
likely the interaction between criminals and those administering the identity card will 
generate even more security issues. 
Principle and practice 
The aim of this study is to look at the idea of the identity card in principle and with 
regard to its specific format. The idea that an identity card can be used to prevent 
identity theft and fraud is something that can be analysed through the study of the 
perpetration of identity theft and fraud and how it is committed. This will provide an 
understanding of how forms of identification are manipulated and what impact a single 
secured form of identification such as the identity card might have. But the specifics of 
how the scheme is operated will always be open to change. Public opinion, political 
discourse and the actions of identity thieves will affect the identity card scheme both in 
the planning stage and when the scheme is brought into effect. This means that there 
will always be a need to reassess the relationship between the identity card scheme and 
those involved in committing identity theft. An ideal time to conduct this reassessment 
would be when the identity card scheme is being introduccd so the application process 
can be examined. 
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Rather than being able to give a definitive answer as to whether or not the identity card 
will stop identity theft and fraud, this is the beginning of a prolonged assessment of the 
identity cards efficacy against current tactics of criminals to defeat the identity card 
scheme and constraints placed on the scope of the identity card scheme through public 
protest and political debate. 
Internet based research and discourse over the World Wide Web 
As part of the planning process for the simulation of identity theft, the internet was used 
to gather information on how to commit identity theft and how to gather information on 
someone else. As a source of information the internet proved to be a very valuable 
resource. 
Initially the use of the internet was purely as a means of compiling literature on identity 
fraud and identity cards. Online archives of newspapers and government reports and 
statements were downloaded or printed out as a means of supplementing literature from 
library searches. Over time, it was discovered that there was a far larger body of 
resources available on the internet on the subjects of identity fraud and identity cards 
than there was in the local libraries. It became clear that just as the crime of identity 
fraud was closely associated with the internet, so too the majority of literature on 
identity fraud and identity cards was internet based. 
Accessing information on the Internet 
Not only were there government websites that gave access to PDF's on identity cards, 
but there were also private companies like Experian, public interest groups such as the 
Privacy Rights Clearing House, groups who opposed the introduction of identity cards 
such as Privacy International, political party websites and web based commentators who 
shared their views online. The abundance of information on the internet soon eclipsed 
the information gained from conventional searching of libraries or journals. Even when 
looking for literature in libraries through the internet it was possible to search online 
catalogues of various university libraries such as those in London, Manchester and 
further afield in America and Canada. 
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Due to the electronic nature of the information gathered a new concern had to be 
addressed; given that the information obtained came from searches of the internet there 
arose a risk of being inundated with huge quantities of websites, documents and 
commentaries from all over the world. Under these circumstances it became necessary 
to prioritise and organise the information in order to focus on the most relevant. 
Through the use of referencing tools such as bookmarks and favourites, it was possible 
to compile computer files of web addresses stratified along different topic areas. Initially 
this began with just two files, identity fraud and identity cards, but later this developed 
further with files on illegal immigration, terrorism, people smuggling and press reports 
on identity fraud, helping to further stratify the information found on the internet, With 
regard to identity cards, the internet was used to find any information on related topics 
and this lead to the creation of additional bookmark tabs on subjects of biometrics and 
opposition groups. As routinely searching the internet and book marking any useful 
websites became an important method of gathering information, the book mark files 
grew, requiring further stratification. The benefit of this was that when it was necessary 
to research a particular area, for instance illegal immigration, there were already several 
websites bookmarked as useful sources of information. 
This process of book marking websites and gathering information on the internet helped 
to prioritise the vast amount of information that was available on the internet. 
While the process of trawling the internet was time consuming it was still important to 
distinguish the important or valuable information from the relatively useless. 
Discourse over the Internet 
While there was a large amount of infon-nation on the internet which provided insight 
into identity fraud and identity cards it was still only literature. In order for the role of 
the internet to be more than the provision of a large store house of information in this 
research, it was important to use the internet to interact with others. With this in mind, a 
process was undertaken of using the internet as a means of contacting people who it was 
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believed would be helpful in answering some more in depth questions about identity 
fraud and identity cards. 
This approach enabled contact with a wide variety of different people and organisations, 
quickly and without distance being an issue. The issue of distance was a factor as there 
were a number of people in America who, without the use of the internet, would have 
been less easily approachable. 
Through the internet, access was also gained to university websites and academics who 
were involved in the study of identity fraud or identity cards. Accessing academics who 
had a specialty in identity fraud was an important break-through in this study. By 
emailing people like Professor Michael Levi, Dr Natasha Semmcns and Dr Emily Finch, 
it was possible to gain access to papers they had written and they were able to provide 
direction to others who had expertise in the study of identity fraud. If contact had not 
been tried with these people through the internet directly, there would have been a 
reliance on their work coming up during word searches on the internet or searches of 
online library databases; after seeing the vast amount of information available on the 
internet this appeared to be more of an issue of luck than skill. Additionally, aside from 
contacting experts in the field of identity fraud, the internet was also used to contact 
groups and private organisations involved in identity fraud. There were several 
organisations in America who were involved in helping victims of identity fraud. 
Obtaining confidential Information on the Internet 
Discourse on the subject of identity theft, identity fraud and social engineering was 
available through searches of web chat rooms and in some instances 'how to' guides can 
be obtained, explaining bow identity fraud can be committed, This is a method of 
researching identity fraud used previously by journalist Bob Sullivan in his book Your 
Evil YWin (2004), Sullivan noted that information - including credit card numbers, 
names and addresses and other forms of private information - was available on the 
internet. This information, according to Sullivan and others, is available through private 
chat rooms, based in places like Russia and Indonesia. Within the virtual chat rooms 
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information on people is bought and sold, enabling not only credit card fraud but also 
larger more complex identity fraud schemes. These chat rooms can often be closed to 
public contact, requiring a prior relationship with someone who has access to be allowed 
in. According to Sullivan, aside from these specialist areas of the internet devoted to 
confidential information stolen from people, a simple web search can provide similar 
results. The abundance of information available on the internet about people is vast. 
This is partly due to people's self promotion of their identity, but also because of 
security leaks at companies charged with protecting information. Equally, there are 
several easily accessible chat rooms on the internet where people discuss identity theft 
and manipulation of people to obtain confidential information. Below is an extract of a 
chat room discourse on social engineering (discussed further in chapter 7) and how to 
obtain someone's National Insurance number. 
"DISCLAIMER: The information in this post is meant to be used as an 
educational tool and is intended to be nothing more than a suggestion of 
theoretical possibilities. I take no responsibility is someone uses the suggestions 
and infonnation contained in this post to commit fraudulent or illegal acts. I 
would never and have never condoned these acts, and all the information 
contained within this post can be found freely available to the public, 
Of late, I've noticed a lot of places, including my college, have clamped down 
significantly on giving people sensitive details over the phone. Kudos to them 
finally wising up to such things, but it does make life rather annoying and 
slightly more complicated for us SE's. However, they are still open to convincing 
e-mails. (I send off single e-mails with a modified e-mail bomber program, 
allowing me to mimic any email address I need to, but I usually get them to send 
the details back to me through the post via a drop box. ) However, doing it over 
the phone is just ten times more fun, so try the phone method first, and use the e- 
mail as a backup, but expect to use it more and more often from now on. Right, 
now that's out the way, thought I would just drop a couple of pointers for any 
Brits or anyone who might be doing a little SE in the UK. 
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Ok, lets start with some basics so that we are all on the same page. In the states, 
they have Social Security numbers. The UK has exactly the same thing expect 
we call it a National Insurance number. Now, naturally this number is on the top 
of most SE's list of useful info. 
Now, after a little research I decided to have a little scoot around the HM 
Revenue & Customs website (they handle taxes and crap) and found that they 
had rather nicely plunked all their procedural manuals online at 
http: //www. hmrc. gov. uk/manuals/ and they've even ZIPed a lot of them so you 
can download them. The main website is also packed with juicy details and 
operating procedures for every single department (including a Departmental 
Security Manual) 
I mean, really. 
Amongst downloading and sifting through several bundles of this crap (some of 
which could prove useful crap in the future) I wandered back through the site 
and discovered a guide telling you the only people you should give your details 
too: 
- Employers, for the deduction of tax and NICs 
- Jobcentre Plus, (Jobs and Benefits in Northern Ireland) to administer 
Jobseeker's Allowance 
- Local Authorities, (The Housing Benefit Executive or the Rates Collection 
Agency in Northern Ireland), to administer Housing Benefit. 
- 1IM Customs and Excise to administer VAT Registration applications 
- Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
They are basically, in essence, telling you in black and white who you need to be 
to able to ask for National Insurance numbers. The how, who, where and why I'll 
leave up to you, but I'll give you an example'one of my friends'told me about. 
One day, he was yabbcring with his mates in his college cafe when the 
conversation turned to social engineering. One of his friends laughed the whole 
notion of social engineering off, saying that real life wasn't like War games or 
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Sneakers. So, my friend decided it was time to show this guy up and teach him a 
little lesson. He excused himself and walked outside to the payphone round the 
comer, dropped a couple of pounds in and called the Colleges front desk. 
College: Good Morning Crappy College. 
Social Engineer: Good Morning, my names John Smith, I'm calling from the 
National Insurance Contribution Office of HM Revenue & Service, how are you 
this morning? 
C: I'm fine thanks, and yourself? 
SE: I'm fine thank you very much. Basically, I was wondering if you could help 
me. I'm calling regarding one of your students, would it be possible to check that 
the person is a registered student at your college? 
C: You'll have to talk to Student Services about that, I'll put you through. 
After being put through and going through the same introduction and story and 
request, the lovely lady at Student Services brought the students name up on the 
computer. 
SE: That's great, now would it be possible to just quickly double check some 
details to make sure they match up with the ones I have here? 
The woman on the line paused, and seemed to get a little suspicious. 
C: What kind of information? 
SE: Just the basics, name, address, NI number, phone number, date of birth, just 
so I can verify that they are who they say they are. 
She seemed to swallow that. 
C: Ok, do you want me to just read them off now? 
SE: If you can now, if not you can simply email them to me. 
This wasWt bullshit; they had set up an email with a @Iimrc. co. uk domain. 
Luckily, she just read them all out and my friend wrote them down, Couple of 
minutes later, my friend returned to the college cafe and passed the paper, 
complete with all this guys 'private details' on. His face must have been a picture. 
Well, that's my say, its a little crude and simple but it can work. All I can say is 
before you do anything-, research, research, research. And then, research again, 
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Then revise and research. Remember, this aint exactly legal, so either don't get 
caught, or don't do it at all. 
PS If there are some screw ups in this, please feel free to flame me. You gotta 
learn from yah mistakes, right? (/code) 
Last edited by PP on Thu Nov 30,2006 9: 24 pm; edited I time in total" 
(Anon, Social Engineers 101,2006: 1-2) 
This web chat room was devoted to social engineering and the methods of how to 
manipulate people through lying and pretexting. The people who frequented this site 
discussed their own experiences and successes. These accounts implied that through 
simple observation, research and the confidence to try, people can be manipulated into 
divulging confidential information. 
An alternative name for social engineering is pretexting; this is a practice used by 
private investigators and those involved in information brokering. It is possible that the 
approaches discussed do not work or that claims of success by chat room users are false. 
But while it may be a mistake to take these accounts as completely truthful, they do 
highlight the way social engineering involves asserting a claim for information or 
identification by falsely claiming a right to that information. 
From this chat room, it also became clear that the majority of discussion was on social 
engineering in the U. S. A. Aside from the above example, most discourse between social 
engineers was of exploits carried out in the U. S. A. The majority of people in this chat 
room referred to obtaining the types of identification commonly found in America - 
Social Security Numbers, State Drivers Licences etc. 
The aim of this study was to investigate identity theft and fraud in the U. K. and aside 
from a few contributions from people in the U. K. (or at least people who claim to be 
from the U. K. ) there was very little discussion of the situation in the U. K. This is in part 
to be expected, as the phenomenon of identity fraud has been a widely discussed issue in 
the U. S. A. for the last fifteen years (See chapter 3). Identity fraud has only received an 
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increased coverage in the U. K. media since the millennium. In time, it may be that there 
will be an increased interest in social engineering in the U. K. 
Training available on the Internet 
As well as individuals discussing their own experiences on the internet there is also a 
number of websites where training information can be obtained on how to steal 
identities or learn the skills of social engineering. These guides often come with 
disclaimers against their use by criminals but do in themselves discuss the ease with 
which the law can be broken using the techniques they describe. 
Information In America 
As discussed in chapter 3, identity theft is an issue which has received a great deal of 
attention in America. Consequently there are several organisations and individuals in 
America with useful information on the subject of identity theft. Through the internet it 
was possible to contact these groups and individuals in order to gain insight into identity 
theft and identity fraud. One of the first groups contacted who specialise in identity theft 
was the Privacy Rights Clearing House group. This group is a key organisation in the 
formation of the identity theft law in the U. S. A. and they were contacted directly with 
this email: 
"Hello 
My name is Tim Holmes I am a researcher at the University of Wales 
Bangor. I am conducting a study into id fraud in the UX and the 
possible impact of an id card system on this type of crime. 
I was hoping you could help me, as part of my study I am looking in 
to identity fraud in America, in particular when did identity 
fraud/identity theft become a big issue in America, and how has your 
country responded. 
Any help you could give my study would be greatly appreciated. 
Regards 
Tim Holmes" (Holmes. T, 2006 see appendix 8 for original email) 
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This email is a general introduction used when contacting organisations via email. This 
contact was an important one to make as prior research into identity theft in America 
had revealed the importance of the Privacy Rights Clearing House as a source of 
infonnation and expertise. Luckily, through this contact it was possible to access not 
only information on identity theft in America but also contact information for other 
experts on identity theft. This is the response received from the Privacy Rights Clearing 
House's director Beth Givens: 
"I wish I had the answers to your questions in a single document -- or 
I could point you to a history of id theft in the U. S. Unfortunately, 
I don't have such a document at my fingertips. And to give you my 
assessment would take more time than I have, sorry to say. It's a big topic. 
The first hearing on the topic was held by the Federal Trade 
Commission in 1996. You might be able to find some useful info in the 
materials associated with that hearing (they call their hearings 
workshops). I believe you! ll find the transcripts here: 
http: //www. ftc. gov/bcp/workshops/idtheft/index. html 
Here are some links that you might find useful for older materials: 
http: //www. ftc. gov/os/I 998/05/idcnthef. litm 
http: //www. ftc. gov/os/1998/05/identhef. htm 
And we have a page that links you to various id theft surveys: 
http: //www. privacyriglits. org/ar/idtlieftsurveys. htm 
Good luck! 
Beth Givens" (Givens. B, 2006 see appendix 9 for original email) 
After this initial response was received a follow up email was sent, the goal of which 
was to discuss academic research in America: 
"Ili 
Thanks for responding to my e-mail. I am about to look through the 
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stuff you have sent me. I would have liked a big history of id theft 
in the US but I am not surprised that it isWt easy to find. From 
my research I have found that id theft/id fraud is a subject which generally 
doesWt receive much academic attention or research. 
(Apart from the US and the UK the only other place in the world 
that looks at Id fraud is Australia) 
Thanks for the information 
All the Best 
Tim Holmes" (Holmes. T, 2006 see appendix 10 for original email) 
Givens responded with an email that directed me to experts in America on identity theft: 
I know of a PhD student who is studying id theft for her 
dissertation. She's from Rutgers Univ and is visiting my office later this week. 
Her contact info is: 
Megan McNally 
Perhaps she has run across a general history of the subject, 
Another possible resource is Judith Collins, PhD, of Michigan State 
Univ. She has established an id theft center 
Good luck! " (Givcns. B, 2006 see appendix II for original email) 
Through this email it was possible to contact Megan McNally, the PhD student. This 
connection proved very useful as McNally is very knowledgeable about identity theft in 
America. Over a period of several months it was possible to discuss via email with 
McNally several ideas and theories on identity and identity theft. This discourse helped 
to refine and improve theories and understanding with regard to the subject of identity 
and identity theft. (See appendix 12 for examples) 
As well as seeking out others to discuss identity fraud within America, contact was 
made with several of the organisations in America devoted to helping victims of identity 
fraud. These groups provide information and the opportunity to discuss identity fraud 
with experts; however it became clear that the information received was specific to the 
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U. S. A. While researching identity fraud in America was useful in providing background 
material, it was evident that there was a need for research specific to the U. K. 
Can you trust the internet? 
This discourse was only achievable thanks to the internet, but it also raised several 
questions over the nature of identity. There has never been a face-to-face meeting with 
Megan McNally and despite a quick search of the Rutgers University website a picture 
of her was unavailable nor was there much in the way of biographical information 
beyond what has been said in our emails. Not much is really know about her in the 
traditional sense of identification beyond text from emails and whatever inferences 
could be drawn from them as to what kind of person she may be. 
The internet as a whole, aside from being a huge technological endcavour, is also an 
exercise in trust and assumption. It was assumed that the people spoken to are who they 
claim to be and are in a position to speak effectively and accurately on behalf of their 
organisation. Ultimately, for this study, it is only possible to trust that the information 
obtained is accurate and genuine. 
It is possible to criticise research or information gathered over the internet because of 
the lack of guarantee as to accuracy and reliability. This study looks at several methods 
of impersonation and counterfeiting on the internet. So bow much trust and value should 
be placed in the information given over and through the intemet? 
It can be argued that, at least if there had been a meeting with these people face-to-face, 
it could have brought another element of identification and judgement into play. But 
equally, as this study of identity fraud in face-to-face encounters will show, even in 
face-to-face encounters there are incidents where people have been deceived. 
In researching what is essentially lying, the issue of what information can be trusted and 
what appears to be reliable is open to a great deal of personal interpretation. In this 
study, it has been necessary to reason that there is a possibility that someone may have 
been lying, that the people spoken to over the intcmet are not who they claim to be. 
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Nevertheless there can be no guarantee that the information provided here is accurate or 
true; ultimately this entire endeavour could be a fabrication, and this study, like the 
information used in it, is dependant on readers trusting its authenticity and their ability 
to discern truth from lies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
History of Identity Related Crime 
Origins of identity fraud and identity theft 
In attempting to establish the origins of the crimes of identity theft and identity fraud, it 
is important to deconstruct the implicit meaning behind these terms. As discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, the terms identity and fraud are open to as much interpretation as the 
concept of identity fraud itself. There is no cast-iron definition of identity; it is a 
contentious term that refers to issues of categorisation by the individual and society, 
personality, role in society, self presentation, social symbolism and bonds of both 
personal and social trust. The issue of defining an identity is further complicated when 
trying to define what it means to lie about an identity. 
It can be argued that all crimes which involve some degree of deception involve a 
person's identity and society's efforts to identify them. A liar wants to be perceived as a 
truthful person; a bank robber who conceals his face wants to avoid being labelled as a 
criminal. Crimes of deception are incidents where criminals succeed by providing a 
false representation of who they are, how trust worthy they are, and their intentions. All 
of these are, in a sense, elements of a person's identity. It can therefore be argued that all 
crimes of deception - allfraud - is identity fraud, as all involve false representation and 
misidentification. 
The issue is no less problematic if the term theft is used; the term identity theft implies 
that something is taken away. However victims are often is able to continue using their 
identity after the theft, and in some cases may be unaware they are a victims at all. It is 
also worth asking what is actually taken in cases of identity theft, If it is information, 
how can we claim ownership of such facts? In order to be a part of our identity, details 
about who we are must be shared with society and open to modification by society. It 
can further be argued that any unwanted modification of our identities by other 
individuals within society can be a form of identity theft. In a very broad interpretation 
of identity theft, it can be argued that someone who is victimised by any form of 
170 
criminal activity is in effect a victim of identity theft as they are forced to exchange the 
identity of non-victim for that of victim. In effect their identity is altered against their 
will, and positive aspects of who they are (be it psychological, financial, material etc. ) 
are taken from them. Thus if we look at the concepts of identity fraud and identity theft 
in these very broad terms they become meaningless. While discussion of the use of 
deception and impersonation is important when defining identity fraud and identity 
theft, an explanation of these forms of criminal activity should not be based on these 
criteria alone. 
When defining identity fraud and identity theft, another aspect of the identification 
process must be considered, namely the formation of bonds of trust. Anyone can lie 
about who they are, or even impersonate another person, but what turns these deceptions 
into acts of identity fraud and identity theft are the bonds of trust they break. By 
focusing on which bonds of trust are breached and to what extent it is possible to use the 
terms identity fraud and identity theft in a more effective manner, they become less 
about the act of lying and more about the manner and consequence of the lies told. 
While the terms identity theft and identity fraud will be explained in detail in the next 
two chapters, the emphasis of this chapter is the history of identity related crime. In 
order to put the timeline presented here in context the crimes of identity fraud and 
identity theft are defined thus: 
Identity theft - the impersonation of a specific person's personal Identity 
victimising an Individual, and their presentation of self. The act of Identity theft 
can and often does lead to a further instance of Identity fraud (see chapter 8&9 
for more). The emphasis here on Impersonating a person's personal Identity and 
benefit from victimising that person. 
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Identity fraud - deception, either through the use of a false or stolen identity 
victimising society and its trust in a person's social role and/or social status. Tile 
emphasis here is on abusing individuals in society by deceiving them as to who the 
identity fraudster is. 
The timelines presented in this chapter show how identity related crime can be 
distinguished in terms of who is being victimised and how. Looking at the history of 
identity related crime there are two connected histories, the history of identity fraud and 
the history of identity theft. 
Communicating identity over distance and forming bonds of trust 
Looking at the history of both identity fraud and identity theft, an important element to 
consider is the value of an individual's personal identity. Current concerns about 
identity theft and identity fraud are based predominantly upon the risks faced by the 
general public from these crimes. This risk is however a new phenomenon, as changes 
in-+ technology and culture in western society have altered the value of a person's 
personal identity. 
Today it is possible to communicate and express one's personal identity on a global 
scale through technology such as the internet; in previous century's individuals' ability 
to communicate who they are (or who they are impersonating) was limited. 
The history of identity related crime shows the development of personal identities and 
the influence of this on the activities of professional criminals. In this chapter, it will be 
argued that the majority of early identity related crimes focused on deception rather than 
impersonation, Identity fraud has been favoured over identity theft because of the 
relatively limited value of impersonating an individual's personal identity. 
The history of identity fraud 
As noted above, identity fraud is the action of deceiving someonc'ns to one's true social 
status or role in society. Historically, there have been several cases of fraud where 
people have deceived others as to their social status or role. In one of the carliest forms 
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of advanced fee fraud - that of the Spanish Prisoner (Ampratwum. 2009) - the success of 
the crime is dependent on successUly deceiving the victim as to their status as a 
representative of the king. 
The Spanish Prisoner is one of the oldest confidence games and originates from 1588. 
The scam begins with a criminal pretending to be a representative of the king and 
approaching the victim. The criminal explains to the victim that a prince - travelling in 
disguise - has been captured by the Spanish and is being held hostage. The criminal 
goes on to explain that the Spanish are unaware that the man they are holding hostage is 
actually a prince. Consequently, an opportunity exists for the king to pay a smaller 
ransom for the prince than he would otherwise need to. In order to do this, the criminal 
explains, the king needs someone else to pay the smaller ransom; so the Spanish do not 
become suspicious as to why the king would be willing to pay the ransom for someone 
the Spanish consider to be of little value. This is where the victim comes in: the criminal 
tells them the king needs the victim to pay the ransom. Once the Spanish prisoner is 
returned, the criminal tells the victim that the king will repay the victim a larger sum 
than the victim paid to secure the release of the Spanish Prisoner. As well as the promise 
of a larger sum of money than the victim had to provide for the ransom, the victim is 
also promised some form of increase in social status. In effect, the victim is askcd to 
give the criminal a sum of money on the promise that the victim will receive a larger 
reward later. After the victims have handed over the money, they are infon-ned that there 
have been complications and that more money is needed; the victim is then routinely 
told that there is a need for them to give more money. The scam ends when the victim 
has no more money. 
The Nigerian 419 scam is a more up to date version of advanced fee fraud which follows 
many of the same principles as the Spanish Prisoner, in both it is misrepresentation 
rather than impersonation of people that enables the fraud. Older forms of fraud using 
fake and false information, information without any official involvement or 
confirmation, are still used today on the internet where the large number of potential 
victims and lack of security make this type of crime still viable. 
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Below are three examples of a scam which use the Nigerian 419 model in order to show 
the similarity in techniques. As with any scam of this type, the aim is to clicit sympathy 
from the victim and the belief there will be financial gain; all that is required is an initial 
amount of money from the victim. A common tactic in this type of scam is to use a well 
publicised event or situation the victim will know about such as a large scale lottery, or 
situation that has recently received media attention and in which people need help, for 
example a natural disaster such as the South East Asia Tsunami. The first example is of 
a Nigerian 419 scam: 
From: rose williams. 
Abidjan Cote d' ivoire 
West Africa. 
Dearest One, 
Good day to you. 
My name is Miss rose williams and am 19 years old. Is my pleasure sending you 
this message. I am requesting you to go through it carefully and get back to me 
the soonest. 
I am contactacting you for a business venture which I intend to establish in your 
country. Though we have not met before, I firmly believe, that you will not lead 
me astray after fervent prayers and fasting. 
There is this huge amount of nine million five hundred thousand US dollars 
($9.5m) which my late Father Mr. Albert wiliams deposited for me in a Security 
Company here in Abidjan before he was assassinated by unknown persons 
during the war in our country Cote d'ivoire, lie intentionally deposited it as 
family valuables for its safe keeping in the Security Company. 
Now, I have decided to invest this money in your country or anywhere safe 
enough outside Africa for security and political reasons. I want you to assist me 
claim and retrieve this fund from the Security Company and transfer it into your 
personal account in your country for investment. I will checrish it if you can 
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consider these listed areas below for the investment. 
1). Telecommunication. 
2). The Transport Industry. 
3). Five Star Hotel. 
I will be pleased and grateful offering you 20% of the total 
fund as compensation for your kind gesture and assistance. 
God bless you and i await your soonest response. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Miss rose milliams (see appendix 13 for original cmail) 
This next example uses the current problems in Zimbabwe: 
My Dear Friend, 
This letter might come to you as a surprise as we have not met before, but I 
believe that you would be compelled to help me after going through the contents 
of this letter. My name is Maria Del Carmen Stevens a swedish, my meeting 
with Mr David Yendall Stevens in south affica led us into marriage. my husband 
Mr David stevens who is now late farmer and exporter of Tobacco in the 
Republic of Zimbabwe, he was shot dead allegedly by ZANU-PF supporters in 
zimbabwe on 25th of april 2000 in the farm. You can confirm this by copying 
and pasting this link on your internet browser. or click on it: 
http: //news. bbe. co. uk/l/hYworld/africa/725643. stm, 
http: //news. bbe. co. uk/l/hi/worIdJafrica/818766. stm 
He (Robert Mugabe) did not stop at that; he also went on to expel all White 
farmers in Zimbabwe. He implored the services of his war veterans to undertake 
this seizure. The war veterans have been accused (correctly) of being behind the 
175 
violent occupation of white-owned commercial farms in which an estimated 
70,000 farm workers have been displaced. At least, over hundreds white farmers 
and black settlers have been killed since the farm invasions began in February 
200O. We have decided that we must see this problem to the end. 
Although we know that we are taking a great risk by staying here in Zimbabwe. 
At the Moment, our phone lines are bugged, and all our movements are being 
monitored by Zimbabwe's (Robert Mugabe)secret Police. Therefore email is the 
safest means of communication for now. 
We (White farmers in Zimbabwe) have taken our case to the United Nations and 
even with the threats of transactions and the subsequent sanctions from the West 
against the Zimbabwean Authorities, Robert Mugabe (The president of 
Zimbabwe) still remains adamant. 
He is insisting that our farm land (some of which we bought with our money and 
most of which We inherited from our fathers) belongs to the (his) government of 
Zimbabwe. the government of zimbabwe has asked all white-farmers to give up 
their farms to black farmers or risk going to prison, So far, more than 1,400 
white owned farms have been invaded and confiscated, as well as claiming the 
properties of the farmers. Also, about 133 white farmers were arrested for 
defying the orders to leave their farms under the controversial land reform 
program of the government, 
Since I could not keep the money in Zimbabwe, I used the services of a 
Diplomatic Courier Company to move this money (registered as official 
documents) out of Zimbabwe to Europe. At present, my money totaling 
US$28,750,000. (Twenty eight million, seven hundred and fifty thousand United 
States Dollars) is in Europe and hopefully, it would be paid into an offshore 
account, Can you help me? Are you trustworthy? Can you handle this money? 
Are you capable of handling this money? If you can, please contact me. All you 
need to do is to claim this money from the Courier Company. 
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You will be required to contact the Courier Company that moved this money 
(official documents) out of Zimbabwe to Europe. All necessary particulars which 
can facilitate and enable you claim the money on my behalf will be forwarded to 
you as soon as your consent to proceed is received. For your assistance you will 
be entitled to have 20% of the total sum. You are also obliged to he)p/advise on 
the proper and most convenient way of investing this money in your country, 
Hopefully, You will consider this request and respond positively. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Maria Stevens (see appendix 14 for original email) 
Below is the third example of a 419 'scam'; again, there is discussion of a situation 
which requires the victim's input to secure a large sum of money: 
Hello, 
I AM MR Paul Cooper, A SOUTH AFRICAN working with SENEGAL 
BRANCH OF CREDIT MUTUAL DU SENEGAL AS THE MANAGER. My 
apologies if you find my mail intruding, i do not intend to offend you but only 
wish to use this medium to propose a business transaction to you which i believe 
would be of financial benefits to both of us if you agree to work with me. 
Firstj would like you to know that i would understand if you take this proposal 
to be some scam or hoax as i would probably think the same in your place. I also 
receive a lot of spam mails all the time which to be honest with you is how i got 
the idea of contacting you through this medium froml want to assure you this is 
a real and genuine business. 
I am sorryj can only give you a few details of the transaction at this moment as 
i am not sure of your position yet and would not want to risk destroying 
everything i have worked hard for so far by being carefree and disclosing vital 
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information! s at this point that could get me into troublej have to be sure you are 
willing to work with me before i can give you the full details including my 
personal information's. 
The total amount involved is around NINE MILLION UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA DOLLARS and all i need from you is to help me get the funds over 
to you safely, i have everything all worked out and there would be no risk or 
danger in this transaction. 
If you are willing to co-operate with me on this deal feel free to give me a call 
or write me ASAP indicating your sincere interest and for further information's 
and any questions you might wish to ask me. Thanks for your time and i took 
forward to a positive response from you soon. 
Thanks, 
Paul Cooper (see appendix 15 for original email) 
These examples refer to different situations, but both also involve a large sum of money 
that requires the assistance of another person to secure, the other person being the 
victim, who if they respond will be informed that they will have to give a sum of money 
to help secure the larger sum of money. 
These examples represent a type of advance fee fraud which is dependent on providing a 
persona that people will trust and sympathise with, to the point they will be willing to 
enter into a business arrangement. The use of identity in the Spanish Prisoner, and its 
modem version in the Nigerian 419 scams, focuses on abusing the bond of trust people 
form with other members of society. The identity abused in this instance is the general 
process of identification and social trust we all use when interacting with others. 
The formation of a more general identity of someone who can be trusted is an activity 
many professional con artists have used over the years. The term con artist is derived 
from a report in the New York Herald (1849) on the activities of a 10 century thief 
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William Thompson. Thompson was known as the Confidence Man because of the 
approach he took to stealing people's property: 
" ... he would go up to a perfect stranger 
in the street, and being a man of genteel 
appearance, would easily command an interview. Upon this interview he would 
say after some little conversation, 'have you confidence in me to trust me with 
your watch until to-morrow; ' the stranger at this novel request, supposing him to 
be some old acquaintance not at the moment recollected, allows him to take the 
watch, thus placing 'confidence' in the honesty of a strange, who walks off 
laughing and the other supposing it to be a joke allows him so to do. " (New York 
Herald, July 8th 1849: 1) 
The case of William Thompson is important not only in the establishment of the term 
'confidence man'. This case also shows how identity fraud does not necessarily involve 
using a false name or personal identity; all that is required is identification as someone 
with the appropriate social status or role. 
This practice of establishing a trustworthy identity has been utilised by several 
subsequent con men. For example, there have been con artists such as Arthur Ferguson 
who during the 1920s conned several American tourists into buying famous London 
monuments, and Victor Lustig who in 1925 sold the Eiffel Tower to a Parisian scrap 
merchant who have defrauded people by impersonating official representatives of 
governments. 
Use of appearance and group identities In Identity fraud 
As seen in several of the examples above, the use of general identities by con artists has 
been a tried and tested method of committing identity fraud. It can be argued that 
focusing on an individual and their personal identity is a modem trend. The use of 
identity fraud does not require the criminals to lie about their names (although they can 
and sometimes do) or to abuse another individual's identity directly rather; it involves 
stealing an archetypal or general identity. Examples of the theft of archetypal identities 
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include people who have impersonated members of state organisations such as the 
police or the armed forces, or private organisations. Another aspect of identity fraud is 
deception with regard to social groupings such as ethnicity or gender. 
Often these groups have some requirements for entry, their worthiness to claim to be 
member of organisations has to be judged. Once entry to the group is achieved, there is 
often some way to distinguish a member of that group from the rest of society. As 
discussed in chapter 2a common method is the use of dress or social sylabolism through 
badges or documentation. In incidents of group identity theft the process of being 
accepted into the group is circumvented and, wherever possible, the identity theft 
accesses the social symbols which distinguish a member of that group from the rest of 
society. 
The focus of modem identity theft and fraud has been on individuals and the social 
symbols which distinguish them from the rest of society. It is the victimisation of a 
single person's identity that has raised public concern over this crime. But it can be 
argued that identity theft aimed at one person is simply a specialised, form of a larger 
area of fraudulent activity and that identity fraud can be committed without victimising 
an individual. 
Below are several examples of identity fraud which have not involved the impersonation 
of another person or the theft of their identity. The following examples of identity fraud 
are crimes which have involved deception by claiming membership of social groups or 
organisations. 
Identity fraud and the army 
One area where there have been several instances of people falsely claiming 
membership of a social group involves individuals who have claimed to be members of 
military organisations. 
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In America there have been several incidents of men falsely claiming to have been 
members of elite military and covert government organisations and there has been a 
great deal of attention given to people who impersonate members of one elite group in 
the U. S. armed forces, the U. S. Navy Seals. This is one of the most elite military forces 
in America and has been in existence since the Vietnam War. Becoming a U. S. Navy 
Seal is very difficult and there is much secrecy surrounding the identity of the Navy 
Seals, and their activities. Often the activities of this group are kept secret, and as a by- 
product of this it can be easy to claim to be a former member of this organisation, If 
challenged, impostors can claim that their activities and membership of the Seals is 
classified information. In order to combat 'Phony seals', a number of genuine retired 
seals have taken it upon themselves to investigate possible impersonators: 
"Phony seals?? Fake seals?? Wannabc Seals?? 
Different names, yet the same kind of 'animal'!! 
They are pretenders who claim they have seen Vietnam UDT/SEAL action, Top 
secret/covert action, and/or even antiterrorist RED CELL, and/or SEAL team 6 
missions 'they can't disclose' and any other heroic (hah! I SPECWAR Team 
action {sj! I Mostly, you can recognize them: they wear SEAL/UDT patches, 
Trident Insignias, Black Berets, Cammo's, even they go so far as to carry or 
possess Naval Weapons! They talk big! " (Nightscribe. com, 2007: 1) 
According to this website there are several reasons for impersonating a Navy Seal: 
impersonators can use their claim to make money giving personal appearances, 
speeches, publishing and as part of their employment background to gain eligibility for 
future employment. However, while there is the possibility of defrauding others through 
this impersonation, its greater significance to genuine members of the U. S. Navy Seals 
is the 'disrespect' to their status that they perceive. Some have used impersonation of 
military personnel for financial gain. However, the impersonation of military personnel 
has been carried out for other reasons. Claiming to be a member of an elite military 
force can be an aspect of a mental illness. Here someone has a false view of themselves 
and their own identity. An example of this kind of person would be Barry George, the 
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man falsely convicted of the 1999 murder of T. V. presenter Jill Dando. The trial process 
and subsequent appeals revealed a great deal about Mr George and false claims he had 
made. It was reported by the BBC (2008), that the trial and appeals process surrounding 
George's conviction for Dando's murder revealed how George had made several false 
claims about who he was. In the years leading up to the death of Jill Dando, George had 
used several aliases and other people's identities. For example, he had for a time 
claimed to be Thomas Palmer, a member of the S. A. S. who was involved in the Iranian 
embassy siege in 1980. George had obtained copies of Palmer's birth and marriage 
certificates and opened a building society account in his name. George's mental 
condition became an issue in the appeal process, with his defence team citing a 
personality disorder and a low I. Q. as a reason why George could not have killed Jill 
Dando. It was argued that George was in many respects a man with a limited grasp on 
reality. The claim of membership of the military and elite groups within the armed 
forces as a form of identification, in this example, is as a means of fulfilling a fantasy or 
establishing a self image. In the story '7he Secret life of Walter Mitty'by James Thurber 
(1939), a similar scenario is discussed. In this story the main protagonist, Walter Mitty 
fantasises about being, among other things, a Navy captain, a fighter pilot, and a world 
famous doctor, as a way of escaping his boring life. Referring to someone as being like 
Walter Mitty has become a way to imply that that person is in some way delusional. 
Instead of from falsely claiming to be a member of the armed forces for financial 
reasons, or as part of a mental illness, some have used impersonation of military 
personnel to gain publicity and fame. In a recent effort to protest against the war in Iraq, 
a man impersonated a soldier in order to criticise the activities of the U. S. army in Iraq. 
In a 20 minute video interview, Jesse Macbeth explains how he and other soldiers were 
ordered to terrorise and abuse Iraqi locals: 
"By my hand alone.... Almost 200 people were taken out by me. That's just a 
rough estimate. A lot of them at close range... they would actually feel the hot 
muzzle of my rifle on their forehead... wed do stuff that would scare them 
first... beat'em up or kick 'em or hit the wife... slaughtering 30-40 people a 
182 
night sometimes, women and children... I was trained, you know, in all the 
Ranger school, 18 months of that crap... I got disappointed in my country... but 
I didn't say anything because I would have been locked up. " (MaWn. M, 2006: 
1) 
Soon after the interview with Jesse Macbeth had been televised on the internet, the U. S. 
Department of the Army reported that Macbeth had not been in the army. Furthermore, 
groups of web bloggers with knowledge of the army on the internet began to debunk 
Macbeth's story. Discrepancies and inconsistencies in Macbeth's story were highlighted 
Macbeth had claimed that he had joined the army at 16 and left when he was 20, that he 
had been injured several times and that he had served in the U. S. Army Rangers and in 
the U. S. Special Forces. Another major discrepancy was discovered in a photograph of 
Macbeth in his uniform which was missing several key details (various badges and 
insignia), and his beret was back to front. 
Another incident of someone pretending to be a member of the US army came to light 
in 2004. Micah Ian Wright had claimed to be a veteran of the 1989 Panama invasion and 
a former member of the U. S. Army Rangers. Due to his experiences in that conflict, 
Wright had become an anti war protestor and had written a book "You Back the A Itack! 
We 71 Bomb No We Want! ". However, when the Washington Post began an 
investigation into Wright, it was discovered that he had never served in the army. Upon 
his discovery, Wright was compelled to write an apology on his wcbsite: 
"Hi My name is Micah Wright. I'm a former Army Ranger, and I've been lying 
to you. I've kept the secret for years now, but all lies grow and eventually get out 
of control. This is me coming clean about my Big Lie. What did I lie about? Oh, 
nothing much... Except that I was never an Army Ranger. I never served a day 
in a Ranger Regiment. I never went to Ranger School. The closest I ever got was 
Army ROTC. " (Wright. M, 2004: 1) 
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Wright goes on to explain that while he had never served in the anny there was a 
lingering perception amongst his friends that he had at some time been an army ranger. 
According to Wright, he began spreading the story that he had served in Panama after 
the terrorist attacks in America on September I 11h 2001. After the terrorist attacks, 
Wright wrote a book which included World War Two propaganda posters with altered 
text which included criticism of the U. S. government's 'War on Terror. Wright goes on 
to explain that the response to his book included several claims that his work amounted 
to treason and Wright received several death threats. In order to counteract the 
impression that he was in some way 'un-American', Wright resurrected the lie that he 
had been in the army and devised a story about how he had served in the Rangers during 
the invasion of Panama and had parachuted behind enemy lines during the conflict. The 
actions of people like Macbeth and Wright are, arguably, variations an the crime of 
identity fraud in as much as they have adopted a fonn of identification to which they are 
not entitled. Another aspect of identity fraud involving the military is the use of identity 
fraud by war criminals. 
Use of identity fraud by war criminals 
After the Second World War, several high ranking Nazi war criminals, people such as 
Henrich Himmler, Adolf Eichmann and Josef Mengele used falsc identities to avoid 
capture and prosecution for war crimes. Himmler attempted to avoid capture by the 
Allies by assuming a false identity, but he was eventually captured. Eichmann was able 
to hide in Germany for a time before he moved first to Italy and then to Argentina. 
Similarly, Josef Mengelc made his way to Argentina after hiding in Germany. 
One of the reasons these men were able to escape from Germany was that there were 
several organisations who intentionally and unintentionally aided their efforts. Aside 
from ODESSA (Organisation der SS Angehocrigen-Association of SS Members) which 
actively tried to help Nazis escape, other organisations such as the International Red 
Cross inadvertently aided the escape to South America by Eichmann and Mengele and 
other Nazi war criminals to by providing them with travel documents when they were 
hiding in refugee camps. 
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Many Nazi war criminals headed for South America and countries such as Argentina. 
Argentina was a good choice for Nazis from Germany because the leader at the time. 
Juan Peron was a right wing leader who had cultivated strong ties with Germany and the 
expatriate German community who lived in Argentina. During the 1950s and 1960s the 
govermrnent of Israel and individuals such as Simon Wiesenthal sought to find Nazi War 
criminals living under false identities in South America. 
There is the case of Adolf Eichmann - the man who was in charge of the final solution to 
the Jewish question which involved the organising of the concentration camps and the 
execution of European Jews. Eichmann's activities after the war are discussed by Smart 
(2009) who notes that Eichmann was able through a series of false identities to reach 
South America and avoid the prosecution of the war crimes court established in 
Nuremberg. Unlike Mengele who was able to hide in a farmhouse near Gunzberg until 
he could escape to Argentina (Bulow, 2008), Eichmann had to use a variety of false 
identities in order to escape. Initially Eichmann pretended to be a Luftwaffe (German 
Air Force) airman called Adolf Karl Barth in order to avoid capture. While pretending to 
be Barth, Eichmann was caught and put in a prisoner of war camp where he used the 
name Otto Eckmann. Eichmann eventually escaped and, using the identity of a forest 
ranger called Otto Heninger, made his way through Austria to Italy with the help of the 
O. D. E. S. S. A. network; once in Italy Eichmann was able to escape to Argentina. 
In 1952, Adolf Eichmann was living under the name Ricardo Klement in Argentina. 
Eichmann claimed to be a mechanic and was employed as a labour organiser by the 
Capri Construction, Measurements and Waterworks Company which sheltered many 
war criminals. By 1961, Eichmann had been captured by Israeli agents and transported 
to Israel where he was put on trial for his actions during the war. In 1962 he was hanged. 
The use of false or stolen identities as a means of avoiding detection by the police or 
authorities has been utilized by a number of people suspected or wanted for crimes since 
the Second World War. Most notable are cases of suspected Serbian war criminals in 
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which false identities have been used to avoid prosecution at the International War 
Crimes Tribunal held at the Hague in the Netherlands. One example is Vlastimir 
Djordjevic who was accused of ordering the killing of Kosovo Albanians. According to 
the South Eastern Europe Times (2007), Djordjevic had been living in Budva under a 
false identity as Novica Karadzic since 2004. He had grown a beard and was employed 
as a construction worker there for more than two months. 
In 2008, former Bosnian Serb leader and wanted war criminal Radovan Karadzic was 
discovered in Belgrade after ten years on the run. Over these ten years, Karadzic had 
grown a long white beard and used the false identity, Dragan Dabic. As Dragan Dabic, 
Karadzic practised alternative medicine, according to the BBC (2008): 
"Masquerading as an expert in human quantum energy, the fugitive was so 
confident in his disguise he even had his own website, and would give out 
business cards during alternative medicine lectures. " (BBC News, 2008: 1) 
left Karadzic ten years ago, right Karadzic today 
(BBC News, 2008: 1) 
In the Second World War cases discussed above, the war criminals often attempted to 
avoid prosecution by moving far away from their homelands. Karadzic, in contrast, 
stayed close to home and was apparently able to completely deceive the people around 
him, despite his notoriety. 
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Identity fraud and espionage 
Deception with regard to identity is also used in instances of espionage, This is an area 
of activity which can be difficult to research. The use of false identities by spies has 
been a well publicized phenomenon in fiction, and in real life there are also several 
accounts of false identities being used by the police and the security services of various 
countries. While it is difficult to find specific information on how false identities are 
used in cases of espionage, or as part of covert police investigations, there are some 
historical accounts we can refer to. 
In a report for the Guardian by Taylor (2002), the use of false identities by undercover 
police officers from the 1960s to the 1980s is discussed. Taylor's report focuses on the 
experiences of the 'Hairies', a squad of undercover police officers. The name 'Hairies' 
was given to the squad because of their habit of growing their hair out from the usual 
short haircut of police officers, and in some instances growing beards in order to 
improve their chances of deceiving people. Apart from changing their appearance, it was 
also a common practice for the 'Hairies' to adopt a new identity, which they referred to 
as 'legend': 
"Each hairy worked out his own legend and memorised. Richard bad just read 
'The Day of the Jackal' and decided to adopt a new persona like Frederick 
Forsyth's assassin the identity of someone who had died young. 'I spent weeks 
and weeks at St Catherine's House studying birth and death records. I was 
looking for child who'd been born, about the same time as myself and died soon 
after. I found him and resurrected him. ' Richard visited the town where the boy 
who was providing his cover was born - and from which the family bad 
conveniently moved away - and researched every detail of the family's history. " 
(Taylor. P, 2002: 1) 
The approaches to formulating legends varied, according to Taylor, but one common 
theme in all accounts was the need to establish something more than a paper proof of 
identity. There was a need to prove not only the 'legend' through the use of 
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documentation, but also to demonstrate that the undercover officer was also living that 
life on a daily basis. This practice can be seen as a form of partial or wholesale 
assumption which is discussed further in chapter 8. The use of a dead person's identity 
is also discussed further in the account of Charles Stopford's use of Christopher 
Buckingham's identity on page 115. 
Another example of the use of false identities in espionage is the attempt of two Israeli 
men who in 2004 were imprisoned in New Zealand for attempting to obtain passports 
from that country. After the suspicions of a passport officer were raised, authorities 
investigated and found a conspiracy involving four Mossad agents, (from the Israeli 
secret service) who were attempting to set up a false identity for an agent called Zev 
Barkan. Only two of the four were caught, Uriel Kelman and Eli Cara, and when both 
appeared in court in 2004 they went to extraordinary lengths to try to conceal their 
identities: Kelman wore a balaclava while Cara had changed his hair colour and 
attempted to alter his appearance. Their conspiracy involved setting up a fake travel 
agency and trying to steal the identity of a wheelchair bound man. Their goal was to 
obtain a passport in this man's name. The use of false identities and documentation by 
Mossad has taken place before; in 1997, Mossad used a fake Canadian passport when 
they attempted to set up an operation to assassinate Sheikh Khalcd Mashal a leader of 
llamas. 
Identity fraud and the medical profession 
There have been several cases of people obtaining false qualifications and 
impersonating doctors. In many cases, the actions of these individuals involved the 
development of fake documentation or the use of another person's legitimate 
accreditation. 
According to Lister (2005) one major case of this type of identity fraud was when a man 
called Barian Baluchi posed as an expert in psychiatric care for refugees, 
neuropsychiatry, plastic surgery and post traumatic stress. Under this guise, Baluchi (a 
taxi driver) emigrated to the U. K. and began impersonating a Madrid based psychiatrist 
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called Antonio Carrillo-Gomcz. Baluchi was able to pass himself off as an expert in 
asylum seekers and refugees and he gave evidence in court and signed 1,500 reports on 
asylum seekers, 1,000 of whom were allowed to stay in the U. K. As a fake doctor, 
Baluchi made more than El. 5 million from various charities, grants, local councils and 
the Departments of Health and the Home Office. 
The case of Mr Baluchi is not an isolated one; in 1998 Godwin Onubogu was found to 
have been impersonating a doctor for over a decade. Onubogu was, a laboratory 
technician; after taking an Open University Science Foundation Course and working in a 
London based laboratory, he setup his own laboratory testing company called Iketam 
Clinical Laboratory Services with the help of an enterprise agency grant. According to 
Louise Kamill who prosecuted Onubogu: 
"All he wanted to do was to call himself doctor. He clearly thought of degrees 
as only a formality" (Kamil cited in BBC News, 1998: 1) 
Onubogu used his laboratory to see 400 people as patients; he used fake medical 
qualifications, pictures of himself in academic robes and fake medical articles. 
Onubogu, like Baluchi also used his pretence to appear as a medical expert in court 
cases. Eventually these activities were detected and Onubogu was arrested for these 
frauds and for indecently assaulting a 15 year old girt while examining her, lie was 
jailed for five years, 
While it is possible that the goal of these types of fraud is economically based, it could 
also be symptomatic of some form of mental illness or condition, In the case of Richmal 
Oates-Whitehead, there were a number of embellishments as to her medical 
qualifications. Miss Oates-Whitchead was found dead in 2005 due to a blood clot. Prior 
to her death Miss Oates-Whitehead had made news as one of the doctors praised for her 
work helping survivors of the Tavistock Square terrorist attack on July 76' 2005. Miss 
Oates-Whitehead claimed to be a doctor from New Zealand, but after her publicised 
activities on July 7th, the New Zealand press began to investigate her past and found she 
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had no qualifications as a doctor. At the time she was working as an editor for one of the 
publications of the British Medical Association, and she resigned from her post. 
According to the Sydney Morning Herald: 
"An investigation since Miss Oates-Whitehead's death has uncovered evidence 
that she led a fantasy life, telling others that she had travelled to Iraq to work as a 
doctor and to Indonesia to treat victims of the tsunami. " (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2005: 1) 
Miss Oates-Whitehead also claimed to have been stalked, to have given birth to twins 
who had died, and to have been treated for cancer. She had also for a time referred to 
herself as 'Professor Richmal Oates-Whitehead'. 
The practice of impersonating a general identity as opposed to a personal identity may 
not involve the persecution or victimisation of an individual who loses a part of their 
identity as is seen in cases of identity tbeft. Nevertheless as shown in the above 
incidents, people can feel that an abuse has taken place if they are dealing with someone 
who adopts a form of identification which they are not entitled to. There is also tile 
abuse felt by people who have formed bonds of personal or social trust with the 
individuals who have lied about their membership of this social group. 
Frank Abagnale Jnr - airline pilot, doctor, lawyer 
The one of the most famous 'con men' is Frank Abagnale Jnr. Abagnale performed a 
number of cheque frauds and falsified IN in order to pretend to be a pilot for Pan Am, a 
doctor, a lawyer and a sociology professor in America in the 1960s. His story was used 
for the film called 'Catch Me If You Can'(2002). Abagnale was able to cash over $2.5 
million in forged cheques and was wanted in America and 26 other countries before 
reaching the age of 21. 
Rather than stealing the identities of others, Abagnale impersonated members of 
professions. Abagnale, used various methods to convince people of the legitimacy of his 
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false identities, often using official looking documents which were enough to convince 
people that he was who he said he was. In the case of Abagnale's impersonation of a 
pilot, he was able to obtain an official Pan Am uniform simply by asking Pan Am where 
he could obtain a uniform. 
His ability to do this in part was a product of the times. In the 1960s, the use of 
computer databases to make a note of 'who's who' did not exist. If someone said they 
belonged to a particular organisation (especially larger organisations such as Pan Am 
airways which was one of Abagnale's targets) the process of confirming this would be 
long and drawn out. According to Abagnale's own accounts, it would appear that as a 
consequence of this people were taken on their word, the quality and apparent 
authenticity of their paper proofs, and their ability to adhere to archetypes. When 
Abagnale he was eventually caught, he was wanted for prosecution in over twenty 
countries. However after spending time in French and Swedish prisons Abagnale was 
sent back to America to face prosecution. While Abagnale was imprisoned for a time in 
America he was eventually given an opportunity to work for the F. B. I as an expert in 
forged documents and the activities of fraudsters. Abagnale went on to start his own 
company in 1976, specialising in providing security for the banking industry and he now 
writes, and lectures on the subjects of forgery, embezzlement and secure documents to 
the F. B. I. academy, government agencies and corporations. 
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Frankl-V. Abagnale 
Author, Lethavr, Coussaltimt (Abagnale and Associates, 2008: 1) 
Identity fraud and deception as a means of attaining prohibited identities 
While in many cases of identity fraud, the goal has been to defraud people, there are still 
some instances where people use identity fraud in order to obtain something they may 
be denied by society. It may be that in attempting to obtain this form of identification, 
they are breaking the law, but it may also mean that they are defying social norms and 
bonds of social trust. The following are several examples of people who have used 
identity fraud to obtain a form of identification that society, under normal 
circumstances, would deny them. 
Miranda Stuart aka Doctor James Barry 
An example which caused great controversy at the time was the case of Doctor. lames 
Barry, a celebrated surgeon and reformer of the British army medical service in the mid 
1800s: 
"... The gentleman had entered the army in 1813, had passed, of course, through 
the grades of assistant surgeon and surgeon in various regiments, and had served 
as such in various quarters of the globe. His professional acquirements had 
procured for him promotion to the staff at the Cape. About 1840 he became 
promoted to be medical inspector, and was transferred to Malta. tie proceeded 
from Malta to Corfu where he was quartered for many years... I Ic there died 
about a month ago, and upon his death was discovered to be a woman. The 
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motives that occasioned and the time when commenced this singular deception 
are both shrouded in mystery. But thus it stands as an indisputable fact, that a 
woman was for 40 years an officer in the British service, and fought one due] 
and had sought many more, had pursued a legitin-iate medical education, and 
received a regular diploma, and had acquired almost a celebrity for skill as a 
surgical operator. " (Manchester Guardian, 21 August 1865 cited in Lothene 
Experimental Archaeology 2007: 1) 
According to Burton (2000), such was the concern over the case of Doctor Barry that 
some began to spread reports that, rather than being a woman, Doctor Barry was in fact 
a hermaphrodite. 
= 'I W Dr James Barry born Miranda Stuart (Levi Alter Website 
Computer Consulting Services, 2008: 2) 
As well as the example of Dr James Barry, there are several instances of men and 
women who have lived their lives claiming to be the opposite sex. While today the term 
transgender may be applied to Dr James Barry and his lifestyle, in the 19"' century the 
discovery that Barry was biologically a woman was scandalous. The use of deception 
with regard to gender is an area which arguably has become less criminal over time. 
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Archibald Stansfield Belancy aka Grey Owl 
Another example of someone who has used identity fraud to obtain a form of 
identification that they would normally be prohibited is Archibald Stansfield Belaney. 
Belaney was an Englishman who in 1906 moved to Canada and adopted the persona of a 
Native American called Grey Owl. Belaney moved to Northern Ontario and married an 
Anishinaabe woman Angele Egwuna, he told her his father had been a Scot and his 
mother an Apache (in reality he was bom in Hastings, England). In his life as Grey Owl, 
Belaney became one of the first environmentalists and conservationists and published 
several books under the name Grey Owl such as 'The Tree'(1937) by Wa-Sha-Quon- 
asin (Grey Owl). Belaney's deception was discovered after his death and as a 
consequence his books were withdrawn from publication. 
The activities of Belaney are an example of how it is possible for people to deceive 
others as to their ethnicity. A term associated with this activity is 'passing'. In America 
during the 200' century there were several cases of black people who 'passed' as white 
people. In Phillip Roth's book 'The Human Stain'(2000), his main protagonist is a 
black classics professor who has passed for a white man for most of his life. According 
to Crary (2003) the story presented in The Human Stain is loosely based on the life of 
Anatole Broyard a literary critic for the New York Times. According to Crary: 
"Broyard was born to a black family in New Orleans and grew up in a black 
section of Brooklyn but as a young man stopped seeing relatives and friends 
from his past and lived the rest of life as white. A handful of people knew the 
truth, but even his own adult children were not among them. " (Crary D, 2003: 2) 
Crary argues that this form of deception was in many instances a response to social 
inequality faced by black people in America. 
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Brian MaclCinnon and Treva Throneberry - deception and age 
As well as identity fraud involving gender and ethnicity, people have also use identity 
fraud and deception with regard to their age. In 1993, Brian MacKinnon was a 30 year 
old Scot who enrolled in his former school Bearsden Academy in Glasgow Scotland as a 
17 year old in an attempt to re-enter medical school. 
MacKinnon adopted the persona of a 17 year old Canadian called Brandon Lee. 
MacKinnon created a back story for his new persona; he told the teachers that he was 
the son of William Lee, a Professor of zoology in Edmonton, Canada, and that his 
mother was an opera singer and that since his parents had separated he had been 
travelling with his mother and as a result had been privately tutored instead of attending 
regular schooling. MacKinnon went on to claim that his mother had died in a car crash 
earlier that year which had left his father severely injured and convalescing in Canada. 
MacKinnon's persona of Brandon Lee had been sent to Scotland to live with his 
grandmother. In a report for the Guardian, MacKinnon describes his experiences of 
going back to school: 
"Waiting, shaking The best are faking and Christ, they were the opening lines 
from some old song, which came back to me repeatedly as I made my way 
through the open gates and down to the concrete yard. It was overcast morning 
in late May 1993, and I was 29 years old. The same old smells - state schoolyard 
mud squelched underfoot, followed by that peculiar 'school diner' aroma that 
pervaded a wide area around the canteen. 
I was faced by the prospect of a year's drudgery, compounded by fear. Pausing 
at the entrance to the hallway, I tapped momentarily into the motivation that had 
brought me to this, to remind myself that I was doing the right thing; the only 
possible thing. " (MacKinnon . 13,1997: 1) 
Despite his having attended the same school when he was a child MacKinnon's 
deception was working. The deputy head teacher accepted that Brandon Lee was a 
genuine 17 year old, and that he was at the Academy seeking for a year to gain 
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qualifications to apply for medical school. However when introduced to his fellow 
students it soon became apparent to them that MacKinnon was not a 17 year old. 
According to MacKinnon it was apathy on their part that saved him from immediate 
detection by the teachers. MacKinnon was able to enter Dundee University under the 
guise of Brandon Lee, but after a term he was unmasked; by this time he had dropped 
out because he lacked funds to carry on. 
MacKinnon's story received a great deal of attention in the press and he has been denied 
access to any other medical school in the U. K. While this does constitute an instance of 
identity fraud, the goal was not criminal; in many reports MacKinnon has expressed a 
genuine belief that he is justified in seeking a career as a doctor. It is his obsession with 
becoming a doctor which has compelled him to seek the status through socially 
unacceptable means. 
Another note worthy case of identity fraud and age is that of Treva Throneberry. In 
200 1, Throneberry was arrested for pretending to be a teenager when in reality she was 
(at the time of her arrest) a 31 year old woman who had been passing herself off as a 
teenager since the 1990s. While MacKinnon's actions can been seen as misguided, 
Throneberry's deceptions often involved not only criminal activity but also several 
damaging and untrue accusations. Throneberry's crimes included the use of false 
identities to defraud state foster care services and she was also charged over falsely 
accusing several people of raping her. She used several false identities and would 
routinely move to different parts of America and then claim to be a teenager from a 
broken family. She would gain access to social services and the local school system and 
pass herself off as a teenager in need of help. 
According to Bell (2007), Treva Throneben-y was bom in 1969 in the state of Texas. As 
a young girl, it is alleged, she and her three sisters were sexually abused by an uncle. In 
1985, Throneberry went to the police and accused her father of raping her at gunpoint, 
The charge was eventually dropped due to lack of evidence, but Treva was put into 
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foster care and placed with a family. She was moved to a new school where despite 
being a diligent student she would recount stories of horrific past experiences: 
"Treva started to tell stories of being kidnapped by Satanists, who tortured her by 
forcing her to watch them kill animals. The stories were never confirmed, were 
likely signs that she was experiencing delusional thoughts. " (Bell A, 2007a: 2) 
Because of this story and claims she wanted to kill herself, Throneberry was sent to a 
State Hospital for psychiatric care. After spending five months in hospital she was sent 
to a home for troubled girls. At 18 she left the home and after a short time disappeared. 
TrevaThroneberry (Bell. R, 2006: 1) 
In the subsequent years, Throneberry passed herself off as a teenager, using the aliases 
Keili Smitt, Cara Leanna Davis, Stephanie Lewis, Kara Williams, Emily Kharra 
Williams and finally Brianna Stewart. Throneberry used these identities in different 
states throughout the 1990s; she would go to a town and live in homeless shelters or in 
foster care eliciting help and support from people. In each instance, Throneberry told 
stories about how her father had been a Satan worshiping police officer who had raped 
her. Aside from accusing her father of sexual assault Throneberry also accused others or 
raping her; in 1993 she accused and pressed charges against a Portland Oregon police 
officer for raping her, claiming he was her father. Before the charges could be 
investigated, Throneberry fled from Oregon. 
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While in several instances Throneberry was able to enrol in local high schools passing 
herself off as a 16 or 18 year old, and enter foster care, there were occasions where her 
deceptions were discovered. In 1996, Throncberry's stories of being raped were 
investigated in Altoona Pennsylvania while Throneberry was using the alias Stephanie 
Lewis. This revealed her true identity and age (which at the time was 27) and resulted in 
a nine day prison sentence for filing a false police report. After this Throneberry 
disappeared again and moved to Vancouver Washington under the name of Brianna 
Stewart. 
While using the name Brianna Stewart, Throneberry enrolled in yet another high school 
and re-entered the foster care system. Again Throneberry willingly recounted tales of 
physical and emotional harm: 
"Many who knew Brianna had some knowledge of her tragic life, something that 
she was not ashamed to hide. She claimed she had seen her mother brutally 
murdered by her father. She told stories of having been repeatedly raped by her 
father and his friends. Then at the age of 12, she purportedly ran away from 
home only to live on the streets and in countless foster homes, in different cities 
throughout the country. " (Bell A, 2007b: 1) 
It was while living as Brianna Stewart that Throneberry's habit of making allegations 
about being assaulted brought her activities to light. Throneberry had made it clear that 
in the past she had been the victim of rape and in 1997 accused a man called Charles W. 
Bankenship of raping her. Bankenship was a 47 year old security guard who was 
charged with communicating with a minor for immoral purposes and sentenced to 365 
days, 315 of which were suspended. Throughout the process of prosecuting Bankcnship, 
no one discovered that Brianna Stewart aged 17 was in fact Treva Throneberry aged 28, 
and that Bankenship had been falsely prosecuted. After the prosecution of Bankenship, 
Throneberry moved between different foster families. One family suspected she was 
lying about her age; after a visit to a dentist suspicions were further raised by the dentist 
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who noted that Throneberry's wisdom teeth had been removed and the scars had healed 
much more than would be expected if Throneberry were 16, as she claimed. In 1999, 
Throneberry accused her latest foster parent David Gambetta, of spying on her with a 
camera while she was in her bedroom; the police investigation dismissed the allegations 
as there were a number of inaccuracies in Throneberry's story. 
In 2000 after moving to live with another family, Throneberry's true identity was 
discovered and in March 2001 Throneberry was arrested. Throneberry was charged with 
several counts of theft and fraud, and the prosecution of Charles Bankenship was 
reopened. By pretending to be a teenager, Throneberry had been able to defraud the 
foster care system of $3,620.27 and obtained $1,050 of tuition from Clark College. She 
was also charged with pedury, obtaining false documentation and falsely accusing 
people of rape. 
During the investigation into Throneberry's activities, D. N. A. tests and the dentist's 
reports were introduced as evidence; despite this Throneberry refused to acknowledge 
her true identity. She claimed it was a case of mistaken identity, The reasons for 
Thronebcrry's actions are hard to determine, but it has been suggested by lawyers and 
psychologists involved in the case that she suffers from a psychological condition which 
compels her to adopt new identities in this way and possibly that she believes the lies 
she is telling. Psychologists argued that if there were any genuine instances of abuse 
during Throneberry's childhood these could be potential cause for her actions. The 
prosecution argued that Throneberry was aware of her actions and even Throneberry 
herself denied the idea that she might have a psychological disorder, arguing that she 
was Brianna Stewart. 
During the trial Throneberry elected to represent herself, but performed poorly, enabling 
the prosecution to easily win the case. Throneberry was sentenced to three years and two 
months on seven counts of fraud and peýury of which she served two years. After her 
release, Throneberry continued to claim she was Brianna Stewart and was able to obtain 
a driver's licence in that name. The licence also notes Stewart's age as 21 Unlike the 
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case of Brian MacKinnon who openly admits his deception, Throneberry is adamant in 
her claim that she is 21 not 3 1. While there were several incidents which put 
Throneberry's claims to the test, it is also worth noting that for ten years Throneberry's 
claims were at least partially successful. 
Deception as a basis for criminal activity 
Acts of identity fraud are instances that involve deception between individuals. It is 
possible to see in the history of identity related crime that criminals have been able to 
use identity fraud without using or needing to use identity theft. Giving the appearance 
of someone who can be trusted has been enough to enable crimes of deception. The 
value of a person's personal identity has been limited for many years by people's ability 
to communicate who they are over distance or for elements in society to confirm a 
person's claim to a personal identity. 
In the examples discussed above, the personal aspects of an identity which an individual 
fonns for themselves are not important. What is important is the adoption of social role 
and status which are elements of the identification process which individuals apply to 
other members of society. 
The history of identity theft 
It can be argued that before the advent of modem communication technology the 
identity of the majority of people was only known in their local community, the 
exception being people of higher classes such as the monarchy. It can also be argued 
that there was limited use for an individual's personal identity unless they Were to some 
degree famous. Looking at historical accounts it is evident that there are several 
instances when people have attempted to adopt the identity of a monarch. 
For example in 1598, Marco Tullio Catizzone failed in his attempt to pass himself off as 
King Sebastian of Portugal who had gone missing while on an expedition twenty years 
earlier. One of the major drawbacks of Catizzone's impersonation was his inability to 
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speak Portuguese and his identification as Catizzone by his wife whom lie had 
abandoned. 
Another later example of someone claiming to be a missing royal is the case of Anna 
Anderson who claimed to be Grand Duchess Anastasia in 1920. Anderson was a patient 
at a psychiatric hospital in Dalldorf Germany; she came to the hospital with no proof of 
identity or memory of who she was. It was only when people noticed her resemblance to 
one of Tsar Nicholas 11's daughters, the Grand Duchess Anastasia, that questions over 
the true identity of Anderson were asked. There was a great deal of speculation that 
Anastasia had avoided the executions of her family. The idea that Anderson was 
Anastasia led to a number of Romanov family members supporting her claims to the 
Russian throne. However, as with the case of Catizzone and his impersonation of King 
Sebastian, Anderson's impersonation had a major flaw: she could not speak Russian. 
Like Catizzone she attempted to explain this discrepancy, according to Burton (2000)- 
`Fhe pro-Anderson lobby must have been moved by powerful motives indeed to 
accept a Russian princess who spoke no Russian. Anderson explained many 
years later in her 'memoirs' that it was not that she could not speak Russian but, 
just as she did not like to talk about events surrounding her escape (because 'I 
had suffered such awful things that I did not want to be reminded of it'), she 
likewise 'had also decided always to speak German, because Russian had 
become disagreeable to me'. "' (Burton S, 2000: 107) 
Accounts of people who pretend to be lost or dead royals often involve the inclusion of 
people who will corroborate the impersonator's claims, regardless of how credible they 
are. It can be argued that they do this because there is a possibility they will gain access 
to power or wealth through the impersonator. Also since these impersonations can 
involve a political element, there is the risk of being considered treasonous for having 
doubts or being sceptical. 
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One of the most famous cases of identity theft is that ofthe'Fichborne Claimant. ']'his 
case involved a man called Arthur Orton whose prolonged attempt to claim the identity 
of Roger Charles Doughty Tichborne became a highly publicised case in the 19"' 
century. Sir Roger Charles Doughty Tichborne was the heir to the Tichborne estate who 
1854 was travelling back home to England from Rio de Janeiro. His ship was lost at sea 
with all hands, and after a year Sir Roger was pronounced dead and his title and estates 
were transferred to his younger brother. 
JR, oger, T'whbwwne- (teft) sind ArChur Ortcal 
(Orton. P, 2008: 2) 
Despite the pronouncement of Sir Roger's death, his mother refused to believe that her 
son was dead. She sent inquiries all over the globe looking for any sign of him and in 
1865 she received word from a lawyer based in Sydney who told her that a man fitting 
the description of her son was living in Wagga Wagga Australia. In reality, the man was 
Arthur Orton, a butcher, who despite bearing a slight similarity to Sir Roger was not the 
real Sir Roger Charles Doughty Tichborne. Aside from some vague similarity in facial 
features there were more reasons to believe that Arthur Orton was not Sir Roger. In 
appearance Sir Roger had sharp features and black hair while Orton's features were 
rounded (he was quite fat) and his hair was light brown, and most crucially, while the 
real Sir Roger had been raised in France as a child until the age of 16 and could speak 
fluent French, Orton could not speak a word of French. 
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Despite this Lady Tichbome deluded herself into believing Orton was her son. Lady 
Tichbome sent money to Orton to come and see her. When Orton was finally exposed 
he explained the reasons for accepting and continuing the deception: 
"The reason I wrote the letter (to the dowager Lady Tichborne) was because I 
was hard pressed for money at the time, and I thought that if she was fool 
enough to send me money so much the better. I could go to Sydney and take the 
steamer to Panama where I could join my brother, and nobody would ever hear 
anything from me. I learned about the Tichborne family in Burke's Peerage, 
which I saw in Goulburn, and enabled me to converse about different members 
of the family. 
Bogle thoroughly believed I was Sir Roger, he used to converse very freely with 
me about the family, giving me the whole history of it ... I was pumping him all 
the time as to names and habits and customs of various members of the family. I 
have always been a good listener and by listening quietly and patiently for hours, 
to statements which have been made to me by, I suppose, I may say hundreds of 
people, all of whom gave information concerning the Tichborne family. I learned 
such facts that really induced me to prosecute my claim. I found by listening to 
others the story built itself and grew so large I really couldn't get out of it. 
I could not get away from those who were infatuated with me and firmly 
believed I was the Real Sir Roger ... Of course I knew perfectly well I was not, 
but they made so much of me, and persisted in addressing me as Sir Roger, that I 
forgot who I was and by degree I began to believe I really was the rightful owner 
of the estates. If it had not been that I was feted and made so much of by the 
colonialists in Sydney I should have taken the boat and gone the rest of my days 
to Panama with my brother. " (Arthur Orton, 1895 cited in Sniggle. net, 2007: 18) 
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While it was Orton who perpetrated the impersonation he did have help from a number 
of supporters. The first of these was Andrew Bogle, an old friend of Sir Roger's father; 
there were also the Tichborne family solicitors, Edward Hopkins and Francis J. Baigent, 
who met with Orton when he made the trip to London in 1866. In January 1867, Orton 
went to Paris to met Lady Tichborne, who immediately identified Orton as her son. 
After the meeting, Orton was given an allowance of f. 1,000 a year, As Orton says (see 
above), he then encountered several others from whom he derived information to 
improve the impersonation. 
The case of the Tichborne Claimant illustrates how even the most implausible 
impersonations can be achieved if the people who are being deceived are eager to accept 
the information with which they are presented. However, Orion's deception was 
revealed eventually by those who were not so eager to accept Orton's story. Other 
members of the Tichbome family investigated Orton and found that while he was in 
England staking his claim to the Tichbome estate, he had enquired about his real family 
who were living in Wapping. Orton's claim was also put under further pressure when 
his main supporter Lady Tichborne, died in 1868. While Orton could have ended his 
deception then and escaped, he had by this time raised significant debts in his claim to 
the Tichbome estate. The story culminated in a trial at the Court of Common Pleas in 
May 1871. The trial involved examinations of the discrepancies in Orton's accounts and 
his inability to speak French, despite presumably spending his youth in France, and 
Orton's brother was brought into deny the claim the Orton was Sir Roger. In response, 
over a 100 people were brought into confirm that Orton was Sir Roger. Ultimately, the 
jury decided against Orton, denying his claim. 
After the trial Orion was charged and convicted on two counts of perjury and was 
sentenced to 14 years hard labour, of which he served 10. Orton died penniless in 1898. 
The case of the Tichbome claimant can be seen as an early and elaborate form of 
deceased identity fraud. In modem instances of this type of identity fraud thieves 
attempt to steal pensions from the recently deceased elderly, or they claim state benefits 
that the deceased would be entitled to if they were still alive; in the Tichbome case 
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Orton went one step further and attempted to acquire Sir Roger's inheritance, status and 
social network of friends and family members. 
In the above examples, there is variation in the ability of the individuals involved to 
impersonate the individuals they claimed to be. However, they do in many respects 
highlight several elements of identity fraud which would later become staple aspects of 
modem identity fraud. The targeting of a specific individual and the accruing of 
supporting evidence and in particular, as in the case of Orton, the adoption of additional 
information from third parties, are all aspects of modem identity theft. It can be argued 
that what has changed has been the willingness of criminals to target a more diverse 
range of people. 
F. W. Demara - the Great Impostor 
One man who has used both the theft of archetypal identities and the theft of specific 
people's identities is F. W. Demara also known as the 'Great Impostor. Demara's 
activities were immortalised in the 1960s film 'The Great Impostor' and several reports 
in Life magazine documenting his activities. What is interesting about the case of 
Demara is that his impersonations were intended to enable access to professions rather 
than be a means of defrauding the legitimate identity holder or the organisation Demara 
worked for. Ironically, he was a great success in the numerous professions he worked in, 
despite gaining access to them through deception. Demara is also an example of a con 
artist who utilised both identity fraud against individuals and identity fraud against more 
general forms of identity. 
In a career that spanned three decades, Demara impersonated several people including a 
doctor in the Canadian Navy and passed himself off as an academic, prison warden and 
a monk. According to Burton (2000), Dernara had several aliases: Dr Robert Linton 
French, Dr Cecil Boyce Hamann, Dr Joseph Cyr, Jefferson Baird Thorne, Martin 
Godgart, Ben W. Jones and Anthony Ingolia. Demara utilised both the theft of an 
individual's identity and the impersonation of archetypal or general identity. 
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F. W. Demara - The Great Impostor (Peate. L, 2008: 1) 
Demara spent most of his life using false identities and lying about who he was. He was 
born in 1921 in Lawrence Massachusetts and at an early age had an interest in joining 
the Catholic Church. At fourteen he ran away from home and tried to join a Trappist 
order in Rhode Island, where his parents reluctantly allowed him to stay believing that 
the strict life of a monk would soon prove to difficult for their son. Demara stayed at the 
monastery for two years and earned his hood and habit, being given the title Frater Mary 
Jerome. However the monks at the monastery felt Demara lacked the right temperament 
to be a monk. Forced to leave the monastery, Demara then attempted and failed to join 
two other monastic orders. His efforts to become a priest ended when he stole a car from 
the Brothers of Charity children's home in West Newbury. 
Demara moved on and joined the U. S. Army, a decision he soon regretted. He sought a 
way out of the army and found it in the identity of his friend Anthony Ingolia. The two 
were stationed at Kessler Field Air Force base in Biloxi Mississippi. One weekend 
Ingolia decide to take his friend home with him, when they arrived Ingolia mother spent 
some time explaining to Demara details of her son's life. While these details seemed 
han-nless to Ingolia and his mother they would prove invaluable to Demara. He used the 
infon-nation to steal Ingolia's identity, according to Robert Crichton ( 1959), Demara's 
biographer: 
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"Since his aim was to do good, anything he did to do it was justified. With 
Demara the end always justifies the means. Stealing Ingolia's papers was not in 
itself a bad act if he didn't do bad things with them. It was, in fact, a good act. " 
(Crichton 1959, cited in Burton S, 2000: 75) 
After stealing In golia's identity, Demara left the Army and after a couple of years joined 
the U. S. Navy under his own name. In the navy, he sought to be accepted to medical 
training course and while he proved adept at the basic courses, he was denied access to 
advanced training because he lacked the correct educational qualifications. In order to 
get around this, Demara began fake and forge documentation to gain access to the 
medical school; he was so impressed with his attempts that he bypassed trying to go to 
medical school and went on to try and gain a commission as an officer. His hubris cost 
him however, as his efforts were detected. Demara was aware that eventually he would 
be arrested for his actions, so he faked his death by putting a naval uniform and a suicide 
note on a quayside. 
After faking his death, Demara faked his identity again. He became Dr Robert Linton 
French, a former naval officer and a psychologist. Demara worked at several churches 
around America as Dr Linton and this culminated in his establishing a school of 
philosophy and teaching on the subject of psychology at Gannon College in Eerie, 
Pennsylvania. While Demara proved to be a highly competent teacher, suspicions began 
to arise amongst staff at the University. Demara's career at Gannon came to an end 
when the Navy found him out and arrested him for desertion. Dcmara was charged and 
sentenced to six years in prison. Ile served eighteen months of his sentence and was 
released because of good behaviour. According to Burton (2000) Demara disliked the 
status of being an ex-con: 
"As Dr French, those cops wouldn't have treated me that way. I really hated not 
being French. No. What I hated most was being Dernara again. Who was 
Demara? Anyway you looked at it, French was somebody, good or bad, Good or 
bad, Demara - that guy was a bum. " (Burton S, 2000: 82) 
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In response to his dissatisfaction with his status in society, Demara began impersonating 
and inventing identities again. He enrolled in Northern Eastern University as Cecil 
Boyce Hamann and attempted to complete a degree in Law. Ile soon lost interest and 
instead of gaining a qualification simply claimed to have a Phl). Dr Hamann as Dernara 
would refer to himself, as was a zoologist. He went to another Christian institution in 
Maine - the Brothers of Instruction - and took up a teaching post; and it was here that he 
met Dr Joseph Cyr. Cyr's identity would prove to be one of the most noteworthy of 
Dernara's impersonations. Cyr had moved to America from Canada and was a doctor 
seeking a licence to practice medicine in America. Demara became friends with Cyr and 
offered to help him in his efforts to gain accreditation. Demara took (although he claims 
they were freely given) all of Cyr's documents under the pretence of helping Cyr. 
Eventually, Demara left his job with the Brothers of Instruction and moved north to 
Canada. At this time, the Korean War was causing {amongst other things) a distinct 
shortage in the number of doctors available to the Canadian military, Presenting Cyr's 
credentials to the Canadian Navy in 195 1, Demara demanded a post as an officer saying 
that he would otherwise join the Canadian Army. In response to this ultimatum, the 
Canadian Navy rushed the acceptance process for Dernara, and within days Demara had 
become a Surgeon Lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Navy. 
Demara was posted to RCN Stadacona hospital in Halifax and then to the IIMCS 
Cayuga a ship sent to patrol the waters off the east coast of Korea. This meant that 
Demara was now responsible for the well-being of a crew of 292. While he was aboard 
the Cayuga, Demara's impersonation was put to the test when the ship picked up three 
injured South Koreans who had been involved in guerrilla fighting. Demara had to 
operate and successfully removed a bullet from the chest of one man and amputated the 
foot of another. All his patients survived and his work earned him the respect of the 
crew and a great deal of attention, Many of officers of the Cayuga wanted to put Demara 
forward for a medal. It was this attention which brought about an end to Demara's 
impersonation. 
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News of Demara's activity had been picked up in the news papers, and one of the people 
who had read of his exploits was the real Dr Cyr's mother. While Demara was posing as 
Cyr on the Cayuga the real Dr Cyr was practising medicine in Grand Falls, Now 
Brunswick. Cyr found that while it was his name in the paper, the picture was of his 
friend Dr Hemann from Maine. Upon discovery that Demara was an impostor a message 
was sent to Captain James Plomer of the Cayuga in October f 195 1: 
"Captain's eyes only, have reason to believe your Medical Officer is impostor. 
Investigate and report. " (Sugrue C, 2007: 1) 
Further investigation and a search of Demara's room revealed letters and documents that 
proved he was not Dr Cyr. Demara was transferred to a British ship and sent back to 
Canada. Demara's exploits as Dr Cyr were eventually made into the film '77ie Great 
Impostor'in 1960 with Tony Curtis taking the lead as Demara. 
How Demara was able to pass himself off as Cyr for so long is due in part to the 
character of the man. Demara, while critical of those who sought education, had a good 
memory for facts and was able to learn very quickly. Demara also manipulated others to 
aid him in his deceptions. While at Stadacona naval hospital he had approached one of 
his superiors asking for their help in putting together a booklet which would act as a rule 
of thumb guide on medical matters. Demara claimed the guide was meant as help for 
lumberjacks who were often very far from immediate medical assistance. Dcmara would 
use this quick guide, as well as lessons he had learned from previous work he had 
conducted in a hospital in Los Angeles. Onboard the Cayuga, Demara also had the help 
of a competent sick berth attendant who handled most of the minor cases. In fact this 
attendant Petty Officer Bob Horchin, was pleased to have a superior who did not 
interfere in his work. 
After returning to America Demara moved on with his career as an impostor and found 
himself using the identity of Ben W. Jones. With this identity, Demara began work at 
Huntsville Prison in Texas as a prison guard. As with many of the professions Demara 
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attempted, he was a success, gaining the admiration and respect of the governor and 
prisoners. Demara was eventually put in charge of the maximum security wing which 
housed the most dangerous prisoners. For a while, Demara was content and appreciated; 
however the attention his activities had received by the media proved the downfall of his 
efforts to be Ben W. Jones. A report by Joe McCarthy for Life magazine in 1951 on 
Demara's exploits resulted in Demara's detection as Jones. - 
Again, as with the incident in Canada Demara was detained, but again as with Canada, 
the state of Texas did not prosecute Demara for his deception. In 1959 Robert Crichton 
wrote about Demara and his exploits; below is an extract from his book: 
"His arms swung from side to side and this, combined with his bulk, 
gave him the appearance of a graceful bear. 
When he saw the detectives, a look of surprised hurt crossed his 
face and he stopped exactly as suddenly as if he had been shot. For a 
moment he seemed to teeter where be stood, unsure of whether he was 
going to fall forward or tip backward, then he finally came on ahead. 
"I have a feeling I can be of help to you two men, " he said softly. 
"Wbat took you so long to get bere? " 
"Let's do it this way first, " Nickerson said, flourishing a paper, a 
warrant for Godgart's arrest, in his hand. "You are Martin Godgart? " 
"In a manner of speaking, yes, " the big man said. 
"Your real name is Ferdinand Waldo Demara, Jr., is that right? " 
"Sometimes it's hard to say what my name is. " 
"Let's do this thing right, " Milligan said. "This is an arrest. " 
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"All right, then. I was born under that name but I use Fred W. 
Demara now. " Nickerson was checking against a small notebook. 
"Alias Martin Godgart? " he asked. The man nodded yes. "Alias 
Dr. Robert Linton French? " There was another nod of ycs. 
The detective studied the list for what seemed a long time. 
"My, " he said, "that Dr. French really got around. You went 
places with him. " 
I did. He was one of my best, " the teacher agreed. "Alias Brother John 
Payne? " 
"Alias Dr. Cecil Boyce Ifartnann? " 
"You people have been doing your homework, Yes, I was him 
too. " 
"Alias Ben W. Jones, assistant warden of the Huntsville Prison in 
Texas? " 
I'm not ashamed of that one. " 
"Alias Dr. Joseph C. Cyr, surgeon lieutenant in the Royal Canadian 
Navy? " 
"One of my very best, " the prisoner said. Ile saw that Nickerson was 
closing his notebook, "Go ahead, go ahead. 'You've missed some. " 
(Crichton A, 1959: 2-3) 
Demara, eventually became a clergyman under his own name and died in 198 1. The 
activities of Demara are in many ways unique and cannot be seen as a typical example 
of an identity thief. But the manner in which he gathered and used information about 
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people, and his manipulation of organisations are informative in displaying the lengths 
to which someone can use deception and impersonation. 
The art of impersonation 
The examples of early incidents of identity theft presented here outline how for the most 
part early identity thieves sought out the advantages found in the lifestyles of the people 
they impersonated. For Catizzone, Andersen, Orton and Demara it was the social status, 
role and resources (property and/or money) of the people they impersonated that they 
wanted. This meant a high level of commitment to the impersonation both in terms of 
their time and personal well-being. 
It is argued in this study that as communication technology has improved people's 
ability to communicate their identity over larger distances in shorter amounts of time, 
the need to commit to the impersonation in the way the early identity thieves did has 
decreased. While there are exceptions, such as the case of Charles Stopford, modem 
identity thieves do not have to commit to their impersonation to the same degree. Also 
the focus of modem identity theft has shifted to obtaining the resources associated with 
a personal identity. Early examples of identity theft were prolonged acts of 
impersonation; modem identity theft is quicker and in some respects easier to commit, 
This has resulted in the use of identity theft becoming a more viable option for those 
seeking to commit identity fraud - acts of misrepresentation. 
The modern view of Identity fraud and Identity theft 
While it has been argued in this chapter that the history of both identity fraud and 
identity theft can be tracked back several centuries, the use of the terms identity fraud 
and identity theft is a modem phenomenon. Due to media representations of identity 
fraud and identity theft, a misconception has developed that these are new crimes. 
In the U. K. the 'new crime' of identity fraud was introduced to the general public 
through the experiences of Dcrck Bond. Bond's imprisonment in South Africa in 2003 
came about at a time when concerns over the idcntirication process were at a high with 
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concern over terrorism and illegal immigration (see case of Derek Bond page 113). The 
terrorist attacks in America in 2001 resulted in a rise in concern over the identification 
of terrorist threats. Concern with regard to terrorism was also raised with the 2004 
bombing in Madrid, the terrorist attack on London in 2005 and the 2007 car bombing of 
Glasgow airport. 
In 2004, the deaths of 23 Chinese illegal immigrants in Morecambe Bay raised concern 
over illegal immigration, and the identification of illegal immigrants in the U. K. The 
common theme connecting these areas of criminal activity is the issue of securing the 
identification process. As a result of this, the issue of securing the identification process 
has been raised and put at the forefront of crime prevention efforts. New anti terrorism 
laws, and the proposed introduction of an identity card scheme, have attempted to 
address this raised level of concem. As well as the experiences of Bond in 2003, the 
discovery of Charles Stopford's 23 year deception in 2005, and connections made 
between identity fraud and the internet, have further raised the prof Ile of identity related 
crime in the 2 I't century. 
The reason identity theft and identity fraud have become such major conccrns in the 2l't 
century is that now more than ever there is value to a person's personal identity. 
Consequently, those who would have been satisfied in previous centuries with acts of 
misrepresentation (identity fraud) and ftaudulent deception, are now in the 21" century 
using impersonation (identity theft) to greater degree than ever before. By using stolen 
identities, fraudsters can make money, enter the country illegally or enable terrorist 
attacks. 
Conclusion 
The history of identity related crime has shown an ever strcngtbening link between the 
use of identity theft and identity fraud. The ability to use and obtain information about 
individuals has expanded and developed the use of identity fraud. Whereas in previous 
centuries people like William Thompson and Frank Abagnale Jnr could use deception 
and subterfuge to commit identity fraud, the abundance of information available about 
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people's personal identities and the venues where this information can be used means 
identity theft is a far easier means of enabling identity fraud. The terms identity theft and 
identity fraud can be seen as recent developments but the activities they describe are 
well established forms of criminal activity. The use of misrepresentation in early cases 
of identity fraud shows how criminal activity has capitalized on the inability to reliably 
confirm identities. 
By differentiating between acts of impersonation and deception, it is possible to see how 
over time the value of a person's personal identity has increased. Early examples of 
identity theft have been aimed at people whose identities have been communicated over 
a wide area, such as in cases where people have impersonated royalty. As technology 
has improved, it has become more viable to abuse personal identities; this can be seen 
by the rise in the instances of identity theft. 
Identity fraud and identity theft are not new crimes, but thanks to developments in 
technology and identification processes, the number of people susceptible to these types 
of crimes has increased significantly. It can be argued that the use of the terms identity 
theft and identity fraud illustrate this development as it has become necessary to infonn 
and protect more people from this type of crime. 
In the next two chapters there is an outline of how modem identity theft and identity 
fraud are committed; this outline is presented in the form of a progression. This 
progression shows how identity theft and identity fraud have become more 
interconnected in modem cases of identity related crime. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Gathering and Appropriating Information on 
Identities 
The process of defining identity theft and identity fraud is something that a number of 
experts in the area of identity related crime have endeavoured to do. However there are 
often vast differences in the specifics of what constitutes identity crimes. These 
differences can involve terminology but also the scope of the crime. As discussed in 
chapter 6 it is necessary to distinguish between forms of identity theft which rely on 
stealing a personal identity and identity fraud which relies on deceiving an organisation 
or other individuals. 
Identity theft - The impersonation of a specific person's personal identity. This 
victimises the individual and their presentation of self. The act of Identity theft can 
and often does lead to a further instance of Identity fraud. The emphasis here is to 
impersonate n person's personal Identity and benefit from victimising that person. 
Identity fraud - Deception, either through the use of a false or stolen Identity 
victimising society and their trust in a person's social role and/or social status. The 
emphasis here Is on abusing Individuals In society by deceiving them as to who tile 
identity fraudster is. 
As discussed in chapter 6 the crimes of identity theft and identity fraud have become 
more interconnected in recent years. In the light of this, the modem practice of using 
identity theft to enable identity fraud is discussed, rather than treating the two crimes as 
separate entities, 
Previous definitions and the Input of others 
When attempting to classify or define identity related crime, the usual approaches are to 
use either the term identity fraud or the tenn identity theft, or to use both terms to 
describe different aspects of the same subject, 
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For example, the definitions used by Finch (2003) discuss identity related crime in terms 
of partial and total identity theft, whereas Sernmens (2005) refers to identity theft as a 
long term offence, where a person's identity is appropriated entirely and to identity 
fraud as a short term offence against someone's identity, usually for the purpose of 
stealing funds or resources. These definitions and the definitions of others discussed in 
chapter 3 are useful for providing a broad idea of what identity theft and identity fraud 
are. These definitions, however, do not provide a detailed explanation of how identity 
theft and identity fraud are committed. The goal in presenting this progression is to 
provide a more comprehensive view of how these crimes are committed, in order to 
better understand what impact a National Identity Card Scheme would have on them. 
When attempting to establish this progression, a wider array of terms were needed, and 
as mentioned earlier, the first two terms that were used were identity theft and identity 
fraud. Other terms were necessary, and initially terms such as fake and false identity 
were used. These were terms that had been used in the past to describe identity related 
crimes. However, these terms could not describe the type of activity that takes place 
when someone attempts to commit identity fraud. What was needed was terms that 
could explain the different ways an identity can be manipulated or misused. 
The first terms that which were considered for use were the concepts of appropriation 
and impersonation discussed by Sernmens (2005). Using the terms impersonation and 
appropriation, it, became possible to develop more terms that could explain the different 
stages of the identity fraud progression. 
The terms gathering and appropriating are used to refer to gaining information; 
impersonation and misrepresentation are terms used to explain the difference between 
identity theft and identity fraud. For the final stage - the identity fraud itself - categories 
developed by the Fraud Advisory Panel (2003) account takeover, false application and 
wholesale assumption. Also included is the term breaching security, to describe the 
acquiring of identifying details that do not immediately have any financial benefit or are 
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intended as a means of accruing identification as a means of enabling more complex 
identity fraud or as a means of circumventing a security system. Also, the term partial 
assumption is used to describe situations where people have two or more identities that 
they use at the same time. 
A U. K. view of identity theft and identity fraud 
By developing this progression, it will be possible to understand how a person's identity 
is stolen in the U. K. The use of work from other countries hag been included in the 
progression, for example the work of Newman and McNally (2005) on identity theft in 
America. The definitions developed by Newman and McNally draw on the reasons 
people commit identity theft and identity fraud in America: for financial gain, to hide a 
criminal past, and to establish a new life. These reasons are included in this progression 
as they appear to be universal motivators for this type of crime. 
However, the work by Newman and McNally is based on the American experience of 
identity related crime, There are a number of significant differences between the U. K's 
experience of identity related crime and the U. S. experience. Firstly, there is a huge 
difference in the way the identification process is operated in the U. S. A. which has 
different proofs of identity and different systems of protection and security surrounding 
various forms of identity. Secondly, America has established the crime of identity theft 
as an indictable offence, making it easier for prosecutors to explain and define the 
actions of people who commit identity theft. In the U. K,, the legislation introducing the 
National Identity Card Scheme expands on previous legislation to make the use of 'false 
representations' a crime. Until this law is introduced, identity related crime is only 
investigated through the various abuses of the identification process, such as providing 
false information on an official document (see case of Charles Stopford 115). Thirdly, 
there is a difference in the approach to solving the problem of identity related crime. The 
U. S. A. has rejected the use of ID cards, but does have a driver's licence which includes 
a photo and acts as a de facto ID card. In the U. K., the main approach to dealing with ID 
crime is the introduction of an ID card. Other differences include the focus on particular 
reasons for committing identity fraud. In the U. K. abuse of the welfare state is a bigger 
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concern as there are a number of services such as free healthcare, unemployment 
benefits and state pensions. Abuse of similar services in the U. S. A. is more likely to be 
covered under the abuse of private organisations. 
Another area in which Britain and the U. S. A differ in their experiences of identity theft 
is in the publicising of the crime. In the U. S., the victimising of people by identity 
thieves has been well documented since the 1990s through the work of groups such as 
the Privacy Rights Clearing House, Identity Theft Resource Centre and the 
Knightsbridge Castle Group before identity theft became a big issue in the U. K. In the 
U. K., only 2% of victims directed towards victims support services are victims of fraud. 
Of this percentage, there is no distinction between the different types of fraud. While 
instances of identity theft have been reported in the media, there is still no victim 
support system designed to help victims of identity fraud. In the U. S., there are several 
groups who cater to victims of identity fraud, for example the Privacy Rights Clearing 
House, the Identity Theft Resource Centre and the Knights Bridge Castle Group. While 
the threat of identity fraud has received increased attention in the U. K., there has been 
less attention given to victims of identity fraud. 
Geography also plays an important role in derining identity related crime for the U. K. 
As America is a collection of states, there are more communication concerns with regard 
to verifying identities. Illegal immigration and the role of organised crime groups is a 
major concern. It has been reported that the major threats to the U. K. from people 
smugglers come from eastern European gangs. 
While work from America and Australia has been reviewed in earlier chapters, it is 
important that the progression presented here represents identity fraud in the UX 
specifically. This progression is an attempt to show identity fraud in the U. K. - what is 
stolen, why, and bow. Before outlining the different methods of gathering and 
appropriating information on people, the identification process will be discussed, 
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Identification process 
The approach to the identification process used here is based on observation of 
identification processes used by individuals, government agencies and private 
organisations. When attempting to identify someone there is a dual process enacted, 
where society or a group within society, seeks to identify an individual, and an 
individual seeking to be identified puts him or her self forward to be identified. The 
identification process is something that both society and individuals engage in. The 
process displayed here is society's efforts to identify individuals; there is equally a 
process by which individuals try to identify themselves to society. 
When society seeks to identify someone, they are searching for several different factors. 
These factors can vary in terms of their importance but they are all present in the 
identification process. The first is safety; part of any identification process is 
determining that there is no threat of harm, either physical or more abstract forms of 
damage. For example, when a bank considers an applicant for a loan, part of the 
identification process is to determine if that person can be trusted. Establishing whether 
or not a person is dangerous has been fundamental to the identification process for 
centuries: for example, early on, gestures such as shaking hands developed as a means 
of showing that a person does not have a weapon in their hand. 
Physical appearance and biometrics have always played an important part in the 
identification process; not only do we establish a person's trustworthiness by what 
others look like and our own understanding and preconceptions of the meaning of their 
appearance, but physical appearance also plays a part in confirming identity. The use of 
physical appearance and bionietrics in the identification process has diminished 
somewhat with the advent of systems of long range communication such as the mail 
service and telecommunications technology such as the phone and the internet. 
Returning an identity to a specific person is truly the only way of confirming who 
someone is. 
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The next element of the identification process is the establishing of social status and 
role, which is where previously established forms of identification come into play. The 
fourth element of the identification process is the establishment of eligibility. 
Individuals seek identification by society and other individuals for a reason, often to 
seek access to some type of service or inclusion in a social group. As mentioned earlier, 
there is also an identification process within which individuals attempt to identify 
themselves to society. Here the key issue is what the individual desires society's to 
acknowledge about them. Identity fraud can be seen as an attempt to control both 
societies' efforts to identify the individual and how the individual's identity is 
acknowledged by society. The distinction between society's identification process and 
the individual's identification process can be seen as the first distinction between types 
of identity fraud. Frauds that involve manipulating society's efforts to identify the 
individual can be seen as the more short term frauds such as credit fraud. These frauds 
do not require that society acknowledges that the individual is genuine in their identity, 
only that they be allowed access to society because of it. Longer term identity fraud such 
as assuming a new identity for life (wholesale assumption) requires that certain parts of 
their identity (namely the new name) be acknowledged by society, which places these 
types of fraud more in the sphere of the individual's efforts to identify themselves. The 
simple distinction would relate to how much of the fraudster's efforts and success are 
reliant on society seeing them as someone other than who they are, and the duration of 
the impersonation. 
While there are numerous ways to change identity illegally, it is not a crime to use 
another name to the one displayed on a birth certificate. It can be argued that identity is 
a declaration of who an individual is, and as such this is open to change at any moment. 
When people are identified in terins of their emotional state, the identification process is 
reliant on change in a person's appearance to note a change in their mood to identify 
when they are happy and when they are sad. Other forms of identification, such as 
identifying someone according to their age are reliant on there being a difference in how 
a person can be identified over time. 
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Change in identity is natural and necessary, but there is one area in which change in 
identity is less common or accepted and that is in a person's name. While our identity 
can change through time, it is necessary for at least one part to remain the constant in 
order to accurately track an identity. If a physical form could be kept from aging or 
changing its appearance then it could be used as constant identificr. It can be argued that 
D. N. A. is the only truly constant identifier, however, the use of D. N. A. in identification 
processes is limited at present. 
Types of identifying document 
In the U. K., there are several types of identifying document. These allow citizens access 
to resources such as accommodation, state welfare and the credit industry, and these 
documents are also used to prove identity. Below is a list of several different types of 
identification that are commonly used in the U. K. to prove identity. 
" valid passport 
" standard acknowledgement letter (SAL) issued by home office (110) 
" Application Registration Card (ARC) issued by Home Office (HO) 
" identity card issued by European Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA) 
member state 
" Form GV3, A one way travel document issued by United Kingdom (U. K. ) 
embassies abroad 
" U. K. residence permit 
" full driving licence 
" local authority rent book/card 
" council tax documents 
" life assurance/insurance policies 
" mortgage repayment documents 
" recently paid fuel/telephone bills in customer's name 
" original marriage certificate 
" original birtb/adoption certificates 
" divorce annulment papers 
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" certificate of employment in Her Majesty's Forces 
" certificate of employment under the crown 
" certificate of employment in the merchant navy 
" wage slip from recent employer 
" trade Union (TU) membership card 
" travel pass with photograph affixed 
" vehicle registration/motor insurance documents 
" expired passport 
" Form B79 -a form used to notify Department for Works and Pensions (DWP) 
staff that a person has been discharged from prison and has been advised to 
claim benefit 
Cheque books, cheque guarantee cards and store/credit cards are also used to prove 
identity. A National Insurance Number Card (NINO) on its own is not evidence of 
identity but it can be used in conjunction with other documents. Often people who are 
required to conf inn identity use a selection of questions and requests for information to 
confirm and corroborate claims of identity. Below are examples of questions used by the 
Department for Works and Pensions: 
" Sumame/family name, ask if there are other ways of spelling the name 
" Forenames or first names 
" Previous names 
" Date of birth 
" Current address 
Previous address 
" Any other names/alias or known as 
" Dependant details 
" Employment history 
" Name and address of previous employers 
" If person from abroad - details and dates of arrival in U. K? 
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" Type of benefit claimed - does this match inforniation provided by customer? 
" How much benefit was in payment? 
" Which Post office was used to collect benefit 
" Bank details 
Often the provision of identification documents is spaced over time, as eligibility can be 
dependant on age or financial status. Eligibility for identification is also dependant to a 
degree on society's opinions about when an individual is mature enough to be given 
responsibility for certain forms of identification such as being allowed to drive a car, 
Below is a guide as to when certain types of identification are issued or can be applied 
for. This breakdown of when identification becomes available is important as time and 
age of the identity thief can affect the difficulty faced when trying to steal or appropriate 
a particular type of identification. 
At birth 
Parental notification to hospital/mid-wife of newborn's name and then 
information is given to the registry office by parents and hospital. Then an 'Entry 
from the Register of Births' is given (birth certificate, has unique number). 
National Health Service Preliminary Medical Card 
National Health Service Number 
Exceptions- Adoption and Immigration 
Young adulthood 
National Insurance Number- issued before 16'h birthday 
Provisional/Full Drivers Licence 
Adulthood (18-60) 
" Passport 
" Mortgage 
" Insurance 
" Bank Account 
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9 Credit Cards 
Old Age (60+) 
" Pension Allowance 
" Disability notification 
While the question of what is an identity and what should be included or excluded in 
defining an identity is still open to debate in academic study, processes of identification 
carry on regardless; it can be argued that a person's identity is whatever is used to prove 
eligibility for various services available to members of society. 
Gathering and appropriating 
The first stage of this progression is an information gathering stage. In her definition of 
identity fraud and identity theft, Semmens (2005) refers to this stage as appropriation. 
Semmens also refers to impersonation as a part of identity related crime. These terms 
were used within the progression as they help to distinguish various parts of identity 
crime. 
While the use of terms such as identity fraud and identity theft describe what is done 
with an identity, they fail to describe the activities that take place. Describing something 
as fraud or theft does not explain what happens to the identity during the process of 
impersonation or the use of deception. Theft and fraud are very much the end results of 
a corruption of the identification process. They fail to describe how a person's identity is 
transformed through the input of an illegitimate user. 
Identity related crime 
In this study, identity related crime is broken down into a progression with three stages 
of activity. The first stage in this progression is the gathering and appropriating stage. 
Gathering refers to the legal forms of identifying information, and appropriation is the 
illegal approach to information gathering. This distinction is used because the gathering 
and appropriating of identifying information about other people can be done both legally 
and illegally. The forms of gathering information described in the progression represent 
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the types of information available and the methods of obtaining it. The illegal methods 
of obtaining an identity involve intercepting information and communication going to 
and from the legitimate identity holder. Also, previous successful attempts at stealing a 
person's identity can be used to further corrupt a person's identity. Third parties can also 
be used to enable gathering and appropriating, as is seen when corrupt employees steal 
information from their employer. 
Legal forms of gathering and appropriating 
While illegal methods of obtaining information about a person's identity have received a 
lot of attention, information can be obtained through legally permissible means. These 
approaches work on gaining information which is freely available to the public, and on 
gaining information freely divulged by the individual about their identity. While this 
type of information is not confidential and does not lead to direct financial gain it can be 
used to improve or enable identity fraud in conjunction with illegally obtained 
information. For example, if a person's account number was obtained through going 
through their bins, this piece of appropriated information could be used in conjunction 
with their mother's maiden name or the name of their father's school to enable online 
bank fraud. 
Legally obtained information can give illegally obtained information a context, but it 
can also be a more covert and harder to detect approach to identity theft and identity 
fraud. Legally obtained information can be separated into two types: freely available 
information, and freely divulged information. 
Freely available information 
The first example of freely available information is a person's birth certificate. This 
document is a record that notes a person's name, names of that person's parents, and the 
date of their birth. In terms of the information provided, it is quite basic; it notes the 
beginning of an identity and places the identity in context with that of others, This is the 
first paper proof of someone's existence. Records of birth are kept in a register but 
copies of entries in the register can be obtained; these certificates are given to the 
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parents of each child born and additional copies can be bought for E 10, added to which, 
birth certificates other than one's own can be requested. Legitimate requests for copies 
of people's birth certificates do occur. People with an interest in genealogy, for instance, 
will use birth certificates to track their family tree. Birth certificates could be used to 
establish false identities, for instance when the birth certificate of a dead child is could 
be obtained and used as the basis for the creation of a new identity. This was illustrated 
in the book 'The Day of the Jackal'(1973) by Fredrick Forsythe. Other certificates that 
are available are marriage and death certificates. By obtaining a couple's marriage 
certificate, a fraudster can discover the maiden name of the bride. Security measures 
used by financial organisations often rely on questions such as 'What is your mothers 
maiden name? ' to verify identification. 
Death certificates mark the end of the legitimate identity holder's use of their identity, 
but potentially, with this information, a fraudster could resurrect the identity. The 
writing of a will and the, employing of a solicitor is intended as a means of shutting 
down an identity, ending its use by anyone. Further to the existence of these records in 
the registers of Births, Deaths and Marriages, these events are often reported in 
newspapers. 
As well as the recording of births deaths and marriages, other events are also required to 
be registered, such as the creation of a company or business. Records of these are kept at 
Companies House and can be freely obtained. These records list the owner's name and 
their place of residence. The electoral register is another source that can be freely 
viewed at public libraries and list any person who is registered to vote in a particular 
area and their place of residence. Due to the use of the electoral register as a source of 
information on where someone lives there have been changes to this service. Now there 
are two registers: one which is freely available for the public to view and a second 
which marks a person's address. 
Other sources of infomation exist which can provide a person's address, thus linking a 
name to a location. An example is the register of company directors at Company's 
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House which can be viewed by the general public; the register shows the address of any 
director or head of a company. This register can be viewed for L2 and shows the name 
and head of any publicly listed company. 
Records of people's involvement with social groups, or organisations are also available 
and can provide information on a person's history and aspects of their biographical 
identity. Membership of a school can be found on the website Friends Reunited, and this 
information can help in establishing the name of the school someone attended, which is 
often used as a security measure in online and phone banking. The importance of this 
information is its use in the credit industry as conf innation of identity. According to the 
Association of Payment and Credit Services (APACS) the use of these set questions, 
mother's maiden name, primary school etc., is becoming a security risk as the use of this 
static security is a danger when the information can be gained from other places. 
Membership of the armed forces can be found in military records held by Vetrans-uk 
and the National Archive which holds military records from pre 1924. By looking at the 
register and records of the General Medical Council, it is possible to find out who has a 
medical licence in the U. K. Impersonation of a medical professional - known as 
'quackery' in America - can be a lucrative business. Below are several examples of this 
type of fraud where people have stolen the identities of doctors. The General Medical 
Council provides an online alphabetical list of registered medical practitioners. The 
register provides the doctor's reference number, name, any former name, gender, year 
and place of primary medical degree, date of registration and registration status. It also 
provides any publicly available information about the doctor's practice history since 
2005. 
What the register of companies and electoral register show that is useful is a person's 
address; this can be used in conjunction with illegal methods of gathering and 
appropriating such as mail redirection and bin taiding. As noted above, another source 
available on the internet is the Friends Reunited website, which not only provides 
information on where a person went to school but also, depending on how much 
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information is put on the website, an online biography, so that where the person lives, 
whether or not they are married and what their profession is can be determined. Other 
online resources include 192. com which provides an online search engine to find people 
and where they live. 192. com searches electoral registers, directory enquires, the register 
of birth, deaths and marriages and census records. As well as these examples of how to 
find information on someone it is also possible to look at directories such as Yellow 
Pages, Thompson online and any phone book. 
Seeking out this type of information is not illegal or prohibited; if someone was trying to 
find someone else, a long lost family member or a friend they have lost contact with, 
these are the types of places they would look in. Indeed, the use of identity gathering 
techniques is often employed by people seeking missing relatives, According to the 
National Missing Persons Helpline (NMPH) and the Home Office there are about 
2 10,000 people who go missing each year. According to the NMPH (2005) the vast 
majority of missing persons are found within 72 hours, but still thousands of people 
remain missing. The NMPH receives 150,000 calls per year and helps to resolve 70% of 
the cases they take. In cases of people who go missing the police tend not to get 
involved in the tracing of them unless there is an element of criminal activity or the 
missing person is classified as a vulnerable person (e. g. missing children). 
As well as the work of the NMPH there is also the Salvation Army's Family Tracing 
Services who concentrate on reuniting blood relatives. Despite the efforts of the NMPH 
and the Salvation Army, the issue of missing persons is still an area which needs more 
attention: 
"Other specialised agencies, official and voluntary, deal with various aspects of 
the missing person's phenomenon but none has an overview of the problem as a 
whole. There is no central or single source of general or statistical information 
on a growing social problem which causes much distress to the absent and those 
they leave behind alike. " (NMPII, 2005: 2) 
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The majority of information and research on missing people centres, on cases involving 
children and teenagers. There is very little information on adults who go missing; 
however, according to research conducted by the NMPII in 2002 - 
* Males in their late 20s are more likely to disappear than any other group of 
adults. 
* Among those aged 60 years or over, the most common reason for going 
missing is dementia, or mental health problems. 
* 28% of adults who go missing sleep rough, as do two fifths of young 
runaways. 
* Adults are more likely to go missing if they are going through a crisis or a 
difficult transition, or if they are vulnerable due to chronic difficulties. 
(NMPH 2005: 3) 
Aside from providing help lines and support for people who have lost friends and 
family, the NMPH also uses age progression and reconstruction technology and 
databases to identify unidentified people, both alive and dead. As part of this service, the 
NMPH provides a website database of unidentified people. 
Freely divulged luformation 
While many fonns of gathering and appropriating involve interception of information 
such as paper proofs of identity, a person's identity can also be gained through 
communication with the legitimate identity holder or someone associated with them. As 
part of everyday life, individuals will use their identity and thereby divulge infon-nation 
about themselves. The threat from this situation comes from people's belief that either 
the infonnation is safe to divulge or the person being told this information is 
trustworthy. Divulging details such as name and age may seem innocuous but if 
someone has an understanding of how to use these details, this can lead to further 
information which could lead ultimately to identity fraud. This process is dependent on 
the skill and knowledge of the person seeking to steal an identity and the willingness of 
people to divulge infonnation. The trend in using the intemet as an online diary- known 
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as web blogs is a source of information about people and their lives which ultimately 
can lead to an understanding of their identity. 
An example of the use of freely divulged information for legal purposes is the use of the 
skill of cold and hot reading. According to Carroll (2005) the skills of cold and hot 
reading are reputed to have been used by fake psychics and mind readers. It is the skill 
of eliciting information about someone through conversation so as to imply that this 
information was derived from another source. Cold reading is the skill of doing this 
without prior information about a person, hot reading is when a performer finds 
beforehand out information about the person they will 'read', and uses this in 
conjunction with what is said in conversation. 
While there is not a great deal of likelihood of these approaches being used, these skills 
do illustrate how it is possible to elicit information from people without them being 
aware of how that information was gained. 
The threat of identity related crimes is in part due to confusion over what is 'identity 
sensitive information'. Identity sensitive information is any fundamental detail about a 
person's identity which can allow others to assume that identity. While some questions 
are clearly going to be seen as 'identity sensitive' for instance asking someone what 
their National Insurance number is, other questions, such as asking someone what their 
mother's maiden name is, may seem innocuous but are also identity sensitive questions 
the answers to which can help someone else to assume the first victim's identity. Thus, 
information can be elicited through a number of clandestine methods but most 
information is available simply through discussion. Information which is used to 
establish identity has to be freely divulged in order for it to be effective, what is the use 
of having an identity if you cannot or will not use it? 
In 2005 it was discovered that Drivers and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) 
personnel were selling personal details about individuals at the rate of E2.50 for each 
item. The information sold included names and home addresses and was available to 
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banks, solicitors, private companies and private investigators. The DVLA's sale of 
information was discovered by the Mail on Sunday and spurred a ministerial 
investigation into the practice. In a report by Turnbull (2005) it was said that: 
'The DVLA even admitted it was happy to sell the data to convicted criminals - 
and its approved customer list revealed one parking enforcement firm run by two 
men currently in prison for extorting money from motorists" (Turnbull D, 
Oliver J, 2005: 11) 
Aside from reporting the practice of selling information, Turnbull and Oliver noted that 
the DVLA in 2005 sold 100,000 names of drivers each month. The DVLA argue that 
there are legitimate reasons for selling the information and people who are entitled to 
buy it. However, the sale of this type of information is clearly a threat with regard to 
identity fraud as the information can be a key resource in the gathering and 
appropriating process. 
The use of all of the approaches mentioned here is not legally prohibited and while it is 
possible that they may enable identity fraud, the investment of time and effort is 
required before the information enables the theft of an identity. Obtaining information 
about a person this way will not directly access any information which is private or 
confidential to the individual. But this information may begin the identity theft process, 
and if used in conjunction with illegal methods of gathering and appropriating, the 
likelihood of success in stealing an identity will increase. Furthermore, there is no crime 
in gathering this type of information; companies that use telemarketing techniques often 
use lists of people to contact from looking at these types of sources. The use of this type 
of information by genealogists is also legal. 
Social engineering and pretexting 
Social engineering is a term used to describe the manipulation of people that can take 
place during instances of fraud. Social Engineering is a key skill used by those seeking 
to steal an identity. According to Bearman (2004): 
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"In a system, there is hardware, software and wetware, wetware being the human 
element of the system. With million pound security systems and state of the art 
security technology, the first two systems may be impenetrable, but with enough 
patience and knowledge, a social engineer can use weaknesses in the wetware to 
trick an unsuspecting target into revealing sensitive information, Social 
engineering is a use of psychological knowledge to trick a target into trusting the 
engineer, and ultimately revealing information. " (Bearman. 11,2004: 3) 
Bearman has compiled a series of papers on social engineering in the form of a guide on 
how to become a social engineer, What is covered in his work are a number of different 
techniques that can be used to discover information on people and how to gain access to 
information. Included in these different techniques are the use of bin raiding and the use 
of internet resources to obtain information. But essentially what Bearman discusses is 
the act of manipulating people and deceiving them. Another name for social engineering 
is pretext and this refers more closely to the process of manipulation that goes on. With 
every piece of information held by social institutions such as banks there is an accepted 
process for accessing that information-, social engineering and pretext is the technique of 
accessing information under the guise of a legitimate request for information. With 
regard to identity theft and identity fraud, social engineering and pretexting can be 
involved both in the obtaining of another person's identity and in the use of a stolen or 
counterfeit identity. The key to social engineering and to identity fraud is the use and 
manipulation of infon-nation. Identity thieves use their knowledge of how key pieces of 
information, such as drivers' licences can be used to commit identity fraud. Equally, 
social engineering involves understanding bow requests for information or the 
processing of information are undertaken by people. 
Arguably, anyone involved in identity fraud requires an understanding of social 
engineering, and can be considered a social engineer. It is difficult to declare that social 
engineering or pretexting is a legal or illegal method of appropriating or gathering 
information; certainly in cases of identity fraud, these techniques are used for criminal 
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ends, but these are it is not an inherently criminal processes or techniques of gathering 
information. 
Illegal methods of gathering and appropriating 
Illegal approaches to gathering and appropriating have gained a high degree of attention 
because of the effectiveness of these methods for providing information. What is 
important to note is that they represent interception of information and means of 
identification intended for the legitimate identity holder. Also, private or personal 
information can be held by third parties, and information can be stolen from these 
sources also. 
Intercepting correspondence 
The first illegal method is the theft of information intended for the individual who 
legitimately owns the identity. Intercepting correspondence intended for the legitimate 
identity holder allows the person trying to steal the identity to access not only 
information but also objects sent through the post. Examples of objects that may be sent 
through the post are parcels, credit and debit cards, cheques, or money. The advantage of 
intercepting mail is that the holder of the genuine identity is unaware of its existence. 
Also, there is to a degree a guarantee that the information is of value to the genuine 
identity holder and that the information is intended for the genuine identity holder. Theft 
of conventional mail can be committed by stealing letters from a person's mail box or a 
person's mail can be redirected to another address or a post office box, so it can be 
checked for private information intended for the legitimate identity bolder. 
Gaining information from the post can occur through simple mistakes made by the 
postal service. In one case in Bangor U. S. A. (2005), a man and woman were sent the 
drug test results of two men, by accident. The letter should have been sent to a post 
office box in a place called Portage Lake but it was mistakenly delivered to a post office 
box belonging to Wayne David Broome in Eagle Lake. While the -zip codes for each 
post office box were different, the numbers of the boxes were identical. This simple 
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mistake allowed Broome and his girlfriend Nicole Dufresne to use the two men's social 
security numbers and obtain credit cards and merchandise equalling $4,000. 
Another approach involving obtaining mail is to investigate houses that have recently 
been left by previous residents to check if their mail has been forwarded or not. Often, if 
the mail forwarding service offered by the post office is not used, when a person moves 
house there is a chance mail will be sent to their old address. Potentially this can mean 
that private and confidential information is left at the old address. Theft of mail can be 
just as effective a method of gathering information as raiding bins. In one case, from 
2005, a former postman called Dido Mayue-Belezika ran a massive cheque fraud 
operation that involved several members of his family and cost his victims E20m. The 
gang, lead by Mayue-Belezika defrauded thousands of people by intercepting cheque 
books as they entered the sorting office Mayue-Belezika worked at. Once he had the 
cheque books he would hand them to his brother in law Ishiaba Kasonga who would sell 
the cheque books to money launderers. While the operation run by Mayue-Belezika 
defrauded nationally E20million and the number of victims measured in the thousands, it 
was because the gang were targeting one community in North London that attracted the 
police attention. It was estimated that 1,300 residents of Golders Green were defrauded 
of as much as E5 million. It was the apparent targeting of this community which lead the 
police to Mayue-Belezika and 36 others, of whom 22 were charged across the U. K. In 
2005, Mayue-Belezika was jailed for six and a half years, his brother-in-law Kasonga 
for three and a half years, and the others received sentences ranging from six months to 
three years. Through this criminal operation, Mayue-Belezika was able to make a 
fortune: 
"While using a second hand car at work, at home in his council flat in Maiden 
Crescent he had an expensive entertainment system, designer clothes, and a 
Mercedes 4x4 vehicle parked outside. " (BBC News, 2005: 1) 
It is estimated by Postwatch that of twenty two billion pieces of mail sent each year, 
fifteen million items go missing, are misdirected or stolen. As a source of information, 
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the mail can be invaluable and as the case of Mayue-Belezika shows if thief is organised 
he/she can steal a vast amount of money. In a report for the BBC, one postman describes 
how easy it would be to steal someone's mail: 
"Paul, from Ruislip, who worked as a postman for 34 years, told the BBC it was 
"easy" to steal mail while on a delivery round. "When you're sorting in the 
morning, there's pigeon holes in front of you and one of those pigeon holes is the 
one you do for a walk. "So if you pick up some mail and it feels like something 
that's interesting like a cheque book, you can just throw that into your pigeon 
hole. "And then when you start throwing in the walk-off you just sort that out 
later on, you just take it with you. "If you find money in the bundle you were 
delivering, you could just put it back in the pouch, " he said. He said supervisors 
in sorting offices were no deterrent to those bent on thieving. "If you're 
determined to pinch something, you can do it, " he said. "It's not hard at all. " 
(Shukor. S, 2005: 1) 
As well as the potential threat from post office personnel, there have also been incidents 
of criminals stealing mail from, houses, mail vans and postmen/post women. 
Bin-raiding 
The other approach is to steal from people's bins, in effect gaining the same information 
after it has been communicated to the legitimate identity holder. 'Bin-raiding' or 
'dumpster diving' relies on people believing that once the information is discarded in 
the bin no one will attempt to look for it. 
In a study by the credit referencing company, Experian (2002), of residential bins in 
Nottingham Experian found that people were discarding valuable information without 
any effort made to stop third parties from obtaining this information. The study found 
that of the hundred of bins in the Nottingham area- 
"Only 14% of household rubbish bins contained absolutely no 
information of interest to fmudstcrs. 
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Almost three-quarters (72%) of bins contained the full name and full 
address of at least one household member. 
On average, one in every five bins contained a whole credit or debit card 
number that could be linked to an individual and 80% of these have an 
associated expiry date. In more affluent areas (i. e. stylish singles and high 
income families), up to two in five bins (42%) contained a whole credit 
or debit card number that could be linked to an individual and 80% of 
these had an associated expiry date. 
Bank account details were regularly found in the sample and, on average, 
one in every five bins contained a bank account number and sort code 
that could be related to the full name and address of a household member, 
Only rarely were attempts made to destroy information. Just 8% of 
households throwing away full card numbers had made attempts to 
destroy the documents, and only 1% of households had been successful. 
Attempts had been made by 22% of households to destroy bank 
statements but only 7% of households had been successful. No attempts 
had been made to destroy three of the four benefit books found in the 
rubbish. 
One bin contained a signed blank cheque and another contained an used 
cheque book. From another bin, information was found about an 
individual's full name, address, date of birth, bank account number, sort 
code, employment details and medical information. They had also thrown 
away a whole benefit book, utility bill and other official letters that might 
be used to corroborate identity. Significant information about this person 
was contained in a complete passport application. " (Experian, 2005: 5) 
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Experian in this same study also discovered that bin-raiding had been recognised as a 
serious problem in 80% of local authorities. More recent work on bin-raiding has 
furthered the work of Experian and given more recognition to the dangers it poses. 
Work on bin-raiding by the company Rexel U. K. has revealed that two thirds of the 
population of the U. K. are still failing to completely destroy confidential documentation 
and that 80% of the public do not own a shredder. (Rexel Press release 2006) 
In a study of high street bank bins conducted by Scamsdirect and the BBC programme 
Watchdog, it was discovered that vast amounts of private and confidential information 
was discarded by high street banks. According to Scamsdirect, HSBC, Bank of 
Scotland, Nat West and Halifax had all failed to dispose of vital and highly confidential 
information properly. In their report, Scamsdirect discovered a wide variety of 
documents such as loan and credit card applications, account numbers and customers' 
telephone numbers. While the Halifax was thankful to Scamsdirect for their research 
according to Scamsdirect Nat West and the Royal Bank of Scotland have threatened 
legal action. 
Due to the awareness raised by the media over this type of gathering and appropriating, 
many people have begun to shred important documents before throwing them away. In 
some instances, the importance of shredding documents has even lead to police forces 
offering to shred documents. An example of this was when in 2003 Humberside police 
in Bridlington offered to shred the general public's thrown away documents to ensure 
their safety (BBC News, 2003). As well as the police, local councils have also urged the 
general public to shred as in the 2004 case of Middlesbrough Council who, during a 
spate of bin bag slashing in Gresham, suggested that residents shred their documents as 
it was likely that thieves were rummaging through the rubbish for information such as 
bank statements and credit card slips (BBC News 2004). Even with this precaution it is 
still possible to reconstruct shredded documents. In response to this, new shredders have 
been designed which cross-shred documents into small squares instead of a series of 
long strips. 
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The value of this approach is not only that people abandon important documents, but 
also it can be argued that by throwing these documents away, people forget about them, 
increasing the likelihood that their theft will go unnoticed. Here the saying 'out of sight, 
out of mind' is particularly apt as this is what identity thieves rely on when gathering 
information from people's bins. 
Shoulder surfing 
Aside from monitoring information on people by methods outside their direct control, it 
is also possible to monitor people as they are using private or personal information. An 
example of this is the practice of monitoring people as they use personal identification 
numbers (P. I. N's) and this practice is known as shoulder surfing. In a report by 
Summers and Toyne (2003) for BBC Online the threat posed by gangs who used 
shoulder surfing to gain access to credit information is discussed. In their report, 
Summers and Toyne discuss the several methods employed by organised gangs who use 
this method to access credit and debit card details including account numbers, personal 
identification numbers and in some instances the actual card itself. Summers and Toyne 
note that this type of identity fraud costs banks and account holders millions of pounds 
each year. According to their report: 
"Cost of ATM Fraud 
1997 - L8.2m 
1998 - L9.7m 
1999 - L12.2m 
2000 -ZI8.3m 
2001 - E21.2m 
2002 - E29.1m 
Jan-Oct 2003: more than L30m" 
(Surnmers. C, Toyne. S, 2003: 1) 
There are several various methods of committing Automated Teller Machine (ATM) 
fraud through shoulder surfing. The goal is to obtain the credit or debit card and/or the 
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personal identification numbers associated with them; in order to do this some identity 
thieves monitor the locations where people are most likely to use this information, 
namely ATMs. One of the earliest approaches used involved stuffing a plastic sleeve 
into the card reader on an ATM; this meant that when a customer went to use the ATM 
they would insert their card into the plastic sleeve rather than the card reader, Once this 
is done the thieves plan on the customer trying in vain to insert their PIN, at which point 
they can 'shoulder surf' for the number. The next step is to wait for the victim to go 
inside the bank to complain at which point they can go back to the machine and pull out 
the plastic sleeve (including the credit or debit card). At this point, the thieves have the 
card and the PIN and can access the account. According to Summers and Toyne, this is 
known as a 'Lebanese loop'. This approach in turn gave way to more sophisticated 
methods. 
The goal in shoulder surfing is to observe the PIN number being inputted and to copy 
the inforniation on the card. Initially shoulder surfers would physically have to watch 
over a person's shoulder, but over time, cameras and binoculars have been used to 
shoulder surf at a distance. Shoulder surfers have also used small pinhole cameras (often 
concealed on the side of an ATM) and special card readers which are attached to the 
front the ATM card reader. This means that as the customer inserts the card into the 
ATM, the card is run through the thieves' card reader first. Another approach involves 
coating an ATM's keypad with ultraviolet ink and getting a copy of people's PIN, 
Criminals have even gone so far as to buy or steal ATM machines and set them up so 
that they can more easily obtain information. 
With the advent of chip and PIN technology and the spread of ATMs into places other 
than banks, the value of operating a shoulder surfing operation has increased. Organised 
gangs have been caught operating vast systems of shoulder surfing on several ATMs. 
According to the Metropolitan Police, shoulder surfing operations run by a Romanian 
organised crime group are a major problem in the U. K. 
Gathering and appropriating information on the Internet 
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With the introduction of the World Wide Web has come a new group of offences 
covered by the term 'cyber crime', and several new forms of e-commerce where 
identification through technology is very important. The use of identities on the World 
th Wide Web is discussed by Mike Butcher in the Observer (April 27 2003). Butcher 
highlights the increased use of e-commerce and the risks that are associated with it: 
"The Interactive Media in Retail Group, a UK e-commerce industry body 
estimates that 14 million British shoppers spent some Elbillion at e-commcrce 
sites in November - the most ever in one month in the U. K and a 95 per cent 
increase on 2001. " (Butcher. M, 2003: 36) 
Butcher highlights the case of Stephanie Poutney who became the victim of a cyber 
criminal who was using her credit card details to make online transactions at websites 
she had visited. This type of cyber criminal is referred to by Butcher as a cracker rather 
than a hacker. This is due to the difference in intent between hackers and crackers: 
"Poutney had become the victim of a 'cracker'. Hackers, by contrast, are 
computer enthusiasts who like to mess around with software and expose 
problems on the internet for benign purposes. By contrast, some crackers work in 
serious, organised gangs. " (Butcher. M, 2003: 36) 
Butcher explains how crackers not only go after individuals but also companies in an 
effort to cause harm and steal money: 
"In September IT security firm Synstar estimated that over 1,000 UK 
organisations had been cracked into - almost a rive fold increase on the previous 
years 225. " (Butcher. M, 2003: 36) 
According to Butcher the most common form of cyber crime is the theft of data, in 
particular the theft of data regarding identity. Among these details, credit card numbers 
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are of particular interest. Butcher goes on to describe how some companies choose not 
to report instances of cyber crime due to the difficulty in detecting this type of offence: 
"That it's hard to detect and rarely reported makes cyber crime the ultimate 
6 silent crime. It presents a Catch-22 for businesses: they can report the crime, 
risk adverse reaction from customers and disruption to business, or stay silent, 
leaving police with no evidence and no argument to procure more resources for 
enforcement. " (Butcher. M, 2003: 36) 
Butcher notes that companies have allowed crimes to be committed against them 
without reporting these offences to the police. The concern here for the companies is the 
appearance that they are not in control of the infon-nation they have. If it became 
common knowledge that IT companies and financial institutions were not able to protect 
this information, then they would lose customers and shareholders, which would lead to 
an even greater financial loss. 
Butcher also describes how the then Home Secretary David Blunkett established a 
National High Tech Crime Unit to deal with the problem of cyber crime. This unit deals 
with a variety of crimes covered by the term cyber crime: 
"The unit divides cyber crime into two areas. 'New crimes, new tools' includes 
crimes committed against computers and networks that present new 
opportunities to criminals, such as cracking, virus creation and 'denial of 
service' attacks. 'Old crimes, new tools' are traditional crimes supported by the 
use of the IT, such as fraud, blackmail, extortion, paedophilia and child 
pornography, identity theft, intellectual property crime and stalking. The unit 
deals with some of the biggest cases in the UK and some of the largest 
businesses in the world. " (Butcher M, 2003: 36) 
Butcher goes on to describe how this unit has been criticised for looking at large 
companies and government organisations rather than small to medium sized companies 
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which are ill prepared to fend off any kind of attack by a cyber criminal. Butcher also 
highlights the deficiencies in the law and legislation regarding computer enabled crime. 
Butcher highlights the fact that the principal law governing cyber crime is the Computer 
Misuse Act of 1990, which was brought in at a time when few had access to the internet, 
or any idea of its existence: 
" ... according to 
Bill Goodwin, specialist journalist with IT industry title 
Computer Weekly: 'Under the existing legislation, I can steal a PC and be 
prosecuted, but if I steal a database I can't be prosecuted. Those are two big 
areas the Home Office is known to be actively looking at, but they haven't 
reached a conclusion yet. "'(Butcher M, 2003: 36) 
One approach to internet based gathering and appropriating of information is the use of 
computer cracking (criminal version of hacking) or spyware. According to Berinato 
(2007), the potential for using the internet for commerce was something internet based 
criminals were quick to capitalise upon. Through the use of computer viruses by internet 
based criminals, identity theft and identity fraud has become an easier crime to commit. 
Berinato notes that in 2003 the first of many viruses designed to steal personal 
information from online sources was discovered. The programme was called Berbew 
and was developed by an online criminal who calls himself Smash, the co-founder of the 
International Association for the Advancement of Criminal Activity (IAACA). Berbew 
operated undetected for approximately nine months and stole 113GB of people's 
personal details. Berbew was a type of computer program called 'malware'. Malware 
are computer programs which interfere with the functions of computers and send 
personal information to internet criminals over the internet. After Berbew was 
contained, new 'malware' programs appeared using similar code but designed to 
overcome defences set up to contain Berbew. Since Berbew, Berinato notes that just as 
defences to protect against viruses and computer hackers are developed, new viruses 
appear. In one case of computer hacking from 2003, a cracker was able to obtain details 
of five million credit card accounts from Visa and MasterCard. The cracker was able to 
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break through the security of a company that processed credit card transactions for 
businesses. (BBC News, 2003) 
Another aspect of computer hacking to enable identity theft is the use of spyware. 
Spyware is a type of computer program that can be sent to a person's computer; once 
there, the program makes a copy of every keystroke entered into the computer and then 
communicates the keystrokes to whoever sent the spyware. The aim is to gain copies of 
passwords and financial information from people. 
The internet is a communication tool that has opened up a number of different areas for 
criminal behaviour. With regard to identity theft and identity fraud, the risks faced on 
the internet are much the same as the general risks posed by identity theft and identity 
fraud. The goal when attempting to steal someone's identity is to gain enough 
information about a person's identity so that when entering the identification process (in 
whatever form it takes) the impersonator cannot be distinguished from the genuine 
identity holder. While the internet offers a more effective approach to identity fraud, 
many of the methods used to defraud people that will be discussed later (phishing and 
pharming) can be committed using other forms of communication such as telephones or 
the postal service. What makes the internet so attractive to fraudsters is the lack of 
fundamental security and state regulation. The internet is an environment which 
transcends nations, and internet based criminals from one country can target people 
from other countries with ease. There are therefore great difficulties in policing as 
security has to be built into every website and that security may not be uniform in 
nature. As companies develop a presence on the World Wide Web they have become 
targets for criminals engaged in cyber crime. 
Identity on the internet can involve information that goes beyond the personal identity 
and refers to a presence people have in large databases used by companies and 
government institutions. With the advent of computer technology and data-basing it is 
possible for a person's identity to be reduced to a number. Security on the internet can 
involve the use of information specific to an individual. Questions such as what school a 
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person attended or what their mother's maiden name is are ways for organisations to 
ensure they are communicating with the legitimate holder of an identity. The flaw of this 
system is that in order for it to be used on a large scale the number and variety of 
questions asked must be uniform. This form of security is relatively static which makes 
it easier for customers to use. However, this weakens the security system by allowing 
identity thieves to target specific pieces of information in order to steal an identity. 
For example, a persons name connects them to a birth certificate which shows their 
parents' names, which leads to a marriage certificate which shows a mother's maiden 
name. This process and others can be used to discover information used on online 
security. It requires effort and an understanding of where this information is to be found, 
but it is freely available, and does not require much interaction with the individual 
whose identity is being stolen. One of the fundamental flaws of security on the internet 
is that it cannot provide the physical face-to-face confirmation of a person's identity. 
The internet allows for complete anonymity for its users. 
Use of phishing and pharming 
The three types of identity fraud based on the internet are phishing, phamling and the 
use of spyware. These three forms of identity fraud, while found on the internet, are not 
dependent on this forni of technology to work. 
Phishing involves using an e mail message, which for all intents and purposes looks like 
an official message from an internet based company. Other names for phishing are 
'brand spoofing or 'carding. The email message sent by people committing this type of 
fraud describes some circumstance which calls for the receiver of the message to send 
their personal or financial details to a web based company they frequent. In reality, the 
email directs the customer to another website that does not belong to the company in 
question but to the firaudster. This way the customer sends passwords, financial details 
etc to the fraudster, allowing them to steal that person's identity. The name phishing 
comes from the way this method of identity fraud is used, large numbers of emails will 
sent out much as a fisherman casts a net. 
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An example of this involved the online auction company e-Bay. Customers of this 
company were sent an e-mail saying that the company had lost that person's financial 
details and that they needed the details to be sent again to a website listed in the e-mail. 
The 'phishers' in this case sent out numerous spani e-mails, confident that at least a 
percentage of the people they sent emails to would have an account with e-Bay. This 
approach has a hit and miss quality to it, as fraudsters try to catch a few people by 
sending e-mails to a great many. The following are two examples of phishing emails 
sent to customers of Suntrust and PayPal: 
Suntrust phishing e-mail 
"Dear valued Suntrust member, 
Due to concerns, for the safety and integrity of the online banking community 
we have issued the following warning message. 
It has come to our attention that your account infon-nation needs to be confirmed 
due to inactive customers, fraud and spoof reports. If you could please take 5- 10 
minutes out of your online experience and renew your records you will not run 
into any future problems with the online service. However, failure to confirm 
your records may result in your account suspension. " (Landesman. M, 2007a: 1) 
PayPal phishing e-mail 
"Dear PayPal User, 
We recently noticed one or more attempts to log into your PayPaI account from a 
foreign IP address. We have temporarily limited access to sensitive PayPaI 
account features. Allowing your account access to remain limited for an 
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extended period of time may result in further limitations on the use of your 
account and possible account closure. 
If you recently accessed your account while travelling, the unusual log in 
attempts may have been initiated by you. However, if you did not initiate the log 
ins, please visit PayPal as soon as possible to log in and perform the steps 
necessary to restore your account access. " (Landesman M, 2007b: 1) 
Pharming 
Pharming is the misuse of Domain Name System or Servers (DNS). Rather than sending 
emails directing people to false websites, pharming involves establishing false websites 
in the DNS server so that when people try to access a particular website they are 
redirected to a false website. This form of internet based identity fraud is in some 
respects the 'bigger brother' of phishing. While phishing targets individuals trying to 
entice them to a website, pharming invades the network and forces everyone who tries 
to visit a website: to go to the false website setup by the fraudsters. 
While the threat posed by pharming has been defined, actual instances of this type of 
crime are rare. In January 2005 Panix -a large New York Internet Service Provider - 
was hijacked so that internet users who attempted to use the Panix domain were rerouted 
to a site in Australia. (Greenarmor 2007) On this occasion there were no reports of 
financial losses. In April 2005, Hushmail, a secure e-mail provider, was also attacked 
and users were redirected (Leyden 2005). There have only been a few reported cases of 
pharming but the major concern is that this type of activity enables other types of 
internet based identity fraud. For instance by establishing a fake website for a bank, 
fraudsters could gain access to customer's private and confidential information. 
Other approaches to identity fraud on the internet include the use of technology such as 
'spyware'. This is software that allows a person to target another computer and record 
all of the keystrokes made. This way a person's activity on a computer can be observed, 
their passwords copied, and the web based companies they use noted. The use of 
spyware has become such a risk that there is now 'anti-spyware' programmes that can 
be bought to protect computers. 
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All of these forms of identity fraud that are based on the use of the internet 
paradoxically do not rely on the existence of the internet. The internet improves the 
chances of success, but in each case, what is done specifically is not unique to the 
technology. People are deceived into divulging information in the belief that the person 
they are giving this data to has a right to it or need for it. These forms of identity fraud 
could be committed by using conventional mail, or the telephone; these fraudulent 
requests for information could even be done face-to-face, so that the actual request for 
information used in cases of phishing and pharming is not unique to the internet. What 
the internet Provides that is so attractive to criminals is a higher degree of anonymity, 
the process is much faster, more people can be reached globally and the lack of 
understanding by the general public with regard to how internet fraud is committed 
means that people are often unaware of the dangers. 
The methods used by hackers on the intemet to commit acts of phishing and pbarming 
are in many respects modem versions of documentation forgery. What forgers aimed to 
do was copy original official documents to the point where third party users could not 
tell the difference. What hackers create on the intemet are forgeries of official websites 
and their aim is to deceive third party users into believing that the website is the genuine 
article. While the medium has changed, the goals and end results are much the same. 
Even though the impersonating of a company through pharming is considered to be in 
many respects the newest form of identity fraud, this type of criminal behaviour has 
been used in the past. 
Use of corrupt officials 
As well as obtaining information by targeting the individual, as is described above, 
information can also be gained by targeting organisations that have access to 
confidential information about individuals. Corrupt officials can be found in both public 
and private sector organisations and their collaboration allows criminals to access vast 
amounts of information on individuals without there being any need for direct contact 
with the victim. 
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In 2002, one of the largest fraud cases in America highlighted the danger posed by 
corrupt employees. This case involved three individuals who used access to credit 
information to commit identity theft. The reason they were able to attack so many 
people was due to one of them, Phillip Cummings, using his job at a software company 
contracted to the credit company Experian. Cummings worked at a helpdesk to steal 
credit reports from numerous credit companies. Once Cummings had obtained the 
information, he would hand it over to his accomplices, Linus Baptiste and Hakeern 
Mohammed for $30 per report. As of 2002, this scam had accrued 30,000 victims and 
had made the trio approximately $2.7 million, According to the United States 
Department of Justice (2002), this was the biggest case of identity theft in U. S. history. 
The theft of information from call centres is also a serious risk to individual identity 
which people can do very little to control or stop. According to Christopher Franklin 
from the information intelligence consultancy, Detica, there is a great deal of risk 
involved in using call centres, with regard to identity theft. In particular, Detica notes 
the danger of using outsourced call centres: 
"Some security experts argue that all call centres environments are at equal risk, 
but we feel that outsourced ones are particularly vulnerable as trust is placed 
outside the company and personal data could potentially be exposed to 
unacceptable risks. " (Detica, 2005: 1) 
Franklin also notes that some businesses have taken measures to stop theft by their 
employees. He notes the example of BT which has banned mobile phones and PDAs 
from their outsourced call centres to prevent its employees from copying information as 
it comes up on their computer screens. Franklin does note, however, that there are still 
many areas that are vulnerable to the actions of unscrupulous staff members, The risk 
posed by collusion with corrupt officials is the one area individuals are limited in their 
ability to protect their identity. As the purpose of an identity is to allow an individual to 
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interact with society, it is inevitable that some aspect of a person's identity will be 
beyond their control. 
Disasters and fraud 
information on people's identities can also be gathered by exploiting circumstances 
where conventional identification process have broken down, such as after natural 
disasters or terrorist attacks. In a report for the Times, by Steve Bird and Christopher 
Browne (2005), the use of identities of victims of the 2004 Tsunami by identity 
fraudsters is discussed. This report describes how efforts made by family members to 
find their loved ones who were lost during the Tsunami have been used by fraudsters to 
gain access to these peoples identities: 
"Mark Jones, managing director of Conversant Data, a British fraud 
investigation company, said: 'Criminals pick up the name, age and home town of 
tsunami victims from television and other news sources, then make up a similar 
birth date to find out more from credit reference agencies, the victim's local 
electoral roll or dumpster diving (searching dustbins) to get bank account and 
credit card numbers among other details. ' 'As many of the tsunami victims were 
reasonably well off the crooks know they are likely to have good credit records 
and thus make ideal fraud sources"' (Bird S, Browne. C, 2005: 9) 
Duration of the gathering and appropriating process 
Estimating how long it takes to commit identity theft or fraud is dependent on the type 
and quantity of personal information criminals have access to. Gathering and 
appropriating can be done specifically to steal one person's identity; given time and 
knowledge of the identification process, any identity can be stolen. When trying to 
protect any identity, an individual will try to limit access to the information discussed 
above. They will use shredders before putting any documents in the bin, they will use 
security programs on their computers. The goal in protecting an identity is to make the 
gathering and appropriating process so difficult that identity thieves will give up before 
they can get enough information to impersonate someone. It is possible that fraudsters 
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will target an individual specifically, but there is evidence from various cases of identity 
theft and fraud which suggests that fraudsters will try to gather information on a large 
group of people. The use of phishing emails and bin raiding for instance suggests a very 
broad approach to finding a victim. In a sense, they will fish for information until they 
get a vulnerable identity. 
It can be argued that this is due to the improvements in communication technology. In 
the 1980s, the introduction of the fax machine meant that fraudsters implementing the 
Nigerian 419 could send out faxes to large numbers of people. This trend was continued 
with the introduction of the internet. Now, rather than looking into one bin or stealing 
one person's mail the internet allows fraudsters to send e-mails to find information 
about people (phishing) or send out spyware programs which copy people's keystrokes 
on a computer. In many respects it is the use of technology which has brought identity 
theft and identity fraud closer together. 
Amassing information about people 
In many instances of modem identity theft, the goal is to impersonate victims only to the 
point at which they proceed to commit identity fraud. The exception is when identity 
fraudsters seek to adopt a new identity (see wholesale assumption chapter 8) and 
therefore must do more than impersonate the victim. 
The methods of gathering and appropriating information on people presented here are 
intended as a guide to the types of information which can be stolen and how it is taken. 
There may be other methods of gathering information on people which have not been 
covered here. However the methods presented here highlight the most well known or 
established methods of gathering information on people. 
Conclusion - the criminality of gathering information on people 
In this first stage of the progression, the methods used are separated into legal and illegal 
approaches. This distinction is an important one as it highlights how information which 
may form part of a security procedure may not in itself be a secure piece of information. 
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Illegally gathering information on people's identities through theft or deception has the 
advantage of being more direct; it provides the exact piece of information needed to 
compromise a person's identity. Legally gathering information on people requires more 
'leg work' to develop the information into something that can enable the abuse of an 
identity. 
In the next chapter we will consider the next two stages in modem identity related 
crime, namely identity theft and the process of impersonation and identity fraud and the 
use of misrepresentation. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Modern Identity Theft and Identity Fraud 
Introduction 
In chapter the 7 the process of gathering information on people is discussed, in this 
chapter we will look at how information gathered on people is used to impersonate 
them. Additionally this chapter will examine how the process of impersonation found in 
identity theft has increasingly been used to enable identity fraud and misrepresentations 
in various identification processes. 
Unlike the early examples of identity theft and identity fraud discussed in chapter 6, 
modem identity theft and identity fraud are closely related phenomena. The increased 
value and use of identities in commercial transactions has meant that using identity theft 
to enable identity fraud has become an effective approach for criminals to adopt. 
As stated in the previous two chapters, this study differentiates between identity theft 
and identity fraud in terms of who the criminal in question is deceiving and how. In 
modem identity related crimes, the criminal is victimising individuals by stealing their 
identity, and the criminal then moves on to use that identity with others in society and 
thereby victimises them through misrepresentation of who they are. It is this dual act of 
victimisation which often confuses people as to the difference between identity theft and 
identity fraud. The end result of using identity theft and identity fraud together is the 
depriving of the individual and social institutions in society such as banks. 
Modern use of identity theft 
The key to identity theft is impersonation. Identity theft begins when the person seeking 
to steal an identity has gathered enough information to impersonate the legitimate 
identity holder. 
The time and effort required to impersonate someone varies according to the quality and 
quantity of information obtained while gathering and appropriating information on a 
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victim. In some cases the identity theft can take a long time to achieve - for instance if 
only legal methods are used to gather information. The use of illegal methods of 
gathering and appropriating can mean that the identity theft is achieved quite quickly 
and completed in a short space of time. 
The identity theft begins when the person stealing an identity believes they have enough 
information to impersonate the legitimate identity holder. At this point, the legitimate 
identity bolder and the person trying to steal the identity can present enough information 
to a third party to claim ownership of the identity. To achieve this situation can be quite 
easy in some cases and almost impossible in others. The determining factor is the nature 
of the identification process the person stealing the identity intends to enter. An easy 
impersonation would be using someone's identity with a person or institution the 
legitimate identity holder has never been involved with. A difficult impersonation would 
be if the person stealing the identity wanted to be identified by a family member of the 
legitimate identity holder. The level of information that would have to be gathered and 
appropriated would make this impersonation very difficult, as would the problem of 
overcoming any physical differences. 
How difficult it is to impersonate someone is dependent on the identification process the 
identity thief intends to try and deceive. Many identification processes have minimal 
security surrounding them. However, where there are resources such as money or access 
to services allowed to specific people only, confirmation is required in the identification 
process. Financial service providers and government agencies often require confirmation 
of identity. So if an impersonation is to succeed it must be durable enough to withstand 
scrutiny if the goal of the impersonation is to obtain something only the legitimate 
identity holder is entitled to. 
Observation of identities 
Often the degree to which an identity is observed by its legitimate holder and by third 
parties can determine how open it is to abuse or stealing. Credit reference companies 
provide reports on a persons credit status- how many accounts, credit cards, debts, loans 
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etc. a person has - and through this service it is relatively easy to establish whether or 
not someone's identity is being used by an illegitimate user. Other services have also 
emerged using new technology to provide people with the opportunity to scrutinize and 
observe how their identity is being used. The supermarket chain Tesco has offered a 
service where they will monitor the purchases of a customer who has a Tesco credit 
card. If the credit card is used to buy something that the customer has no history of 
buying, or is unusual in some way, then Tesco will inform them of the activity. Other 
forms of observation are simpler, such as scrutinising bills and account summaries for 
any signs that someone else has used the identity. However well scrutinised a person's 
identity may be, there is always a chance that the identity could still be used without 
them being aware of the abuse. 
There are several techniques that can disguise the use of another person's identity. The 
first approach is to target someone who will not be able to observe or detect the abuse of 
their identity, for example deceased fraud (see case of Charles Stopford page 115) or the 
use of a person's identity in other countries (see the case of Derek Bond page 113). 
Another possible approach is to subtly change the name of the identity being stolen, for 
instance the inclusion of a non-existent middle name or initial, or a slight alteration in 
spelling. If, for example, my identity was stolen and instead of using my name correctly 
(Tim Holmes), the thief, introduced a nonexistent middle name (Tim A. Holmes) or 
changed the spelling (Tom Holmes), this would further confuse and obscure the theft of 
my identity, as the legitimate identity holder would have to determine whether my 
identity had been stolen or mixed up with the identity of another person named Tim 
Holmes. 
If there is no obscuring of the theft of an identity then the effects of its theft will be 
noticed and measures will be taken to stop the abuse. Therefore if there is no attempt to 
hide the theft of an identity, then the identity thief must act quickly. Theft of credit and 
debit cards or the abuse of bank accounts has lead to heightened security when instances 
of theft are reported. 
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Is identity theft really about identity? 
As discussed in chapter 2, there are many aspects to a person's identity and it is 
debateable as to how much the criminal activities of an identity thief will affect a 
person's identity. While in early cases of identity theft, such as the case of Arthur Orton 
and his impersonation of Sir Roger Charles Daughty Tichbome, there was a need to take 
on the life of their victims, it can be argued that in modem cases of identity theft there is 
less need to take on an elaborate impersonation. 
Modern identity theft - is it all about documents? 
While the term identity theft (and the term identity fraud) implies that a person's identity 
is actively involved in the process, it can be argued that what is really at the core of 
identity theft is society's response to a person's identity. In effect, it is not the name that 
is important but what entitlement and status the name provides. 
It can be argued that the establishment of entitlement and status has in the U. K. often 
resulted in a great deal of significance being given to paper proofs of identity. Arguably, 
in many instances of identity fraud, it is the fact that impersonators have had access to 
documentary proofs of identity which has been of more importance than the simple 
verbal claim of being someone. During instances of credit or debit card fraud where the 
aim is to copy the card and obtain the personal identification number there is very little 
interaction with the personal aspects of the victim's identity. It can be argued that this 
crime is more theft of data than identity. Equally, in instances of identity theft by illegal 
immigrants, it is not the personal life and information which is desired, merely the status 
of being a legal citizen of a particular country. When looking at the activities of 
terrorists with regard to identity fraud again it can be argued that the goal is not to co- 
opt a person's 'sense of self' but to ensure access to a certain area or to avoid detection. 
The issue of how much identity theft has to do with the issue of identity is dependent on 
the perceived extent and nature of a person's identity. The above examples of identity 
theft may not have involved the theft of an individual's personal identity or sense of self, 
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but these are still instances of identity theft as they abuse a person's link to society or 
their social identity. 
Being a victim of identity theft 
"Virtually anyone may become the victim of identity theft. Contrary to popular 
misconception, personal information is not just from affluent. Persons of even 
modest means may become victims of Identity theft. In most cases all that is 
required is good credit, which is what Identity thieves use to steal thousands of 
dollars in the name of the victim. " (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
2002: 2) 
When a person's house is burgled the effect is clear to see and the victimisation is 
apparent. During instances of fraud, it can be very difficult to detect that a crime has 
occurred not only on the part of the victim but also any organisations they contact. 
There are several reasons for this. One is that as fraud often involves the identification 
process used by large organisations the actual crime can be hidden from view. If a 
fraudster changes the billing address on a bank account they have invaded, the victim 
can go months without realising a crime has occurred. It is the length of time between 
the commission of the crime and when the victim becomes aware of it that confuses the 
issue of victimisation with regard to identity theft. 
Another point which confuses the issue of victimisation with regard to identity theft and 
identity fraud is the issue of loss. Through conventional forms of theft, the loss of 
property or money can be quite clear and visible. In instances of identity fraud, what is 
stolen can be quite abstract or even virtual. Accessing a person's bank account and 
transferring money from it can be done over the internet with no contact with either the 
bank or victim necessary. According to Lesley Malone, Information Officer for Victim 
Support: 
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"The statistical data that Victim Support collects shows the number of fraud 
victims we support, but does not unfortunately break the information down any 
further so it is not possible to tell whether these were victims of identity 
fraud/theft or other types. Fraud accounts for less than I% of referrals to Victim 
Support overall, although it is part of our core service, (i. e. all Victim Support 
branches must offer a service to fraud victims). This means basically that 
information, practical help and emotional support as described in Victim 
Support's service model must be offered, to the specified standard, and branches 
must refer a victim on to another agency where they are better placed to offer the 
help or support required, and the person supported requests this. 
Just to touch on your point about victims approaching us - most victims are 
referred to us by the police when they report a crime, and the number of self- 
referrals we receive is very low (around 2%). We are also aware that although 
there is a formal agreement with the police that they should pass on details on all 
victims (except some agreed exceptions) that this does not always happen in 
practice, and it may be that victims of identity fraud who report it to the police 
are not always referred to us, for whatever reason. 
Lesley Malone" 
Information Officer, Victim Support National Office 
(Malone L, 2006 see appendix 16 for original email) 
According to the National Consumer Council there are several difficulties faced by 
victims seeking help with identity theft: 
"Victims or relatives find themselves very much on their own, often with little 
support, having to deal separately with each company concerned to prove the 
deception and bearing all the costs of putting things right. Victims of ID theft 
have reported spending months clearing their names, being hassled by debt 
collectors, blacklisted for new credit, and experiencing sleepless nights and 
health problems caused by stress. " (National Consumer Council, N D: 2) 
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Can you take a person's sense of self?. 
The issue of how much identity fraud or identity theft has to do with an individual's 
identity is debateable due to the differing criteria individuals apply to determine what 
their identity is. As discussed in chapter 2 an individual's identity is in part the product 
of society's efforts to identify and categorise individuals and the individual's efforts to 
present their sense of self to society. It can be argued that identity theft is more 
concerned with documentation and acts of impersonation. The degree to which a 
person's sense of self is affected by identity theft can be very minimal. A sense of self is 
one way of describing an individual's personality or their individual efforts to identify 
themselves. 
When discussing individual cases of identity theft, there is often a gap of time between 
the commission of the crime and the victim becoming aware their identity has been 
stolen. It can be argued that the reason for this is that most instances of identity theft do 
not directly affect the individual's sense of self. As the individual's efforts to express 
who they are within their direct control any effort to usurp this control may be easily 
detected. However while there may be no direct takeover of a person's sense of self in 
an instance of identity theft, it can be argued that there will be an eventual effect on the 
individual's sense of self when their efforts to identify themselves are hampered or 
denied due to the actions of their impersonator. 
Identity theft can be seen as simply an issue of stealing data or documentation. But it 
can also be argued that it affects a person's sense of self, and it requires the abuse of 
societal expectations through the use of impersonation and deception. 
Benign Impersonation 
Impersonating someone is not necessarily a criminal endeavour; pretending to be 
someone else or deceiving people as to one's true identity is not a'crime unless this 
deception involves official documentation or identification processes which prohibit 
lying about details of one's identity. 
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An example of non criminal impersonation might be impersonating a famous person, 
such as Elvis Presley. The goal is to impersonate and imitate rather than take control of 
the identity and change it. It is the control and change aspects of the identity theft stage 
which indicate criminal intent. Changing identity is fully permissible in the United 
Kingdom, in some instances such as adoption and marriage the change in name is 
expected. 
Identity changing services 
While the issue of changing names or identities is represented as part of a criminal act, 
the desire to change or alter one's identity does not have to be a criminal matter. 
"Identity theft was once a serious problem. Thousands of people around the 
world had their identification stolen and were forced to pay large debts created 
by others. Up until now, law enforcement agencies and the general public have 
viewed this situation as chaotic. But here at A New Identity, Inc., we feel 
differently. If someone really wants your identity, good! Let them have it. We 
can get an even better one for you. Why bother with credit card debt, car loans, 
and home mortgages when you can leave them all behind? All you need to do is 
complete our free evaluation form, tell us a little bit about yourself now, and who 
you would like to become in the future. We'll analyze your information, 
determine the best identity for you, and send you a confirmation profile of the 
new you. Your identity will come complete with all necessary proof of 
existence, and cross-refcrenced by local and federal authorities. Once you 
accept your new identity, you may begin to enjoy the new you. " 
(aNewldentity. com, 2007: 1 of 1) 
This statement is from aNewIdentity. com (May, 2007), a company based in America 
which offers people a service to enable them to obtain a new identity, effectively 
discarding their old identity. aNcwIdcntity. com, offers its clients the opportunity to take 
the identities of other people and obtain fake academic qualifications. The website 
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promotes the changing of a person's identity as a means of evading debt or criminal 
records and of obtaining access to another person's finances. (No mention is made of the 
legality of their actions). Ultimately, aNewIdentity. com claims that taking on a new 
identity will: 
"Make your dreams come true, Become the person you have always dreamed of, 
Eliminate bad dept, Improve your credit rating, Remove criminal convictions from 
your record, Improve your wealth, Remove all public info associated with you, 
Prevent telemarketers from finding you, Never pay a credit card bill again, Acquire 
property and never pay for it, Create a legal ID for each of your multiple 
personalities, Earn a degree from any prestigious institution in a matter of minutes 
for a fraction of the cost, Boost your self esteem, Make others envy you, Only you 
will know you used this service, We respect your privacy and won't tell who you 
really used to be. " (aNewIdentity. com, 2007: 1) 
Another American website - www. ariza-research. com - provides information on how to 
change identities. Since 1995, this website has offered a book on how to change one's 
identity. It reports that the commonly known methods of obtaining a fake ID are not 
only ineffective but dangerous. According to Ariza, going to websites that offer fake ID 
cards is a waste of time as these sites are often trying to deceive people and will either 
not send fake IDs to their customers or will send poorer copies of IDs than they are 
offering. On the subject of obtaining identities from gravestones Ariza are even more 
sceptical: 
"... inexperienced identity changers attempt to 'borrow' the identity of a dead 
infant through a terribly worn out system called 'paper tripping'. They wander 
through cemeteries in search of the gravestones of deceased children and then 
attempt to resurrect a dead child's identity on paper and assume it as their own. 
This tired old system has been so terribly overused by career criminals that it's 
now the most dangerous identity changing system available! Why? 
Just how many other new identity seekers have visited that same gravestone 
before you? Do you really want to take the chance that you'll be sharing your 
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new identity with a cop-killer or someone on the FBI's top ten most wanted list? 
11 didn't think so! ) " (Ariza-research. com 2006: 1- 2) 
Ariza claims to offer not only a safe way of changing identities, but also a quick way, 
claiming that new documents can be obtained within a couple of days. The knowledge 
offered by Ariza research is one example of the type of literature that is available on 
changing identities. Books such as 'Acquiring New Id: How to Easily Use the Latest 
Technology to Drop Out, Start Over and Get on with Your Life'by Ragnar Benson 
(198 7) and 'How to Create a New Identity'which was written anonymously in 1987, 
show how to change one's identity without resorting to criminal or deviant methods. 
The underlying theme in these texts is the idea that identity is something that is open to 
alteration by individuals who seek to change their lives. All that is required is for people 
to develop the skills to alter their identity, and then they will be free to be whoever they 
want to be. The general view of identities by aNewIdentity. com and Ariza is that the 
obtaining and changing of an identity is a simple process we can all engage in. 
However, it can be argued that for many people an identity is an integral element of 
their life which should not be tampered with. 
Modern identity fraud - the use of misrepresentation 
A distinction can be made between the activities of modem identity thieves and earlier 
instances of identity thcft. Modem identity fraud is also different in many ways to 
earlier forms and approaches to committing identity fraud. The most notable difference 
is the increased use of identity theft to enable acts of identity fraud. This is not to say 
that fake or fictitious identities are not still used to enable identity fraud. 
Fake identities - works of fiction 
Another approach to identity related crime involves the creation of a new identity or an 
illegal modification of a person's identity. Rather than gathering and appropriating 
someone else's identifying details and attempting to impersonate them, a new fictitious 
identity is created. This identity has no records and is not recognised by any social 
institution. The effectiveness of this approach is questionable; without the input and 
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acceptance of society, this new identity has no existence beyond the declaration of its 
existence by the person using it. 
Without the approval or sanction of society, this identity has no official documents, so 
that copies or forgeries of documents such as birth certificates would have to be made. 
These copies would have severe limitations compared to genuine documents as they 
would not have a place in the official records. While they would possibly pass a cursory 
inspection (dependent on the quality of the forgery), they would not pass confmnation 
by any official database, unless that database was corrupted in some way and an entry 
was included. According to Oscherwitz (2005) another name for this type of identity 
fraud used in America is synthetic identity fraud. Oscherwitz states that: 
"In contrast to 'true name' identity theft, where a thief impersonates a real - life 
victim, synthetic identity fraud involves creation of a fake identity through the 
combination of real and false identity elements -a virtual Frankenstein 
monster. " (Oscherwitz T, 2005: 1) 
Oscherwitz argues that the large majority of identity fraud committed in America 
involves the use of synthetic identities, citing statistical research from ID Analytics that 
state that of 300 million account applications, 88% of successfully opened fraudulent 
accounts involved the use of a synthetic rather than 'true name' identity. The reason for 
the popularity of this type of identity fraud is according to Oscherwitz the lack of a 'true 
name'victim: 
"Why does this massive source of identity fraud get so little attention? A partial 
answer is that it is difficult to track. Since synthetic identities do not correspond 
to one particular consumer, the fraudulent activity will never appear on any 
consumer's credit report. " (Oscherwitz T, 2005: 1) 
The term 'synthetic identity fraud' in many respects refers to the older use of identity 
fraud where there was no need to use a personal identity. Looking at the activities of 
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people such as Archibald Stansfield Belaney who claimed to be Grey Owl, or Dr James 
Barry, it can be argued that fictitious identities have been used historically. 
The use of camouflage passports 
The use of fictitious identities can also involve fake or false documentation; one 
example of this is camouflage passports. Camouflage passports are documents which 
refer to countries which either do not exist or no longer exist to issue passports. These 
passports are available over the internet and are marketed as novelty items. In instances 
of identity fraud, camouflage passports can be used to cross borders or prove identity. 
Below are examples of camouflage passports reported by the Isle of Man Financial 
Supervision Commission (2008): 
Camouflage name 
British Guiana 
British Honduras 
British West Indies 
Burma 
Ceylon (Republic of) 
Dutch Guiana 
Eastern Samoa 
Netherlands Antilles 
Real name 
Guyana 
Belize 
Does not exist 
Myanmar 
SriLanka 
Surinam 
American Samoa 
Collection of islands e. g. Aruba, Curac5o, 
etc., that do not issue passports. Citizens of 
the islands have full Dutch passports. 
Netherlands East Indies Indonesia 
Newfoundland and Labrador Canada 
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New Grenada 
New Hebrides 
Rhodesia (Republic of) 
South Vietnam 
Spanish Guinea 
Upper Volta 
Zanzibar 
Does not exist, although Grenada does. 
Vanuatu 
Zimbabwe 
Vietnam 
Equatorial Guinea 
Burkina Faso 
Amalgamated with Tanganyika to become 
Tanzania. Exists but does not issue 
passports. 
(Financial Supervision Commission, 2008: 1-2) 
Camouflage passports play on the appearance of legitimacy. Providers of these passports 
claim their products are not meant to enable identity fraud, but it is possible that these 
fake passports may be used to enable identity fraud. 
Identity fraud during states of emergency 
Aside from the use of a specific fake identity there is also the use of a fake archetypal 
identity. Examples of this form of identity fraud can be seen during states of emergency 
such as Hurricane Katrina. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, after 
hurricane Katrina in 2005 there were several cases of internet based fraud surrounding 
the aid operation. One case involved a man who claimed on online forums to be a pilot 
trying to ship aid into the affected areas. He defrauded people by asking them for money 
to fuel his flights to New Orleans: 
"He laid it on thick, posting descriptions on the new web site describing his 
alleged non-stop missions to hurricane-strickcn areas. He'd seen dogs wrapped 
in live electrical lines. He'd transported a critically ill 7-month-old girl to South 
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Florida for transplant surgery. He'd flown his plane alongside Air Force One and 
both planes had 'tipped wings' over Louisiana. The stories were so compelling 
that in just two days he'd collected some $40,000 from 49 people in the U. S., 
Canada, Mexico, Europe, and Hong Kong. One contributor alone donated 
$20,000" (FRI Press Office, 2005: 1) 
Illegally modifying an identity 
As well as the use of fictitious identities, there are also illegal modifications of 
someone's identity. This can be seen most clearly in cases of people who claim 
membership of regulated or prohibited identities, such as members of the medical 
profession, or members of state agencies, such as the police or the army (see chapter 6). 
While the use of a fictitious identity does not involve the theft of another person's 
identity, it does involve misrepresentation as to the individual's true identity. This 
misrepresentation can be done for a number of the same reasons and purposes as those 
sought through the theft of another persons identity. The illegality of this approach is in 
the forgery of official documents, and the abuse of services or social institutions. 
An example of this type of deception in the identification process is the activities of 
Gene Morrison discussed in chapter 2. Morrison, while retaining his 'real' name had 
adopted the persona of a forensic expert and lied about his qualifications. Morrison used 
this deception for 26 years before being found out. Deception with regard to 
qualifications and experience is a practice which some argue has become more popular 
in recent years. In a survey of 1476 workers by employment law consultancy firm 
Peninsula, 66% admitted to lying about qualifications and experience. 8 out of 10 of 
those who admitted to lying said they would lie again to gain a promotion or enhance 
their career. While the use of fictitious identities or illegally modifying an identity may 
not be identity theft, it is an abuse of the identification process. It represents a 
misrepresentation of a person's true identity, and on this basis it is included in the 
discussion of modem identity fraud. 
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Identity theft leading to identity fraud 
Once a criminal has stolen a person's identity, in modem instances of identity crime the 
next step is to progress to commit identity fraud by misrepresenting the victim's 
identity. The misrepresentation begins after a successful impersonation. From this point 
on, there is a third party who believes that the person who has stolen an identity is the 
legitimate identity holder. From this point onwards, the person stealing the identity is 
developing the stolen identity in ways not intended by the legitimate identity holder. In a 
sense, this is when a person whose identity has been stolen loses control of their 
identity. 
Misrepresentation can involve developing the stolen identity, for instance obtaining a 
passport or driver's licence or buying a property. Misrepresentation can also involve 
taking resources from the legitimate identity holder such as taking money from a bank 
account or state benefits. While identity fraud can and does involve the continued 
victimisation of the person whose identity has been stolen, the deception at this point 
has shifted to varying degrees from the individual to the providers of resources in 
society. The diagram below shows how some forms of identity fraud are heavily 
dependent on identity theft to enable them, while other forms of identity fraud do not 
require identity theft but are made easier through its use. 
Types of modern identity fraud 
The types of identity fraud shown in this study are in part developed from the categories 
developed by the Fraud Advisory Panel (2003). The first form of identity fraud 
discussed is the use of identity fraud to avoid criminal liability or prosecution. 
Criminal liability for the actions of others 
In the U. K., the most famous instance of this form of identity fraud is the case of Derek 
Bond, but there have been several other cases in which people have been held 
responsible for the actions of the identity thieves who have targeted them. 
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As well as facing punishment for the crimes of their impersonators, victims of this type 
of identity theft must also face the stigma attached to the crimes of their impersonators. 
Being labelled a criminal can mean more than the prospect of some form of state 
sanctioned punishment, it can involve persecution by the community. In the 2002 case 
of Dr Paul Grout, his impersonator used Dr Grout's identity to obtain child 
pornography. 
As well as being a Senior Consultant at Hull Royal Infirmary, Dr Grout was also one of 
the east coast flying doctors who were first responders to many accidents and 
emergencies. However when he was arrested in October 2002 he became a social 
outcast. Dr Grout was arrested and his home searched, his computer and files were taken 
and not returned until 2004. The arrest took place after Operation Ore - an international 
operation investigating paedophiles - had identified Dr Grout as a suspected paedophile. 
The F. B. I. had tracked and linked Dr Grout's computer and credit card to a child 
pornography website. In the two years before the trial, Dr Grout lost his job and many of 
his friends drifted away from him and his wife. As the trial began in April 2004, it was 
revealed that a link could be made between Dr Grout's computer and the accessed 
pictures; however no images were found on his computer, With the F. B. Ps detailed list 
of when the images were accessed, Dr Grout's only defence was his electronic day 
planner. This showed that Dr Grout was not physically able to access the images at the 
times noted by the F. B. I. In one instance, Dr Grout was attending a police custody 
officer training course. 
During the trial a computer expert testified that Dr Grout was probably a victim of a 
cracker. It was revealed in an investigation by the BBC's Inside Out (2004) programme 
that Dr Grout's only crime was being careless with his passwords and wallet, and that 
his system was vulnerable to computer hackers. Inside Out went to a computer expert 
called Gary O'Leary-Steele. Mr Steele is a computer hacker who helps companies with 
online security issues, Through a simulation of Dr Grout's computer system the 
programme was able to show how it took O'Leary-Steele moments to break Dr Grout's 
security: 
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... It's not much more than clicking buttons really, ' explains Gary. 'There's no 
elite programming that need to be done. Any user who knows computers could 
break a password like this. "' (BBC News, 2004: 3) 
Dr Grout was acquitted of the four charges he was arrested for - two charges of 
attempting to incite the distribution of indecent photographs of children and two charges 
of incitement to distribute indecent photographs of children. The argument that someone 
had hacked into Dr Grout's computer and stolen his credit card details saved the doctor 
from imprisonment. However, according to Detective Superintendent Colin Andrews of 
Humberside Police: 
I am satisfied that this was a professional investigation, that it was right and 
proper that we investigated the allegations and a full and detailed file was given 
to the CPS, he said. These were not trumped up charges. " (BBC News, 2004: 1) 
The arrest of Dr Grout left him without a job and stigmatised by the idea that he was a 
paedophile long before his trial or proof of his guilt was established. 
Other cases of people having their credit card details stolen and used to obtain child 
pornography have been reported by the BBC in connection with Operation Ore. 
According to the BBC of the 7,000 people who were detected using credit cards on a 
website which provided child pornography, 2,000 spent many months being investigated 
before charges were dropped. According to Professor Ross Anderson from Cambridge 
University: 
"The police just didn't look for and didn't understand the evidence of wholesale 
fraud.... And as a result, hundreds of people, possibly in the low thousands of 
people have been put through a terrible mill with threats of prosecution for child 
pornography. " (BBC News, 2007: 1) 
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These forins of identity theft force people to not only face the consequences of their 
impostor's actions but also the social stigma attached to the crime. While it is a key 
element of British law that a person is innocent until proven guilty, in cases of identity 
theft the 'accused' have the added pressure of proving they were not involved in the first 
place, despite evidence to the contrary. 
In America there have been several incidents of this type of identity fraud, and in some 
instances even after the victims have informed the authorities of the misunderstanding, 
they have still been arrested and detained. The experiences of Michelle Brown are a 
good example of someone using another person's identity to avoid prosecution (see case 
of Michelle Brown page 109). 
Another example of identity fraud used to conceal criminal activity is discussed in Bob 
Sullivan's book 'Your Evil Twin'(2004). Sullivan highlights the case of Malcolm Byrd 
who suffered for five years after a man was arrested on drug charges and used Byrd's 
name when he was detained by the police. This incident took place in a town near where 
Byrd lived and he became aware of the misidentification when the arrest was reported in 
the local newspaper, He reported the mistake to the police and the newspaper printed a 
correction. Despite Byrd's efforts to correct the mistake with the police, four months 
later Mr Byrd was stopped for speeding and he was then arrested for drug dealing (the 
crime his impersonator had been arrested for). While Mr Byrd had gone to the police to 
inform them of the mistaken identity the police had not removed his name from the 
computer crime database. The mistake was realised when the police checked Mr Byrd 
against the photograph they had on file. The effects of this case of identity fraud 
escalated; Mr Byrd lost half a day's wages from being arrested and later Mr Byrd lost 
his part time job as a nursing assistant because his employers believed he had lied on his 
application for the job when he said he had no criminal record. Months later Mr Byrd 
lost his full time job and was denied unemployment benefits because of his 'criminal 
record'. By the time he had cleared up the mistake over his benefits, Mr Byrd was 
informed that his driver's licence had been suspended for non payment of fines. Mr 
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Byrd's impersonator had continued to use his identity and pin his crimes on Mr Byrd. In 
response, Mr Byrd obtained court documents from the county district attorney 
While it can be argued that identity fraud in the form of wholesale and partial 
assumption are the most invasive in terms of controlling an identity, identity fraud as a 
means of implicating another in criminal activity can be the most destructive to an 
individual's well-being. To be held criminally liable opens the individual to being 
vilified and stigmatised for the actions of someone else. 
Account takeover and false application fraud 
The next two forms of identity fraud to be discussed are the use of account takeover and 
false application fraud. These forms of identity fraud are often highly dependent on 
personal identities. 
Account takeover is a term which refers to instances where identity thieves steal an 
identity in order to gain access to an organisation with which the legitimate identity 
holder has a previously established relationship. Once this access has been achieved, the 
identity thief will abuse this relationship in some way. This approach can often involve 
the obtaining of information that an individual is required to keep secret such as 
Personal Identification Numbers (P. I. Ns). Often the account number or speciric personal 
identity number on its own can be used without the need for a lengthy or thorough 
impersonation. During the sentencing of three men convicted of trying to steal E357,000 
of tax credits from 40 people, the investigation discovered that they had obtained 37 
national insurance numbers. In addition, they had used II fraudulent bank accounts, 
eight forged driving licences and nine credit cards, in an attempt to defraud the tax credit 
system. (BBC News, 2006) False application fraud is where an identity thief will use 
information gathered on their victim to start a new social relationship with an 
organisation such as a bank. An example of this might be the obtaining of a loan using 
someone else's identity (see below for examples). 
270 
Of all forms of identity fraud, false application and account takeover are the ones which 
have caused the biggest response from the credit industry. It can be argued that while 
identity fraud as a means of avoiding criminal liability is the most damaging, it is 
because of false application fraud and account takeover that identity fraud has become 
such a widespread phenomenon. The goal here is to gain access to people's bank 
accounts, credit and any type of money a person is entitled to through displaying their 
identity. Through the use of technologies such as the internet, it has become possible to 
victimise large numbers of people and shorten the process of impersonation. 
How noticeable the abuse of the identity is in cases of false application fraud and 
account takeover, is dependent on the amount of money taken and how quickly this is 
done. The theft of a few pounds stolen periodically over time may go unnoticed. 
However, the taking of all of someone's money will immediately alert the individual to 
the theft of their identity. Taking someone's money through account takeover can be 
done by simply taking money from a cash machine, or by going into the bank; however 
both of these approaches leave the thief highly visible to any security the bank has. 
Money can also be taken by transferring the money from someone's account into 
another account. The use of phone and internet banking means that the thief can transfer 
money from someone's account without going to the bank. 
In some cases of false application and account takeover, the criminals involved will play 
on a weakness in a particular identification process or system. An example of this is the 
targeting of the HM Revenue and Customs tax credit website which took place in 2005, 
The website was used by fraudsters to make online tax credit applications; they used the 
stolen identities of 1,500 employees of the Department for Works and Pensions. 
(Thomas 2005) 
Liability for fraud 
In instances of account takeover where money is taken by someone impersonating the 
legitimate identity holder, victims are reimbursed by the bank or credit company that the 
money was taken from. This can lead to the assumption that people are not really 
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victims as they are not at a financial loss. However, in many instances the burden of 
correcting the activities of an identity thief can often be the responsibility of the victim 
or their family (in instances where the victim is dead, very young or very old). 
Example of account takeover and false application fraud 
An example of false application fraud is the case of Robert Scott (Curwen, 2006) who 
had his identity stolen and used to obtain a number of loans and accrue a number of 
debts in his name. Mr Scott was left in the situation of having to locate debt collectors 
and solicitors who were seeking payment for debts he was accused of This resulted in 
Mr Scott's credit records being so bad that no credit or loan company would take him on 
as a suitable credit risk. Mr Scott's existing credit cards were also set at a higher interest 
rate. Another example provide by the National Consumer Council is the experiences of 
Elsa: 
"Elsa, from Stratford-upon-Avon, was called by a debt collection agency, asking 
her to repay fA, 387 owed on her credit card. Elsa has never had a credit card and 
the date of birth quoted was wrong. She continued to be harassed, by letter and 
phone. She went to the police but they just said it was a civil matter and would 
not give her a crime reference number. 
Eventually she was referred to CIFAS and advised to get her credit record and 
put protective registration on it (protective registration ensures that CIFAS 
member companies carry out extra checks whenever anyone applies for financial 
services in that person's name). Her credit record revealed a long list of 
fraudulent activity. Three months later she is still dealing with the debt 
collector. " (National Consumer Council, N D: 1) 
Below is an account of one such instance of account takeover from the perspective of 
the victim, During this instance of account takeover, it was possible to speak with the 
victim directly and accompany her during a visit to their bank to report the incident. At 
the request of the victim, she will be referred to simply as Mrs B. 
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This incident of identity fraud took place in January 2007; it was discovered by Mrs B 
while she was reviewing her accounts online with her bank. While reviewing the 
accounts, Mrs B noticed firstly a sum of El 12 and then a subsequent sum of E65 had 
been taken from her account in order to balance an account with Betfare an online 
gambling company that Mrs B had never heard of prior to the discovery of the payment. 
Both payments were made within days of each other. 
With the knowledge that her bank account had been compromised, Mrs B approached 
her bank seeking to retrieve the stolen funds and prevent any further withdrawals from 
her account. Mrs B elected to visit the local branch of her bank in person and was 
directed to speak to a member of staff there. Upon hearing that her account was being 
accessed by someone, else the bank officials first checked the accuracy of Mrs B's 
claim. Then they reported the instance of fraud to the banks online fraud unit and gave 
Mrs Ba form to outline how much money had been taken. According to Mrs B: 
"The whole thing felt more like an insurance claim rather than reporting a 
crime. " (Mrs B, 2007) 
Because Mrs B felt that her claim had not received the attention it deserved, she reported 
the crime to the police in the hope that the theft of her money would be recognised as a 
crime. However while the police did take a report of the incident, they were not 
optimistic that they could catch the thieves who had stolen the money. The targeting of 
Mrs B's account had taken a short amount of time to commit, and it was only due to Mrs 
B's review of her accounts that the crime was detected. 
The attitude held by staff at the bank and to a certain degree by the police also suggests 
a sense of defeatism when it comes to instances of online account takeover; rather than 
treating the incident as a crime, the attitude seemed to be that it must instead be treated 
as an unavoidable hazard of using online commerce. Another point of interest raised by 
this incident is the timing of the account takeover. It is possible that one of the reasons 
Mrs B's account was attacked in January is that the theft of her money might go 
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unnoticed amongst other payments due to the increased spending over Christmas and 
New Year. 
Identity fraud between family members 
One area of victimisation which can be particularly damaging is when identity theft 
happens within a family. These incidents of identity theft often involve family members 
applying for credit or financial assistance using a relative's information. An example 
identity fraud within a family is the case of Elaine Hall and her impersonation of her 
younger sister Linda Cowan. According to Bruce (2007), Hall had stolen her sister 
(Linda Cowan) identity to conceal a criminal record for fraud. 
Hall's impersonation of her sister involved using her sister's identity to secure work at a 
care home in Edinburgh under Cowan's maiden name - Linda Hall. The identity fraud 
also involved obtaining bank accounts, credit cards, store cards and a mobile phone 
contract in her sister's name. Eventually Hall was able to use her sister's identity to 
obtain a E140,000 mortgage for a four bedroom house in Livingston, West Lothian. 
Cowan was alerted to her sister's activities in 2003 when she was contacted about an 
overdue payment on a Ford Puma motorcar. After this initial discovery, it was revealed 
that Hall had been using Cowan's identity and credit to fund her purchases. It was 
estimated that Hall stole ; E250,000 from her sister. In August 2007, Hall was jailed for 
15 months, After the sentencing Cowan was asked why she thought her sister had done 
it. She said: 
"Maybe she was jealous. She is older than me and maybe things should be the 
other way around, with me needing money from her. If that's true I feel sorry for 
her, this is what she ended up as. I do love her deep down but I can't stand the 
sight of her. " (Cowan cited in Bruce S, 2007: 1) 
Theft of children's Identities 
As well as instances of identity fraud between siblings, identity fraud within families 
can also involve parents who use and abuse the identities of their children. Again, as 
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with identity fraud between siblings, the bond of personal trust between parent and child 
can make identity fraud easier to commit. Using a child's identity can be a very effective 
way for criminals to make money. While children may not have bank accounts or credit 
cards for identity fraudsters to exploit through account takeover, the fact that they have 
no bank accounts or credit history means that they have a perfect credit rating. This is 
something some people try to exploit. 
In his book 'Your Evil Twin, Sullivan (2004: 47) reviews the case of Jeremy Potter and 
his use of identity fraud against his own children. According to Sullivan, Potter's 
activities were discovered by his ex-wife Rachel Soper. For a time after the divorce, 
Potter moved away from the town in Nevada that Soper lived in. After two years he 
returned with his new wife and step son. Sopers suspicions about Potter's activities were 
raised when she saw her ex-husband had bought a new car and furnishings for his house. 
Soper knew that her ex-husband and his new wife had a poor credit rating and could not 
afford any of the things they were buying. Soper's suspicions were further raised when 
Potter contacted her by phone and the caller ID showed the name of Potter's new 
stepson who at the time was nine years old. Soper later found out that Potter and his new 
wife had used the step son's identity on their electricity and home phone accounts. This 
lead Soper, who had three children with Potter, to suspect he may have used their 
children's identities as well. After performing a credit check on her seven year old son's 
identity, Soper discovered that Potter and his new wife had opened numerous credit card 
accounts and had made loan applications in the child's name. Potter had so completely 
abused his son's identity and credit rating that by the time Soper had performed a credit 
check, her son's credit rating had a reached a level equalled only by people who have 
declared themselves bankrupt. Potter had made no attempt to pay off any of the debts he 
had accrued in his son"s name. When a credit card reached its limit, Potter simply 
applied for another one. Sullivan notes that Potter was able to do this because credit 
companies usually do not bother checking the age of applicants. Eventually Soper was 
able to convince the police to investigate and Potter was arrested and given a one year 
suspended sentence and two years on parole. 
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In many cases of identity theft and identity fraud there is no personal bond between the 
victim and the person committing the crime. In these cases, it can be argued that the 
bond of trust abused is a bond of social trust. But in cases of identity fraud between 
family members it is a bond of personal trust that the criminal abuses. This abuse in 
many ways is more damaging than instances of identity fraud where social trust is 
abused. But in terms of committing identity fraud, it can be argued that targeting family 
members is simpler than targeting strangers, and access to information is easier to 
achieve. Reasons for committing identity fraud against a family member can vary. In the 
first example discussed - the case of Elaine Hall -jealousy was raised as a possible 
cause, implying that perhaps the closer relationship and awareness of her sister's 
identity may have led her to commit her crime. But equally, the case of Potter and his 
abuse of his children's identities implies that identity fraud between family members 
mayjust be an issue of opportunity. Potter sought financial gain from using his son's 
identity; his awareness of his son's identity made the crime easier. 
It can be argued that when committing identity fraud in the form of account takeover 
and false application, fraudster are not trying to adopt all of the identity or even pass 
themselves off as the victim for any length of time. This is what we would expect to see 
in more traditional forms of identity theft. But in modem cases of identity theft, it is the 
resources provided through an identity which the criminal is primarily focused on. Even 
so, the sense of being 'compromised' or 'vulnerable' to further attack does still exist, 
making false application and account takeover more than a clerical error. 
Wholesale assumption and partial assumption 
The next two forms of identity fraud arc wholesale and partial assumption; these 
categories refer to people who are attempting to abandon their old identities and start a 
new life under another identity. The distinction between wholesale and partial is the 
number of identities involved. In cases of wholesale assumption only one identity is 
taken and used; in cases of partial assumption, criminals take on several identities in an 
effort to abandon their old identity. Wholesale and partial assumption can involve the 
use of dead people's identities. 
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The impersonation of Christopher Buckingham by Charles Stopford is an example of 
wholesale assumption as is the case of Christopher Clarkson and his assumption of 
Stephen Duffy's identity which was discovered in 2005. 
The case of Charles Stopford is a prime example of wholesale assumption, as not only 
did Stopford maintain and develop the identity of Christopher Buckingham but he also 
abandoned the identity of Charles Stopford for 23 years. The reasons for committing 
identity fraud in the form of wholesale assumption, in this instance, were in many 
respects personal. This may account for the difficulty in detecting Stopford's activities, 
as his goal appears not to have been financial. 
Another use for wholesale assumption is to avoid identification of a criminal past and an 
example of this would be the arrest of Christopher Clarkson in 2005. Ile was a member 
of a notorious gang of bank robbers known as the 'Stopwatch Gang', which during the 
1970s stole about $8 million from 140 banks in Canada over a ten year period. Clarkson 
was one of two members of the gang who were facing charges on drug smuggling. 
During the hearings, Clarkson fled from Canada to America where it is believed lie went 
to California and stole the identity of Stephen Duffy, a four year old boy who died in 
1948. Using Duffy's identity, Clarkson went to Florida where he became a successful 
property dealer and lived for 30 years. Wigmore notes that when the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation finally caught up with Clarkson: 
"Special agent Ed Moreno said: 'He was definitely stunned. He didn't ask us any 
questions. He knew why we were there. ' How much his wife Janice Caron knew 
about his past is unclear. Asked about his arrest she said: 'I just don't have 
anything to say right now. ' Alan Brown, a colleague at the estate agency, said: 
'The staff are all pretty shaken. Nobody had any idea he was anything but a 
normal guy"' (Wigmore. B, 2005: 1) 
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Wliolesale assumption can be used by those seeking to distance themselves from a 
criminal record or some aspect of their past that impedes them in society. For example, 
someone may be a convicted sex offender who wants to work with children, or if a 
person who has declared bankruptcy may wants to conceal their past in order to obtain a 
bank loan. The goal is to distance themselves from the stigma or label attached to their 
genuine identity, This is in contrast to most other forms of identity fraud, where the goal 
is to obtain something from the other identity while still retaining a true identity. One 
approach to wholesale assumption is to use the identity of a dead person. 
Deceased fraud - Day of the Jackalfraud 
According to Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) and 
deceasedidentityfraud. co. uk, the use of dead people's identities in identity theft and 
identity fraud is a popular approach for identity thieves. Using the identities of dead 
people ensures that victims cannot complain about the abuse of their identity. Deceased 
fraud is sometimes known as Day of the Jackalfraud, referencing the use of identity 
fraud by the main protagonist in Fredrick Forsyth's book '7he Day of the Jackal'. 
Statistics on the use of dead people's identities compiled by CIFAS indicate that in 2005 
there were an estimated 80,000 cases of identity fraud involving the identities of dead 
people, 
According to BDO Stoy Hayward (2008), at any one time pensions are being paid to 
70,000 dead people. In an article by Matthew Hickley (2002) for the Daily Mail, the 
theft of identities from babies is discussed. In this report, Hickley discusses how the 
identities of more than 1,000 babies who died before their first birthday have been used 
to create driver's licences, National Insurance numbers and passports for sale to illegal 
immigrants. Below are examples of victims' accounts of wholesale and partial 
assumption: 
"Mrs L explains, 'My mum died of cancer. We closed her -affairs and arranged 
for mail re-direction. Within a few months we started to get letters from 
departments stores, credit card companies and debt collection agencies, saying 
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that mum had taken out credit cards, store cards and had failed to make 
repayments. I contacted each group and explained that my mum was dead, could 
not have taken out the debt and the people now living in my mum's old house 
must have stolen her identity. I was surprised at their reactions - from complete 
lack of interest to total suspicion about who I was. ' 
'I was very angry. Mum hadn't been well off, and had worked very hard to not 
get into debt, never taking out loans or credit cards and always paying her bills. I 
felt her reputation and her memory were being tarnished. I went to the police. To 
my absolute surprise, the police were not at all interested. They just told me I 
was not the person losing any money and to go home and forget about it! And 
so, for the last two years this has continued - only this week I've had another 
bill. My mum's name is still being used. ' 
Neither the police not any of the companies advised Mrs L of her rights as an 
executor and relative to ask for her mother's credit record. They didn't tell her 
about basic steps she could take to prevent ID theft and she had never heard of 
CIFAS until she told us about her case. " (National Consumer Council N D: 5) 
Another type of victimisation involving wholesale and partial assumption involves the 
identities of People whose ability to detect or protect their identity is impaired due to 
medical conditions: 
"Within the last month I have received correspondence from (a bank) telling my 
wife about her account. My wife has dementia and does not have the mental 
capacity to open an account. I have contacted (the bank's) customer service by 
phone on two different occasions and once by writing. Each time they said they 
would correct the problem. This last time, I was totally blown off and hung up 
on. I believe my wife may be a victim of identity theft for which (the bank) must 
take some responsibility. I need this matter corrected, and her name removed 
from any (bank) account. " (This story posted online on 03115105) 
(Better Business Bureau, 2005: 2) 
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In instances of wholesale and partial assumption of a person's identity either the victim 
are kept unaware of the crime or are in a condition which makes them unable to report 
the abuse of their identity - such as in instances of wholesale assumption involving the 
dead or people with severe medical conditions such as dementia (as discussed above). 
This form of victimisation is arguably the worst abuse of a person's identity, as it 
removes individuals' right to control who they are. When this form of identity fraud is 
targeted at the dead, it is evident from accounts of family members that this abuse of a 
person's identity does affect others. 
Partial assumption 
Cases of partial assumption involve the assumption of several identities with the goal of 
abandoning the identity thief's genuine identity. Some partial assumers are those who 
have failed to maintain a wholesale assumption. The activities of F. W. Demara are an 
example of this kind of identity related crime. Demara took on several identities in an 
effort to abandon his own identity. Demara can be seen as a partial assurner because 
each of his impersonations and misrepresentations was found out, forcing him to take on 
a new identity. 
A more recent example of partial assumption is the activities of Rasmus Kirkegaard 
Kristiansen who was a suspected murderer and identity thief from Denmark; he used the 
name Ronald Kirk and ten other false identities in order to hide in and amongst 
expatriates living in Portugal. (BBC News 1999) 
Faking your death - case of John Darwin 
Another example of identity fraud which can be described as partial assumption is the 
activities of John Darwin between 2002 and 2007. In 2002, John Darwin went canoeing 
in the sea near Seaton Carew. Darwin was reported missing and a year later a death 
certificate was issued in his name, In reality, Darwin was not dead, but he had faked his 
death so that his wife could claim the life insurance. Darwin hid in his home after faking 
his death and in 2004 the couple decided to move abroad. At this time Darwin obtained 
the birth certificate of John Jones, a child who died in 1950. Using this identity Darwin 
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and his wife visited several countries and in 2006-2007 the couple began planning a 
permanent move to Panama. In September 2007, Cleveland police received new 
evidence that raised suspicions over Darwin's disappearance. In December 2007, John 
Darwin entered a police station in London claiming to have amnesia. His reasons for 
doing this are unclear; it may be that Darwin was aware of the police investigation and 
was trying to influence it. Darwin's story about having amnesia soon fell apart as 
pictures showing him and his wife in Panama several months earlier led to the 
prosecution of Darwin and his wife for fraud. Both were convicted and sentenced to six 
years in prison. The case of John Darwin is interesting as it represents someone who not 
only abandoned their old identity in favour of a new one; but also went back and tried to 
resurrect his old identity. 
Partial Assumption as multiple false application fraud and account takeover 
This form of partial assumption can develop from instances of account takeover and 
false application fraud, where the identity thief has in some way been able to construct a 
false identity around several instances of smaller scale identity frauds. It can be argued 
that the fraudulent activities of Frank Abagnale constitute this form of partial 
assumption as Abagnale routinely used different names. This form of partial assumption 
can be seen as multiple false application fraud and account takeover. 
The key to the success of partial assumption, as with instances of wholesale assumption, 
is the absence of detection on the part of the victim. Unlike more short term instances of 
identity fraud, or incidents where criminals attack multiple identities at once, partial 
assumption requires a prolonged use of the identity. This increases the chances of 
detection by both the legitimate identity holder (excluding instances involving the 
deceased) and those in charge of policing the identification process. 
Illegal Immigrants and Identity fraud 
The goal in cases of wholesale assumption is the abandonment of 'one identity in favour 
of another. In many respects, this describes the motivation for illegal immigrants to use 
identity fraud. In chapter 3, the subject of illegal immigration and identity fraud is 
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discussed, outlining the activities of illegal immigrants and people smugglers. The use 
of identity fraud by illegal immigrants discussed in that chapter highlights how the goal 
is to obtain proofs of identity which can be used to allow someone to pass as a 
legitimate U. K. citizen. In a sense, illegal immigrants use identity fraud to abandon the 
identity of an illegal immigrant in favour of being identified as a legitimate U. K. citizen. 
In the cases of Charles Stopford and John Darwin the men had stolen the identities they 
used themselves; illegal immigrants can rely on people smugglers and organised crime 
groups to obtain a new identity for them. 
Identity fraud as a means of breaching security 
The final form of identity fraud which relies on the use of a personal identity theft is the 
use of identity fraud to obtain identification in order to overcome security measures. It 
involves obtaining forms of documentation which are relied on in society as secure or 
dependable proofs of identity. Examples of proofs of identity which are targeted during 
this type of identity fraud include driver's licences, passports and National Insurance 
numbers. There may not be an immediate financial gain to the adoption of that aspect of 
a person's identity, but this type of identity fraud is intended as a means of enabling 
other forms of identity fraud, such as false application fraud or using identity fraud to 
avoid criminal liability. This type of identity fraud is intended as a means of reinforcing 
any claim to another person's identity. The use of identity fraud to breach security is 
often associated with the activities of terrorists. 
Terrorism and identity fraud 
It was the attack on September I Ith 2001 that highlighted the connection between 
terrorism and the use of false identities. This terrorist attack and the subsequent 
investigation highlighted how identity fraud has been used not only to enable terrorist 
attacks but also to fund terrorist activity. In 2002 testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information by 
Dennis M. Lormel, chief of the Terrorist, Financial Review Group at the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, it was noted that: 
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"... terrorists have long utilized identity theft as well as Social Security Number 
fraud to enable them to obtain such things as cover employment and access to 
secure locations. These and similar means can be utilized by terrorists to obtain 
Driver's Licenses, and bank and credit card accounts through which terrorism 
financing is facilitated. Terrorists and terrorist groups require funding to 
perpetrate their terrorist agendas. The methods used to finance terrorism range 
from the highly sophisticated to the most basic. There is virtually no financing 
method that has not at some level been exploited by these groups. Identity theft 
is a key catalyst fueling many of these methods. " (Lormel D. L, 2002: 1) 
It is this connection between terrorism and identity fraud which has in the U. K. 
motivated an increase in the security surrounding various identification processes. 
Passport security and the introduction of identity cards are two examples of the concern 
that has been raised - not just by the threat of terrorism but also by the threat of terrorists 
who use false identities to enable their attacks: 
"Prior to September 11, governments and businesses were sensitive to identity 
impostors, but they viewed the problem as primarily a financial matter, that is, as 
a significant component of fraud. Called identity theft, statistics were gathered 
about its effect on businesses; hearings were conducted on its harm to individual 
victims and in 1998, federal legislation was passed to criminalize it. 
However, it was the events of September 11, and the investigation conducted 
afterwards, that awakened society to the fact that the criminal use of false 
identifiers and false identification documents is not just a significant component 
of fraud, but also of terrorism. " (Willcox NA, Regan T. M, 2002: 2) 
In the September I Ith attack, of the 19 hijackers, two utilised false identities during the 
attack - Abdul Azziz Alomari and Ahmed Salch Alghamdi. With the help of Kenys 
Galicia, the two were able to obtain false identities and residency certificates which 
identified them as residents of Virginia. It was with these identities that they were able 
to board the planes they would eventually hijack with their co-conspirators. Aside from 
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the activities of these two terrorists, the others were also reported to have used false 
documents and identity cards. According to Willcox and Regan (2002), it is believed 
that all of the terrorists used false social security numbers. Social security numbers are 
comparable to U. K. National Insurance numbers and likewise are a key element of any 
identification process. 
Willcox and Regan argue that while identity fraud has often been seen as the tool of con 
artists, the events of September I Ph forced people to see it as a more fundamental 
element of most criminal activity: 
"The activities of the September I lo'terrorist now cause us to realize that 
identity fraud is not just the tool of the con artist. It is, when properly rccognised, 
indigenous to any criminal enterprise, whether it be drug trafficking, alien 
smuggling or cyber stalking. " (Willcox. N. A, Regan. T. M, 2002: 4) 
While identity fraud was used as a means of enabling the attacks on September I Ph 
2001, identity fraud was also one of the means by which at-Qaeda was able to finance 
the operation. According to Sullivan (2004): 
"A Spanish judge who presided over the indictment of eight suspected al-Qaeda 
members for involvement in September II says the group financed itself largely 
through credit card fraud. The terrorist cell, thought to be a financing hub for al- 
Qaeda, used stolen credit cards and false identities to move money and people 
around the globe. Perhaps $1 million was raised and moved out of the country by 
couriers to Saudi Arabia, U. S. investigators say. " (Sullivan B, 2004: 78) 
However despite there being a connection between the use of identity fraud and 
terrorism, terrorists do not always need to use false identities: in the terrorist attacks in 
London on July 7d' 2005, the terrorists did not use false identities and had no need to 
conceal who they were. 
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Theft of a business or organisations Identity 
The theft of a business or organisation's identity is distinctly different to the theft or 
defrauding of an individual's identity. When dealing with the theft or abuse of an 
individual's identity, the key point is that the identity should only be used by one 
individual. However, when dealing with the identity of an organisation - be it a 
business, charity or state organisation - the identity is designed to be used by multiple 
members of that organisation. Business identities can exist simultaneously in several 
countries, being used by different members of the same corporation. 
Business Identities 
All companies in the U. K., have to be registered at Companies House; this and a 
number of changes involving the payment of taxes and the employment of other 
individuals, is how a business is formed. Beyond these parameters, a business can take 
any form in respect of the number of individuals involved, or the location of the 
business, and the goals and purpose of the business can vary greatly. This ambiguity 
over the nature of a corporate or business identity has been fiarlher exacerbated by the 
introduction of internet based companies. 
There are two ways in which a business identity can be abused. The first involves 
stealing a business identity in much the same way an individual's identity is stolen. 
Impersonating a company can be carried out in order to gain individuals' account details 
or as a means of obtaining monies from someone by redirecting a payment intended to 
the legitimate representative of that company. This type of victimisation can be seen in 
instances of phishing and pharming as mentioned in chapter 7. While the initial goal in 
this type of deception is to gain access to the individual's account details, it is only 
possible by corrupting the organisation's identity. 
In a report by Lague (2006), the experiences of Japanese electronics company, NEC, 
with corporate identity theft are discussed. According to Lague, after NEC employees at 
the Tokyo headquarters were alerted to the sale of counterfeit keyboards, CDs and 
DVDs bearing the NEC logo in Beijing and Hong Kong, an investigation into 
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counterfeiting was initiated. This investigation revealed that counterfeiters in China 
were making 'knock off' copies of NEC products and that they had also set up a fake 
NEC company: 
"Evidence seized in raids on 18 factories and warehouses in China and Taiwan 
over the past year showed that the counterfeiters had set up what amounted to a 
parallel NEC brand with links to a network of more than 50 electronics factories 
in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, " (Lague. D, 2006: 1) 
The counterfeiters had set up their business as if it were a legitimate representative of 
NEC, the people who worked there were issued NEC business cards, shipping their 
products in crates that looked like authentic NEC packaging and the factories they used 
had NEC signs outside them. 
Not only were the counterfeiters using the NEC company name and they were also 
producing their own products including entertainment systems, MP3 players, batteries 
and DVD players. League notes that in some retail outlets in Southeast Asia, the 
counterfeit products were being sold next to legitimate NEC products. According to 
Steve Vickers from International Risk: 
"... the NEC case demonstrated how piracy is evolving from opportunistic and 
often shoddy copying of branded goods to highly coordinated operations. " 
(Lague. D, 2006: 1) 
The NEC case represents the extreme of how criminals can use and abuse a company's 
identity. 
Other confidence scams committed using business identities have combined the 
fraudulent use of individual's identities with the abuse of corporate identities. In 2004, 
an American company called T-Data discovered that its identity was being used by 
criminals to enable credit card fraud. According to Sullivan (2004), T-Data is a New 
York software based company, which does not accept and never has accepted credit card 
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charges. But in 2004 the owner of the company - Jeff Duhl - discovered that $15,000 
worth of credit card charges had been accepted by his company: 
"A quick investigation revealed most of the charges bad been made using stolen 
credit cards. Slowly, he caught on: someone had stolen a batch of credit card 
accounts, then stolen his company's name, set up an impostor version of T-Data, 
and rung up thousands of dollars worth of fake purchases. The 'profits' then 
deposited into checking accounts, it seems like the perfect scam. " (Sullivan B, 
2004: 1) 
As well as from T-Data, another 50 firms were targeted in this scam. By combining the 
theft and abuse of an individual and a corporate identity, the criminals had improved the 
process of gaining money from the act of identity fraud. In general when someone's 
identity is stolen and abused the biggest problem for the criminals is how to abuse the 
identity without being detected. By stealing the identity of a corporation the criminals 
in the T-Data fraud had tried to confound the company's ability to detect their abuse of 
people's identities. 
Shell companies 
The second approach is to set up a Shell company (also known as a paper company); 
these are fake companies that exist only on paper, not physically, Unlike the abuse of a 
legitimate company identity discussed above, this approach to corporate identity fraud 
involves creating an entirely fake company. This form of abuse involves the 
misrepresentation of criminals as legitimate business people, rather than the 
impersonation of another company. 
In 2003 Devon and Cornwall police noted the appearance of a company called Data 
Protection Agency, claiming to be based in Crewe. This company was sending out 
letters to businesses based in the south west of England. They claimed that these 
businesses had failed to submit a notification to the information commissioner and if 
they did not send a E95 fee they would be liable for a L5,000 fine. The deception 
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employed by Data Protection Agency was in many respects a variation of an advance 
fee fraud, similar to the Nigerian 419 scam discussed in chapter 7. 
Aside from the approach used in the above example, shell companies can also be used to 
manipulate investors and banks. In South Korea, in 2002, several businessmen were 
caught using shell companies to rig the stock market and defraud investors. 5,000 shell 
companies were initially created. The scheme involved creating fake companies that 
appeared to be well funded businesses; this would enable the gang to gain investment 
and bank loans. Once they had gathered enough money into the fake company, they 
would pull the money out of the company. 
Just as in identity related crime targeted at individuals, the abuse of corporate identities 
can involve acts of impersonation leading to fraudulent activity; but it can also involve 
the development and use of fictitious corporate identities. 
Limitations of the progression 
The only thing this progression cannot illustrate is the amount of time it takes to Commit 
identity theft or identity fraud. Previous definitions of identity theft and identity fraud 
have focused on the issue of time and have distinguished between identity theft and 
identity fraud on the grounds of how long someone's identity has been abused. 
The issue of how long it takes to commit identity theft or identity fraud is a complex one 
which can confuse the process of defining the two types of crime. Issues which come 
into play when discussing the time it takes to commit identity theft or identity fraud 
include: 
0 the type of information used and how valuable it is to establishing proof of 
identity 
0 the skill of the criminals involved with regard to deccption and manipulation of 
the identification process 
the use of technology both to steal information on a person's or corporation's 
identity and to facilitate the defrauding of social institutions 
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awareness of the victims - both individuals in cases of identity theft, and social 
institutions in cases of identity fraud 
Geography can be an important factor. The experience of Derek Bond is an example; 
Mr Bond's identity was used by Derek Sykes in the U. S. A. for over twenty years. Also 
the theft and abuse of NEC's corporate identity in China shows how identity theil and 
identity fraud on a global scale can be hard to stop or detect. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of presenting this progression is to explain how as time has passed, the use 
of identity theft to enable identity fraud has become a more popular approach. While 
early incidents of identity theft were targeted at notable identities, the expansion and 
development of identification processes has opened up more people to be targeted. It is 
these developments which have not only caused the redefining of certain activities as 
identity theft and identity fraud but which also explain why there appears to have been a 
statistical rise in the number of cases of identity theft and identity fraud. It can be argued 
that the combining of identity theft and identity fraud is a response to changes in society 
which the national identity card scheme is attempting to regulate. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Identity Cards versus Identity Fraud 
Introduction 
To this point the emphasis of this study has been on defining identity theft and identity 
fraud. In this chapter the work on identity theft and fraud will be combined with 
discussion of the proposed identity card scheme, in order to determine what an identity 
card might do to prevent and/or detect identity theft or fraud. 
The first part of this chapter is devoted to discussion of the current identity card scheme. 
It enlarges on points made in chapter 4 with regard to the introduction of a National 
Identity Card Scheme and what the scheme seeks to do. The aim of this part of the 
chapter is to determine what the identity card is trying to do. The second part of this 
chapter combines discussion of identity cards with discussion of identity theft and 
identity fraud. This part of the chapter will focus on the main question of this study. 
what effect might an identity card scheme have on identity theft and fraud? 
Part I 
History of current ID card scheme 
In order to discuss what the identity card scheme will do, it is important to discuss the 
origins of the current identity card scheme and the motivations for its introduction. 
Where the idea for the ID card system came from is a point that does not have a 
straightforward answer. While it was initially presented by former Home Secretary 
David Blunkett, the concept of a National Identity Card has been suggested by previous 
governments, both Labour and Conservative. Both parties have suggested introducing 
identity cards and both parties have also opposed the introduction of an identity card 
scheme, citing the cost of introducing such a program and maintaining it. 
As discussed in chapter, 4 ID cards have been used in the U. K. in the past, during the 
Second World War. At that time, they were accepted as a necessary measure for national 
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security. However when the war was over and the threat of invasion was gone, the 
system fell out of favour as it was seen as impinging on civil liberties. Since then, 
identity cards have been used as a means of security for companies and state agencies 
but never again have they been issued to all citizens. 
While the ID card has not been reintroduced, there have been arguments for a return to 
the ID card system. The benefits of an ID card system are that they offer a simplified 
and universal form of identification. When applied to a national system such as the 
Welfare State or the National Health System it would mean a quicker and more 
streamlined administrative process. The original name for the current identity card 
scheme was the Entitlement Card Scheme, but this title was later changed. According to 
N021D (2008), this name was dropped in 2003 after criticism from the House of Lords; 
many lords refused to use the word 'entitlement'. But this first title is important in 
highlighting the purpose of the card: in an administrative sense entitlement is what the 
ID card seeks to establish - entitlement to the services each citizen has a right to. This is 
different to the use of the card as a security measure. According to Privacy International 
(2002), no European country has such a comprehensive or invasive identity card system. 
In this connection, Walton (2002) notes that European identity cards are not used to 
prevent crime; they are used as a means of establishing entitlement to government 
services. 
Entitlement cards and Identity fraud 2002 
In 2002, a consultation paper published by the Home Office assessed how the then 
envisaged Entitlement Card would work and how the system might affect identity fraud. 
In this paper, much is made of the benefits to society that would come from having a 
general purpose card that could be used by the whole of society. This paper outlined the 
'possible uses of the entitlement card' and it referred to the numerous ways this card 
could be used by various elements in society, both public and private. Ultimately, 
however, the concept of the entitlement card was that it would help the general public 
with the day to day process of identification: 
291 
"Public services in the U. K. have developed their own individual ways to 
identify the people they need to serve and to determine what their service 
entitlements are. As a result, people need to provide the same information about 
themselves to many different organisations. They may also need to provide the 
same document such as a birth certificate a number of times. As well as being 
irritating, this can lead to delays in people getting services they are entitled to. At 
the extreme, people might not apply for services they are entitled to, especially if 
they have difficulty filling in forms or using the telephone. " (Entitlement Cards 
and Identity Fraud, 2002: 27) 
Initially it was thought that the entitlement card could be used in a similar fashion to a 
driver's licence or a passport. The paper also highlights possible layout for the card and 
the areas where it might be used. On the subject of identity fraud, the paper describes 
identity fraud as thus: 
"Identity fraud arises when someone takes over a totally fictitious name or 
adopts the name of another person with or without their consent. " (Entitlement 
Cards and Identity Fraud, 2002: 39) 
The entitlement card scheme aimed to improve security and combat identity fraud by 
providing what it refers to as: 
". .. a higher level of assurance of a person's 
identity than existing documents. 
(Entitlement Card and Identity Fraud, 2002: 30) 
While this goal is both laudable and a good idea for combating identity fraud, the 
consultation paper goes on to explain the difficulties the scheme would face once it was 
set up. It makes no mention of how the system would guarantee it is providing a higher 
level of assurance of a person's identity. 
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The foundations of how this system will be setup are very important; it is the basis for 
any claim of security. Only by insuring that an entitlement card or identity card is in fact 
secure from the same kind of dangers faced by other identi f ication. documents, can it 
form the basis for a secure identification process. 
The Entitlement Card Scheme faced many opponents in government and since 2002 
there have been several changes in the legislation, most notably the change of name to 
the Identity Card Bill. One area where the identity card system has received significant 
alteration, particularly with regard to preventing identity theft or identity fraud, relates to 
the scope of the use of identity cards. While the card was intended as a universal form of 
identification to be used in all areas that would require identification processes, this 
issue of entitlement soon became a concern for critics of the entitlement/identity card 
scheme (see below), 
The name 'Entitlement Card' proved to be unpopular and was replaced with the current 
title of 'Identity Card'. This change in the name of the scheme mirrored a further change 
in the aims of the identity card. These changes are explained in the Home Affairs 
Committees fourth report on identity cards (2004) by the then Home Secretary - David 
Blunkett: 
"Post-1 I September 20011 was asked on a number of occasions, starting on the 
end of the week of II September, whether I believed that we should have ID 
cards as a consequence of the attack on the World Trade Centre, and I said on 
record several times, and I still believe it, that whilst there could be a 
contribution towards countering terrorism this was not the primary purpose, and 
although it would be part of any such scheme it should not be seen as the sole 
focus. I went on to say that it was probably sensible, if we were going to move 
towards such a programme, to describe it as being part of entitlement- 
entitlement to services and benefits- which we had built up by the contributions 
we made and the mutuality that has stood us in good stead and is part of the 
National Insurance concept of the post Second World War settlement. I then 
293 
took that to the appropriate Cabinet committee the following January, that is 
January 2002. When we launched the consultation proper in the July it soon 
became clear that people did not like the term 'entitlement' card. They thought it 
should be an ID card, that it should be explicit rather than implicit, that it should 
give a clearer picture that it encompassed tackling terrorism and organised crime, 
and they believed that it should be more honest and transparent of the 
Government to do so, so in a nutshell we agreed after listening to the results of 
the consultation that that is what we should describe it as. " (Blunkett cited in 
Home Affairs Committee, 2004: 24) 
The change in title and the addition of the goals have lead to a great deal of importance 
being placed on the security of the identity card scheme. This is concerned not only with 
ensuring that the card itself is secure, but also the assurance that it is a secure form of 
identification, and is something that society can rely on. 
Changes to current National Identity Card Scheme, August 2008 
As of August 2008, there have been several changes to the proposed National Identity 
Card Scheme and the gathering of biometric data on people. One of the most significant 
changes to the National Identity Card Scheme has been plans to drop the compulsory 
obtaining of an ID card when applying for a passport. According to former Home 
Secretary Jacqui Smith (2008), plans for the identity card scheme are to allow consumer 
demand to drive the take up of the identity card. Speaking to the BBC Smith stated that 
gaining public acceptance of the identity card was as important as ensuring the system 
was as widespread as possible. 
Other changes to the ID card scheme include changes to the national identity register. 
Originally, plans were for the national identity register to be contained on a single 
centralised computer database. Plans now are for several databases to be used to house 
the register. Ms Smith also announced that the identity card scheme is expected to 
achieve full coverage of the U. K. by 2017. These changes to the identity card scheme 
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mean that for at least the next nine to ten years the identity card will not be the only way 
for someone to identify themselves. 
Identity card proposals and the law 
The first area in which the identity card will affect the crimes of identity theft and 
identity fraud is in the new rules and legislation included in the Identity Card Bill. 
Included in the Identity Card Bill 2006 are changes in the legality of false 
documentation. The bill makes possession of false identity documents an offence: 
"It is an offence for a person with the requisite intention to have in his 
possession or under control- 
(a) an identity document that is false and that he knows or believes to be false; 
(b) an identity document that was improperly obtained and that he knows or 
believes to have been improperly obtained; or 
(c) an identity document that relates to someone else. " (Identity Card Bill, 2006: 
23) 
The bill also notes that apart from the use of false documentation being a crime, so will 
be the creation or possession of anything that is used to create false documentation. The 
bill also makes it an offence even to have identity documents that are false, or 
improperly obtained, identity documents that refer to someone else or any of the 
paraphernalia used to create false documentation. 
The punishment for someone possessing false documents or the equipment to make 
them - according to the act - would be a prison sentence upon successful conviction of 
up to ten years. For being in possession of false documents or improperly obtained 
documents, punishments laid out in the act vary from two year prison sentences to six 
months and the issuing of fines. The act defines false documents according to meaning 
laid down in the 1981 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act (part 1). Improperly obtained 
documents are defined thus: 
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46an identity document was improperly obtained if false information was 
provided, in or in connection with the application for its issue or an application 
for its modification, to the person who issued it or (as the case may be) to a 
person entitled to modify it; " (Identity Card Bill, 2006: 24) 
The combination of these provisions and the new legislation outlined in the 2006 Fraud 
Act is discussed in chapter 3. These provisions mean that not only are false 
representations illegal, but also the creating or obtaining of forged or false documents 
are also illegal, meaning that any attempt to present, create or use a false identity is 
illegal. 
The proposed identity card scheme (22/06/05) also attempts to include the two 
objectives of improving provision of service and increasing security in the identification 
process in one system on a national level, The proposed security for this system will be 
a nationwide biometric register of people's identity. The nature of this system is 
designed to provide an ironclad form of identification which will be impervious to 
duplication or manipulation. An important element of how effective this system will be, 
however, will be the manner in which the identity card is used and checked on a daily 
basis. If the card is checked frequently and uses the safeguards provided by the 
biometric security, this should in turn make identity theft difficult to commit, and should 
improve the detection of false or fabricated identities. 
However even in the 2002 Entitlement Card Consultation paper it is noted that relying 
on one form of identification is not the right way to combat identity fraud: 
".... -best practice in combating identity fraud stresses that organisations should 
not rely on a single source document or check to establish a person's identity. 
Organisations should make a number of checks from different sources. The 
range and sophistication of the checks will depend on the value of the product or 
service offered. Some commercial organisations have indicated their reluctance 
to undertake checks on identity - preferring to tolerate a level of fraud - unless 
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they can clearly identify a financial benefit which would outweigh the cost of the 
checks. " (Entitlement Card and ldcntity Fraud, 2002: 30) 
National Identity Register 
The reason, it is believed that the identity card will provide a means of securing the 
identification process in the U. K. from identity fraud is that it intends to provide a 
secure database of information. Not only is the identity card supposed to provide key 
pieces of information on a person's identity it is also designed to provide information 
that it is in the public interest to know. But what does this mean? 
A key part of the National Identity Card Scheme is the introduction of a National 
Register which will hold all of the relevant biometric security information and the 
personal details of individuals entered on the system, 
The purpose of the National Identity Register according to the Identity Card Bill is to 
provide a means for individuals entered on to the system - people with ID cards - to 
prove facts about themselves included on the system. The National Identity Register is 
also responsible for providing a secure and reliable way for information about people 
included on the system to be accessed and confirmed. The parameters for accessing this 
information according, to the Bill, are if it is necessary for public interest reasons for 
this information to be accessed. The National Identity Register is a storehouse of 
biometric information and what the Bill refers to as 'Register able Facts'. 
What is a Register able Fact? 
Under the Identity Card Bill register able facts are determined to be the following: 
1. "his identity; 
2. where he resides in the United Kingdom; 
3. where he has previously resided in the United Kingdom and elsewhere; 
4. the times at which he was resident at different places in the United Kingdom 
or elsewhere; 
5. his current residential status; 
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6. residential statuses previously held by him; 
7. information about numbers allocated to him for identification purposes and 
about the documents to which they relate; 
8. information about occasions on which information recorded about him in the 
Register has been provided to any person; and 
9. information recorded in the Register at his request. " 
(Identity Card Bill, 2006: 2) 
This list of register able facts focuses on not only people's identity but also their 
geographical location and history. The focus is essentially on who they are and where to 
find them. This is elaborated upon to include where they have been and occasions when 
they have interacted with other identification processes. The register also includes the 
possibility that people will want to include more information about themselves. 
The Bill also elaborates on the meanings of the words identity and residential status to 
explain what is meant by these terms. Matching up the understanding of the Bill on 
identity and what is commonly thought to be identity fraud, will be important in 
explaining the possible impact of identity cards on identity fraud. According to the Bill, 
what is covered by the term identity are a person's name (including previous names), 
gender, age (including date of birth), and that person's physical characteristics. 
This description of what an identity is according to the Bill is, arguably, simplistic. 
Rather than addressing sense of self or personal preferences for things like religion or 
political affiliation, the Bill's interpretation of identity adheres to the physical basics 
appearance and location. 
What is In the public Interest? 
Much of the controversy surrounding the identity card involves how it will be used. 
According to the Bill, the parameter for why someone should be required to present 
their identity card, or have their information checked is whether it is in the 'public 
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interest'. The Identity Card Bill states that there are five meanings for the term 'in the 
Public Interest'. Something is in the public interest if it is: 
I. "in the interests of national security; 
2. for the purpose of the prevention or detection of crime; 
3. for the purpose of the enforcement of immigration controls; 
4. for the purposes of the enforcement of prohibitions on unauthorised working 
or employment; or 
S. for the purpose of securing the efficient and effective provision of public 
services" 
(Identity Card Bill, 2006: 1-2) 
Looking at these various aspects of the term public interest, the final one listed above is 
a commonly used reason in other countries in Europe that have identity cards, but what 
distinguishes the U. K. identity card scheme are the other meanings applied to the term 
public interest. Both the use of the card for reasons of national security and for the 
prevention and detection of crime refer to the use of the identity card in preventing 
identity fraud and potentially terrorism (which is discussed later). In order to combat 
illegal immigration, the identity card will be used to control not only who enters the 
country (border control) but also by enforcing rules on employment it will potentially 
make it difficult for any illegal immigrants in the country already to continue living and 
working in the U. K. 
Biometrics 
Biometrics is the use of unique biological factors to test identity. The use of biometrics 
has increased in recent years, as technology has improved; however the use of 
biometrics is not new. While literature on the subject of biometrics covers various 
different aspects of physiology which can be tested and measured, the emphasis for this 
study with regard to biometrics is the issue of reliability and the use of three specific 
types of biometric tests in the National Identity Card Scheme, namely iris scans, 
fingerprinting and facial recognition. 
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Biometrics is the term indicating physical tests to confirm identity; an established form 
of biometrics is taking a copy of someone's fingerprints to confirm identity. More recent 
developments have included the testing of other physical features such as the shape of a 
person's face and the scanning of a person's iris. The effectiveness of biometrics in 
confirming identity has been an important issue in the development of security in the 
identification process. The basis for proclaiming that the current identity card scheme 
will be a secure form of identification is its use of a biometric security system. In 
reviewing some of the literature on biometrics, two key areas of concern have emerged, 
firstly the feasibility of using biometrics and secondly the elements of a Person's 
biology which will be tested - namely fingerprints, iris scans and facial recognition 
technology. 
Literature on the feasibility of biornetrics 
A feasibility study was conducted for the United Kingdom Passport Service (U. K. P. S), 
the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency (D. V. L. A) and the Home Office on the 
feasibility of using biometrics in an identity card scheme. According to this study 
biometrics is: 
"Biometric identification systems measure physiological and behavioural 
characteristics of a person, and use these measurements to reliably distinguish 
one person from another. " (Mansfield T, Rejman-Greene. M, 2003: 3) 
According to Mansfield and Rejman-Greene biometrics can be used, to establish a 
person's identity and to confirm a person's right to access. Mansfield and Rejman- 
Greene note in their report that the proposed identity card system is the largest of its 
kind from a biometric point of view: 
"Such a system would be a groundbreaking deployment for this kind of 
biometric application. Not only would it be one of the largest deployments to 
date, but aspects of its performance would be far more demanding than those of 
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similarly sized systems; such existing systems are either not applied in the civil 
sector or operate in countries where public acceptability issues are less 
prominent. " (Mansfield T, Rejman-Greenc. M, 2003: 3) 
In a report for the BBC, Twist (2004) looks at the proposed biometric system, and how 
it will be implemented. Twist interviews Mansfield in this report and discusses the 
usefulness of biometrics in the identification process. According to Mansfield, 
biometrics such as iris scans will be an accurate means of establishing identity, as long 
as there are provisions to deal with exceptional cases such as People with disabilities. 
Twist notes that: 
"In simple terms, explains Dr Mansfield, this means that one iris is more 
accurate than one finger in discriminating who is who. The added strength of iris 
recognition is that it never makes 'false matches', say experts. There has never 
been a documented case of an iris comparison mistaking one person for another. 
But the potential weakness of iris recognition is that it can fail to make a match 
at all. " (Twist J, 2004: 1) 
A national trial involving 10,000 volunteers will be used to test how the new 
identification process will work. The first stage of this trial will involve reporting to one 
of the nationwide centres which is equipped with a booth designed to take recording of 
biometric data. These booths will record an image of a person's face, iris and 
fingerprint. Each of these characteristics is unique. Once they have been recorded, the 
second stage of this trial involves comparing the individual's biometric data with what 
has been recorded. According to Twist, this information will then be contained on a 
microchip which will be embedded in the identity card. 
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With regard to crime control, Twist points out that the role of identity cards in stopping 
terrorism will be marginal, 
"David Blunkett has admitted the scheme is not going to directly stop the 
possibility of terror strikes in the UK. But, he said, it would make a big 
difference to the work of counter terrorism and security services when it comes 
to verifying if people are who they say they are. "(Twist. J, 2004: 2) 
An article by Ali (2004) for BBC News Online reports the concerns posed by experts in 
biometrics and security systems. In this report, Ali quotes the concerns of a panel of 
experts at the Royal Institution in London. The concerns of these experts lay in the 
reasons for having an identity card scheme and the problems faced with implementing a 
system of this size: 
"Neil Fisher, director of security solutions at technology group QinctiQ, told the 
reporters the rationale of the Home Office for implementing the scheme - to 
deter illegal working and tackle immigration abuse, and strengthen the country's 
security - was in his view all wrong. Rather, it was a "golden opportunity" for 
Britain to set a new standard in our digital era, he said, " (Ali J, 2004: 1) 
Ali also talks to Dr Frazin Deravi from the University of Kent who is sceptical about 
whether a large scale system would work, as a large scale biometric system has never 
been attempted before. The type of problems faced by this type of system include the 
breakdown of machines and any errors these scanners make; also there are some people 
who will not be able to use these machines. According to Ali, in some rate cases people 
with eye problems or damage to their fingertips will not be able to give accurate 
information to the biometric scanners. Dr Deravi further argues: 
".. the system could also be abused by way of false fingertips, photographs of 
irises or even masks, " (Ali J, 2004: 2) 
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Ali talked as well to Professor John McDermid of the computer department of the 
University of York, who believes there are positive reasons for having an identity card 
system: 
... There are many instances where I would find an ID card useful, ' said the 
professor. 
He argued that vital questions still needed to be addressed - such as whether the 
government could deliver within a reasonable timescale, what the detailed 
technological requirements were, and whether the system could really meet the 
government's objectives. 
At present, answers to these questions were decidedly hazy, he believed. 
'The government doesn't seem to have worked out its requirements yet. 
There are many big and fundamental questions they don't appear to have an 
answer to. "' (Ali J, 2004: 2) 
Iris scans 
Iris scans are the analysis of features in the coloured area of a person's eye which 
surrounds the pupil. According to the National Centre for State Courts (N. C. S. C. ) there 
are more than 200 points on the iris that can be used for identification purposes. The 
N. C. S. C also note that idea of using scans of the human iris was first put forward by an 
ophthalmologist, Frank Burch, in 1936. However, it was not until 1994 and tile 
development of algorithms by John Daugman and Iridian Technologies that iris 
scanning became a reality. It is argued by The N. C. S. C. that the usefulncss of iris 
scanning lics in the uniqueness of the human iris: 
"The uniqueness of eyes, even between the left and right eye of the same person, 
makes iris scanning very powerful for identification purposes. The likelihood of 
a false positive is extremely low and its relative speed and case of use make it a 
great potential biometric. " (National Centre for State Courts, 2002: 2) 
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In a report by Mark Ward for BBC News Online (2003), the usefulness and 
effectiveness of iris scans is questioned. This report suggested that while iris scans 
would be able to confirm a person's stated identity effectively, this system would not be 
able to identify wanted criminals or terrorists due to the immense size of the database. 
The effectiveness of identification rates was also questioned in this report. Ward noted 
that: 
"In February 2002 the US Department issued a report that found wide 
discrepancies between manufacturers' claims of successful biometric 
identification rates and those seen in the field. The report found that iris 
recognition did better than most but one manufacturer's claims of a 0.5% false 
identification rate ballooned to 6% during the DOD tests. " (Ward M, 2003: 1) 
Concerns also exist over the size of the proposed identity register database, Ward notes 
that according to the US General Accounting Office in November 2002 the largest iris 
scanning system had 30,000 records, According to Ward, it is unknown what difficulties 
may arise in implementing a system which has millions of people's iris scans stored on 
it. 
For this report Ward talked to Professor Mike Fairhurst from the Electronics Department 
of the University of Kent who explained that the actual process of scanning people's 
information into the biometric database may prove to be diff icult: 
"Tests of biometric systems by the UK's Communication Electronics Security 
Group have shown that people can take up to ten times as long to get through 
them than the existing passport checks. " (Ward A, 2003: 2) 
Professor Fairhurst also points out that there are differing opinions globally over the 
acceptability of biometric scans. Ward gives the example of China, which has ruled out 
the use of iris scans over fears that they may cause damage to the eye. 
304 
Fingerprints 
Fingerprinting is a method of identification and verification of identity which has been 
used by law enforcement organisations worldwide for more than a hundred years. 
Moore's 'The History ofFingerprints'contains a discussion about the development of 
fingerprinting technology and its use. Moore explains that the use of fingerprints can be 
traced back to ancient Babylon and China where fingerprints were used in clay tablets 
and seals for business transactions. In more recent times, fingerprinting has been more 
widely associated with the investigation of crime. In the late 19'h century, the 
development of fingerprinting allowed for the collection of copies of people's 
fingerprints. According to Moore, in 1888 Sir Fmncis Galton began studying fingerprint 
pattems as a means of identification. In 1891 Juan Vucetich, a police officer from 
Argentina, began using Galton's system to compile fingerprint files as part of his work. 
In 1892 Vucetich made his first identification using fingerprinting when he investigated 
the case of Francis Rojas. In the case, Vueetich identified that Rojas was responsible for 
the murder of her two sons and her own suicide, by using a bloody fingerprint Rojas left. 
During the 2& century, fingerprinting developed further with other countries including 
the U. K. relying on the accuracy of fingerprints. In 2002, the security provided by 
fingerprinting was brought into question. Japanese cryptographer Tsutomu Matsumoto 
demonstrated how using gelatine and digital photography equipment it is possible to 
deceive fingerprint scanners. 
According to Leyden (2002), Matsumoto used gelatine and a plastic mould to create a 
false finger which fooled four out of five fingerprint scanners. Matsumoto then obtained 
other people's fingerprints using heated super glue to raise them on objects and then 
taking a picture using a digital camera. Using a PhotoShop programme to improve the 
image of the fingerprint Matsumoto then used a photo-sensitive printed-circuit board to 
etch the fingerprint into the copper of the circuit board. Matsumoto then applied the 
fingerprint from the circuit board to the gelatine fake finger. This provided Matsumoto 
with a false fingerprint which deceived fingerprint detectors 80% of the time. Bruce 
Schneier of Counterpane Internet Security said of Matsumoto's efforts that: 
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"The results are enough to scrap the systems completely, and to send the various 
fingerprint biometric companies packing. " (Selineier cited in Leyden J, 2002: 1) 
The efforts of Matsumoto are important when discussing the use and role of biometrics. 
While biologically the factors being tested are unique and therefore reliable in 
confirming identity, the technology used to confirm identity is still open to being 
deceived. 
Facial recognition 
The development of facial recognition technology began in the mid 1960s. This 
technology involves the development of software which can measure and recognise a 
person's face. According to Johnson and Bonsor (2007), facial recognition software 
such as Facelt which is developed by a company called Identix uses a person's unique 
facial features to identify them: 
"Every face has numerous, distinguishable landmarks, the different peaks and 
valleys that make up facial features. Facelt derines these landmarks as nodal 
points. Each human face has approximately 80 nodal points. Some of these 
measured by the software are: 
Distances between the eyes 
Width of the nose 
Depth of the eye sockets 
The shape of the cheekbones 
The length of the jaw line 
These nodal points are measured creating a numerical code, called a faceprint, 
representing the face in the database. " (Johnson. R, Bonsor. K, 2006: 1) 
Concerns over facial recognition systems in passports echoes the concerns raised over 
the usefulness of biomctrics in identity cards. In a report for BBC News Online (2004), 
the light sensitivity of facial recognition scanners was discussed: 
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"The BBC's Rory Maclean says unpublished studies carried out in Europe and 
the UK found the computerised scans failed in about one in 10 cases. The 
problems are apparently due to the technology's sensitivity to light conditions. 
(BBC News, 2004: 1) 
Concerns were raised in this report by Professor Angela Sasse of University College 
London who is an expert in biometrics. Professor Sasse believed that facial recognition 
scans were not a practical security measure as there is a chance of the system 
misidentifying a genuine passport holder. According to Fiona Mactaggart a Home 
Office Minister is quoted as saying: 
"This technology is not foolproof. No country is looking just to depend on the 
biometrics technology. They are relying on all other things that are used. " (BBC 
News 2004: 2) 
With regard to biometrics, there is a great deal of confidence in the ability of iris scans 
to provide accurate information about who people are. This confidence is apparent in 
literature on the subject and the claims of experts on biometrics. However claims by 
critics of the scheme of difficulty in scanning certain people and the conditions under 
which these biometric scanners will and will not work raise concerns over the usefulness 
of this system. Another point of contention is the purpose of biometrically scanning 
people; the claims that it will help in the fight against terrorism or stop illegal 
immigration have been met with scepticism. 
Data security In the UX 
By introducing an identity card program in Britain, the government seeks to change the 
relationship between the individual and the state. Prior to the introduction of an identity 
card, the emphasis on initiating interactions between the individual and the state was on 
the individual. Registration for services or future access to services may be provided by 
the state, but it is dependent on the individual initiating the process. The identity card 
scheme will, initially, be voluntary and thereby replicate the old relationship between 
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the individual and the state. The intention was that in 2009 the system will be made 
compulsory with a fine of E2,000 for those who do not participate. This fundamental 
shift will eventually mean that the state will initiate the identification process. Whether 
or not this is a beneficial change, the implication of this change for civil liberty will be 
vast. As soon as the identity card becomes compulsory, the state will be in charge of 
saying who exists in Great Britain. This will mean that anyone who chooses not to 
participate in the identity card scheme will effectively be excluded from provisions of 
state welfare benefits and financial services. 
The underlying issue here is control over identity, While individuals are in control they 
have the option to deceive others as to who they are. State control of identity in contrast 
is absolute, regardless of what individuals say or do, they cannot change their identity 
without sanction from the state. 
Can you trust the government with your Information? 
Another question that must be asked when determining whether or not the identity card 
scheme 'should' be introduced is whether or not the government can be trusted with this 
information. The identity card scheme was introduced by the then Home Secretary 
David Blunkett and after he left the post of Home Secretary his successor - Charles 
Clarke - was also a proponent of the identity card, highlighting the possible introduction 
of a budget identity card. In October 2005, Charles Clarke introduced the 'budget' 
identity card which would cost E30. Unlike the identity card provided when renewing a 
passport or driver's licence, this card would be available at any time but without the 
added use as a passport or driver's licence. 
However, Clarke was forced to leave the post after it was revealed that the Home Office 
had lost track of a number of foreign criminals who had been released from prison but 
not returned to their home nations. This incident highlighted the way in which 
administrative fumbles at the Home Office, over record keeping, could occur on a 
massive scale. After Charles Clarke came Home Secretary John Reid. His time as Home 
Secretary came under scrutiny with yet another mistake at the Home Office, another 
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failure to track 280 British nationals who had been imprisoned abroad. According to 
Tempest (2007), in this instance the police records were not updated by the Home 
Office so that the Criminal Records Bureau were unaware of the criminal records which 
included the details of 5 murderers, 25 rapists, 29 paedophiles, 17 other sex offenders, 
29 robbers, 9 who were convicted of attempted murder and 3 who were convicted of 
attempted rape who had been imprisoned abroad. Again a large scale mistake was made, 
begging the question as to how secure the eventual National Register for the Identity 
Card will be. 
The next Home Secretary was Jacqui Smith, and while there has been no reported 
change in the identity card scheme (August 2008) there has been a change to the 
structure of the Home Office which is being split, to an extent into two organisations. 
Aside from the Home Office there will also be a Justice Ministry which will be 
responsible for prisons, sentencing and probation. 
Setting up a large scale database may seem like a good idea but unless security is 
guaranteed and mandatory, then it is a fundamentally flawed security measure. In 2005, 
it was discovered that 1,500 employees of the Department of Works and Pensions had 
had their infonnation stolen (see chapter 8). The most recent discovery of problems at 
the Home Office with regard to tracking people (January 15 2007) came on the heels of 
plans to create a large Whitehall based database of people's personal information. 
Function creep 
The term function creep refers to the possible use of the identity card beyond the 
established reasons for its use. This term has been used in discussion of the identity card 
since the plans to introduce the Entitlement Card in 2002 were first discussed. In some 
respects, function creep has happened with every form of document identification in use 
today in the U. K. Drivers' licences are intended to prove who is allowed to drive a car, a 
passport indicates, your access to travel abroad, but both are used -as generally accepted 
forms of identification. Paradoxically because there is no universal form of 
identification (such as an identity card), function creep is necessary with every other 
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form of documentation. So when people express concern over function creep with the 
identity card scheme, it is important to understand what exactly should be' off limits' to 
the identity card and why. 
Identity cards in the private sector 
While the identity card is intended for interactions with state agencies and authorised 
private organisations; it is foreseeable that when it is issued not only will people use the 
identity card for interactions with authorised organisations but also with other 
unauthorised areas of society. It can also be argued that non-authorised organisations 
may begin to use the identity card as proof of identity, regardless of their ability to 
confirm the validity of the identity card they are shown. 
In terms of using and accepting the identity card as proof of identification this would 
make the identity card similar to every other form of identification. This form of 
function creep is not really so different to what happens to every other document in use 
today. Where the issue of function creep becomes problematic is in terms of being 
'required' to present the identity card. While this is expected when dealing with state 
agencies, it is possible that private organisations such as banks might require the ID card 
when someone is opening an account, or a company could make it requirement forjob 
applicants to show their identity cards. The rules on the use of identity cards state that 
the individual must agree to have their identity card checked and verified against the 
National Identity Register. But it can be argued that if an individual denies an 
organisation the opportunity to verify the identity card, then the organisations may deny 
access on the grounds of security, or limit access on the grounds of the individual being 
a higher security risk. In the first Entitlement Card consultation paper it was suggested - 
as a positive advantage - that the card could be used in this fashion, in a sense becoming 
the only form of identification necessary or accepted in society. A popular phrase with 
regard to identity cards and the security they provide is: 'If you have nothing to hide you 
have nothing to worry about. 
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The implications of this for civil liberties are of major concern to critics, not only in 
terms of the privacy issue but also with regard to limiting access to individuals have to 
society. In this respect, function creep is a major issue as it not only refers to the 
increased use of the identity card but also the increase in dependency on it by society. 
Function creep will also have an effect on the usefulness of identity cards for crime 
prevention and detection. If the private sector relied heavily on the identity card in 
situations such as employment or in setting up of business relationships (accounts, 
loans, credit etc. ) then it would be expected that the use of the identity card would 
ensure that things such as false applications could not happen (the card would be 
required to prove identity). The identity card in this scenario would become more than a 
secure form of identification; it would be a gatekeeper for all identification processes. 
This could happen if the function of the identity cards expands past its intended use. 
Equally, if the function of the identity card does not 'creep' into the private sector, the 
identity card will not become a gatekeeper for all identification processes. This will limit 
the usefulness of the identity card in the prevention of identity fraud. The identity card 
would only be effective at preventing crime against government agencies that require it 
as part of the process for accessing services. It is questionable how much crime this will 
prevent or detect, For example, while a percentage of fraud against the Department for 
Works and Pensions involves false identities, the majority involves people claiming 
benefits while working or claiming benefits they are not entitled to. 
Part 2 
Identity cards the potential threats and benefits 
When discussing the interaction between an identity card scheme and the use of identity 
theft and/or fraud it is important to not only discuss not only how the identity card will 
affect identity theft and identity fraud. It is also important to discuss what threat is posed 
by identity theft and identity fraud to the identity card scheme. 
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This discussion will first address the question of what threat the identity card will face 
from identity theft and identity fraud, before considering the potential impact of the 
identity card as a preventer and detector of identity theft and identity fraud. 
Identity cards and identity fraud - attacks on the ID card system 
When discussing the role of an identity card in preventing identity thcft and/or fraud, it 
is also necessary to consider the risk the identity card faces from identity fraudsters. In 
order for the identity card to be effective in preventing abuse of the identification 
process, it must itself be immune from corruption. 
Risk in introducing the card - false application 
The first point at which the identity card may face attack is in its introduction, and in 
possible false application fraud. One of the problems the ID card has which cannot be 
over come is that it is reliant to a certain degree on other forms of identification at its 
inception. According to the Identity and Passport Service, the identity card will rely on a 
'biographical footprint': 
"Your 'biographical footprint' is simply the basic facts of your life, for example: 
name, date of birth and address. When you apply for an ID card, we will check 
your 'biographical footprint' against information held in other databases such as 
National Insurance or driving licence records. We will not rely entirely on 
written documents for this information (as they could be forged). You will be 
asked to visit one of our local or mobile centres in person wherever possible. 
This will make it harder for someone to pretend to be another person when 
applying for an ID card. " (Identity and Passport Service, 2008a: 1) 
As seen with other forms of identification, there is a process of application in order to 
achieve the desired proof of identity, and this process can be corrupted. In the U. K., 
thousands of passports and drivers' licences are obtained through -false application and 
applications using false identities as well as through thefl. It was noted by the BBC in 
2007 that the Home Office admitted that as many as 10,000 passports were fraudulently 
312 
applied for, and that more than a 1,000 passports go missing in the post each year. The 
identity card will not be the first form of identification a person receives and is reliant on 
other forms of identification. Therefore, for the identity card to be a 'secure' form of 
identification, the information it is based on has to be secure and immune to abuse by 
identity thieves. It can be argued that relying on a biographical footprint at the beginning 
of the process will undermine the secure nature of the identity card by assuming the 
secure nature of other proofs of identity such as passports or drivers licences. 
Secondly, in order for an ID system to be accurate, it must be able to avoid ambiguity in 
the numbers of people it will cover and their ability to distort who they are. So for 
instance if you had a society of only thirty people and they were issued an ID card at 
birth, the likelihood that they could steal another identity, and be able to deceive the 
other 29 member of their society is slim. The U. K. ID card has the problem that it is not 
starting at year Zero; it is being patched on to a society that has a previously established 
identification system. The current identity card bill outlines a system where everyone 
over the age of sixteen would be eligible. This means that rather than being a system 
that starts from the beginning of an identity it is again being attached to a previously 
established identity. 
With the incumbent identification system already open to theft and fraud, and the 
precise number of citizens in this society blurred by illegal immigration and migration in 
general, it is clear that the ID card system cannot guarantee accuracy. 
For an identity card system to guarantee it is not being corrupted by some form of 
deception, it must be in place at the beginning of the identification process. While the 
idea of issuing identity cards at birth may seem impractical, it is the only way to ensure 
that the identification process is not relying on some other form of identification system. 
The problem of introducing the identity card scheme is exacerbated by the prolonged 
introduction process of the ID card. Current plans are that the ID card will be 
compulsory and people will have to obtain one when they renew their drivers' licences 
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or passports. But with passports lasting ten years before renewal is necessary, and the ID 
card system planned for 2009 (the intention was that the card would be introduced for 
immigrants in 2008 first), it would mean that people who renewed their passports or 
drivers licences before 2009 could go ten years before needing to obtain an ID card. 
This wait for accuracy may be further held up by people who are opposed to the ID card 
making a point to renew passports and drivers' licences before 2009 and the 
introduction of the ID card. 
While the National ldcntity Register will hold a record of everyone who has an ID card 
it cannot ensure that it is providing an accurate account of the number of people living in 
Britain today. In many respects, the ID card scheme is like a house built on foundations 
of sand. While it may appear solid and secure it cannot guarantee the information it is 
based on is accurate and true. 
The consequences of this situation are that if someone who had committed identity fraud 
successfully wanted to, they could apply for an ID card and further validate their 
deception. This situation would allow the fraudster only to obtain an identity card in one 
name. It would limit the fraudster to committing one instance of identity fraud rather 
than multiple cases of identity fraud. However there are a number of instances where 
one instance of identity fraud is all that is needed, for example, in cases of wholesale 
assumption such as the case of Charles Stopford where the criminal in question has 
spent years trying to legitimise a 'biographical footprint'. 
With regard to false application fraud it can be argued that the identity card is as open to 
this type of fraud as the passport and drivers' licence. In order to avoid false application 
there must be a process of ensuring that the person applying for the identity card is the 
genuine identity holder. The drawback of this is that any attempt to ensure that a person 
is the genuine identity holder will take time, and since this is a national scheme, it can 
be argued that this security measure will prolong the time it takes to complete an 
application for an identity card. 
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Breaking the security - account takeover 
The second area where the security of identity cards will be tested is when criminals try 
to steal another person's identity card. This area of security will depend on the biometric 
security system installed on the card and the way this security measure will be used. 
This area of concern with regard to the security of identity cards is where the majority of 
effort has been placed. While false application fraud is an area that identity cards could 
have difficulty stopping, there are several reasons to believe that any attempt at a form 
of account takeover with regard to the identity card would face extreme difficulties. 
There are two elements of the identity card scheme which will make this form of 
identity fraud difficult to achieve, firstly the biometric security and secondly the 
National Identity Register. However these security measures are not always applicable 
as circumstances may arise where the identity card is used and relied on without the 
security measures being used. An example would be if the identity card was used in the 
private sector which has no way of confirming the biometric data or the identifying 
information on the national identity register. It is possible that forged or altered identity 
cards may be used. 
Attempting account takeover with the National Identity Card Scheme would require 
some method of defeating or avoiding the biometric security. Equally, it would also 
require some means of avoiding detection of the takeover on the National Identity 
Register. In order to do this identity thieves may attempt to coerce people who work on 
the National Identity Card scheme or use corrupt employees to altering information or 
conceal the duplicate use of information. Another approach, which may prove to be the 
most damaging, is attacks by criminal computer hackers (crackers). The security of the 
identity card scheme is based on the accuracy of the biometric information held on the 
national register. As long as the information held on the register is accurate it can be 
trusted, but if computer crackers are able to access the register and manipulate the 
information held on the register, then the security provided by the identity card would be 
seriously undermined. 
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Equally it may be that identity thieves will attempt to avoid interacting with the security 
surrounding the identity card. This could be achieved by using forged or counterfeit 
copies of identity cards, in areas of society which do not have access to the National 
Identity Register. Companies without access to the National Identity Register cannot 
confirm if the identity cards presented to them are genuine or not. 
The use of stolen identity cards 
Another approach to the fraudulent misuse of identity cards is to obtain stolen identity 
cards and modify them for use by criminals. In theory, the theft of an identity card 
would not allow the person stealing the identity card to use the identity card 
successfully. In order to successfully use the identity card, the information on the stolen 
card and the national register would have to be altered, This would mean when the 
criminal had themselves and their identity card checked with biometric scanner, the 
machine would successfully match their biometrics with the details on the card's 
microchip and with the register. If the criminal only stole the identity card without 
altering the information on the register, they would not be able to match their biometrics 
with the details on the microchip and the records on the register. This would result in 
them not being successfully identified. 
An example of how a biometrically secure form of identification can be stolen is the 
abuse of the e-passport system, In March 2006, a new biometrically secured passport 
was introduced by the Identity and Passport Service (I. P. S), in order to meet standards 
set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The new c-passport is 
secured by the introduction of a microchip which holds the passport holder's photo and 
the personal details printed on page 31 of the passport. This information is used in 
conjunction with the Public Key Infrastructure to make the passport more secure in 
principle. According to I. P. S.: 
"The data will be locked down using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which 
provides protection against encoded data being changed. PKI is a digital 
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encryption technology, which enables validation of the data as being genuine. " 
(Identity and Passport Service, 2008b: 1) 
By providing the Public Key Infrastructure a multinational database would be available 
-a Public Key Directory (P. K. D. ). This would allow any of the 45 countries introducing 
the e-passport to check the chip and the biometrics on it. It has been argued that this 
security measure would make the theft or forgery of e-passports ineffective. Forged or 
stolen copies of passports would not show up on the P. K. D. 
In 2008 during an investigation of the e-passport system, Boggan endeavoured to 
challenge the claims over the security of the e-passport. In his investigation, Boggan 
found that of the 45 countries who had signed up to the e-passport system, only five 
countries are using the P. K. D. Boggan also notes that Britain will not be using the 
P. K. D. until 2009. Until the P. K. D. is taken up by the other 35 countries involved with 
the e-passport system, confirmation of the information on the e-passport is done 
manually. This means that the protection against the use of stolen and counterfeit 
passports is compromised. 
Boggan illustrated how compromised the security was by using computer expert Jeroen 
Van Beek, to clone the passport of 16 month old child, taking the information off the 
encrypted microchip and transplanting the information to another microchip. Van Beek 
then replaced the image of the child on the chip with that of Osama Bin Laden, and ran 
the microchip through a chip reader using the Golden Reader Tool software: 
"At first, Golden Reader refuses to authenticate the new, altered chips. A digital 
key signature, a certificate of authenticity has been changed, and the reader is 
concerned. But Mr van Beek falls back on the work of Peter Gutmann from 
Auckland University, New Zealand, who found a way to programme another key 
signature into the chip. The IACO's reader software now accepts both chips as 
genuine. " (Boggan. S, 2008: 7) 
317 
According to Boggan the lack of complete coverage of the P. K. D. means that cloned 
cards will appear authentic when used at passport control. Consequently, the theft and 
counterfeiting of passports still remains a threat to security. A similar situation could 
arise with the introduction of the national identity card scheme if the authentication 
process used is compromised in some way. If criminals are able to access the National 
Register, or if the register is not used effectively - as with the P, K. D. 's use with the e- 
passport - it can be argued that clones of the identity card may come into use. 
Wholesale and partial assumption and the identity card 
With regard to the identity card scheme it may be that those involved in wholesale or 
partial assumption may actively seek out an identity card. In instances of wholesale and 
partial assumption the goal is to abandon one identity in favour of another; in the case of 
wholesale assumption the identity card could prove to be a form of identification that 
identity thieves may actively seek out. In these instances of identity fraud the criminal 
is attempting to appear as legitimate as possible without open or easily identifiable 
instances of abuse. Identity cards may be'attractive to wholesale assumers as the cards 
are intended as a secure fon-n of identification which other identification processes will 
rely on. If a wholesale assumer was able to apply for and successfully gain an identity 
card it could be used by the assumer to dissuade anyone who has cause to question the 
legitimacy of the wholesale assumer's identity. 
Equally, with partial assumers, it may be that gaining an identity card in another 
person's name may be an attractive option for people such as professional or organised 
criminals who wish to have a legitimate identity as well as the identity they use for 
criminal activity. 
The biggest threat to wholesale and partial assumers with regard to obtaining an identity 
card is the reporting of their actions by the legitimate identity holders. The usual 
response to this danger is to consider using an identity which will- not report the abuse, 
such as the identity of a dead person. However, as seen in the case of Charles Stopford 
and his impersonation of Christopher Buckingham, there are already methods of 
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detecting this type of abuse, by cross referencing with the registry of deaths. One 
possible phenomenon that may arise with the introduction of the identity card scheme is 
the application for identity cards by wholesale and partial assurners 'before' the 
legitimate identity holders have a chance to obtain an identity card. 
As part of the identity card scheme, identity cards will be issued when people go to 
renew their passport or drivers' licence. As discussed earlier, current estimates are that it 
will be approximately ten years before identity cards have been issued to the majority of 
the U. K. population. It will be possible to apply for an identity card at any time before 
the renewing of a drivers' licence or passport is necessary and it is here that wholesale 
assumers may attempt to obtain a passport before the legitimate identity holder. If 
successful, both the individual and the system will face the dilemma of distinguishing 
the legitimate identity holder from the fake. There is also the possibility of mistaking the 
wholesale or partial assumption for a clerical error; two people with similar information 
whose files have been mixed up. 
The problem posed by wholesale and partial assumers is different to the threat posed by 
identity thieves who are looking to defraud an identity. Wholesale assumers such as 
Charles Stopford can spend years amassing information and proof of identification to 
make their claim seem legitimate. 
Social engineering and the Identity cards 
According to Finch (2005), one of the problems caused by relying on an individual form 
of identification is that people stop checking and confirming identity and rely solely on 
the technology of the identity card scheme. While the proposed scheme relies on 
advancements in security technology, according to Finch: 
"What fraudsters know about is human nature. They know about people, they 
know how we operate, and they know how relationships of trust in which 
information is disclosed develop, " (Finch cited in Amos J 2005: 1) 
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Finch has been critical of the identity card scheme on the grounds that fraudsters will 
look to manipulate people who are involved in checking and confirming the identity 
card: 
"There is a worrying assumption that advances in technology will provide the 
solution to identity theft whereas it is possible that they may actually aggravate 
the problem, " (Finch cited in Leyden J, 2005: 1) 
Finch's views on the identity card and the way criminals will react to it are based on 
interviews conducted with convicted fraudsters. According to Finch: 
"Studying the way that individuals disclose sensitive information would be far 
more valuable in preventing identity fraud than the evolution of technologically 
advanced but ultimately fallible measures to prevent misuse of personal 
information after it has been obtained, " (Finch cited in Leyden J, 2005: 1) 
As seen with other forms of identification and more generally in previous instances of 
identity fraud discussed in chapter 5, the ability to manipulate individuals has often 
negated security measures put in place to prevent deception. People like F. W. Demara 
have found that there are circumstances where the conventional procedures for 
confirming identity can be avoided through social engineering. An example is Demara's 
exploits in the Canadian Navy and how he was able to enter it. While this is an old 
example, the increase in the reported instances of identity fraud since the year 2000, 
documented by CIFAS (see chapter 3), would suggest that this type of deception may 
still be possible. Accounts of social engineering reported in online forums (discussed in 
chapter 5) also imply that even with security measures in place people still find ways of 
'conning' information out of people, 
The security provided by the new technology included in the Identity Card Scheme may 
appear impressive. But ultimately the success of the identity card scheme will rely as 
much on the individuals charged with administering the security procedures as the 
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technology itselE While deceiving technology such as biometric security measures may 
prove to be impossible, it is clear that deceiving people is far from impossible, 
What the ID card might do to modern identity theft and fraud 
As discussed previously, in modem cases of identity related crime, identity theft and 
identity fraud are closely related activities. Using other people's personal information is 
a useful and easy way to commit identity fraud in the 21" century. In order for the 
identity card scheme to be effective in stopping or detecting identity related crime, it 
must be able to prevent impersonation and the duplicate use of personal information. If 
the identity card can prevent impersonation and identity theft then it will be harder for 
criminals to commit acts of identity fraud. By tying one person to one identity card, the 
scheme could prevent the use of multiple identities and detect anyone trying to use 
another person's identity. 
The only hope the identity thief has is that they are able to alter the infonnation on both 
the identity card and the National Identity Register, as discussed above, or that they will 
be able to avoid situations which would require the checking of the identity card. 
Public sector Identity fraud and private sector identity fraud 
If the identity card scheme is successful in preventing people from using multiple 
identities as is the case in instances of identity theft, the next issue to consider is how 
many identification processes will rely on the accuracy of identity cards. The goal in 
introducing the identity card must be to prevent identity thcft and thereby limit the ways 
people can commit identity fraud. 
A distinction can be made when discussing identity fraud between fraud in the public 
sector (e. g. welfare state, immigration control etc. ) and fraud in the private sector 
(banks, private companies). In both public and private sector fraud, identity theft is used 
to enable identity fraud. 
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Public sector fraud 
Public sector fraud is an important area when discussing identity cards as it is likely that 
all government agencies will require the presentation of identity cards as part of their 
identification processes. 
The first area of public sector fraud is the defrauding of state benefits, and benefit fraud 
is one of the areas that it is assumed identity cards will affect. Benefit fraud is where 
individuals fraudulently claim state benefits, such as unemployment benefit, housing 
benefit or state pension. The effect an identity card has on these and other forms of fraud 
in the welfare state is debatable. Those involved in the provision of state benefits will 
have access to not only the National Identity Register, but also any internal efforts to 
stem the growth of fraud such as the National Identity Fraud Unit of the Department for 
Works and Pensions (DWP). It is conceivable that there may be a positive effect on the 
levels of false application fraud and account takeover in the welfare system. 
Critics of the identity card scheme have argued that the majority of state benefit fraud 
does not involve deception with regard to identity but rather deception with regard to 
eligibility. For example, fraud involving unemployment benefits often involves people 
who are working and claiming state benefits at the same time. This type of fraud would 
not be detected by the identity card, nor would the card impede people from attempting 
to commit this type of crime. In the London School of Economics study of the identity 
card project in 2005 the difficulty of establishing the exact numbers for identity fraud 
with regard to the benefit system are discussed. 
The LSE Identity Project Interim Report (2005) study notes that figures on the levels of 
all types of fraud experienced by the Department for Works and Pensions vary from 
between Million andf5billion. According to the LSE, of these figures the number 
; C3.5billion is taken as being an estimate of the level of fraud experienced by ilia DWP. 
Of this figure, fraud involving some aspect of identity fraud is thought to comprise I% 
(05million). 
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Health tourism 
The term health tourism has been coined to refer to instances where people assume a 
false identity in order to enter the U. K. and obtain medical treatment on the National 
Health Service. As with other forms of fraud, obtaining accurate figures on this type of 
fraud is difficult. However, this type of crime is investigated by the National Health 
Service's Counter Fraud Service, which prosecutes instances of this type of fraud. 
In 2005, the first case of health tourism was prosecuted-, in this instance a 71 year old 
Egyptian called Albert Gilgris received heart surgery and prescription drugs on the 
N. H. S. Mr Gilgris had been given this treatment for free on the assumption he was a 
U. K. citizen when in fact he was not. Mr Gilgris was forced to pay L30,000 which 
covered the cost of his treatment. (Counter Fraud Service, 2005). In this type of identity 
fraud, it is the status of the individuals which is counterfeit, not necessarily the whole 
identity of the person; in some instances such as the case of Mr Gilgris it is the status as 
a U. K. citizen which is fraudulent. One area of concern has been the use of the N. H. S. 
by failed asylum seekers still living in the U. K. 
Illegal immigration and illegal working 
Another area of concern with regard to public sector identity fraud is one of the main 
reasons for the introduction of the identity card scheme, namely illegal immigration. 
When the first Entitlement Card Scheme was considered in 2002 one of the first reasons 
to be given for its introduction was the role it would play in combating illegal 
immigration: 
"By giving a clear indication that the holder of an entitlement card is lawfully 
resident in the UK, a card scheme could be a powerful weapon in combating 
illegal immigration..... A universal entitlement card scheme would give greater 
credibility to legal migration routes into the country. " (Entitlement Cards and 
Identity Fraud, 2002: 7) 
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This reasoning for the entitlement card carried on into later versions of the identity card 
scheme. The idea of using the identity card to combat illegal immigration in principle is 
a sound one: 
"The identity card scheme is intended primarily as a United Kingdom wide 
measure to help deter and control illegal immigration by helping to establish the 
nationality and immigration status of UK residents ( ... )" (Legislation on 
Identity Cards: A Consultation cited in Home Affairs Committee, 2004- 25) 
By improving the government's ability to determine who is a legal citizen and who is 
not, it would be possible to limit what an illegal immigrant could and could not do in the 
U. K. Ideally the end result of this would be that if there is nothing for illegal immigrants 
to do in the U. K. they will either not come here or they would use legal means of 
migration. It was estimated by the Home Office in 2005 that there may be as many as 
570,000 illegal immigrants living in the U. K. (cited in BBC 2005). However gaining 
accurate figures on the numbers of illegal immigrants is difficult as this is a highly 
covert community. Given that this is hidden community determining how the 
introduction of the identity card will work in practice can be difficult, as can 
determining what possible adverse effects there could be. 
The attraction of being an illegal immigrant 
One of the important elements of illegal immigration and illegal working is the 'pull 
factor' this is how attractive a country is to immigrants and illegal immigrants. The 
attractiveness of particular countries to illegal immigrants is dependent on the 
opportunities to make money in that country and the degree of safety, comfort and 
protection they can expect. In some instances, people will move through a series of 
countries to reach a particular country which is perceived as a particularly good place to 
go. 
Another area of interest when discussing identity cards and illegal working practices is 
the role of employers. As well as the use of illegal workers by organised crime groups, 
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there is also the requirement for legitimate employers to ensure they hire legal workers. 
According to the Home Affairs committee report on Asylum Applications (2003-4) and 
illegal employment: 
"We believe that a significant factor in the problem of illegal working is the 
deliberate decision by some employers to break the law. We recommend that the 
Government should target such employers, who are not only easier to identify 
than those they employ but arguably more culpable. " (House of Commons, 
2004.83) 
While it is unlikely that an identity card would succeed in stopping people from wanting 
to immigrate to a new country, the improved security to public services and access to 
employment would mean that living in this country as an 'illegal' immigrant would be 
more difficult. The impact of an identity card would be on catching illegal immigrants 
after they have arrived and attempted to establish a legitimate identity in this country. 
Once in the country illegal immigrants would either have to overcome the ID card 
system and establish themselves as legitimate citizens or attempt to live in this country 
without interacting with government agencies or going anywhere that required the 
presentation of an identity card. Looking at experiences in other countries, there is 
reason to believe that while the basic idea of stopping illegal immigrants by introducing 
a national identity card may seem a good one, there is reason to believe it will fail. 
Countries with National Identity Card Schemes such as Spain still have problems with 
illegal immigrants. In Spain, it is estimated that there are between 500,000 and 800,000 
illegal immigrants, mostly from Morocco and Northern Affica. 
In America, the issue of illegal immigration has produced a new category of immigrant, 
'the un-documented' immigrant, who while living in the country, in some instances 
paying taxes and in possession of all proofs of identity available to U. S. citizens, does 
not have U. S citizenship. This situation has lead to calls for an amnesty to allow 
'undocumented' immigrants to receive citizenship and thereby ofricial recognition. 
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In the U. K. the Home Office has operated a mass amnesty on three occasions, granting 
citizenship to 750,000 failed asylum seekers who had not left the country. In these 
instances the amnesty was enacted to clear a backlog of cases (BBC News, 2007). The 
effect of a general amnesty on any and all illegal immigrants in the U. K. is unknown; 
it 
can be argued that it would cause an influx of immigrants to the U. K. which would have 
a detrimental effect on state services such as the welfare state and the ability of the 
police and security services to operate. Equally it can be argued that providing an 
amnesty could help those immigrants who are beholden to organised crime groups or are 
too afraid of detection by the state to report criminal activity. 
Role of organised crime, illegal immigration and the identity card 
Who will try to beat the identity card scheme? This is a difficult question to answer, but 
it is reasonable to assume that organised crime groups and those involved in people 
trafficking will try to circumvent the identity card system or if possible attempt to beat 
it. Circumventing the identity card system is one reaction to the introduction of an 
identity card system. This could take place with the illegal immigrant community who 
are already trying to live in this country under a degree of scrutiny. The choice to try and 
circumvent the identity card would probably depend on the amount of false 
documentation that illegal immigrant had and how much they involved themselves with 
government services. If they were living in the UK with a set of falsely applied for 
papers (documents that by rights belong to someone else) or were using good quality 
counterfeit documents, they may be able to pass for a legal citizen, The identity card is 
not intended to be the only way to prove identity as the identity card will be introduced 
over time gradually as people obtain a new drivers' licence or passport. So the 
possibility exists that people will be able to operate as they have, pre-identity card. 
It can be argued that by introducing the identity card the government will be introducing 
a quick and easy form of identification. Consequently, it is possible that anyone not 
using the identity card could come under greater scrutiny as the numbers of people with 
identity cards increase. They would in a sense become the exception to the normal 
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identification process when dealing with government agencies. This would take time 
and it is debateable whether or not detecting illegal immigrants is easier over time or if it 
gets harder. They may be able to gain access to better documentation or efforts to detect 
them may improve. 
If the identity card does prove to be a success and is commonly used in society as a 
general proof of identity there would be an incentive for illegal immigrants to seek out 
counterfeit copies or to try and falsely apply for one themselves (see chapter 7 for false 
application). It would be difficult to try to live in a society which is heavily dependant 
on identity cards and identifying through identity cards would also be difficult. Either 
illegal immigrants would avoid contact with areas which rely on displaying the identity 
card or they would actively seek out some way of obtaining an identity card. The trade 
in counterfeit or falsely applied for identity cards could be a great source of income for 
organised crime groups. In effect the more of an obstacle the identity card becomes, the 
more organised crime will try to offer ways to either circumvent it or to obtain an 
identity card. 
One possible result of the successful introduction of the identity card could be a 
reduction in the pull factor of the U. K. for illegal immigrants. Another possible result is 
that illegal immigrants will still come to the U. K., but due to the use of identity cards, 
illegal immigrants will be more reliant on those who have brought them into the 
country. Illegal inunigrants could become more beholden to organised crime groups for 
a means to live in the U. K. 
A final point is that made by critics of the identity card scheme who have noted that by 
introducing one centralised form of identification the government may be making 
identity fraud easier by giving criminals one specific form of identification to attack and 
counterfeit. 
327 
Security provided by ID cards against terrorism 
Evidence to support the usefulness of identity cards in combating terrorism and the use 
of identity fraud by terrorists is limited. While much of the justification for identity 
cards has been based on its usefulness in stopping terrorism, identity cards have not 
been used in the U. K. or America as a method of preventing terrorism or detecting 
terrorists. It can be argued that even if an identity card scheme is introduced to the U. K., 
its usefulness in preventing or detecting terrorists is not guaranteed. The manner in 
which the identity card scheme will be used by the security services determines whether 
or not the identity card will in fact protect people from terrorism. 
With regard to the recent terrorist attacks by al-Qacda only the attack on Madrid in 
March of 2004 involved a nation where an identity card scheme was in place. The attack 
took place on the 130' March, when bombs were placed on trains in Madrid. In this 
attack a 192 people were killed and 2,050 were injured. After the attack the rail system 
around Madrid was shut down and security tightened. Eventually the four bombers were 
found in Leganes in South Madrid. Upon discovery, all four blew themselves up along 
with one police officer who was attempting to arrest them. While Spain has had an 
identity card scheme in place, the identity card did not play any part in detecting or 
preventing the attack. The example of the Spanish national identity card scheme does 
provide some insight into the potential drawbacks of the U. K. national identity card 
scheme. It can be argued that not only did the identity card fail to stop the attack in 
2004, it has also failed to protect Spain from attacks by ETA, the Basque separatist 
group, who have been operating since 1959. 
One of the main uses of identity fraud by terrorists as discussed earlier is as a means of 
breaching secure identification processes by using an alternative identity which the 
security services are unaware of. According to M15 the benefit of introducing an identity 
card is that: 
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"Many of the targets of Service investigations have multiple identities, and any 
system that makes it more difficult for our targets to use and maintain multiple 
identities would be welcomed. " (Enquires Team, Security Service, 2007 see 
appendix 17 for original email) 
In order for the identity card scheme to work in the U. K. as a method of detecting 
terrorists it must firstly be able to prevent the use of multiple identities, so that any 
terrorist in the U. K. could not enter a secured identification process without using their 
real identity. This approach is the main obstacle that an identity card scheme would 
provide to terrorists attempting to operate in the U. K. As seen in the attacks in America 
on September II th 200 1, every terrorist involved used stolen social security numbers and 
several used entirely false identities to succeed in their attacks. However looking at the 
later attack on London the terrorists involved were all using their own identities their 
success was based on the authorities not knowing they were terrorists. 
In a speech given by Rachel North (2006) on of the survivors of the Kings Cross 
bombing and a spokesperson for the Kings Cross United group, which is a non political 
victim support group. North discusses the need for an independent public enquiry into 
the July 7h bombings, and criticises the argument given by the government that it would 
cost too much to have enquiry. As part of this speech, North discusses her views on the 
plans to introduce an ID card scheme to prevent terrorism: 
"It is a disgrace to talk about cost, when there is enough money to get the PM a 
private jet, to run John Prescott at f2million a year and to squander billions on 
ID cards, which will not stop fraud, nor identity theft, and certainly wouldn't 
have stopped the July 7 bombers, whom I understand were careful to look into 
CCTV cameras and to carry ID. Khan had 3 of the 4 carry his ID, so keen did he 
seem to be to achieve his posthumous fame as a martyr. " (North R, 2006: 4) 
In some respects, the identity card scheme will work as a method of preventing and 
detecting terrorist activities provided that the security services have already identified as 
terrozists. 
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The second method of detecting terrorists with an identity card would be to consistently 
monitor the use of individual's identity cards, where they are and what they are doing 
with their identity card. Again this would require the security services to be aware that 
the individual is a terrorist to begin with. With regard to terrorism, the usefulness of the 
identity cards would not be as a tool to identify terrorists but rather as a means of 
excluding them from, and detecting them if they try to enter, locations and identification 
process where they could cause damage. For example, it would exclude them from 
airports or obtaining a passport, and if they do still attempt to enter they will be detected. 
The ways terrorists could adapt to this situation is to avoid contact with the identity card 
scheme and any official identification processes that involve the use of identity cards. In 
effect, they would have to find alternative methods of gaining access or alter the manner 
in which they would attack. In response to attacks on New York in 2001, airport security 
and in particular passport security, has been increased to protect against the threat of 
terrorists attack. In 2006 an attempt to hijack planes in the U. K. failed. However, the 
attacks on London in 2005 and the more recent attacks and attempted attacks on 
Glasgow and London involved bombings on public transport and the use of car bombs 
implying that there is an alternative to hijacking planes as a means of attacking the U. K. 
With the recent attacks there has been increased speculation over the possible use of 
identity cards in the U. K. as a form of internal passport. This would allow the state to 
monitor the movement of citizens. The use of identity cards in this manner has raised 
several concerns with regard to civil liberties. 
Private sector fraud 
The effect identity cards will have on identity fraud against private organisations is 
dependent on the level of access the private sector will have to the National Identity 
Register. In 2005, plans were put in place to sell access to the National Identity Register 
to private companies at an initial cost of E750 with an additional cost of E750 for 
machines that could read biometric details. This initial plan was reported by the 
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Independent News paper and the BBC. In a report by the BBC then Immigration 
Minister Tony McNulty stated that: 
44 ... a verification process would take place, but denied private firms would 
be 
allowed to 'go fishing' for information. 'Verifying facts about an individual's 
identity is entirely the purpose of the database. "' (McNulty cited in BBC News 
2005: 1) 
According to the Identity and Passport Service, the current plans with regard to identity 
cards and the private sector is to allow access to the National Identity Register for 
'accredited organisations' who will be able to verify information held on identity cards, 
but not to change or amend that information. This process is referred to as an Identity 
Verification Service, and the Identity and Passport service note that it will work at 
different levels according to the situation the card will be used in. They provide the 
following examples on their website: 
" "for a basic transaction such as proving your age it could confirm simply that 
your card is valid 
" if you are a foreign national applying for a job it could be used to confirm 
that the status of your visa allows you to work 
" if you are applying to work in a position of trust (as a nanny for example) it 
could be used to confirm that you do not have a criminal record" (Identity 
and Passport Service, 2008c: 1) 
The use of the identity card in the private sector is dependent on the acceptance of the 
individual. If a person does not want their identity card checked then the identity card 
cannot be used in that transaction. This raises some questions with regard to the security 
of the identity card, as well as the possible implications for civil liberties. 
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Internet fraud 
One area of identity fraud which may prove to be the most resistant to the influence of 
the identity card scheme is fraud on the internet. As discussed in chapter 6, this area of 
fraudulent activity often involves the use of 'card not present fraud' and techniques of 
gathering information such as phishing and pharming to enable account takeovers and 
online false application fraud. While some identity card schemes such as the Estonian 
National Identity Card system have an online element, the U. K. identity card Bill has 
not outlined any provision for the identity card to have a virtual presence. 
One of the main problems the identity card scheme faces with regard to the internet is 
that many of the services provided on it are designed in such a way as to not need any 
face-to-face communication or verification. 
Conclusion: what to expect from the identity card scheme 
When the new identity card scheme was first proposed in 2002, it could be argued that it 
was presented as a panacea for several problems. The identity card was presented as a 
solution to identity fraud, terrorism and illegal immigration. It can be argued that by 
introducing an identity card the government was trying to put to an end to any and all 
deception in the identification process. The initial aim of this study was to determine if 
the identity card scheme would succeed in this goal of stopping identity fraud. But after 
studying identity fraud and the identity card scheme, it has become apparent that rather 
than stopping identity fraud the identity card will at most prove to be a new obstacle that 
must be overcome. By introducing a form of identification where ensuring accuracy is a 
central concern, the government may be able to create an obstacle to those seeking to 
commit both identity theft and identity fraud. But it is also important to recognise that 
the proposed identity card scheme (as it currently stands) still has several significant 
problems which could degrade its effectiveness as a preventer of identity theft and 
identity fraud. 
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Chief amongst these problems is the issue of how the identity card scheme is introduced. 
According to Home Secretary Jacqui Smith the identity card will rely on consumer 
demand to drive the uptake of the identity card. It is estimated that the identity card will 
achieve full coverage of U. K. citizens by 2017. This means that until then the U. K. must 
by necessity treat the identity card as an optional form of identification for people. If 
identity thieves wish to avoid the proposed security offered by the identity card they will 
be able to do so, by claiming not to have an identity card or declaring that they choose 
not to use it. The identity card can only prevent identity theft and fraud if people are 
compelled to use it to prove their identity. In terms of security, the identity card can only 
be seen as solution to identity fraud if it is universally required in the U. K. as proof of 
identity. 
This however raises civil liberties issues which groups such as Liberty, N021D and 
Defy-ID have championed. Looking back at the Second World War identity card, that 
scheme came to an end because of the mandatory need to present the identity card. If the 
identity card scheme does rely on consumer demand in its introduction, then it must 
ensure that the scheme continues to seek the support and acceptance of the general 
public. 
Aside from issues of how the identity card will be introduced and its acceptance by the 
general public, there are also several questions about how the identity card will work in 
practice. At present these questions cannot be answered but it is reasonable to assume 
that issues of security may arise with regard to the following: 
9 How thoroughly will biographical footprints be checked? 
The biographical footprint will be used during applications for identity cards to 
determine identity. Can this process be fooled by identity thieves? One approach to 
identity theft and fraud is the use of dead people's identities, With the biographical 
footprint check, looking at registers of deaths will identity thieves favour targeting the 
identities of the living rather than the dead? 
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* How thoroughly will the biometric security be checked? 
As discussed earlier, there are several concerns over the efficacy of the biometric 
security system employed on the identity card. But aside from these concerns there is 
also the question of how often in practice a person will be required to undergo a 
biometric check. Additionally, will all three factors - iris scan, fingerprint and facial 
recognition be used? 
How effective will the identity card be at detecting long term, wholesale and 
partial assumers? 
As shown in the cases of wholesale and partial assumers in chapter 7 some identity 
thieves spend several years perfecting their impersonations. Will these people modify 
their activities to adapt to the identity card scheme? 
Will the National Identity Register's Databases be secure from attacks by 
computer crackers and loss of records? 
Recent changes to the identity card scheme have replaced the idea of a single National 
Identity Register with several databases holding the National Identity Register. This 
move has been welcomed as it is thought it will reduce the likelihood of the entire 
register being compromised. But the question still remains as to whether the register is 
sufficiently protected against abuse by computer crackers. In recent years the security of 
government databases has been criticised with several high profile losses of public 
records. 
* Will the identity cards be used effectively in the private sector? 
Current plans allow for private companies to access the National Identity Register in 
order to confirm a person's identity. But the degree to which the private sector begins to 
use and rely on the identity card has yet to be determined. 
0 Will issues of civil liberty limit the identity cards use? 
Arguably while the civil liberty issues surrounding the identity card scheme have not led 
to it being abandoned, they have influenced the scheme and continue to raise questions 
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as to the value of introducing the scheme. Both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
parties have declared that if they were in power they would abandon the scheme in 
favour of other initiatives. It could be that the identity card scheme is abandoned or 
curtailed significantly long before any benefits from the scheme are experienced. 
What effect will immigration and foreign identification have on the identity 
card? 
One of the first uses of the identity card scheme will be in the identification of 
immigrants to the U. K. How the identity card application process will operate using 
identification process from other countries will be an area which will need researching. 
It can be argued that identification processes from the U. K. would be easier to trust and 
confirm during the biographical footprint stage. But how much access to foreign 
databases will there be to confirm immigrants biographical footprints? 
As seen in several cases of identity theft and fraud most notably the case of Derek Bond, 
stealing an identity and using it in another country can be an effective way of concealing 
identity theft. A situation could arise where a person who commits identity theft in 
another country could immigrate to the U. K. and use the identity card scheme to validate 
their impersonation. How the identity card will affect identity fraud in a global context 
is an important issue to consider and discuss if and when the identity card is introduced. 
9 How will organised crime respond to the identity card? 
Illegal immigration and identity fraud can be very lucrative sources of income for 
organiscd crime groups. How organised, crime will respond to the identity card will be 
an important area to study. Will there be attempts to forge or counterfeit the identity 
card? Will organised crime move away from illegal immigration and identity fraud? Or 
will they modify their activities to negate the effect of the identity card? 
* Will future acts of terrorism change attitudes to the identity card and its powers? 
The effectiveness of the identity card in detecting terrorists or terrorist activity has been 
questioned. Reference is often made to the 2005 bombings in London and the 2007 
Glasgow bombing as examples of how an identity card cannot stop terrorism. It has 
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been argued by some in the government however that the identity card could be a 
valuable resource in the prevention of terrorism if it can prevent people from using 
multiple identities. 
Looking at the history of the current identity card scheme it can be argued that the 
terrorist attacks on September I Vh 2001 were influential in bringing about proposals for 
a national identity card scheme. It may be that future developments with regard to 
terrorism may influence people's attitudes to the identity card scheme and the issue of 
state surveillance in general. This could result in either further curtailing of the identity 
card scheme or perhaps an expansion of the scheme. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Overview of Study 
Overview of study 
This study has focused on two phenomena - the emergence of identity related crimes 
and the idea of reintroducing an identity card scheme. Since the beginning of the 21" 
century, concern has risen over the threats of terrorism, illegal immigration and identity 
fraud. None of these are new crimes, but in the last eight years the profiles of these types 
of crime have risen dramatically. In response, the idea of reintroducing a national 
identity card scheme emerged in the U. K. In simple ternis, the government sought to 
solve the problem of deception in identification by hardening the identification process. 
The question which has formed the basis of this study is whether or not the identity card 
scheme will succeed in stopping identity fraud. In researching this question, much was 
learned, not only about the proposed identity card scheme, but about the nature of 
identity theft and identity fraud. This chapter will provide an overview of three main 
areas: 
" What was learned about identity theft and identity fraud 
" Re-starting the Identity Card 
" Ongoing developments and future areas of study 
In each section of this chapter, there is a brief review, and discussion, of what was 
discovered. 
What was learned from this study? 
This study first considered definitions of identity theft and identity fraud. In the U. K., 
America and Australia, the scope and meaning of the terms identity theft and identity 
fraud vary. As discussed in chapter 3, some commentators prefer the term identity theft 
to identity fraud, and vice versa. Some use the terms interchangeably and some use the 
terms to distinguish between different types of identity related crime. As the definitions 
of what constitutes identity theft and/or identity fraud are debateable, it is important to 
review what it means to steal, use or abuse another person's or corporation's identity. 
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In this study, the history of identity related crime was examined as well as the modem 
use of the terms identity theft and fraud. It became apparent that while identity theft and 
identity fraud are modem terms, they refer to well established forms of deception. This 
study looked back to the 16t" century to review the history of deception in criminal 
activity. In this review of the history of deception, themes of impersonation and 
misrepresentation emerged with regard to certain acts of identity related crime. Identity 
theft and identity fraud were distinguished on the grounds of impersonation and 
misrepresentation. Identity theft was linked to the theme of impersonation. Identity 
fraud was linked to the theme of misrepresentation. In this way it was possible to 
distinguish between different activities (cheating individuals versus cheating an 
institution) and methods of using and abusing the identification process. 
Looking at the history of identity thell and identity fraud, it became apparent that both 
impersonation and misrepresentation can be used to commit crime. Early instances of 
identity theft tended to be directed at famous people whose identities were well known. 
Early instances of identity fraud used misrepresentation and deception to trick people 
into being defrauded. 
In the later part of the 20th century and the start of the 2 I't century, criminals began to 
use identity theft to enable identity fraud. This shift in the use of identity theft to enable 
identity fraud is a result of the increased value of people's personal identities. In both 
the 20'h and 21" century, communication technology has improved, allowing people to 
use their identities quickly over larger distances. The further effects of this are a 
decrease in the time needed to impersonate someone, and an increase in the 
opportunities to use and abuse another person's identity 
Identity or identification fraud? 
During research into simulated identity theft, a question arose about whether or not 
identity fraud and/or identity theft are actually about identity, as the emphasis in many 
instances of identity related crime is on the use and abuse of documentation which prove 
identity. 
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The role of a person's sense of self in identity theft and identity fraud is something 
which can be hard to quantify. In some cases of identity related crime, the involvement 
of the individual's personality or sense of self is extremely limited. For example, the 
2003 internet fraud case where a cracker was able to obtain details of five million credit 
card accounts details from Visa and MasterCard. The cracker was able to break through 
the security of a company that processed credit card transactions for both businesses. 
(BBC News, 2003) Apart from cases involving private companies, there have also been 
several instances of government agencies losing large amounts of data, such as the loss 
of 25 million child benefit records in 2007; these records included names, addresses, 
dates of birth, bank details and National Insurance numbers. Either through the theft or 
the loss of data, it is possible to leave millions of people vulnerable to identity fraud. It 
can be argued that in these examples, while large numbers of people are being 
victimised or endangered, there is no interaction with the people's sense of self or their 
personal identity. Furthermore, what effect can such an incident have on a person's 
social role, status or personality? Arguably these are far more significant aspects of a 
person's identity than an account number or a National Insurance number. 
There is some merit then to viewing the crimes of identity theft and identity fraud as 
identification theft and identification fraud. This emphasises that these crimes are about 
stealing proof of identity, and means that it is easier to focus on the real targets of 
fraudsters, namely paper proofs of identity, passwords, and personal details. 
In most of the cases of modem identity theft considered by this study, there appears to 
be no real intention to target specifically a particular person. The exception to this has 
been cases of identity theft within families. However, aside from these cases, many of 
the victims described in this study have been victims of circumstance. Through the use 
of gathering and appropriating techniques some people have found themselves 
vulnerable to attack. A good analogy would be a fisherman trawling for fish with a net. 
With recognition of the practice of identity theft via the intemet, this analogy has lead to 
the use of the term pbishing to describe how fraudsters use e-mails to steal money. The 
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analogy, however, holds true for many forms of data gathering used by identity 
fraudsters. 
Thus, there is some value in interpreting identity related crime as the theft and abuse of 
proofs of identification, rather than the theft and abuse of a person's identity. Certainly, 
in cases of identity related crime involving illegal immigrants and terrorists the focus is 
on the abuse of identification rather than abuse of a specific person's identity. However, 
it can also be argued that the alternative position, focusing on identity theft and identity 
fraud as abuses of a person's sense of self, also has merit. Modem cases of identity theft 
and identity fraud are often much quicker and easier to commit than in previous 
centuries. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the sense of victimisation felt by people 
who have their identities stolen is overcome just as quickly. It can be argued that the 
sense of abuse felt by modem victims of identity theft is only magnified by the speed at 
which some identity thieves can steal a person's identity. 
The role of victims in identity theft and fraud has been an important factor in raising the 
profile of identity related crime. It can be argued that it was the protests of victims such 
as Michelle Brown or Derek Bond (see pages 109 and 113) that raised public awareness 
and concern over identity related crime, Both in America and the U. K., the experiences 
of victims of identity related crime have compelled governments to introduce new 
legislation. In America, the experiences of Michelle Brown led to the introduction of 
identity theft laws. Equally, the introduction of an identity card scheme is in part due to 
public concern over becoming a victim of identity fraud. While fraud has often been 
viewed as a victimless crime, the recent media attention given to victims of identity theft 
has undermined this idea. 
The accounts of victims' experiences are also a useful source of information on how an 
identity can be abused by criminals. Reports given to victim support and advocacy 
groups such as the Privacy Rights Clearing House and the Credit Industry Fraud 
Avoidance System as well as media reports highlight new developments in identity 
related crime. As society develops, along with new and more elaborate uses for people's 
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personal identities, new forms of identity related crime may emerge. Only by monitoring 
new developments in the experiences of identity theft and fraud victims can 
criminology, the National Identity Card Scheme and the state in general, hope to keep 
pace with the ways in which identity can be abused. 
The study of victims of identity theft also reveals the importance of social trust in 
society. This study has argued that a key clement of identity related crime is the abuse of 
bonds of trust, most notably social trust. In many aspects of life, there is a dependence 
on social trust to enable a variety of different social interactions. It is the assumption that 
people will be truthful about who they are which identity thieves depend upon. The 
numerous cases of identity theft discussed in this study have all, in some way, depended 
on people assuming at some point that the criminal can be trusted. 
If social trust were curtailed in favour of increased security and surveillance, it could 
mean an improvement in protection against identity theft. By increasing security around 
the identification process, there would be less dependency on social trust. The identity 
card scheme is, in a sense, a way of replacing social trust in strangers with a state 
guarantee. If there are instances of identity theft or fraud, the identity card can also be 
used as a means of state surveillance to track and detect deception. 
It can be argued that replacing social trust with increased security and surveillance is a 
good thing for combating identity theft. However, by decreasing social trust between 
individuals within society, an indirect effect could be a decrease in social trust between 
the state and the general public. The threat of losing social trust between the state and 
the general public was the reason the last identity card scheme was abandoned in 1953. 
Fear over the abuse of surveillance technology by the state is essentially an issue of 
social trust. 
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Do we as a society continue to trust that strangers will tell the truth about who they are 
(social trust)? Or do we increase the use of surveillance and security in the identification 
process, stop trusting people to tell the truth and instead make sure that no one can lie? 
As Barry Steinhardt said: 
"There is no longer a technological barrier to a surveillance society. " (Steinhardt 
. 13,2004: 1) 
If there is no longer a technological barrier to a surveillance society, then the debate 
over increasing surveillance becomes an issue of how much social trust there should be 
in society. In terms of identity theft and fraud, it can be argued that these crimes are an 
abuse of social trust so the less society relics on social trust, the safer people will be 
from these types of crime, However replacing social trust with increased security and 
surveillance in the identification process poses its own threats to civil liberties. 
Criminal liability and identity theft and fraud 
The experiences of those whose identities were used to avoid criminal liability also 
undermines the idea that identity thell or fraud is only about identification and proof of 
identity. For instance the experiences and harm felt by Dr Grout and Michelle Brown 
after being held responsible for the actions of their identity thieves. 
The issue of whether or not identity related crime is an attack on a person's identity or 
an abuse of identification was in part raised during the simulation of identity theft 
discussed in chapter 5. In the simulated identity theft thought experiment the effect 
simulated identity theft might have on the donor identity provided by the research 
subj cct was considered. It was determined that the risk posed to the research subject's 
sense of self and potential harm. to their relationship with society made the simulation 
unethical. Furthermore, there was a sense that the proposed simulation also failed to 
accurately portray identity theft. The targeting of one person specifically did not display 
the manner in which identity fraudsters might trawl for information on anyone who is 
vulnerable to attack. 
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These two issues are important to consider in the future, as focusing on one approach or 
the other will influence how we treat and respond to identity related crime. Treating 
identity theft or identity fraud as if these were only an abuse of proofs of identity may 
help in the policing of these crimes. Identity frauds committed by online criminals, for 
instance, have often focused on the abuse of certain forms of identification. For the most 
part, the efforts have not been to persecute individuals specifically, but to exploit access 
to proofs of identity. The emphasis for criminals is on the identification more so than on 
the identities. So in investigating identity related crime perhaps focusing on 
identification may also help. 
However, it is also important to acknowledge the experiences of victims of modem 
identity theft and fraud, and the sense of abuse of social trust. The experiences of 
victims of identity theft and fraud have motivated a change in the public perception of 
fraud as a victimless crime. It can be argued that if people did not feel a threat to their 
personal identity or to the identification process in general, then calls for the 
introduction of an identity card scheme would not have emerged. 
Criminality of false representation 
Another area researched in this study is the criminality of false representation. Prior to 
researching the law on representation it was assumed that there was a degree of legal 
ambiguity in relation to lying about who one is. However, recent developments in the 
law with regard to fraud have sought to criminalise false representation. This change in 
the law, in conjunction with new legislation against forgery and the theft of identifying 
documentation, has placed more of an emphasis on identity related crime and its 
illegality. 
Although strengthening the law should provide more power to prosecute those who use 
false representation, there is still the issue of how much of a priority identity related 
crime is for the police, and how easy or difficult it is to prosecute. Looking at the 
American and their identity theft laws, commentators such as Sullivan (2004) have 
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argued that while there is a law prohibiting identity theft, the complexity of the law and 
the time it takes to investigate identity theft, means prosecution is still difficult. Of the 
U. K. cases researched in this study, the majority of prosecutions discussed involve large 
scale crimes, often with large numbers of victims or great amounts of money taken. 
Cases involving identity fraud to avoid criminal prosecution are an exception to this, but 
in these instances there has often been a lot of media attention. 
How much attention or effort is given to individual cases of false application, fraud, or 
account takeover, is an area which requires further study. CIFAS surveys and reports 
from 1999 to 2007 suggested that there had been a sharp rise in the levels of identity 
fraud and victims in the U. K. While these figures are open to interpretation and scrutiny, 
they would nevertheless suggest that there are a number of identity fraud cases which 
actually receive very little media attention. The way that these victims and their cases 
are dealt with by the police will provide a degree of insight into the value of new 
legislation on false representation. 
Re-starting the identity card scheme 
With regard to the identity card scheme, this study found that the first major obstacle 
this scheme would face was its reintroduction. As the card is not the first form of 
identification a person will have in the U. K., the manner in which the scheme is 
introduced will be a vital aspect of the card's potential as a secure form of identification, 
The identity card is in effect being grafted on to a pre-existing system of identification. 
In order to identify people, the scheme is forced to rely on information about them 
gained from other proofs of identity. Since the identity card is also being introduced 
because of the lack of security in these other forms of identification, how applications 
for the identity card are handled will be a crucial issue. When discussing the identity 
card scheme, the government have been vocal on the security it will provide through the 
use of biometrics. But the biometric security system will only come into effect when the 
system is already in operation. Before it reaches the point where biometric security 
comes into effect, the identity card must go through a period of setup and application. 
During this period, the identity card must deal with the problem of false application by 
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relying on biographical foot-printing, and on previously established proofs of identity. 
This situation creates a strange paradox: in order effect this 'secure' form of 
identification, it has to rely on the very forms of identification it is aimed to replace. 
False application and biographical footprints 
Before the identity card scheme can be considered a secure form of identification, it 
must establish itself as an accurate identifier. In order to do that, it must first of all 
ensure that everyone who applies is who they say they are. The way the scheme will do 
this is by checking on the past history of applicants in order to establish the applicant's 
biographical footprint. That the identity card scheme must establish its identification of 
people through the use of other forms of identification raises questions over its potential 
to be accurate at this first stage. 
Ideally, if the identity card could come in as the first form of identification a person ever 
receives in their life, then it could guarantee that there is no doubt as to who is applying 
for it. By being first form of identification and autonomous from all other forms of 
identification, the identity card could be a truly secure form of identification, providing 
an unbiased view of people's identities. As the system stands now, it will not be the first 
form of identification a person gains in their life. As a consequence, there is an 
opportunity for impostors to apply for an identity card under an assumed name. 
Provided they can apply for the card first, and beat the biographical footprint check. 
Research conducted during this study has shown how identity thieves can gather enough 
information about someone to achieve a successful impersonation, using current proofs 
of identification. If the biographical footprint check is not thorough then it maybe that 
identity cards will fail in their first task, namely accurately identifying who is who in the 
U. K. 
This issue of making sure that legitimate identity holders obtain their identity cards is an 
important one. As there is a prolonged introduction process for the identity card scheme, 
it is possible that identity thieves may try to obtain identity cards before the legitimate 
identity holders get around to applying for their identity cards. The value in applying for 
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another person's identity card is debateable. By providing their biometrics (including a 
picture of themselves) the identity thieves would be risking a great deal. It would also 
mean the identity thief could not apply for another identity card. In effect, this would 
prevent them from using more than one other person's identity card. In order to obtain 
multiple identity cards, in different names, the identity thief would have to gain access 
to the National Identity Register and alter the data held there. 
There are situations where obtaining only one other person's identity card would be 
necessary or desirable for the identity thief. In instances of wholesale assumption, 
people will only want to establish one alternative identity. It may be that illegal 
immigrants or terrorists only require one alternative identity and will seek to validate 
that alternative identity as much as possible. Equally, identity thieves may falsely apply 
for an identity card in order to use it as a proof of identity in other countries. Identity 
thieves may also obtain identity cards in order to use them in parts of the private sector 
that do not or cannot access the National Identity Register. 
The thoroughness of the biographical footprint check for identity cards is important to 
ensure that the identity cards are issued to the legitimate identity holders. Even if the 
identity card scheme fails to ensure that there are no cases of false application, it should 
ensure that identity thieves have difficulty using multiple identities. 
Multiple identities 
Ideally, what the identity card scheme must be able to do, is to prevent the use of 
multiple identities. Using biometrics to ensure that one person's biology is linked to 
only one identity, would mean that fraudsters, could not steal or use another person's 
identity in the U. K. If the identity card scheme is also linked into an e-passport scheme, 
it would mean that travel and use of multiple identities abroad could also be curtailed. 
If the identity card can stop the use of multiple identities then it would mean that several 
forms of identity fraud could be prevented. False application, account takeover, and the 
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use of identity fraud to avoid criminal liability could be stopped. The only aspect of 
identity fraud which might continue to occur would be wholesale assumption. 
Account takeover and biometric security 
Apart from issues of false application, the other area where the identity card scheme 
may face difficulty is those occasions where criminals attempt to takeover and use 
someone else's identity card. The use of biometrie security should prove to be an 
obstacle to those trying to takeover someone else's identity card. This would only be 
true as long as there are no problems that n-dght arise with regard to failure to read a 
person's biometrics, for instance problems with the calibration of biometric readers or 
damage to a person's fingerprints, iris' and/or face. In principle, the biometric security 
system should ensure that any attempt to use another person's identity card will fail, as it 
is statistically highly unlikely that two people have the same biometric measurements. 
The danger of account takeover, with regard to the identity card scheme, depends on 
how often the identity card can be used without the biometrics being checked. If a 
situation arises where the identity card is accepted as proof of identity without checking 
the biometrics, then it may be possible for people to steal and use other peoples' identity 
cards. This situation may occur if and when the identity card is used in the private sector 
where access to the National Identity Register may be limited. Alternatively it may be 
that biometric scans are taken on a regular basis as part of the identification process. 
This would ensure the early detection of someone trying to use another person's identity 
card. However, repeated checking and monitoring of people's biometrics also has 
implications with regard to the increase in state surveillance. 
Time until full coverage 
As stated in chapter 9, estimates of how long it will take until everyone in the U. K. has 
an identity card, put full coverage of the identity card scheme by 2017. This means that 
until then people will be able to identify themselves without the need for an identity 
card. Consequently there will still be value in stealing and abusing forms of 
identification such as drivers' licences, passports and National Insurance numbers. It 
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also means people will still be able to apply for bank accounts and credit cards without 
using an identity card. 
If not Identity Cards then what? 
It has been recognised in this study that the idea of introducing an identity card scheme 
is a contentious issue. Opposition to the identity card is based on its impact with regard 
to civil liberties and the increase in the use of surveillance technology by the state. 
Political opponents have also criticised the identity card on the grounds of cost. With 
decision of whether or not the identity card scheme will develop or not being a highly 
politicised issue, it is worth considering what possible alternatives there may be to an 
identity card scheme. While both the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats 
have declared their opposition to the identity card their stance on combating identity 
fraud is harder to discern. 
Both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties have given examples of what they 
would do with the money they would save by not introducing the identity card. Both 
parties championed the idea of a National Border Agency to tackle illegal immigration, 
and in April 2008 this agency took over the responsibility for border security from 
several government agencies. The Liberal Democrats have also put forward the idea of 
using the money saved by not introducing the identity card scheme to recruit 10,000 
additional police officers. However, as stated in chapter 4, there is still no clear idea of 
how the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats would combat identity fraud if they 
came to power. The emphasis has been on targeting terrorism and illegal immigration. 
These are important issues to address, but there are still questions as to how financially 
motivated identity fraud, of the type discussed in chapter 8, will be combated. 
Possible Initiatives to stop identity fraud 
Given below are several possible approaches to combating identity fraud, which could 
be used either as an alternative to the identity card or used in conjunction with it. These 
ideas seek to address the areas of identity related crime which the identity card scheme 
may not succeed in preventing or detecting. 
348 
1. Virtual Wallets 
One of the dangers faced by users of the internet is that access is gained to their bank 
accounts or credit cards and their accounts are taken over (see chapter 8 for account 
takeover). The loss of account details is always a threat because when someone is 
making transactions on the internet, there is the possibility that information is being 
communicated to a third party. This is a threat with any transaction including non- 
internet based transactions. So if the security of the account details cannot be ensured, 
the next best thing is to ensure that the account details do not lead to access to a great 
deal of money or information. 
A virtual wallet would be similar to a real wallet, if a wallet is lost or stolen then it is 
possible to limit the effects of that loss by shutting down the accounts, reporting the 
cards stolen, etc. A virtual wallet would be a credit or debit account specifically 
intended for use on the internet, Limits both on the credit limit on the account, and 
perhaps on where it could be used on the internet could ensure a limit on the amount of 
damage that could be done if the account details were stolen. 
One fraud that is used on the internet is to steal someone's account information and then 
use it to finance online gambling. If people were encouraged to create an account that is 
used exclusively on the internet, then certain types of websites could be excluded. For 
instance if someone tries to use the account to access gambling or pornography, billing 
from these accounts could be blocked. 
Most security efforts on the internet are designed to secure the individual websites from 
crackers, especially since frauds such as phishing and pharraing have shown how the 
requisite information can be obtained to challenge this security, and there is a number of 
websites that do not scrutinise security as effectively as is necessary. It is important that 
individuals are better protected from online fraudsters. If online fraud cannot be stopped 
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or security cannot be ensured, then individual customers must be given a means of 
protecting themselves from the risks posed by using the internet. 
2. Shredding Watermarks 
In chapter 7 the use of bin-raiding as a means of gathering information is discussed. One 
possible solution to the threat posed by bin-raiding would be to inform people if a 
document holds any identity sensitive information. A shredding watermark or symbol 
could be added to documents indicating that they must be destroyed before discarding. 
If this watermark were a standardised requirement, it could help to inform the general 
public as to the threat posed by identity thieves. A shredding waten-nark would also help 
to inform organisations which handle identity sensitive documents and information. 
3. Less speed more security 
As noted earlier, the simple fact that people are used to quick service directly affects the 
provision of security. In order to avoid the dangers posed by identity fraud, the simplest 
and possibly the hardest thing to do, would be to require more security checks and a 
reinforcement of pre-existing security checks to ensure accuracy. This would require 
more of a cultural change as much as anything - no more instant credit, no more online 
transactions. It is unlikely that this would happen, but awareness that doing things 
quickly may be dangerous might help inform people. The issue of speed versus security 
is an important factor with regard to the identity card scheme. As has been noted, the 
introduction of the identity card will require an application process where people's 
biographical footprints are checked. The time taken to check a person's biographical 
footprint will affect the likelihood of a false application succeeding. The more time is 
taken to thoroughly check someone's biographical footprint, the better, in one sense. 
However, the longer the application process takes the more time it will take before the 
identity card can become a universal form of secure identification. 
4. More effort in catching online criminals 
As a result of the international nature of the internet, it is possible for criminals in one 
country to steal from people in another. Online fraud gangs do not have to worry about 
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national borders and because of holes in internet security there is little that can be done 
to catch them in the commission of their crimes. During discussion with Mrs B and her 
experience as a victim of identity theft, the police noted that the likelihood of capturing 
or ensuring a conviction for this type of crime is next to zero. The sense that these 
crimes (and the people who commit them) are in some way unstoppable, may be true. If 
there were an increase in interriational efforts to detect and prosecute online criminals, it 
might be possible to have a more significant impact on this type of crime. However, 
there are countries such as Russia and China where the influence of organised crime 
may impede efforts to investigate online identity fraud. 
S. Fraud Awareness 
It can be argued that the emergence of identity fraud as a phenomenon of the 21 
century is in a way a form of moral panic over a crime that has always been a problem 
(see chapter 6 for history of identity related crime), But while the dangers individuals 
face from being unprepared are well known through the accounts of Derek Bond and 
Michelle Brown, the actual methods of protecting oneself are underreported, as are the 
resources available to victims of this type of crime. 
6. Security against internal collusion 
In many respects, the responsibility for protecting an identity lies with the individual, 
but equally individuals are dependant on the organisations they interact with and share 
information with to keep this information safe. There have been several instances (see 
chapter 7) where individuals in the employ of organisations have sold information about 
people's identities. The security surrounding call centres and individuals who are 
responsible for handling 'identity sensitive' information is one area which needs more 
attention. 
With the introduction of the National Identity Card Scheme and the National Register 
the issue of internal collusion with corrupt officials will become even more important. 
The individuals placed in charge of inputting information to the register will have the 
opportunity to steal this infonnation. Moreover, there is also concern about corrupt 
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members of organisations inputting false information or altered information, in order to 
create new or alternative identities for those seeking to change their identity. 
7. Card not present fraud 
One form of identity fraud which will not be directly affected by the introduction of the 
National Identity Card Scheme is Card Not Present Fraud (CNPF). This is the type of 
fraud committed on the internet and through any transaction where there is no direct 
contact between the seller and the purchaser. According to the Association for Payment 
Clearing Services (APACS) in their 2007 report - 'Fraud Vie Facts'. CNPF cost the 
U. K L212.6 million in 2006, a 74% rise from 2003. This type of fraud is highly resistant 
to any protection offered by the National Identity Card Scheme, as this type of crime 
requires no contact where an identity card may be used fully. 
Ongoing developments and future areas for study 
The aim of this study has been to outline the 'potential' effect of the National Identity 
Card scheme on identity fraud: it was necessary to consider how identity fraud is 
committed before the introduction of an identity card scheme, and then to determine 
what an identity card scheme might do. 
The next step, after this study, is to see what happens when the identity card scheme 
begins. The next issues to address will concern how applications for the identity card are 
handled, how the biographical footprint checks work, and how the biometric security 
system works in preventing identity fraud. Additionally, the following areas of research 
should be addressed: 
1. Further research into simulated identity theft 
As discussed in chapter 5, Simulated Identity Theft was considered and ultimately 
abandoned as a research method. While the ethical issues associated with this research 
method are difficult to resolve, further study of the use of simulated identity theft as a 
hypothetical process for assessing how identity theft may occur could be useful. While 
going forward to commit simulated identity theft is not advisable, the planning process 
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can help researchers to consider how the identification process can be abused, and the 
relative value and significance of different forms of identification, Further research into 
how to simulate identity theft would be useful to maintain an understanding of how 
identity theft and fraud is committed, Interviews with those who have used simulated 
identity theft, for example investigators from the General Accounting Office would be 
useful in any future research into simulated identity theft. 
2. Study of information gathering, both legal and illegal (data searches and bin- 
raiding) 
An area which also needs further research is the process of obtaining information on 
people. Further research into both legal and illegal methods of gathering information 
will help to improve our understanding of how people's identities are obtained and used. 
In this study, it has been argued that the illegal gathering of information on people can 
speed up the process of committing identity theft. Therefore, it is important to seek out 
and research new developments with regard to illegal approaches of obtaining 
information used by identity thieves. 
The other area of gathering infortnation on people which warrants more research is the 
legal gathering of information. An area of legal information gathering which has not 
been explored in this study is the harvesting of information by large corporations. Data 
harvesting is a practice of gathering information on people for the purpose of market 
research and targeting of people for the sale of certain products. This process can result 
in large amounts of information being gathered on people's identities. How information 
is used, and perhaps even abused, is an area which requires more research. 
3. Illegal immigration and identity fraud as a multinational problem 
Further research on the use of counterfeit and forged documents by people smugglers is 
important. An area of particular importance with regard to identity fraud and people 
smuggling is the use of forged or stolen identification to cross national bordcrs. As 
discussed in chapter 3, there have been some journalistic investigations into the use of 
false passports and identification by illegal immigrants. Nevertheless, further research 
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into this topic and the role and effect of the new e-passport and/or U. K. identity card 
scheme may be beneficial. 
It would also be valuable to investigate identity theft and identity fraud as a multi- 
national problem; this would provide a means of assessing the influence the National 
Identity Card Scheme may have when it is used as proof of identity abroad. It could be 
that the identity card becomes a secure form of identification which prevents identity 
theft in the U. K., but is easily abused in other countries. Looking at the case of Derek 
Bond whose identity was misused in America for over 20 years, it is clear that 
committing identity theft and/or identity fraud over national borders can help to obscure 
and prolong impersonations and misrepresentations. 
4. Better understanding of the role of the internet 
It has been argued in this study that fraud on the internet is an area where the identity 
card scheme will have little effect. The use of the internet to enable identity theft is 
something that requires more attention, as is the use of computer software to steal 
information on people. 
Final Statement 
The question which has formed the basis of this study is whether or not the identity card 
scheme will succeed in stopping identity fraud. This study argues that identity theft and 
identity fraud are complex forms of criminal activity, which the identity card scheme 
will struggle to eliminate completely. What the identity card scheme must endeavour to 
do is to accurately identify people, removing as much deception from the identirication 
process as possible. It must seek to prevent people from using multiple identities. If the 
scheme succeeds, it is foreseeable that it will curtail identity fraud involving the public 
sector. Its influence on private sector fraud will depend on the popularity of non-face-to- 
face interactions (e. g. the internet) and the uptake of the scheme by private companies. 
The identity card will be a new way to combat identity theft and ftaud but it will not be 
a solution to the entire problem. 
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CORRECTION 
Appendix I 
The National Fraud Strategic Authority is now the National Fraud Authority 
New Estimate of Cost of Identity Fraud to the UK Economy 
The table below publishes the new estimate for the cost of Identity fraud to the 
UK Economy - E1.2 billion or around E25 for every adult in Britain. 
This new estimate is based on a methodology, developed and agreed by the 
Identity Fraud Steering Committee members and advised by Home Office 
economists. 
The Identity Fraud Steering Committee (IFSC) was set up by the Home Office 
in 2003 to work with public and private sector organisations to identify and 
implement cost effective measures to counter identity fraud. The IFSC 
comprised the following organisations: 
" APACS - the UK payments association; 
" Association of Chief Police Officers-, 
" British Bankers' Association; 
" CIFAS, The UK's Fraud Prevention Service; 
" Department for Work and Pensions; 
" Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency; 
" Finance and Leasing Association; 
" Financial Services Authority; 
" HM Revenue and Customs; 
" Identity and Passport Service; 
" Ministry of Justice; and 
" Serious Organised Crime Agency. 
The IFSC members remain committed to improving awareness, prevention 
and enforcement to counter identity fraud. 
How does this estimate differ from those published earlier? 
The first estimate of the cost of identity fraud came from the Cabinet Office 
report'Identity Fraud: A Study' in 2002: E1.3 billion. 
In February 2006 an updated figure of E1.7 billion, was published, with a 
breakdown between organisations, following work by the IFSC. 
The Government made it clear that the EV billion estimate was a one-off 
update and future costs exercises would be based on a now more robust 
methodology that was being devised by the IFSC. 
The new methodology devised by the IFSC does not just examine the 
financial loss to an organisation, but also costs Incurred to set systems In 
place to identify, prevent, deter and prosecute cases of Identity fraud. 
These are relevant costs as in most cases, these costs would not be incurred 
if identity fraud was not an issue and It is very likely that If organisations did 
not incur these costs, the financial losses to the UK economy would be higher 
as a result. 
The 2002 and 2006 returns were based on the original Cabinet Office 
methodology and both estimates included the same figures for money 
laundering, E395m, and VAT 'carousel' fraud, E215m. 
These figures have been excluded from the most recent cost estimate 
exercise as IFSC members feel they do not have a direct link to incidences of 
identity fraud. In addition figures previously attributed to APACS have 
included all types of credit card fraud, and for this assessment the APACS 
figure reflects costs associated with account takeover and application fraud 
only. 
What does this estimate mean? 
The updated estimate for the cost of identity fraud has been produced through 
liaison and discussions with the outlined private and public sector 
organisations. It represents a best estimate of the scale of the problem at this 
time which captures available information. Typical of works of this nature, the 
estimate is likely to be conservative and actual cost may well be higher. 
We know from the experience of individuals, the police, and organisations like 
CIFAS www. cifas. or-ci. uk and APACS www. ai)acs. or-q. uk that identity related 
crime and the overall impact of fraud are a growing concern. 
This is the reason that Government has invested E29m in establishing a 
National Fraud Strategic Authority and Strategy, a Lead Force on Fraud, and 
a National Fraud Reporting Centre housed within the Lead Force (City of 
London Police). 
The National Fraud Strategic Authority was launched on 161 October 2008. 
Estimated Cost of Identity Fraud: 1 April 2006 - 31 March 2007 
Organisation / Industry 
/ Sector 
APACS - the UK 
payments association 
Association of British 
Insurers 
Cost of 
Identity 
Fraud 
f: 201.2m 
f-31 
Notes 
Figures include the actual losses 
associated with Card ID theft, 
namely account takeover and third 
party application fraud. It also 
includes an estimate of the costs 
associated with the prevention, 
detection and investigation of 
identity related crime as specified 
in the methodology adopted by the 
Home Office for this exercise. As 
the banks'fraud prevention and 
detection systems, the 
investigation processes and the 
supporting resource do not solely 
focus in isolation on identity fraud 
related crime, these figures can 
only be regarded as indicative. 
NOTE: There is potential for 
overlap with figures reported by 
CIFAS. APACS and CIFAS have 
liaised to guard against double 
counting. 
The cost of internal fraud through 
re-opening closed claims, dormant 
accounts and paying claims for 
personal gain. Also includes 
account takeover of life policies 
and cashing joint life policies 
(estranged spouses). 
Audit Commission 
British Cheque Cashers 
Association 
E36m 
f-0.4m 
Represents losses from public 
sector occupational pension 
schemes due to, for example, next 
of kin continuing to claim pension 
payments following the death of a 
relative. 
Estimated direct financial loss and 
cost of prevention, detection, 
reporting in relation to cashing of 
cheques by someone other than 
the payee. 
CIFAS - The UK's Fraud E23.5m CIFAS member organisations 
Prevention Service share information about identified 
frauds (e. g. application fraud, first 
party and identity fraud) in the 
fight to prevent further fraud. 
Figures relate to costs associated 
with preventing fraud and actual 
losses through Identity fraud. 
Typical losses reported by CIFAS 
members include purchases using 
credit cards obtained by using 
false identities and the value of an 
asset (e. g. a vehicle) purchased 
from a dealer using finance in a 
false or stolen identity. 
NOTE: There is potential for 
overlap with figures reported by 
APACS. WAS and APACS have 
liaised to guard against double 
counting. 
Criminal Justice System E50m Criminal Justice System costs are 
an estimate of the total police 
investigation, prosecution, court 
and disposal costs for cases of 
identity fraud. 
Driver and Vehicle E5.3m Cost of detecting and investigating 
Licensing Agency applications for driving licences 
using false identities. 
Department for E8.4m Costs relate to setting up systems 
Innovation, Universities to Investigate fraudulent claims 
and Skills (Student and early estimate of Identified 
Loans) losses from student loans 
obtained using false Identities. 
Driving Standards C1.7m Cost of detecting and investigating 
Agency identity fraud in the driving test 
process. 
Home Office E284.4m Home Office costs relate to the 
work of Its agencies in 
safeguarding and validating the 
Identities of its customers, as well 
as costs around deterrence, 
prevention and Investigation of 
A 
identity fraud. 
The majority of the costs 
(E227.8m) relate to the operating 
costs for Identity and Passport 
Service in carrying out identity 
checks, investigating suspected 
identity fraud cases, implementing 
systems and processes to detect 
and prevent fraudulent 
applications of passports, 
including costs relating to the 
introduction of face to face 
interviews for all adult first time 
applicants for a UK passport. 
HM Revenue and 
Customs 
f47.2m 
Other costs relate to the work of 
the Border and Immigration 
Agency (now UK Border Agency) 
around operating a dedicated 
National Document Fraud Unit, 
deterrence, prevention and 
investigation of illegal working. 
Costs have also been included for 
UK Visas work on prevention of 
identity fraud. 
Cost of prevention, detection, 
investigation and direct financial 
loss due to ID tax credit fraud. 
Ministry of Justice 
Telecommunications UK 
Fraud Forum 
E35.8m 
f-485m 
Cost relates to unpaid fines due to 
no trace of identity or address. 
This can be due to a number of 
reasons such as false or 
innacurate information being 
provided and offenders not 
attending court to verify their 
details. 
Estimated cost of obtaining goods 
and services such as mobile 
phones, premium rate services, 
long distance telephone calls 
through fraudulent applications 
using false identity details. 
Total I E1,209m 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "James Blindell" <iames. blindelloa acprxov. au> 
To: "'T. Holmes"' <sop0 11 nabanp-or. ac. uk> 
Sent: Thursday, March 23,2006 5: 33 AM 
Subject: RE: Id fraud Enquiry 
> Tim 
> Current consideration of the ID Card option in Aust. is for crime prevention 
purposes. 
> As you say ID crime terms are used interchangeably. One consequence is 
that it is impossible to get any decent stats. on the extent of losses. 
> The ACPR, in conjunction with AUSTRAC, has developed some model 
definitions that will hopefully be signed off by all Australian Police 
Commissioners in the near future. I set out those proposed definitions below -I 
stress that, at this stage, they are draft definitions. 
> Let me know what you think. 
> Recommendations 
> 43. It is recommended that: 
> The term 'identity' encompass the identity of natural persons (I iving or 
deceased) and the identity of bodies corporate; 
>'Identity Fabrication' be used to describe the creation a fictitious identity; 
>'Identity Manipulation'be used to describe the alteration of one's own identity; 
10 
>'Identity Tbeft' be used to describe the theft or assumption of a pre-existing 
identity (or significant part thereof), with or without consent, and, whether, in 
the case of an individual, the person is living or deceased; 
>'Identity Fraud'be used to describe the gaining of money, goods, services 
other benefits or the avoidance of obligations through the use of a fabricated 
identity; a manipulated identity; or a stolen/assumed identity; II and 
>'Identity crime'be used as a generic term to describe activities/offences in 
which a perpetrator uses a fabricated identity; a manipulated identity; or a 
stolen/assumed identity to faciiitate the commission of a crime(s). 12 
> 44. It should be recognised that an'identityl can be established by a wide 
range of identifiers including written identifiers (such as drivers licences and 
passports), biometric identifiers (such as fingerprints and voice prints) and 
financial identifiers (such as bank account and credit/debit card data); 
> 45. Given the complexity of the issue (including the issues of intention/fault 
element, the inclusion of company and other entity names, and the breadth of 
offences which could be captured by such terms etc. ), it may be necessary to 
undertake further work in this area to more accurately define the various terms 
used above. 
> 46. In addition, consideration should be given to obtaining consensus, at least 
within Australasian law enforcement and revenue protection agencies, in regard 
to a definition of the underlying concept of 'identity and of identification related 
processes such as 'authentication'; 'verification'; 'validation'; and 'registration'. 
> 10 
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
000000 000 00000000 00 00001nvolves the alteration of one or 
more elements of identity (e. g. name, date of birth, address) commonly done to 
dishonestly obtain dual or more access to services or benefits or to avoid 
established obligations. 
>II Examples of identity fraud include: the use of stolen credit cards or credit 
card numbers; counterfeiting credit cards; the use of stolen cheques; 
unauthorised access to online banking services; fraudulently obtaining money, 
loans, finance and credit; fraudulently obtaining benefits, pensions or 
entitlements; and evading the payment of taxes, levies or other debts. Identity 
fraud is a constantly evolving crime type. It is therefore not possible to provide 
an exhaustive list of the activities that may constitute identity fraud. 
> 12 Such as: identity fraud and relevant related offences including the 
possession, distribution and manufacture of relevant items, devices ctc. -, people 
smuggling and trafficking; drug trafficking; terrorism 
> 
> Let me know if I can assist further. 
> Regards 
> James Blindell 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: T. 11olmes [mailto: sop0 II @bangor. ac. uk] 
> Sent: Wednesday, 22 Match 2006 12: 44 AM 
> To: James Blindell 
> Subject: Id fraud Enquiry 
> Hi 
> Thanks for responding the info you have Provided is great. I was not 
> aware that Australia had considered an identity card scheme. 
" My study is focused mainly on the idea that id cards can be used to 
" prevent crime, specifically id fraud. Havc id cards ever been considered 
> as a crime prevention tool in Australia? 
> So far I have found that apart from Australia, the US and the UX no 
> one else appears interested in id fraud [even here in the UX and the 
> US there is very little research on id fraud]. 
> To make things worse there does not appear to be any consensus on what 
> identity fraud is. Some work on id fraud distinguishes between id fraud 
> and id theft, others use the term interchangably. 
> Can you tell me how identity fraud is defined at the ACPR? 
> Tbanks again for the help. 
> Regards 
> Tim Holmes 
> T. Holmes sopO II abangor. ac. uk 
Ajaj and Yousef: A Case Study in Fraud 
This case study illustrates some of the techniques used by two of the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing terrorists to enter and remain in the United States. Almost all of these 
tactics-italicized here for emphasis-would continue to be used by al Qaeda during the 
1990s and in preparation for the 9/11 attack. Using the services ofa travel agent in 
Pakistan and traveling under aliases, on August 31,1992, Ahmad Ajaj and Ramzi 
Yousef boarded Pakistan International Airlines Flight 703 in Peshawar and flew to 
Karachi, Pakistan, and then on to Kennedy Airport in New York City, Yhey sat infirst 
class during both legs of the trip, believing they would receive less scrutiny there. 
Between them, they carried a variety ofdocuments to support their 
alias identities, including identification cards, bank records, education records, and 
medical records. 
Upon Ajajs arrival at Kennedy, the immigration inspector noted that he was traveling 
on a photo-substituted Swedish passport. Ajaj was sent to secondary immigration 
inspection, where he claimed he was a member of the Swedish press. His luggage was 
searched and officers found a partially altered Saudi passport and a passportfrom 
Jordan, the documents supporting their alias identities, a plane ticket and a British 
passport in the name of Mohammed Azan, bomb-making manuals, videos and other 
material on how to assemble weapons and explosives, letters referencing his attendance 
at terrorist training 48 camps; anti-American and anti-Israeli material, instructions on 
documentforgery, and two rubber stamp devices to alter the seal on passports issued 
from Saudi Arabia. The immigration inspector called an agent on the FBI Terrorist Task 
Force to tell him about 
Ajaj, but the agent declined to get involved, instead requesting copies of the rile. The 
inspector also called the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which was "not 
interested. " 
Meanwhile, Yousef also was sent to secondary immigration inspection for lacking a 
passport or a visa that would allow him to enter the United States. lie there presented an 
Iraqipassport he allegedly boughtfrom a Pakistani officialfor $100. Upon questioning, 
Yousef said that the passport wasfraudulcnt and that he bribed a Pakistani official in 
order to board the flight. Inspectors also found in his possession an Islamic Center 
identity card with Yousef's photo and the name Khurram Khan, under which AjaJ had 
traveled into the United States. They also found a boarding pass in the name of 
Mohammed Azan, Although their documents were thus oddly intermingled and both 
men were in secondary inspection, Yousef was not linked to AjaJ. Rather, Yousef was 
arrested for not having a visa. He made a claimfor political asylum and was released 
into the United States pending a hearing. 
Ajaj told authorities he had a political asylum claim from a prior entry in February 1992, 
and was detained pending a hearing. The evidence suggests that AjaJ left the United 
States in April 1992, thereby abandoning his asylum claim. In fact, it appears that he 
traveled tinder an alias to attend a terrorist training camp on the Afghan-Pakistani 
border. 
AJaj later pleaded guilty to a charge of use of an altered passport and served six months 
in prison. Not surprisingly, Yousef never appearedfor his hearing. The World Trade 
Center was bombed on February 26,1993. Ajaj was released from prison shortly 
thereafter, although he had no grounds for remaining in the United States. He was 
arrested in connection with the attack on March 9,1993. Yousef was indicted on 
September 1,1993, but had left the United States on afraudulent Pakistani passport. lie 
was captured in Pakistan and returned to the United States to stand trial on February 8, 
1995. 
Although AJaJ was arrested for involvement in the bombing, he did not give up on his 
political asylum claim. lie petitioned for a new attorney and an exclusion hearing-held 
to determine whether someone is admissible into the United States-in Houston, where 
he had filed his original political asylum claim. AJaJs request was denied on April 24, 
1993, on the grounds that a passport holder from a visa waiver country who uses a 
fraudulent passport-Ajaj had used a bogus Swedish passport to enter the United 
States-is not entitled to such a hearing. Not satisfied with that outcome, Aj aj asked to 
file a newpolitical asylum claim and was given ten days by an immigration judge to do 
so. Thus, Ajaj was able to file a political asylum claim after his arrest for involvement in 
the bombing of the World Trade Center. 
Yousef was sentenced to 240 years in prison; AjaJ was sentenced to 90 years, 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Trevor Mendham" <contact(-aýtrevor-niendham. com> 
To: -5s2pQ I l2a`bqpgor. ac.! u1k> 
Sent: Thursday, September 07,2006 8: 45 PM 
Subject: Re: Identity Cards 
> Tim, 
" You raise some very good questions. I don't have time to respond in 
" detail but will make a few points: 
>> Thank you for responding. I have heard of the National Register but 
>> I am unsure 
>> as to what threat is posed by this in terms of cvil liberties? [I 
>> am aware of 
>> the logistical/finnancial nightmare of trying to run this type of 
>> system) 
>> I have a couple of questions 
>> I) What is it that the national register does that other govemement 
>> and private 
>> databases don't do that makes it such a threat to civil liberties? 
" It's the arbitrary invasion of privacy. One big, central database 
" containing all sorts of information about us. In particular the 
" "audit trail" means that the government will have a record of every 
" time our card is checked against the central database. This is 
" defined in para 9 of Schedule 1: 
" httl2: //www. opsi. jzov. tik/ACTS/, acts2OO6/6001 5--b. htm#sch I 
" And we can't "opt out". 
>> 2) Given the way our society works what is the problem with having 
>> a national 
>> register? We already freely give out masses of information about 
>> ourselves to 
>> private otganisations and government agencies. To play a bit of 
>> devils advocate 
>> where is the issue of liberty? To be a part of society you have to be 
>> recognised by society woWt a national register merely formalise 
>> what we do 
>> every day? If being unknown to the state is a liberty then we all 
>> give it up 
>> quite early on in life doWt we? 
" You used one vital word: "freely". For example I have chosen NOT to 
" use supermarket loyalty cards. I with have no cboicc about the NIR 
" and ID Card. 
" In addition the existing databases are all "information silos". 
" Government departments -and private companies - know what they necd " to know and no more, The NIR turns this principle on its head and 
> says "We'll record everything we can just in case it's useful". 
> Yes, there are times when we must give up information for society to 
> function, I accept that. But currently they are considered necessary 
> exceptions rather than the general rule. 
>> 31 Why is privacy more important than secuirty? Is it better to 
>> have privacy 
>> and 
>> crimes like illegal immigration or is it better to have no privacy 
>> butthe 
>> reassurance that the state knows who every mcmeber of society is 
>> and can verify 
>> that information? 
> There is no evidence that ID Cards will actually stop these crimes 
> and give us any significant extra security. Many countries have 
> compulsory ID cards and still suffer from illegal immigration, crime 
> and terrorism. 
> Privacy is essential for a free society. Without privacy it's very 
> difficult to be different, to be an individual. Or, in political 
> terms, a dissident. 
> That's why privacy is included in article 12 of the Universal 
> Declaration of Human Rights: 
> http: //www. unhchr. ch/udhr/lanfy-/eng. htm 
> We're supposedly fighting the terrorists in order to preserve our way 
> of life. If we give up that way of life then they've won. 
Trevor 
> 
--Original Message 
From: CAMERON. Davi 
To: sop0I1abanqor. ac. uk 
Sent: Friday, February 23,2007 5: 04 PM 
Subject: RE: Law & Order 
Dear Tim, 
Many thanks for taking the time to email regarding Identity 
Cards. 
You may be interested in reading the following article from our 
website about our campaign to scrap the ID cards scheme; 
http: //www. conservatives. com/tile. do? def=news. story. page&obi id- 
134901 
http: //www. conservatives. com/tile. do? def=cam2aigns. display. page& 
obj_id=134894 
I hope this information is useful and good luck with your 
project. 
Yours sincerely, 
Anna Biles 
Correspondence Secretary 
David Cameron's Office 
House of Commons 
London SWlA OAA 
www. conservatives. com 
----- original Message ----- 
From: sopOll@bangor. ac. uk (mailto: sopOll@bangor. ac. uk] 
Sent: 16 February 2007 12: 51 
To: CAMERON, David 
Subject: Law & Order 
Feedback submitted from the Conservative Party Website. 
Name: Tim Holmes 
Email: sopOll@bangor. ac. uk 
Postcode: Postcode not given 
------------------------------------------ 
Comments; 
University Of Wales Bangor Study of Identity Cards and Identity 
Fraud 
Hello my name is Tim Holmes, I am a criminologist from Bangor 
university. I am studying the use of identity cards as a means 
of combatting identity fraud. I am trying to include the views 
and opinions of all the major political parties on the proposed 
id card scheme in my study and would appreciate any comments or 
input the Conservative Party could give. My particular interest 
is in your views on should the id card be introduced and how 
effective you think it will be in combating crime? Any help You 
could give my research would be great. 
Regards 
Tim Holmes 
Address: 147.143.83.14 
Browser: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-GB; 
rv: 1.8.0.9) Gecko/20061206 Firefox/1.5.0.9 
Original Message 
From HANNEY- Matthew 
To: sýpQl 1 (@-bamor. ac. uk 
Sent: Monday, October 30,2006 6: 15 PIVI 
Subject: ID Cards 
Tim, 
Apologies for not getting back to you sooner. 
Below I have outlined the Liberal Democrat position on the points you 
raised: 
1. The government has yet to offer any conclusive proof that ID cards 
prove beneficial in the prevention of crime. Indeed, it is possible that they 
would lead to an increase in some crimes, such as fraud. Though the 
government have insisted that these cards would be impossible to forge, 
this claim is somewhat implausible. ID cards will become the "holy grail" 
to fraudsters and terrorists, and with ever developing technology it 
seems unlikely that we can be definite about their security. 
2. There has been no positive link established between the introduction 
of ID cards and a reduction in crime or terrorism. We are sceptical about 
the idea that ID cards would reduce illegal immigration. Employers in 
industries with a high level of illegal immigrant labour are already 
required to check identity documents before employing someone. It is 
the blatant disregard to this procedure which needs to be tackled (via 
inspections), rather than the question of ID cards. 
3. Obviously our alternative policies in these wide ranging areas are 
complex, and I recommend our website (www. libdems. org. uk) for more 
in-depth information. But our top policies are: with the money saved from 
not implementing the ID card scheme, we would put 10,000 more police 
on the street along with investment in extra equipment and new 
technology. 
We do support biometrics passports, believing these would be more 
effective at tackling cross border fraud, terrorism and illegal immigration. 
We also propose to establish a National Border Agency, bringing 
together officers from customs, police and immigration who currently 
have overlapping responsibilities. We back the use of phone tapping and 
other 'intercept communications' evidence in court against terrorist 
suspects. 
4. Introducing ID cards in Britain would have a huge social impact. Britain 
is a country with a strong tradition of civil liberties. Also, unlike every 
other country with ID cards, the UK does not have a written constitution 
to protect its citizens. With the relationship between state and citizen not 
properly defined by law, the risks of an abuse of state power are greater. 
ID cards will unquestionably tilt the balance of power in the UK away 
from individuals and towards the government. 
The cards could also lead to a culture of mistrust, for example ID cards 
may be required to keep an appointment with a GP. It may also lead to a 
growth in discrimination. An increase in racial and ethnic tensions as a 
result of the introduction of ID card is regrettably an all too likely 
occurrence. 
5. The possible difficulties involved in implementing a scheme on such a 
large scale are numerous. Yet such errors will have serious implications 
such as the withholding of benefits and the denial of services. 
The government has a woeful history of organising large scale IT 
projects, with large scale overspending practically the norm. ID cards will 
be the largest scale public sector IT project undertaken, and considering 
the failure of smaller government projects such as in the Police Service, 
Courts Service, CSA and NHS it is not surprisingly that we feel a lack of 
confidence in the prospects for this scheme. 
6. We are sceptical of how reliable any poll finding can be, since the 
Government still has not come clean about the real cost of this scheme 
or its draw backs. 
I hope that these answers will help. If you have any further questions feel 
free to get in touch. 
Regards, 
Matthew 
Matthew Hanney 
Policy Researcher to Nick Clegg MP 
Liberal Democrat Shadow Home Secretary 
Tel/Fax: 020 7219 0260 
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ICM Poll for No21D 
Fieldwork dates: 5-6"' September 2007 
Interview Method: Telephone, unless otherwise stated. 
Population effectively sampled: All adults aged 18+ 
adN 
Sampling Method: Within each government office region a random sample of 
telephone numbers was drawn from the entire BT database of domestic telephone 
numbers. Each number so selected had its last digit randomised so as to provide a 
sample including both listed and unlisted numbers. 
Sample size: 1,006 
Data weighting: Data were weighted to the profile of all adult.,; aged 18+ (including 
non telephone owning households). Data were weighted by sex, age-, social class, 
household tenure, work status, number of cars in the household and whether or [lot 
respondent has taken a foreign holiday in the last 3 years. Targets for the weighted 
data were derived from the National Readership survey, a random probability Survey 
comprising 34,000 random face-to-face interviews conducted annually. 
The data were further weighted by declared votes in the 2005 general election. The 
weighting scheme is designed as follows: 
Questions: The computer tables attached in PDF format show each question, in full, 
in the order they were put to respondents, all response codes and the weighted and 
un-weighted bases for all demographics and other data including but not limited th, it 
published . 
Voting figures: The vote intention cross break in this poll was included fOf afldlYsIS 
purposes only. ICM's usual vote intention questions were not asked. 
Further enquiries: nick. sparrow(O)icmi-e,; (ýarch. co. uk 
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----- Original Message ----- 
From: "T. Holmes" <sgpOl lJ&qbaflng-or. ac. uk'> 
To: <bgivens@privacy-rightsqrg> 
Sent: Monday, March 20,2006 3: 05 PM 
Subject: U. K. Id fraud study 
> Hello 
> My name is Tim Holmes I am a researcher at the University of Wales 
> Bangor. I am conducting a study in to id fraud in the U. K and the 
> possible impact of an id card system on this type of crime. 
>I was hoping you could help me, as part of my study I am looking in to 
> identity fraud in America, in particular when did identity 
> fraud/identity theft become a big issue in America, and how has your 
> country responded. 
> Any help you could give my study would be greatly appreciated. 
> Regards 
> Tim Holmes 
> T. Holmes sopO 11 nabangor. ac. uk 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Beth Givens" <bgivens naprivacyrights. org> 
TO 1 LCq)LbanZor. ac. uk> To: "T. Holmes" <so 
Sent: Saturday, March 25,2006 9: 30 PM 
Subject: Re: U. K. Id fraud study 
> Hello and sorry for the delay in responding. 
>I wish I had the answers to your questions in a single document -- or 
>I could point you to a history of id theft in the U. S. Unfortunately, 
>I don't have such a document at my fingertips. And to give you my 
> assessment would take more time than I have, sorry to say. It's a big topic. 
" The first hearing on the topic was held by the Federal Trade 
" Commission in 1996. You might be able to find some useful info in the 
" materials associated with that hearing (they call their hearings 
" workshops). I believe you! 11 find the transcripts here: 
" httn: //www. ftc-Rov/bep/workshops/idtheft/index. htnil 
" Here are some links that you might find useful for older materials: 
" bttp: //www. ftc. Rov/os/1998/05/identhef. htm 
" http: //www. ftc. Rov/os/1998/05/identhcf. htm 
" ANd we have a page that links you to various id theft surveys: 
" http: //www. privacyriphts. org/ar/idtheftstirveys. htm 
> Good luck! 
> Beth Givens 
> At 06: 05 AM 3/20/2006, you wrote: 
>>Hello 
>>My name is Tim Holmes I am a researcher at the University of Wales 
>>Bangor. I am conducting a study in to id fraud in the UX and the 
>>possible impact of an id card system on this type of crime. 
>>I was hoping you could help me, as part of my study I am looking in 
>xo identity fraud in America, in particular when did identity 
>>fraud/identity theft become a big issue in America, and how has your 
>>country responded. 
>>Any help you could give my study would be greatly appreciated. 
>>Regards 
>>Tim Holmes 
>>T. Holmes sonO II nabangor. ac. uk 
" The information, advice, and suggestions contained in this email 
" should be used as an information source and not as legal advice. 
> Beth Givens, Director 
> Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
> 3100 - 5th Ave., Suite B 
> San Diego, CA 92103 
> Voice: 619-298-3396 
> Fax: 619-298-5681 
> bgivens2privacyrights. org 
> http: //www. t)rivacyrights. orli 
> ... H"i"" ... "IIIIIIIIIIIII+111ii 
" Join our email newsletter. 
" httl2: //www. privacyriQhts. oro-/subscribe. htmi 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "T. Holmes" <sopQ II 4D ban o nac. ukk> --J-0 -g2_ To: "Beth Givens" <bgivensoa privacyrights. org> 
Sent: Monday, March 27,2006 1: 04 PM 
Subject: U. K. Id fraud study 
> Hi 
> Tbanks for responding to my e-mail. I am about to look through the stuff 
> you have sent me. I would have liked a big history of id theft in the 
> US but I am not surprised that it isn't easy to find. From my research 
>I have found that id theft/id fraud is a subject which generally doesn't 
> receive much academic attention or research. (Apart from the US and the 
> U. K the only other place in the world that looks at Id fraud is Australia] 
> Thanks for the information 
> All the Best 
> Tim Holmes 
> T. Holmes soI201 I nabangor. ac. uk 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Beth Givens" <bgivensnqprivacyrikhts. org> 
To: "T. Holmes" <sW0 I 10a ba r. aLc,, uk> 
Sent: Monday, March 27,2006 8: 55 PM 
Subject: Re: U. K. Id fraud study 
>I know of a PhD student who is studying id thell for her 
> dissertation. She's from Rutgers Univ and is visiting my office later 
> this week. 
> Her contact info is: 
> Megan McNally 
> mrnmI5 I @pep-asus. rutizers. edu 
> Perhaps she has run across a general history of the subject. 
> Another possible resource is Judith Collins, Phl), of Michigan State 
> Univ. She has established an id theft center 
>Judithc(a_ýmsu. edu 
> www. ci. msu. edu/-outreach/identity/ 
> Good luck! 
> bg 
> At 04: 04 AM 3/27/2006, you wrote: 
>>Hi 
>>Thanks for responding to my e-mail. I am about to look through the 
>>stuff you have sent me. I would have liked a big history of id theft 
>>in the US but I am not surprised that it isWt easy to find. From 
>>my research I have found that id theft/id fraud is a subject which 
>>generally doesn't receive much academic attention or research. 
>>[Apart from the US and the UX the only other place in the world 
>>that looks at Id fraud is Australia] 
>>Thanks for the information 
>>All the Best 
>>Tim Holmes 
>>T. Holmes sopOll 0abangonac. uk 
> The information, advice, and suggestions contained in this cmail 
> should be used as an information source and not as legal advice. 
> Beth Givens, Director 
> Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
>3 100 - Sth Ave., Suite B 
> San Diego, CA 92103 
> Voice: 619-298-3396 
>Fax: 619-298-5681 
> bgivensnaprivacyligbts. org 
> http: //www. privacyrights. org 
> Join our email newsletter. 
> http: //www. privacyrijzhts. org/subscribe. litml 
> 
> 
----- Original Message 
From: ers. edu> 
To: "T. Holmes" <ýM' r. ac. uk> 
Sent: Wednesday, March 29,2006 4: 21 PM 
Subject: Re: U. K ID FRAUD Study 
> Hi Tim, 
> I'm still in the process of trying to answer some of these questions 
> myself, but I'll be happy to share what I do know. You may already have 
> this (see attached), but you might want to take a look at the literature 
> review I co-wrote, which generally covers the state of identity theft in 
> the U. S. through the end of 2004. The basic conclusion is that the issue 
> over here is a big mess and it has actually gotten worse in the past year. 
> The terms "identity theft" and "identity fraud" are often used 
> interchangeably here - and its been almost 10 years since it was first 
> criminalizcd. There really is no consensus on their relationship, but my 
> basic understanding is that identity fraud describes an instance in which 
> someone fraudulently claims to be another person (whether real or 
> ficticious). In this way, identity theft is a subcategory of identity 
> fraud (some also consider both to be categories of "identity crime"). 
> Identity fraud is also defined in relation to "third parties" - that is an 
> institution of some type, while identity theft can only properly be used 
> in relation to the owner of an identity. Generally, this means an 
> individual, but some collective identities have been "stolen" (i. e., 
> fraudulent activities are committed using the name of an institution). 
> I'm not that familiar with the UK literature, but here the term is also 
> used to describe credit card and bank fraud, which frankly is rediculous. 
>> Hello 
>> My name is Tim Holmes I am a Phd student at the University of Wales 
> Bangor. I am conducting a study assessing the impact of an identity card 
> system [which the UX will adopt in 20081 on the levels and nature of 
> identity fraud in the U. K. 
>> As part of my study I am looking at id theft U. S. A, I was told that you 
> are also studying identity theft and may be able to help me. I am trying 
> to establish the development of id theft in your country- when was the 
> term first used and why. 
>> I am also trying to establish what definitions of id theft/ id fraud are 
> used in the U. S. Here in the U. K [and in Australia] there is no 
>> consensus on what constitutes id thcft and whether or not it is 
>> different to id fraud. 
>> Any help you could give me would be greatly appreciated, 
>> Regards 
>> Tim Holmes 
>> T. Holmes sopO II naban gor. ac. uk 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: Yers. edu> 
g2 K To: "T. Holmes" <soT0_U0a-ba-n r-. ac. uk-> 
Sent: Wednesday, March 29,2006 5: 47 PM 
Subject: Re: U. K ID FRAUD Study 
> Hi Tim, 
> Sorry, but I think I accidentally sent you half an email earlier. I'm not 
> sure what got sent so some of this may be repeated. 
> I'm still in the process of trying to answer some of these questions 
> myself, but III be happy to share what I do know. You may already have 
> this (see attached), but you might want to take a look at the literature 
> review I co-wrote, which generally covers the state of identity theft in 
> the U. S. through the end of 2004. The basic conclusion is that the issue 
> over here is a big mess and it has actually gotten worse in the past year. 
>I am working to update this review as part of my dissertation, but I 
> won't be finished until this summer. 
> The terms "identity thefl" and "identity fraud" are often used 
> interchangeably here - and its been almost 10 years since it was first 
> criminalized. There really is no consensus on their relationship, but my 
> basic understanding is that identity fraud describes an instance in which 
> someone fraudulently claims to be another person (whether real or 
> ficticious). In this way, identity theft is a subcategory of identity 
> fraud (some also consider both to be categories of "identity crime"). 
> Identity fraud is also defined in relation to "third parties" - that is an 
> institution/business of some type, while identity theft can only properly 
> be used in relation to the owner of an identity. Generally, this means an 
> individual, but some collective identities have been "stolen" (i. e., 
> fraudulent activities arc committed using the name of an institution). As 
> such, when an offender uses my name to open a new credit card account, I 
> am a victim of identity theft (because it's my identity) while the credit 
> card company and any business in which the account is used arc victims of 
> identity fraud. 
> I'm not that familiar with the UK literature, but here the term is also 
> used to describe credit card and other types of routine fraud, which 
> frankly is rediculous. The term "true name fraud" was developed by the 
> credit card industry (and perhaps used in some other types of financial 
> industries) to distinguish real identities (individuals) from Ue 
> identities. Now the term is used (albeit sparingly) to describe what I 
> consider to be the real victims of identity theft - those whose identities 
> are actually assumed. Generally, this can be understood as "new 
> activities" or when an offender uses a victim's name/personal information 
> to lead a sort of parallel life. They may open a new line of credit, 
> obtain a loan or employment, or give the information to the police. 
> Essentially, the victim can be unaware of new activities for a long time - 
> at least as long as it takes for the offender's actions to catch up to 
> them. But as I mentioned, the term is also used to describe a number of 
> "existing activities" - when offenders misuse existing resources (bank, 
> credit card, Internet/email, telephone and utilities accounts). So, in 
> other words, the victims life/lifestyle is directly affected but they find 
> out about it sooner and they are unlikely to suffer damages as a result. 
> To complicate these matters even more, the tenn identity theft is now used 
> to describe any instance in which personal information is wrongfully 
> obtained, particularly in relation to database breaches. In my opinion, 
> the offense of identity theft has not been completed until the information 
> has been misused, but the potential for such misuse is largely being 
> exploited in the absence of evidence that anything happened as a result of 
>a breach. 
> In terms of where the term came from, the first U. S. reference to 
> "identity theft" I have found is in a 1989 article published in the 
> Sun-Sentinel (Florida), entitled " Identity theft besmirches victims, 
> records. " (I have not specifically searched the literature of other 
> countries for the origin of the term, so if you have any information about 
> this I'd appreciate it). I've actually been in touch with the author 
> (Mike Billington) who claims his editor really came up with the term. I 
> haven't been able to track down the editor to find out whether he heard 
> the term from someplace else, but I do doubt that he actually conicd the 
> term. The first reference to the term "identity thicr, actually appeared 
> seven years earlier in the 1982 obituary of Ferdinand Waldo Demara, Jr. 
> His life story was the inspiration for the 1959 book/ 1960 movie "The Great 
> Imposter. " I just got my hands on the book, and I'm trying to find out 
> whether the term identity theft was specifically used. Atanyrate, itis 
>a common sense way to describe it, so who knows where it actually came 
> from. Before that, there were a number of cases of "identity assumption" 
> or "assumed identity", which obviously refers to the same thing. I've got 
> newspaper stories going back to the 1800's that fit the description of 
> what is now collectively known as identity theft, and there are a handful 
> of historical examples practically dating back to the bible ... not to 
> mention literary examples like the Prince and the Pauper. 
> The question of why the term is used now is more difficult to answer - and 
> its actually one of the questions I'm trying to answer in my research. 
> The party line is that its a product of the information age (specifically 
> the use of computers and the Internet, and our increasing reliance on 
> information to conduct routine business). This makes a certain amount of 
> sense, but its really speculation. There's no specific evidence to back 
> this up right now, particularly with regard to the use of computers or the 
> Internet either to obtain personal information or misuse it. The second 
> half of the party line is that it was criminalized to recognize individual 
> victims (i. e., the shift from identity fraud to theft). Before the 
> mid-1990s, individuals were not considered victims of "identity fraud". 
> There is something fishy about this to me though since 
> the laws that criminalized identity theft really have nothing to do with 
> victims. 
> I'm actually leaving for California on Friday to speak with some of the 
> people who were involved with the initial movement to criminalize identity 
> theft. The whole thing seems to have generated from public interest 
> groups there, so I'm going to find out for myself what actually happened 
> since there is little published before 1998.1 also have some interviews 
> scheduled for when I return with a few other people who were involved in 
> the beginning. Hopefully, I'll have a better answer to this in a few 
> weeks and I'll let you know what I find out. 
> As for my personal opinion, I believe identity assumption is a problem 
> because it can seriously damage individual lives and is a real pain to 
> clear up, but these cases only constitute about one-third (or 1.5% of the 
> population) of the 10 million victims estimated by our government. The 
> rates are inflated because they've included credit card fraud, but 
> underestimated to a degree because they exclude deceased victims and 
> children under the age of 18. My research, therefore, is examining the 
> use of identity theft as a pretext for other agendas. Specifically, I'm 
> looking at the phenomenon as a moral panic, and I believe the whole thing 
> is tied to the aftermath of 9/11. From what I've found so far, there was 
> actually very little attention paid to the topic before 2002 even when the 
> entire country was rushing to criminalize it, but its now a household term 
> that is used without qualification. 
>I hope all of this helps. As you might have guessed, I could talk about 
> this stuff for hours. I'm also interested in hearing your perspectives on 
> the development of identity theft in the UK. I will be gone for about a 
> week, but I will let you know what I come up with after the interviews are 
> complete. 
> Megan 
>> Hello 
>> My name is Tim Holmes I am a Phd student at the University of Wales 
> Bangor. I am conducting a study assessing the impact of an identity card 
> system [which the UX will adopt in 20081 on the levels and nature of 
> identity fraud in the U. K. 
>> As part of my study I am looking at id theft U. S. A, I was told that you 
> are also studying identity theft and may be able to help me. I am trying 
> to establish the development of id theft in your country-when was the 
> term first used and why. 
>> I am also trying to establish what definitions of id theft/ id fraud arc 
> used in the U. S. Here in the U. K [and in Australia] there is no 
>> consensus on what constitutes id theft and whether or not it is 
>> different to id fraud. 
>> Any help you could give me would be greatly appreciated. 
>> Regards 
>> Tim Holmes 
>> T. Holmes sopOl IP-bangor. ac. u 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: wrs. edu> 
To: "T. Holmes" <-su-011 0a-ba--9Z-0r-ac. uk> 
Sent: Thursday, March 3 0,2006 3: 51 PM 
Subject: Re: U. K ID FRAUD 
> Hi again, 
> It sounds like the issue has developed about the same as it has here, only 
> we really didift have one precipitating incident. In fact, it's like 
> identity theft sprang out of the ground one day. What year was the Derek 
> Bond incident by the way? I've never heard of it and I came up with a few 
> thousand hits when I did a search. 
> As you mention, id theft is linked over here with terrorism, illegal 
> immigration, organized crime, benefits fraud, and the kitchen sink. I 
> know the UK has been fighting over the issue of national identity cards 
> for a while, and the first proposal for one over here appeared about 30 
> years ago. The issue was resurrected after 9/11, with the obvious desire 
> to fight terrorism, but this soon morphed into protection against identity 
> theft and other social ills. The fcdcral government hasjust passed the 
> Real ID Act of 2005, which attempts to reform drivers licenses with the 
> stated purpose of addressing illegal immigration, but their plan 
> essentially creates a national ID card. Our government has also been 
> fiddling around with their plan for Total Information Awareness (aka, Big 
> Brother), and even though the plan was voted down several times, it keeps 
> resurging in different forms. Whether they say so officially or not, the 
> FBI/CIA and other agencies have been creating a national information 
> database on its citizens, and they are in cahoots with private industries 
> who routinely collect and sell our personal information. 
> All of this has also been accompanied by claims that id theft is a growing 
> menace and that is has become an epidemic, but of course there is no 
> evidence (or only cooked evidence) to support such claims. I'm still 
> trying to locate the origin of that one, but from what I can tcl II right 
>now it came from a New York or a California senator. Doyouknowwliat 
> year this claim surfaced in the UK? 
> Can you also give me the citation information for the Frank Nesbitt 
> thesis? I'm basically looking at the same issue, but ifs a bit more 
> complicated in the US. It seems like the momentum of id theft was started 
> by victim advocates, but I know the finaicial industries (particularly 
> credit card companies) had a hand in it. The government was kind of slow 
> to react, but there really is no separation between the government and 
> private industries over here, and this is obvious in the laws that have 
> since been passed in the so-called area of "consumer protection". I 
> definately think that private industries have attempted to turn the 
> collective lemons of their predicament into lemonade by selling insurance, 
> paper shredders, etc, but it doesn't necessarily fit that they concocted 
> the whole thing for that purpose. The federal government seems a more 
> likely culprit in terms of their plans for total information awareness, 
> but the issue of identity theft seems to predate their goal of world 
> domination. At any rate, I'd really like to take a look at the Nesbitt 
> thesis considering the connections. Hopefully, I'll get sonic answers I 
> need in CA, but I'll let you know. 
> Megan 
>> Hello Megan 
>> As someone who can talk the car off a donkey about id fraud [I live on a 
>> farm so tbat' sa provable statemcntl]l am glad to find someone who will 
>> talk for hours about id fraud. 
>> I use the term id fraud more than id theft because id fraud is a term 
>> that was first used in the UX in 2000 in a paper by Mike Levi and 
>> Gareth Jones [for a couple of years this was all the academic work- I had 
>> on the subject]. 
>> Since then there have been a few who have done work on the subject - 
>> Prof Martin Gill 
>> m. gillnaVeU2etuitXRrou12. com 
>> Dr Natasha Sernmens 
>> N. C. Sernmens na-sheffield. ac, uk 
>> Dr Emily Finch 
>> E. Finch nmuea. ac. uk 
>> As I mentioned before there is no consensus on what id theft or what id 
>> fraud is. Most definitions vary on the grounds of duration of the crime 
>> or on the scope of criminal activity covered by the terms id theft and 
>> id fraud. What is clear is that id fraud has become a concern in the U. K 
>> when discussing -Terrorism, use of the internet, illegal immigration 
>> [within this are some forms of organised crime], fraud against the 
>> credit industry and personal safety of UX citizens. I have outlined 
>> below some of the reasons for this - 
>> Id fraud was not a big issue in the UX until the Derck Bond incident. 
>> I don't know if you have heard of this case, an old man is thrown in a 
>> South African jail for three weeks because someone was using his 
>> identity in the U. S. A to commit crime. I do not know how much coverage 
>> this case got in America but it was big here and it was such a big news 
>> story that it kick started the news mcdia! s interest in people who had 
>> lost their identity. Subsequent stories were not as big or shocking but 
>> they did demonstrate that everyone was at risk, and the media made 
>> point of showing how little people were aware of the risk they faced. 
>> Recently we had another big id fraud case, this was a man who claimed to 
>> be Lord Christopher Buckingham for 23 years when in fact Christopher 
>> Buckingham had died as a baby. The man claiming to be Christopher 
>> Buckingham gad built a life for himself with this identity. tic had a 
>> wife and two kids and a job as good job and had all the documentation 
>> that the real Christopher Buckingham would have had. I Ic was caught when 
>> he used his passport on a trip back from France. There had been a 
>> cross-referencing of passports with the register of deaths while the man 
>> claiming to be Christopher Buckingham had been away. Further 
>> investigation showed that he had stolen Christopher Buckingham's 
>> identity and the man was imprisoned for two years for providing false 
>> information on a passport application. What made the case even more 
>> newsworthy was that the man refused to divulge his real identity. Ile 
>> even denied his children when they asked to know who he really was. This 
>> has lead some to speculate about why he rcfuse to divulge his real 
>> identity. [I have digressed a bit, sorry, I told you I like talking 
>> about this subjectl I] 
>> The Derek Bond case got mixed up with the September II th terrorist 
>> attacks, concern over state benerit fraud and the rise in illegal 
>> immigration in the UX and created a national interest in finding out 
>> who's who. The credit industry here has been very instrumental in 
>> raising awareness of id fraud there is a group called the Crcdit 
>> Industry Fraud Avoidance System [CIFAS www. ciffis. orgaikl they and 
others 
>> from the credit industry have put forward this figurc of 1.3billion 
>> pounds per year lost because of id fraud. This figure pops up every 
>> where in discussions of id fraud. CIFAS was also one of the first to 
>> claim that id fraud was the fastest growing crime in the U. K. I read a 
>> MA dissertation from a guy called Frank Nesbitt, lie argues that the 
>> phenomena of id fraud was constructed by the crcdit industry so they 
>> could sell protection against id theft 
>> The U. K government's response has been to create the National Identity 
>> Fraud Unit which is a part of the Department for Works and Pensions. 
>> They deal with fraud in the state bend it system and advise on how to 
>> detect id fraud. 
>> The government also put forward the National Identity Card Scheme. One 
>> of the key selling points the government put forward for the id card 
>> [and the one my study looks at] is its use as a crime prevention tool. 
>> Without much in the way of research or consensus on what id fraud is the 
>> government has decided that the solution to id fraud was a 
>> bio-metrically secure id card. 
>> Id cards are a big issue here, many are opposed to their introduction on 
>> the grounds of civil liberties and right to privacy. What doesn't get 
>> much attention is the practicalities of the system. People get hung up 
>> on the question of whether or not we should have an id card that they 
>> rarely stop to ask if it will work as a prcvcnter of id fraud. The 
>> London School of Economics has done some work which is critical of the 
>> id card. There is a guy from the LSE called Simon Davies who has a web 
>> site called Privacy International http: //www. privacyintemitional. org/ 
>> Mostly when you talk about id fraud in the U. K the conversation usually 
>> turns to id cards and vice versa. I am interested in looking at America 
>> and Australia because my understanding is that id cards don't play much 
>> of a part in discussions on id fraud. I am trying to see if there is an 
>> alternative the UX could use to id cards. 
>> if you are interested in international accounts of id fraud/id thcft I 
>> have found that the U. K, U. S. A and Australia are tile only places that 
>> are researching id fraud. I recently started talking to James Blindell 
>> from the Australian Centre for Policing Research. 
>> I have to end this email know my fingers are starting to hurt 
>> Thanks for the help 
>> All the Best 
>> Tim 
>> T. Holmes soVO II O)ban-gor. ac. tik 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: <mmml5lQregasus. rutgers. cdq> 
To: "T. Holmes" <snQ II Ca ban or. ac. uk> 'gng2Lqsýý 
Sent: Wednesday, April 05,2006 4: 51 PM 
Subject: Re: U. K ID FRAUD 
> Hi Tim, 
> Thanks for the info and the article on Derek Bond. My trip was 
> informative to a degree, but I haven't quite figured out how the whole 
> thing started yet. I'll be speaking with two more people next week, and 
> will begin putting together a time line of the events I've learned about. 
> It certainly seems at this point that private industries had a large role 
> from the very beginning. It is also clear that the federal government has 
> since passed weak preemtive legislation in favor of businesses 
> (wishy-washy stuff that states must follow regardless of their own 
> regional laws), so I'll have to do some more digging to figure out how 
> they are involved. No one could really tell me when or why the term 
> identity theft came to be used, but I'll keep you posted as I find out 
> more. 
> Megan 
>> Hi 
>> The Derek Bond incident was in 2003, his id was stolen 14 years before 
>> his arrest by a man called Derek Lloyd Sykes. Sykes was a British man 
>> living in Houston Texas where he was part of a telemarketing scant. In 
>> 1999 Sykes [using Mr Bonds nanie] was indicted for money laundering, wire 
>> fraud and transporting stolen property. This resulted in the F. B. 1 
>> issuing a warrant for the arrest of Derek Bond, when Mr Bond went on 
>> holiday to South Africa he was arrested and put in jail for three weeks. 
>> Meanwhile the F. B. I caught Sykes- now using the name Robert James Grant 
>> in Las Vegas. This was a big deal in the U. K because Mr Bond was a 72 
>> year old man who wasn't even aware his identity had been stolen and the 
>> conditions in the South African jail were really bad. 
>> Frank Nesbitt is a police officer from Northumbria I can give you his 
>> e-mail address, frank. nesbitt. 1279C(iýnorthumbria. 12nii. police. tik 
>> I am not sure if his dissertation is available except ftorn Frank. 
>> All the Best 
>> Tim 
>> T. Holmes soVO1 I Ca bangonac. uk 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: <mmml5l e asus. rutgers. edu> 
To: "T. Holmes" <-sov-0 
LIILCa -b-a-R9-0r-ac-uk> Sent: Wednesday, April 26,2006 8: 29 PM 
Subject: Re: Id Fraud 
> Hi Tim, 
> My holiday went well, thanks. I actually spent most of it coding data, so 
> it sounds as if we both had a productive easter. Tlianks for the info on 
> KnightsBridge, I've never heard of them. I havedt heard the term 
> "impersonation" per se, but I've seen several allusions to "The Great 
> Imposter" -a book that was written in the 1950s and later become a movie 
> in the 1960s. A similar term that I've seen used is "assumption". I 
> actually prefer this term myself for different reasons, but there is no 
> consistency in the literature. I've also heard the term "cloning" lately, 
> but it is used in different ways. 
> The situation in the US sounds similar to the one in the UK - it is not 
> against the law to impersonate someone, but there is a fine line between 
> impersonation and slander (which is still not identity theft). Its also 
> not strictly against the law to possess the personal information of 
> someone else, but it is against the law to steal it. I've done a little 
> work on this aspect, because I think there has been much talk about 
> stealing identities and not enough clarity regarding what exactly is being 
> stolen. When I have those sections edited I'll send them to you. 
>I personally think the issue of ownership is critical, although it 
> receives little attention. The identity at stake in an identity theft 
> is largely a social construction - pieces of information that are tied to 
> my physical/emotional self. Much of that information has been bestowed 
> upon me (my name, my social security number, my credit card number, ctc. ), 
> but each is (in theory) a unique identifier of me - thus, now part of my 
> identity. Imagine if one day banks or credit card companies claimed 
> ownership over account numbers, saying they were theirs to do as they like 
> with them. It wouldift happen obviously because that number is now mine 
> regardless of how it was assigned to me. 
> Unfortunately, there are few controls regarding how corporations treat 
> your personal information once it is given to them. Many companies sell 
> information for a profit - but I don't make any money from it and Fin now 
> beseiged by telemarkers and spam. If my identity were truly my own, 
> however, companies would have to ask before sharing or selling my personal 
> information. That would certainly be a startl I can't see any reason to 
> give someone else the right to own or control the "personal information" 
> that constitutes my identity - whether financial, emotional or physical. 
> If I have to pay the ultimate price for its misuse, then I should have 
> ultimate control over what is done with it. 
> The answer to your question then is - whatever information is tied to me 
> or used to identify me should rightfully belong to me (in my opinion). 
> You can't separate a persoWs physical being from their social being, so 
> you shouldn't be able to control social information at tile potential 
> expense of the physical person. I think the real answer though is that we 
> NEED to claim ownership of it - it is certainly not being given to us. 
> For me, it is a philosophical question - my identity reflects my existence 
> and my rights in society. Many things -are lost to expedience, but tile 
> only thing I can ever truly own in this world is myself. And if I start 
> handing over the keys to the castle one by one, eventually I'll be locked 
> out. Perhaps even more to the point - if I don't own my identity then who 
> will? Who can I trust enough to manage my identity with my own interests 
> in mind? - no one that I can think of. 
> I'm babbling now, but this whole thing boils down to the control of 
> physical identities as well - DNA tests, fingerprints, national id 
> cards ... etc. All of a sudden 
its against the law to dye your hair or wcar 
> colored contacts, then blood samples will be taken every time you board a 
> plane or enter a government building; eventually we will have little chips 
> implanted in us (instead of our id cards) so we can be scanned in a more 
> orderly fashion. Ownership of information tidbits is how it begins, but 
> it can very easily open the door to other forms of identity ownership and 
>I say no to all of it. 
>Hopefully, I haven't bored you with my rantings. I just don't think its 
> fair (considering its intrinsic value to me and its market value on the 
> street) that my identity should be up for grabs. I am interested though 
> in hearing more about your views on national id cards and your impressions 
> on the question of ownership. 
> Megan 
>> Hi 
>> Hope you had a good caster, just got back after three week holiday [I 
> say holiday, I spent three weeks shifting fire wood on the farmll I have 
> been searching the web and have come accross this group called Knights 
> Bridge Castle. [http: //www. knightsbridgecastle. com/index. litmll Its a 
> group that provides support for victims of identity thell in America, I 
> mention them because I read somewhere on their wcbsite that they don't 
> like the term id theft or id fraud becuase they don't believe that it is 
> possible to steal somones identity. They have stories from victims of id 
> theft where they said they prefer the term impersonation. I lave you come 
> accorss this distinction before in your work? 
>> I had not considered the issue of ownership that much in my work I 
> acknowledge that everyone has an identity but can we claim ownership of 
> it? In the UX it is not illegal to use someone clses name or do an 
> impersonation, for example when people impersonte ceicbritics like Elvis. 
> At what point do you think we can claim to own an identity or what parts 
> of an identity can be seen as exclusive to the legitinate holder of the 
> identity? 
>> All the Best 
>> Tim 
>> T. Holmes sopQ II abangor. ac. uk 
>> Gall y neges e-bost hon, ac unrhyw atodiadau. a anfonwyd gyda hi, gynnwys 
> deunydd cyfrinachol ac wedi eu bwriadu Vw dcfnyddion unig gan y sawl y 
> cawsant eu cyfeirio ato (atynt). Os ydych wedi derbyn y neges c-bost hon 
> trwy gamgymeriad, rhowch wybod ir anfonwr ar 
>> unwaith a dilawch y neges. Os na fwriadwyd anfort y negcs atoch chi, 
> rhaid i chi beidio a defnyddio, cadw neu ddatgelu unrhyw wybodaeth a 
> gynhwysir ynddi. Mae unrhyw farn neu safbwynt yn ciddo i'r sawl a'i 
> hanfonodd yn unig ac nid yw o anghenraid yn cynrychioli barn 
>> Prifysgol Cymru, Bangor. Nid yw Prifysgol Cymru, Bangor yn gwarantu bod 
>y neges e-bost hon neu unrhyw atodiadau yn rhydd rhag firysau neu 100% yn 
> ddiogel. Oni bai fod hyn wedi ei ddatgan yn uniongyrchol yn nhestun yr 
> e-bost, nid bwriad y neges e-bost hon yw ffurfio contract rhWymol - mac 
> rhestr o lofhodwyr awdurdodcdig ar gael o Swyddfa 
>> Cyllid Prifysgol Cymru, Bangor. www. bgngor. ac. uk 
>> This email and any attachments may contain confidential material and is 
> solely for the use of the intended recipient(s). If you have received 
> this email in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete this 
> email. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you must not use, retain 
> or disclose any information contained in this email. Any views or 
> opinions are solely those of the sender and do not necessarily 
> represent those of the University of Wales, Bangor. Tlie University of 
> Wales, Bangor does not guarantee that this email or any attachments are 
> free from viruses or 100% secure. Unless 
>> expressly stated in the body of the text of the email, this email is not 
> intended to form a binding contract -a list of outhorised 
>> signatories is available from the University of Wales, Bangor Finance 
> Office. www. banfior. ac. uk 
-- Origipal Me ' 
ssagp 
From: roSe300 williams@ýahb6co. 10 
To: rose300 williams6W-y4tQ2--CO-J-2 
Sent: Tuesday, December 04,2007 10: 02 PM 
Subject: (Spam? ) From miss williams 
Front: rose williants. 
Abidjan Cote d'ivoire 
WestAfrica. 
"I 
Dearest One, 
Good day to you. 
My name is Miss rose williams and am 19 years old. Is ftly pleasure sending 
you this message. I am requesting you to go through it carefully and get back 
to me the soonest. 
I am contactactingyoufor a business venture which I intend to establish In 
your country. Though we have not met before, Ifirmly believe, thalyou will 
not lead me astray afterfervent prayers andfasting. 
There is this huge amount of nine millionfive hundred thousand US dollars 
($9.5m) which my late Father Mr. Albert wiliams depositedfor me in a 
Security Company here in A bidian before he was assassinated by unknown 
persons during the war in our country Cote d7voire. Ile intentionally 
deposited it. asfamily valuablesfor its safe keeping in the Security Company. 
Now, I have decided to invest this money In your country or anywhere safe 
enough outside Africafor security and political reasons. Iwant you to assist 
me claim and retrieve thisfundfrom lite Security Company and transfer it 
into yourpersonal account in your countryfor investinent, I will cheerish It if 
you can consider these listed areas belowfor the investment. 
P. Telecommunication. 
2). The Transport Industry. 
3). Five Star Hotel. 
I will bepleased andgrateful offeringyou 20% ofthe total 
fund as compensationfor your kind gesture and assistance. 
God bless you and i awaityour soonest response. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Miss rose. willianis 
New Design Yahoo! JAPAN 2008/01/01 
-- Original Message 
From: Wria Stevens 
To: mmaria stevens70(cD-yahoo. corn 
Sent: Monday, March 26,2007 5: 47 PM 
Subject: {Spam? ) My Dear Friend 
My Dear Friend, 
This letter might come to you as a surprise as we have not met before, but I 
believe that you would be compelled to help me after going through the contents 
of this letter. My name is Maria Del Carmen Stevens a swedish, my meeting with 
Mr David Yendall Stevens in south affica led us into marriage. my husband Mr 
David stevens; who is now late fanner and exporter of Tobacco in the Republic of 
Zimbabwe, he was shot dead allegedly by ZANU-PF supporters in zimbabwe on 
25th of april 2000 in the farm. You can confirm this by copying and pasting this 
link on your internet browser. or click on it: 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/africa/725643. stm, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/africa/818766. stm 
He (Robert Mugabe) did not stop at that; he also went on to expel all White 
farmers in Zimbabwe. He implored the services of his war veterans to undertake 
this seizure. The war veterans have been accused (correctly) of being behind the 
violent occupation of white-owned commercial farms in which an estimated 
70,000 farm workers have been displaced. At least, over hundreds white farmers 
and black settlers have been killed since the farm invasions began in February 
2000. Wc have decided that we must see this problem to the end. 
Although we know that we are taking a great risk by staying here in Zimbabwe, 
At the Moment, our phone lines are bugged, and all our movements are being 
monitored by Zimbabwe's (Robert Mugabe)sccret Police. Therefore email is the 
safest means of communication for now. 
We (White farmers in Zimbabwe) have taken our case to the United Nations and 
even with the threats of transactions and the subsequent sanctions from the West 
against the Zimbabwean Authorities, Robert Mugabe (I"he president of Zimbabwe) 
still remains adamant. 
He is insisting that our farm land (some of which we bought with our money and 
most of which We inherited from our fathers) belongs to the (his) government of 
Zimbabwe. the government of zimbabwe has asked all white-farmers to give up 
their farms to black farmers or risk going to prison. So far, more than 1,400 white 
owned farms have been invaded and confiscated, as well as claiming the 
properties of the farmers. Also, about 133 white farmers were arrested for defying 
the orders to leave their farms under the controversial land reform program of the 
government, 
Since I could not keep the money in Zimbabwe, I used the services of a 
Diplomatic Courier Company to move this money (registered as official 
documents) out of Zimbabwe to Europe. At present, my money totaling 
US$28,750,000. (Twenty eight million, seven hundred and fifty thousand United 
States Dollars) is in Europe and hopefully, it would be paid into an offshore 
account. Can you help me? Are you trustworthy? Can you handle this money? Are 
you capable of handling this money? If you can, please contact inc. All you need 
to do is to claim this money from the Courier Company. 
You will be required to contact the Courier Company that moved this money 
(official documents) out of Zimbabwe to Europe. All necessary particulars which 
can facilitate and enable you claim the money on my behalf will be forwarded to 
you as soon as your consent to proceed is received. For your assistance you will 
be entitled to have 20% of the total sum. You are also obliged to help/advise on 
the proper and most convenient way of investing this money in your country, 
Hopefully, You will consider this request and respond positively. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Maria Stevens 
----- Original Message ..... 
From: "Mr. Paul Cooper" <paulcooper J nalatamailxom> 
To: <sqpO I laban or-ac. ukK> gqL- 
Sent: Saturday, June 30,2007 8: 37 PM 
Subject: {SpwnHigh? ) Reply Asap... 
> Hello, 
>I AM MR Paul Cooper, A SOUTH AFRICAN working with SENEGAL 
BRANCH OF CREDIT MUTUAL DU SENEGAL AS THE MANAGER. My 
apologies if you find my mail intruding, i do not intend to offend you but only 
wish to use this medium to propose a business transaction to you which i believe 
would be of financial benefits to both of us if you agree to work with me. 
> Firstj would like you to know that i would understand if you take this 
proposal to be some scam or hoax as i would probably think the same in your 
place. I also receive a lot of sparn. mails all the time which to be honest with you 
is how i got the idea of contacting you through this medium from. 1 want to 
assure you this is a real and genuine business. 
>I am sorryj can only give you a few details of the transaction at this moment 
as i am not sure of your position yet and would not want to risk destroying 
everything i have worked hard for so far by being carefree and disclosing vital 
information's at this point that could get me into troublej have to be sure you are 
willing to work with me before i can give you the full details including my 
personal informatioWs. 
> The total amount involved is around NINE MILLION UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA DOLLARS and all i need from you is to help me get the funds over 
to you safely, i have everything all worked out and there would be no risk or 
danger in this transaction. 
> If you are willing to co-operate with me on this deal feel free to give me a call 
or write me ASAP indicating your sincere interest and for further information's 
and any questions you might wish to ask me. Thanks for your time and i look 
forward to a positive response from you soon. 
" Thanks, 
" Paul Cooper 
" Email: p2cooper@box. az 
" Telephone: +221-440-9966 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Lesley Malone" <Lesley. Malonenavictimsupport. org. uk> 
To: <so. V01 1 @, ban or-. ac. uk> nu- 
Sent: Thursday, September 07,2006 1.24 PM 
Subject: RE: Study of Identity Theft 
> Dear Tim 
> Thank you for your email, and my apologies for not replying sooner. 
> The statistical data that Victim Support collects shows the number of fraud 
victims we support, but does not unfortunately break the information down any 
further so it is not possible to tell whether these were victims of identity 
fraud/theft or other types. Fraud accounts for less than I% of referrals to Victim 
Support overall, although it is part of our core service, (ie all Victim Support 
branches must offer a service to fraud victims). This means basically that 
information, practical help and emotional support as described in Victim 
Support's service model must be offered, to the specified standard, and branches 
must refer a victim on to another agency where they are better placed to offer 
the help or support required, and the person supported requests this. 
> Just to touch on your point about victims approaching us - most victims are 
referred to us by the police when they report a crime, and the number of self. 
referrals we receive is very low (around 2%). We are also aware that although 
there is a formal agreement with the police that they should pass on details on all 
victims (except some agreed exceptions) that this does not always happen in 
practice, and it may be that victims of identity fraud who report it to the police 
are not always referred to us, for whatever reason. 
>I hope this is useful - sorry not to be able to give you much information on this 
subject, but if you have any other questions about Victim Suppores services or 
policies, I'll be happy to try and help. 
> With best wishes 
> Lesley Malone 
> Information Officer, Victim Support National Office 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: T. Holmes [mailto: sopO II @bangor. ac. uk] 
> Sent: 29 August 2006 14: 12 
> To: Reception Victim Support 
> Subject: Study of Identity Theft 
> Hello 
> My name is Tim Holmes I am a PhD student at the University of Wales 
> Bangor, I am conducting a study in to identity fraud. As part of my 
> research I am trying to find out about victims of fraud, Can you help my 
> study? 
>I am trying to find out about what support and advice is offered to 
> people who are victims of fraud and identity theft. Are there any 
> statistics on the number of people who approach your organisation asking 
> for help with regards to identity theft? 
> Any help you could provide would be greatly appreciated. 
> Regards 
> Tim Holmes 
> T. Holmes soVO II 6-Dbangonac- A 
----- Original Message ..... 
, M-IL90- From: "enquiries" <ep_quiries@ 
i5. o3vLu-k> 
To: <sopoll@ban or. ac. uk> , =-Z(- Sent: Friday, March 30,2007 4: 36 PM 
Subject: RE: English, Contact us 
> Dear Mr Holmes, 
> Thank you for your enquiry. Many of the targets of Service 
> investigations have multiple identities, and any system that makes it 
> more difficult for our targets to use and maintain multiple identities 
> would be welcomed. 
> The Home Office is the government department which is taking the lead on 
> ID cards and you may wish to contact them directly at 
> www. homeoffice. vov. uk/contact-us. Further information is available at 
> www. homeoffice. pov. uk/t)assports-and-immijý, -ration/id-cards/? vie-vv--Standard > and www. identitycards. vov. uk/index. asp. 
> Good luck with your researches. 
> Yours, 
> Enquiries Team 
> The Security Service 
> This email has been generated from an administration account. Any 
> replies will not be read. If you would like to send another message to 
> the Security Service, please use the form on the website: 
> www. mi5. gov. uk. 
> Name 
> Timothy Holmes 
> Email 
> sovO II A-banszonac. uk 
> Message 
> Hello 
> My name is Timothy Holmes I am a criminologist from the University of 
> Wales Bangor. I am conducting research in to identity cards and their 
> possible impact on crimes sicu, as identity fraud and terrorism. 
> As part of my study I interested in the views of M15 as to what 
> impact/effect identit cards will have in terms of detection and 
> prevention of terrorism. 
> Any help you could give my study would be greatly appreciated, 
> Regards 
> Timothy Holmes 
